Science journalists’ perceptions and attitudes to pseudoscience in Spain

Abstract

Using interviews and questionnaires, we explored the perceptions and attitudes of 49 Spanish science journalists regarding pseudoscience. Pseudoscience, understood as false knowledge that endeavours to pass as science, is a controversial and complex matter that potentially poses a risk to society. Given that concern over this issue has grown in recent years in Spain, our aim was to evaluate how pseudoscience operates in journalistic practice in Spanish media. Our data reveal not only a lack of editorial policies in regard to pseudoscience, but also the existence of a significant number of science journalists who make light of the potential threat implied by the pseudosciences in the media. Some journalists point to the lack of scientific training of editors and media managers as one of the reasons for the proliferation of the pseudosciences.

Keywords

journalism journalist perceptions popularization of science pseudoscience science journalism

1. Introduction and Spain’s social and historical context

Science has acquired enormous importance and utility in all areas of human life, especially since the second half of the twentieth century, when education and dissemination of the sciences reached record levels. Given that an informed and educated population is a fundamental requirement of a properly democratic society, the European Union and its member states consider the popularization of science to be a priority. However, science today coexists with its opposite number, pseudoscience, understood as false knowledge that endeavours to pass as science. Just as science enters its golden age, pseudoscience simultaneously puts down its own roots; it reinvents itself constantly as it becomes embedded in the social body.

Important contextual factors in Spain explain the interest in this field of study. First, Spain is a peripheral country with a limited basic research tradition, largely the consequence of four decades of isolation during Franco’s dictatorship (1939–1975). Also, valid even today is a famous comment decrying the insignificant investment in science and innovation in Spain, by the writer and intellectual Miguel de Unamuno (1864–1936): ‘Let others do the inventing!’ It reflects how science has traditionally been sidelined in Spain; those ‘others’ are Europe’s more advanced economies (United Kingdom, France and Germany); Spain, in contrast, is a mere copier of ideas coming from north of the Pyrenees. Second, the Catholic Church, with its influence on thinking and education, has historically been very important in Spain. The obscurantism fostered by ecclesiastical tradition began to loosen its hold in the 1980s, when the socialist government of the day launched a process of modernization including the secularization of society. Nonetheless, a non-scientific church continues to try and impose its beliefs on Spanish society (Domínguez and Mateu, 2013). Third, the economic crisis unfolding since 2008, which has particularly affected southern Europe, has led to cutbacks in funding for science, research and development; this has resulted in a significant brain drain of Spanish talent to other countries. Fourth, the same crisis has also had a major impact on the profession of journalism, resulting in layoffs and smaller staffs, with implications for the quality of information. Fifth, and particularly relevant, is the lack of supervision and regulation of audiovisual content in radio and television in Spain; Spain is, in fact, the only major European country lacking a state-wide audiovisual council like the Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisual (CSA) in France or the Office of Communications (OfCom) in the United Kingdom. The self-regulating Spanish media ecosystem has allowed tarot, astrology and clairvoyance programmes to proliferate in the media, most especially in private television and radio channels. Finally, in intellectual circles in Spain, there is growing concern regarding how pseudoscientific ideas are tending to displace the recognized sciences. Figure 1 depicts how therapies not recognized by the scientific community established a presence in the Spanish press in the period 2000–2008. In 2000, only 20 texts in the main Spanish newspapers were about pseudoscientific topics, but by 2008, this number grew over sixfold to over 132, although with a downward trend in the period 2003–2005.

Figure 1.

News items covering pseudoscientific therapies in the main Spanish national newspapers (2000–2008).

In addition, the limited interest of the Spanish public in scientific news—which means that scientists are not motivated by educational activities but prefer to devote their efforts to other tasks – perpetuates a vicious circle regarding the popularization of science (Torres-Albero et al., 2011).

Our research covered manifestations of pseudoscience as follows: (1) mental constructs (theories) presented as alternative explanations to the hegemonic discourse corresponding to scientific disciplines, (2) practices that deploy such theories, (3) products necessary to implement such practices, and (4) a vast range of interpretations and statements, more or less elaborate, regarding reality in general.

Pseudoscience is a problem in several different ways: (1) it misrepresents science by posing as science, (2) it dumbs down knowledge and miseducates society, (3) it often deliberately profits from fraudulent claims, (4) it plays on people’s naivety, ignorance and hopes, and (5) it often leads patients, seduced by its promises, to abandon conventional health treatments.

The aim of our research was to collect and explore the opinions and experiences of Spanish science journalists regarding the pseudosciences. Science journalists are partly responsible for informing, educating and raising awareness of science in society, so they also have a role to play in tackling pseudoscientific practices. From the perspective of communication theories corresponding to the paradigm of a return to ‘the concept of powerful mass media’ (Noelle-Neumann, 1973), the media are viewed as entities that structure reality, with individuals negotiating the assimilation and decoding of content, bearing in mind pre-established cognitive schemata, their own psychological traits and also the cultural context, which is, in turn, itself shaped by the media among other factors (Ericson et al., 1989). The media, as creators of a pseudo-environment that ultimately acquires legitimacy and narrates a particular discourse, wield great power in terms of the content they disseminate. According to Ericson et al. (1989), the mere presence of pseudoscience in the media normalizes and authorizes it in society, given that the media represent authority. Lack of control over pseudoscience in the media, therefore, is a serious problem, as it means that the media collaborate in normalizing pseudoscience.

2. Literature review

Due to the heterogeneous and controversial nature of pseudoscience, its study has been approached from different academic angles. The first, classical, approach refers to philosophical and epistemological research into pseudoscience and its features and also into the demarcations of science (e.g. Bunge, 1972; Chalmers, 1999; Kuhn, 1996; Lakatos, 1978; Popper, 2011; Russell, 2009; Ziman, 2000). Demarcation represents an attempt to establish a set of characteristics for science that cannot be extrapolated to pseudoscience, and relies on the acceptance of basic assumptions regarding science, such as its objectivity, the existence of a method, and of an external reality that can be explored by humans. The main features of science – normatively accepted by some schools of thought but called into question by idealists and constructivists – are that it is reproducible, experimental, cumulative, progressive, objective, factual and predictable. Opponents of pseudoscience therefore focus their objections on its failure to conform to these seven characteristics.

Other theorists, however, deny the existence of consensus regarding the apparent virtues of science and the scientific method. Some rely on assumptions deriving from the methodological anarchism described by Feyerabend (1975) or from postmodern epistemic relativism as understood by Sokal and Bricmont (1998). Postmodern (Lyotard, 1984), poststructuralist, cultural studies and cultural anthropology schools argue that science is yet another social construct, inserted within and explained by a given culture. For Feyerabend (1975), science is just another emancipatory meta-narrative – perhaps the sole survivor of postmodernist critique – or an ideology that shrinks reality by excluding all that is not contemplated as belonging to it.

Nonetheless, although the objectivity of scientific discourse may be questioned by some, more advanced societies have come to a consensus regarding the requirements of science. This consensus, while imperfect, is essentially of great functional and operational value.

Pseudoscience is defined generically as ‘that which purports to be science’; however, confusion regarding its definition is mainly due to the fact that pseudoscience functions more like a label than a concept. Pseudoscience as a label encompasses many very different manifestations, such as the degree of professionalization, the quality and quantity of system tools used, and the level of social insertion achieved. As Doering-Manteuffel (2011) notes, in our era, the evolution of pseudoscience is evident, given its survival in societies governed by reason and technology. Knowledge society advances have not reduced faith in mysticism, magic or superstitious beliefs; rather, pseudoscience uses these developments to thrive and become more sophisticated (Doering-Manteuffel, 2011).

Critics of pseudoscience point out that it is based on factual statements that are epistemologically unwarranted (Fuller, 1985: 331) and not defined by the object of study in itself but by the results (Lilienfeld et al., 2003). For Sagan (2000), the power of pseudoscience is that it ‘speaks to powerful emotional needs that science often leaves unfulfilled’ and that it ‘offers satisfaction of spiritual hungers, cures for diseases, promises that death is not the end’ (pp. 24–25). According to Hansson (2009: 240), a statement is pseudoscientific if (1) it pertains to an issue within the domains of science; (2) it is not epistemologically warranted and (3) its major proponents try to create the impression that it is scientific. For Sokal (2006: 289), the main trait of pseudoscience is that it makes statements and establishes causal relationships considered implausible by mainstream science. Kurtz (1978/1981) prefers to define pseudoscience in the following terms: (1) it does not use rigorous experimental methods in research, (2) it lacks a testable conceptual framework, and (3) it claims positive results, although the evidence is highly questionable and generalizations have not been corroborated by impartial researchers.

A second approach to the study of pseudoscience is, given its irrational component, from a psychology or cultural sociology perspective. This is the starting point for the US school of sceptics (Dawkins, 1998; Gardner, 1981; Randi, 1982; Shermer, 1997) for whom pseudoscience offers emotional comfort when society fails to guarantee certainty or provide solutions. The human need for trust in an external figure who knows what to do and how is inherent in the individual, especially in uncertain times of liquid modernity (Bauman, 2005) or a risk society (Beck, 1992), when there is a constant feeling of omnicrisis (Hardt and Negri, 2000) or pervasive fear (Altheide, 2002). This lack of certainty can be seen as a need of emotional pillars, that, paradoxically, causes more doubts and alternative and uncertain discourses. Franks et al. (2013) have studied conspiracy theories in terms of a pattern shared by religions, whereby believers do not quite understand the details of the discourse but draw on generic frames and cultural constructions.

In a third approach to pseudoscience, several studies have underlined the importance of science journalism and popular science in combatting pseudoscience. The role played by science journalists has been documented for human immunodeficiency virus coverage (Makgoba, 2002), research into the relationship between pseudoscience and the advertising media (Dodds et al., 2008), studies of the financial pressures to disseminate pseudoscience (Stocking and Holstein, 2009), research into the importance of encouraging scientists to abandon their prejudices against popularizing science (Rensberger, 2000) and an exploration of how alternative therapies, despite the lack of scientific evidence in their favour, have managed to construct a professional image (Pedersen and Baarts, 2010).

Although science journalism has been studied on numerous occasions, no study has specifically referred to pseudoscience. Professional science journalism routines in the United Kingdom have been addressed by Williams and Clifford (2009), who applied ethnographic techniques to data from a sample of 47 journalists. Their main findings were as follows: (1) the relationship between sources and journalists is asymmetric, as scientists overly influence the decisions of journalists who depend on them; (2) science journalists nowadays have a good relationship with editors since it is no longer a battle to get science topics published; and (3) science journalist workloads have increased considerably as newsrooms have merged. In their meta-analysis of 21 studies regarding science journalists’ views of the main aspects of their profession, Amend and Secko (2012) discussed the tendency to base research on repeated detection of the same problems (inaccuracy, sensationalism, oversimplification and failing to engage audiences in meaningful debate about scientific issues).

Other research – including the study by Brumfiel (2009) and the more recent study by Bauer et al. (2013), based on a sample of nearly a thousand science journalists worldwide – has focused on how science journalists view the decline in traditional journalism and the emergence of alternative models. In his classic study, Hansen (1994) highlighted the growing trend towards specialization by science journalists, concluding, however, that these were categorized first as journalists, and only second as specialists. Hansen (1994) shows how specialist journalists select which information to cover, following conventional news value criteria focusing on what is novel, controversial, exciting or locally relevant or has images or a human side.

Finally, as is evident from the preceding paragraphs, while pseudoscience has traditionally been tackled by the social sciences with descriptive and normative intentions, the hard sciences have reacted in an analytical way to the phenomenon. The medical and health-care sector, warning of the risks, has invested efforts in research aimed at demonstrating that claims regarding certain pseudoscientific practices are scientifically unfounded. These studies – mentioned in passing as not being of direct relevance here – include fertility treatments (Renckens, 2002), homeopathy (Shang et al., 2005), acupuncture (Patel, 1987) and alternative psychotherapies (David and Montgomery, 2011; Lilienfeld, 2011).

3. Methodology

To analyse pseudoscience in the media and in scientific communication, we gathered firsthand information from a group of professionals located at the core of the debate: science journalists. As discussed above, the power of the media to structure reality makes science journalist prominent actors central to the process; their views are crucial to better understanding the communication of pseudoscientific information in Spain. A standard definition of pseudoscience was provided to the journalists to ensure all participants were evaluating the same phenomena: pseudoscience was operationally defined as a term that refers to ‘false science’, that is, topics that wear the mantle of science without being a scientific discipline. The term ‘false’ is used to indicate an intention to deceive. Examples were given, like healers, homeopathy, miracle diets, astrology, the occult, fortune-tellers or tarot.

Research questions

The research questions posed were as follows:

RQ1. What are Spanish science journalists’ perceptions of the pseudosciences, especially of their presence in the media?

RQ2. How do individual factors (years of experience and formal training) influence science journalists’ perceptions of the pseudosciences?

RQ3. How do professional factors (editorial decisions, media policies and media types) affect the presence of pseudoscientific information in the media?

Data and methods

Data for this research were collected from 49 science journalists active in Spain, via 49 in-depth interviews, 49 questionnaires and 2 focus group discussions. Journalists in the sample were full-time or part-time employees or active freelancers. The number of questionnaires reflected the research project budget.

The journalist population was established as 150 on the basis of interviewee responses to the question ‘How many science journalists are there in the communications medium in which you work, including yourself?’

Sample elements were selected according to stratified random sampling, depending on the medium in which journalists worked and applying proportional allocation. Journalists working in press offices were excluded.

Likewise, five researchers based in Spanish cities (mainly Madrid and Barcelona) conducted in-depth personal interviews lasting approximately 60 minutes. Male interviewees predominated (65%); average experience was 12.25 years. After each interview, interviewees completed a questionnaire to supplement the in-depth interview responses. Most questions were answered using a five-point Likert scale. Two 90-minute (approximately) focus group sessions were conducted in Barcelona, in each of which 12–15 science journalists and other experts participated. Fieldwork was carried out between May and September 2012, and respondents were guaranteed anonymity and the confidentiality of the information they provided.¹ In a small number of cases, journalists from specific newspapers refused to participate as respondents, although this did not significantly affect the representativeness of the study.

Statistical analysis was based on calculation of sample proportions inferred for the population assuming a confidence level of 90% (α = .1). On this basis, we calculated the population proportions and the inference error. Finally, in order to obtain relevant and statistically significant conclusions, we constructed contingency tables corresponding to all possible combinations of variables and including the questions as well as personal and professional journalist characteristics as auxiliary variables. Using these data, hypotheses were tested using χ² and the Fisher exact test – for cases with values below 5 in the contingency tables – in order to check for possible dependencies between variables.

4. Results

There was no general consensus among the sampled Spanish science journalists in their perceptions regarding the pseudosciences in either of the two main themes of this research: (1) whether the pseudosciences are perceived as a possible threat to society and (2) whether pseudoscientific practices are receiving greater or lesser coverage in the media. Although the journalists considered that the pseudosciences could represent a problem in the future, a significant proportion of the sample perceived no immediate threat.

Sensitization and awareness

Results from Q1 (Table 1) reflect the science journalists’ perceptions of the pseudosciences, with the word ‘danger’ deliberately used to ensure an unambiguous stance. The table shows how 44.9% (45.1% ± 11%)² of the respondents strongly agreed or agreed regarding the threat posed by pseudoscientific information in the media.

Table 1.

Results in % for the questions asked to the Spanish science journalists.

Q1. I see danger in the presence of pseudoscientific information in the media (n = 49)
Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	NK/NA
16.3%	28.6%	14.3%	24.5%	10.2%	6.1%
Q2. Do you think that the presence of pseudoscience in the Spanish media is increasing, decreasing or remaining at about the same level? (n = 49)
Increase		Decrease	Same	NK/NA
31%		12%	33%	24%
Q3. What editorial policies regarding the pseudosciences are there in your medium? (n = 49)
None		General self-regulation	Criticism/denouncement	Minimally acceptable
47%		12%	39%	2%
Q4. I think my editors are not aware of the potential hazards of pseudoscience (n = 47)
Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	NK/NA
14.9%	36.2%	10.6%	12.8%	17.0%	8.5%

NK: not known; NA: not answered.

The sensitized science journalists were not only in favour of the provision of information to combat proliferation of the pseudosciences, but also demanded more proactive attitudes from the media, with some going further and calling for action from universities, primary and secondary education sectors, and even the government (legislation). This group, strongly in favour of zero tolerance and a clampdown, considered pseudoscience to be a deceptive and fraudulent business practice. As far as this group was concerned, the pseudosciences pose a range of social and cultural threats. According to SJ14, pseudoscience is ‘one of the scourges of modern society’ and was nothing less than a scam; according to SJ35, ‘you are free to believe what you want, but pseudoscience passed off as science, that’s fraud’. Most respondents qualified pseudoscience as a ‘hoax’ and a ‘scam’, as ‘fraud’ and ‘abuse’, and distinguished, moreover, between intellectual fraud and financial fraud. SJ5 pointed out that pseudosciences ‘are used to take advantage of people, to obtain money and to deceive them, especially regarding health, as they exploit the vulnerability and desperation of sick people’. In the same vein, the issue of the impunity of pseudoscientific practices was raised:

[Pseudoscience is] fraudulent, an attempt to deceive, an attempt to obtain financial gain, notoriety, ideological benefit … it amazes me that it is not pursued with greater rigour. I’m surprised at how easy it is for these people to practice their fraudulent activities without any repercussions. (SJ12)

The fact that eradication is not easy once a sector is well established is reflected in SJ47’s comments: ‘pseudoscience is tolerated by the system, go into any pharmacy in Spain and see what there is there of magic: homeopathy, Bach flowers, etc. Many people earn a living from this’.

One of the greatest concerns of the science journalists was the risk posed for society by the mixing of pseudoscience and medical information. As SJ44 pointed out, the invasion of the health-care sector is notable: ‘a patient might stop a treatment for cancer or AIDS, drawn by false promises of a cure’. This issue is especially crucial for serious illnesses that require regular administration of specific treatments that may not produce instant or obvious results. Journalists warn that claims of pseudoscience may lead despairing sick people to switch to more spectacular treatments that apparently promise a certain cure. Replacing standard treatments with such ‘alternative’ treatments can lead to seriously deteriorated health. Many science journalists are keenly aware of their responsibilities in this regard; according to SJ40, ‘the media must do everything possible to inform people of what they [pseudosciences] really consist of and to warn of the dangers, all the while avoiding sensationalism in dealing with these matters’. In other words, journalists need to be aware of the great social responsibility they have as informants and to adopt a proactive stance.

Most of the interviewed science journalists who perceived the pseudosciences as a sociocultural threat advocated the provision of critical information. SJ11 and SJ26 vociferously ‘denounced’ the pseudosciences and called for a redoubling of communicative efforts. SJ2 and SJ4 (respectively) indicated as follows: ‘We must publish reports that criticize them’ and ‘we have to describe them to be able to compare and contrast them’ with science.

Making light of the risks of pseudoscience

The non-sensitized group consisted of science journalists who did not consider the pseudosciences to represent a threat. This group included journalists who made light of and/or tolerated the pseudosciences for reasons such as (1) a lack of interest; (2) relativization of the impact on society; (3) trust in an educated and discerning public; and, more rarely; and (4) conceptual gaps in the journalist himself or herself regarding the concept of pseudoscience.

A lack of interest is evident when a science journalist personally feels no concern regarding the threat: the pseudosciences ‘stand and fall on their own merits’ (SJ3) or are not taken into consideration from either a ‘professional or personal perspective’ (SJ8). Journalists who deny the threat make light of the potential impact of pseudoscience or simply prefer to look the other way. ‘Pseudoscience is entertainment’, according to SJ29, who continues, ‘I do not see it in print or on the news or on the radio’. The science journalists who fail to see a threat in pseudoscience are even of the opinion that ‘science journalism devotes too much space to combatting it’ (SJ48) or that ‘it is being awarded too much importance … since so much about pseudoscience has a rebound effect, it would be best ignored’ (SJ19). Other interviewees suggested that we should tolerate practices that are a matter of personal choices or beliefs: ‘I don’t lose much sleep over the pseudosciences; people need beliefs, like religion’ (SJ9), or, ‘it is not worth worrying much about it. Most people read horoscopes but do not believe them. I don’t think it’s a major problem’ (SJ43).

Finally, analysis of the responses for a small minority of cases (5 of 49) pointed to possible conceptual gaps regarding what is meant by pseudoscience. Evidently, the existence of doubts about the concept hinders detection of the problem and enhances the probability of pseudoscience propagation in the media. Given general confusion reigning regarding the pseudosciences, it is logical to find some hesitation about what constitutes a pseudoscience. Nonetheless, we refer to conceptual errors of a fundamental nature. Homeopathy, for instance, was defended by many journalists as a grounded theory in traditional medicine terms (e.g. SJ17 and SJ25). Doubts existed within the group, as admitted by SJ28, who said that he believes that ‘the soul is more than a mere electrical impulse and I cannot quite decide how we should take healing energies’. While the science journalists were unanimous in agreeing that tarot, witchcraft and horoscopes are fraudulent, some resisted describing homeopathy as pseudoscience. ‘You cannot put them all in the same boat’, declared SJ22, while SJ37 insisted that ‘one thing is alternative medicine, such as acupuncture or homeopathy, another matter is the witch who is deceiving people’.

Pseudoscience presence in the media: Increasing or decreasing?

Pseudoscience’s presence in the media has fluctuated in recent years but now seems to have an established place (see Figure 1 for data on the mainstream press). Results from Q2 (Table 1), however, show how science journalists perceive the situation differently, with a mere 12% (12.3% ± 7.6%) believing that the presence was decreasing, compared to 31% (30.8% ± 10.6%) and 33% (32.6% ± 11.3%) stating that it was increasing or remaining at around the same level, respectively.

Science journalists who believed that pseudosciences were maintaining their presence in the media insisted that there always has been and always will be pseudoscience. As SJ4 pointed out, ‘when it’s not UFOs, it’s power balance bracelets’, and this, according to SJ36, was simply a question of how the pseudosciences come to be ‘updated’. SJ7 pointed to the economics of pseudoscience as a possible reason for its stability over time, since ‘it has its fixed market’. This perspective can be viewed as resignation regarding the difficulty of eradicating pseudoscience from the media:

A few years ago I was more belligerent but now I accept that humans have an irrational side and that the pseudosciences are not going to be eradicated, not even through science education. We can belittle them, push them to the background, but it will be difficult to eradicate them […] they will always be there, adopting new forms. As someone said, we no longer believe in healers, but in alternative therapies, like homeopathy. (SJ15)

The science journalists who believed that pseudosciences were increasing their presence in the media attributed this mainly to the larger number of platforms available. The pseudosciences were increasing their presence – but in the Internet and the new media, not in specialist media or specialist sections of the mainstream media. Most respondents pointed to the Internet as a place where, to quote SJ16, ‘pseudoscience is rampant’. Others pointed to its growth in the generalist media, but always outside the science sections, where there was less screening and criteria were more flexible (SJ7 and SJ9).

Several science journalists complained that since their battle against the pseudosciences failed to be taken up beyond the fringes of their own section (whether scientific or other), they were left powerless in the face of its proliferation in their own medium. In such cases, pseudoscientific content is typically placed in entertainment sections, culture supplements, magazine-type columns, back covers, interviews in any section, advertising or specifically created audiovisual pseudoscience programmes. Thus, even though the content is not scientific or part of the science section, it does manage to distort the final product: ‘The station’s programming schedule includes pseudoscience. I detest the fact that this time is not spent on other more serious issues or on science’ (SJ49). This professional frustration is metaphorically exemplified by SJ38: ‘Science journalism is like a beautiful vase that everyone wants in their “home,” in their medium, but that nobody wants to invest in. It’s decorative, but not something that anyone truly believes in’.

Professional and personal factors affecting perceptions

We examined five professional and personal factors that affected science journalists’ perceptions. Professional factors were editorial policies regarding the pseudosciences in the medium in which the journalist works, the responsibility of editors and media managers regarding the pseudosciences and the working environment of the journalists; the personal factors were work experience (years in the profession) and formal training.

Professional factors

Editorial policies

Our main finding was that there were no specific editorial policies regarding the pseudosciences in many media. Half of the journalists, 47% (46.7% ± 11.1%), confirmed that there was no editorial policy in their work environment (Table 1 – Q3). Some media were blatantly contradictory; as noted, filters tend to be relaxed outside science columns and this led to a dilution of responsibilities corresponding to a collective work. More aware journalists felt a sense of impotency: even were they to redouble their efforts to combat the presence of pseudoscience in their medium, they would be unable to account for all its sections:

In general the media do not have a clear policy. There are many media with science journalists, who do good science columns, but these same media continue to publish horoscopes or interviews with people who believe in UFOs. This would indicate that the media have no general vision of the sciences: they support the sciences but then allow other sections to transmit a completely contradictory message. (SJ14)

Only 39% (38.9% ± 10.8%) of journalists said they worked according to an editorial policy that rejected the pseudosciences. This policy generally consisted of an unwritten set of guidelines applied by the journalists themselves independently of the medium in which they worked. Except in the Público newspaper (now defunct) and Materia science news website (http://esmateria.com/), in which criticism and denunciation of pseudoscientific writing are editorial policy, other media have, at best, guidelines that are self-imposed by science journalists. Respondents agree that criteria tended to be rather ‘flexible’ or ‘informal’ and depended on each journalist.

For 12% (12.2% ± 7.8%) of the respondents, existing editorial policies were limited to general self-regulation (codes of ethics, style guides, etc.). SJ12 explained that ‘there is an ethical code and this includes pseudoscience and everything else. It demands rigour and accuracy’. SJ24 added that ‘there are some general rules regarding checking sources and credibility. It [pseudoscience] falls under not publishing false news’. Just one of the 49 informants stated that the policy for his or her medium was to allow some pseudoscience.

The role of editors and media managers

Just over half, 51% (51.1% ± 12.6%), of the science journalists reported that their editors were not especially aware of the pseudosciences (Table 1 – Q4), and this insensitivity was the result of their poor knowledge of the sciences and the scientific method. According to several journalists, editors with no criteria regarding science could not possibly have them (criteria) regarding pseudoscience. Or as SJ30 commented, ‘unfortunately, the powers-that-be in the newspapers do not have much by way of scientific criteria’. By contrast, nearly 30% (30% ± 11.3%) of respondents reported that their editors were aware of the risks of the pseudosciences.

Criticism of editors was higher among radio and television journalists, possibly due to the higher entertainment content of these media compared to the press or news agencies. The inaction of editors is significant, because it means that another potential filter on the publication of pseudoscientific content in the media is reduced or even removed entirely.

Working environment

P-values for the χ² test referring to the working environment (Table 2) were as follows: Q1 (χ² = 19.48, p = .0776, Cramer’s V = .364), Q2 (χ² = 11.65, p = .4742, Cramer’s V = .2815), Q3 (χ² = 11.91, p = .4529, Cramer’s V = .2846) and Q4 (χ² = 14.12, p = .2931, Cramer’s V = .3099). Hence, the hypothesis of independence could be rejected for Q1 given that p < α = .1: media type made a difference. Journalists working in the press were most aware of pseudoscience; those working for news agencies were most likely to make light of the phenomenon. Audiovisual and digital media journalists, meanwhile, fell in the intermediate region of the spectrum of contingencies. In the case of journalists working in the press, 10 of 17 were of the opinion that the pseudosciences posed a threat; 5 of 17 believed the opposite. In contrast, most of the news agency journalists (4 of 6) saw no threat in the rise of pseudoscientific information provision. Response patterns were similar for audiovisual and digital media journalists, with corresponding ratios of 8 of 16 and 6 of 16 for the former and of 4 of 8 and 2 of 8 for the latter.

Table 2.

χ² test with p-values and Cramer’s V figures to find possible dependencies among answers for each question and for personal and professional factors.

	Years of experience (N = 49, df = 3)	Training (N = 49, df = 6)	Working environment (N = 49, df = 12)
Q1. I see danger in the presence of pseudoscientific information in the media	χ² = 6.24 (p = .100), Cramer’s V = .3569	χ² = 10.22(p = .333), Cramer’s V = .2637	χ² = 19.48(p = .0776), Cramer’s V = .364
Q2. Do you think that the presence of pseudoscience in the Spanish media is increasing, decreasing or remaining at about the same level?	χ² = 6.74 (p = .0807), Cramer’s V = .3709	χ² = 8.44 (p = .4905), Cramer’s V = .2396	χ² = 11.65 (p = .4742), Cramer’s V = .2815
Q3. What editorial policies regarding the pseudoscience are there in your medium?	χ² = 3.71(p = .2945), Cramer’s V = .2752	χ² = 8.71 (p = .4645), Cramer’s V = .2434	χ² = 11.91 (p = .4529), Cramer’s V = .2846
Q4. I think my editors are not aware of the potential hazards of pseudoscience	χ² = 1.74 (p = .7126), Cramer’s V = .1672	χ² = 12.57 (p = .183), Cramer’s V = .2924	χ² = 14.12 (p = .2931), Cramer’s V = .3099

Personal factors

Years’ experience

As P-values for the χ² test referring to years’ experience show (Table 2), the hypothesis of independence can be rejected for Q1 and Q2 given that p < α = .1. The data reveal that more experienced science journalists were more concerned by the hypothetical risk posed by pseudoscience in the media. Furthermore, 13 of 21 journalists with under 10 years’ experience did not perceive the pseudosciences to be a threat, whereas 9 journalists disagreed with this statement. On analysing the contingencies for journalists with over 10 years’ experience, 13 of 21 journalists perceived the pseudosciences to be a threat, whereas only 4 disagreed with this statement. The data seem to indicate that more experienced journalists were more concerned by the pseudosciences. Note that the study did not compare what each interviewee might consider to be ‘preventive mechanisms’, namely, that older, more experienced journalists may have a much more developed concept of prevention than younger journalists, who may consider measures to be adequate and so not perceive risk.

Also notable was the fact that contingencies between Q2 and years’ experience point to a much more defined positioning by journalists with over 10 years’ experience in regard to the growing presence of the pseudosciences in the media (9 of 21), compared to the opposite position (1 of 21). This situation is not so clear cut among journalists with under 10 years’ experience: 6 of 28 believe that the presence of pseudoscience is increasing, compared to 5 who believe it is decreasing.

Academic training

P-values (Table 2) for each question do not permit statistically significant conclusions to be drawn (values were over .1). Venturing a hypothesis rather than a conclusion, one might expect journalists who had received some or all of their formal training in the sciences would be more aware of the issue of the pseudosciences. Nonetheless, for our sample of journalists, those with scientific training were not necessarily any more concerned about the pseudosciences than those without a scientific background. For respondents with journalistic training only, similar proportions (9 of 22) agreed and disagreed; for respondents with scientific training only, there was a similar distribution of agreement.

5. Conclusion

Our study reveals that Spanish science journalists perceive pseudoscientific issues in two distinct ways. One group considers that pseudoscience should never be handled by the media because they do not correspond to science journalism. The other group considers that the pseudosciences should be included, but only to alert society to risks, such as their ability to seduce patients away from conventional medical treatments, their play on the emotions and insecurities of people, and the financial fraud implied.

Non-sensitized journalists perceive pseudoscience to have a minor impact and to be harmless entertainment. This reliance on the cognitive capacities of the general public – an old debate in the media – is perhaps overly optimistic; furthermore, it enables the journalist to make light of the problem and evade professional responsibilities. This group makes light of the pseudosciences using various arguments: (1) diversity and tolerance in the media, which should reflect all kinds of information and opinions; (2) people’s intelligence, meaning that people are considered to be capable of thinking for themselves and of distinguishing between science and pseudoscience; (3) the invisibility of the pseudosciences or denial of their presence in the media (thus no reason for concern); and (4) trivialization of the issue, in considering that the pseudosciences are colourful, entertaining and even funny. It is worth mentioning that such a tolerant opinion of pseudoscience does not mean that journalists are necessarily in favour of the pseudosciences or in awarding them media space. Rather, they are explanations or justifications for the phenomenon, whether occurring in isolation or on an ongoing basis.

At the other extreme is a group of highly sensitized science journalists, who see themselves as the final barrier to entry of the pseudosciences to the media. They demand steps be taken at the public level and lament their editors’ timidity and the lack of specific editorial policies. In a way they assume the role of contemporary ‘heroes’, taking a stand in a ‘hostile terrain’ of very difficult working conditions (poor pay, precarious conditions and low status), against ‘giants’ who fail to appreciate their efforts because science is not highly valued in society. However, science journalists do not feel in any way supported in their denouncement of this situation, even by their own publishers; consequently, they feel they have almost no operational or decision-making leeway. As a result, the main focus of action paradoxically corresponds to more powerful sectors outside the group of professional science journalists.

More aware journalists demand action in all areas of society

Respondents who were most aware of the problem pointed to the fact that pseudoscience operates at both cultural and social levels and warned that actions to combat it must be deployed from various sectors: (1) the government, through a firm commitment to the sciences; (2) the school system, where pupils need to be taught to distinguish between science and pseudoscience; (3) the university network, where courses, lectures and seminars covering pseudoscientific issues should be discouraged; (4) authorities that grant certification for pseudosciences; and (5) the legislature, through regulation to curb practices such as sales of particular products. Most importantly, governments should establish policies and consider legislation regarding the effects of pseudoscientific practices, especially in the health-care area, given that – according to a recent Spanish government report³ – natural therapies are not properly regulated in any Western country.

A number of cases in Spain have aroused controversy over public money being used for pseudoscience. For instance, in 2013, reiki therapy was offered by the General Hospital of Ciudad Real (dependent on the Regional Government of Castilla-La Mancha) and, also in Cuidad Real, a Bach flowers workshop was run by the Provincial Council. Another recent controversy, at the prestigious, publicly funded University of Zaragoza, was the creation of the Boiron Homeopathic Chair, used by a private company to publicize homeopathic treatments whose results have not been corroborated by any scientific study.

There is a lack of scientifically trained editors and media managers

Although further research is needed to confirm this, a main reason given for the increase in the presence of pseudoscience in the media is the lack of scientific training among media management. Feelings of frustration and impotence result from seeing how the vigilance of rigorous science journalists regarding pseudoscience is undermined by editors admitting – whether by acts of commission or (mostly) omission – their coverage in other sections of the medium. This finding is consistent with Goldacre’s (2009) statement that ‘people who run the media are humanities graduates with little understanding of science, who wear their ignorance as a badge of honour’ (p. 224).

The data collected for this research reveal how pseudoscience accesses the most rigorous media. Thus, even if the science section is proof against the onslaught of the pseudosciences, filters that should restrict pseudoscience in other sections fail to work or do not exist. Pseudoscientific information thus slips into the media, with science journalists powerless to prevent it. This process is perpetuated and enhanced by the lack of concern of editors and a tendency for the media to increasingly offer entertainment products as elements in the ‘society of the spectacle’ (Debord, 1999) with its hybrid genres.

There is a third-person effect in responses regarding pseudosciences in the media

We detected a pronounced ‘third-person effect’ (Davison, 1983) within our sample of Spanish science journalists: individuals tended to overestimate certain effects in others and underestimate them in themselves. In our case, the effects had an impact on both the professional and personal dimensions.⁴ The journalists perceived pseudoscience to be a potential threat to the work of other journalists but not to their own, and they claimed to report pseudoscience for the sole purpose of combatting and criticizing it. Most respondents denied having ever intentionally given voice to pseudoscientific practices. If that were truly the case, why then is there pseudoscientific content in the media? At a more human level, the science journalists pointed to pseudoscience as a threat to the public and warned of the confusion it could cause – but did not believe this warning to apply to themselves: they drew a distinction between themselves and the general public. This latter bias is more credible than the former, since, a priori, we are referring to media professionals with better training and more experience than the general public.

We have mapped how the complex and confusing issue of pseudoscience in Spain is perceived by science journalists. Following other sociological theorists (Doering-Manteuffel, 2011; Shermer, 1997), it would be interesting to explore the suggestion that pseudoscience in Spain may occupy the void left by religion and superstition and offer emotional refuge from the problems of everyday life, particularly in times of crisis like the present and in a country with endemic deficiencies in basic science education.

Limitations and suggestions for further research

The main limitation of this study was that funding and practical problems prevented the implementation of an ethnographic participant-observation methodology. This resulted in self-reported empirical data supporting the research. It would also have been desirable to have included information from editors in order to paint a fuller picture of the problem.

This research and its results may be considered as a basis for future studies that explore specific issues such as (1) the scientific training and knowledge of science journalists; (2) science journalist motivations for publishing specific issues in the media; and (3) the responsibility that science journalists attribute to themselves as mediators between the scientific community and the public.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The authors thanks Laura Chaparro, Daniela Lazcano, Juanjo Garcia, Pepa Gallego and Marta Martínez for data collection and to the Science Communication Observatory (OCC) at Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona) for their assistance. Special thanks to the participating science journalists who contributed generously with their time to this research. Finally, we thank the anonymous reviewers for their suggestions and contributions, which have undoubtedly improved this article.

Funding

This research was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through an R+D+I project, led by Sergi Cortiñas-Rovira as principal investigator, titled ‘Science Journalism in Spain and the New Information Technologies: Situational Snapshot and Proposals for Action to Improve Communication Processes’ (CSO2011-25969, 2012–2014).

Notes

Author biographies

Sergi Cortiñas-Rovira is a Science Communication Professor at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF), in Barcelona. Currently, he is the head of the Research Group in Science Communication (GRECC) at UPF, and his research interests are Science Communication, Science Journalism and Pseudoscience & Society.

Felipe Alonso-Marcos is an Assistant Professor and a Researcher in the Department of Communication at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF). He holds a MA in Social Communication, a Degree in Philosophy and another one in Journalism. His main research areas, as a member of the Research Group in Science Communication (GRECC), are pseudoscience, scientific journalism, theories of communication and spiral of silence theory.

Carles Pont-Sorribes is a Professor at the Communication Department of the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona (UPF). As a researcher, he is specialized in risk and crisis communication and analyses issues related to political communication and public opinion, as well as local and historical journalism.

Eudald Escribà-Sales is a PhD candidate at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF). He holds a MA in Information Society and Knowledge and a Degree in Physics. Currently he is part of the Research Group in Science Communication (GRECC) at UPF and has been Associate Professor of Physics at Barcelona Tech University (UPC) from 2007 to 2012.

References

Altheide

DLs

(2002) Creating Fear. News and the Construction of Crisis. New York, NY: Aldine de Gruyter Inc.

Amend

Secko

(2012) In the face of critique: A metasynthesis of the experiences of journalists covering health and science. Science Communication 34(2): 241–282.

Bauer

Howard

Romo Ramos

Massarani

Amorim

(2013) Global Science Journalism Report. Working Conditions & Practices, Professional Ethos and Future Expectations. London: Science and Development Network.

Bauman

(2005) Liquid Life. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Beck

(1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. New Delhi, India: SAGE.

Brumfiel

(2009) Science journalism: Supplanting the old media? Nature 458(7236): 274–277.

Bunge

(1972) La ciencia, su método y su filosofía. Buenos Aires: Siglo XX.

Chalmers

(1999) What Is This Thing Called Science?, University of Queensland Press, Open University press, 3rd revised edition, Hackett.

David

Montgomery

(2011) The scientific status of psychotherapies: A new evaluative framework for evidence-based psychosocial interventions. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice 18(2): 89–99.

10.

Davison

(1983) The third-person effect in communication. Public Opinion Quarterly 47(1): 1–15.

11.

Dawkins

(1998) Unweaving the Rainbow. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.

12.

Debord

(1999) The Society of the Spectacle. New York, NY: Zone Books.

13.

Dodds

Tseelön

Weitkamp

(2008) Making sense of scientific claims in advertising. A study of scientifically aware consumers. Public Understanding of Science 17(2): 211–230.

14.

Doering-Manteuffel

(2011) Survival of occult practices and ideas in modern common sense. Public Understanding of Science 20(3): 292–302.

15.

Domínguez

Mateu

(2013) Spanish Darwinian iconography: Darwin and evolutionism portrayed in Spanish press cartoons. Public Understanding of Science 22(8): 999–1010.

16.

Ericson

Baranek

Chan

(1989) Negotiating Control. A Study of News Sources. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

17.

Feyerabend

(1975) How to defend society against science. Radical Philosophy 11(3): 3–8.

18.

Franks

Bangerter

Bauer

(2013) Conspiracy theories as quasi-religious mentality: An integrated account from cognitive science, social representations theory, and frame theory. Frontiers in Psychology 4: 424.

19.

Fuller

(1985) The demarcation of science: A problem whose demise has been greatly exaggerated. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66: 329–341.

20.

Gardner

(1981) Science: Good, Bad, and Bogus. New York, NY: Prometheus Books.

21.

Goldacre

(2009) Bad Science. London: Harper Perennial.

22.

Hansen

(1994) Journalistic practices and science reporting in the British press. Public Understanding of Science 3(2): 111–134.

23.

Hansson

(2009) Cutting the Gordian knot of demarcation. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23(3): 237–243.

24.

Hardt

Negri

(2000) Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

25.

Kuhn

(1996) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

26.

Kurtz

(1978/1981) Is parapsychology a science? The Skeptical Inquirer 2(3): 14–23.

27.

Lakatos

(1978) The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Philosophical Papers Volume 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

28.

Lilienfeld

(2011) Distinguishing scientific from pseudoscientific psychotherapies: Evaluating the role of theoretical plausibility, with a little help from Reverend Bayes. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice 18(2): 105–112.

29.

Lilienfeld

Lynn

Lohr

(2003) Science and pseudoscience in clinical psychology: Initial thoughts, reflections, and considerations. In: Lilienfeld

Lynn

Lohr

(eds) Science and Pseudoscience in Clinical Psychology. New York, NY: Guilford, pp. 1–14.

30.

Lyotard

(1984) The Postmodern Condition. Manchester: University Press.

31.

Makgoba

(2002) Politics, the media and science in HIV/AIDS: The peril of pseudoscience. Vaccine 20(15): 1899–1904.

32.

Noelle-Neumann

(1973) Return to the concept of powerful mass media. Studies of Broadcasting 9: 67–112.

33.

Patel

(1987) Problems in the evaluation of alternative medicine. Social Science & Medicine 25(6): 669–678.

34.

Pedersen

Baarts

(2010) ‘Fantastic hands’ – But no evidence: The construction of expertise by users of CAM. Social Science & Medicine 71: 1068–1075.

35.

Popper

(2011) Realismo y el objetivo de la ciencia. Post-scriptum a la lógica de la investigación científica, Volumen I. Madrid: Tecnos.

36.

Randi

(1982) Flim-Flam! Psychics, ESP, Unicorns, and Other Delusions. New York, NY: Prometheus Books.

37.

Renckens

(2002) Alternative treatments in reproductive medicine: Much ado about nothing. ‘The fact that millions of people do not master arithmetic does not prove that two times two is anything else than four’: W.F.Hermans. Human Reproduction 17(3): 528–533.

38.

Rensberger

(2000) Why scientists should cooperate with journalists. Science and Engineering Ethics 6(4): 549–552.

39.

Russell

(2009) The Scientific Outlook. London: Routledge.

40.

Sagan

(1995) The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark. New York: Random House.

41.

Shang

Huwiler-Müntener

Nartey

Jüni

Dörig

Sterne

(2005) Are the clinical effects of homeopathy placebo-effects? Comparative study of placebo-controlled trials of homeopathy and allopathy. The Lancet 366(9487): 726–732.

42.

Shermer

(1997) Why People Believe in Weird Things. Pseudoscience, Superstition, and Other Confusions of Our Time. New York, NY: W. H. Freeman and Company.

43.

Sokal

(2006) Pseudoscience and postmodernism: Antagonists or fellow travelers? In: Fagan

(ed.) Archaeological Fantasies: How Pseudoarchaeology Misrepresents the Past and Misleads the Public. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 286–361.

44.

Sokal

Bricmont

(1998) Intellectual Impostures. London: Profile Books.

45.

Stocking

Holstein

(2009) Manufacturing doubt: Journalists’ roles and the construction of ignorance in a scientific controversy. Public Understanding of Science 18(1): 23–42.

46.

Torres-Albero

Fernández-Esquinas

Rey-Rocha

Martín-Sempere

(2011) Dissemination practices in the Spanish research system: Scientists trapped in a golden cage. Public Understanding of Science 20(1): 12–25.

47.

Williams

Clifford

(2009) Mapping the field: Specialist science news journalism in the UK national media. Risk, Science and the Media Research Group, Cardiff University School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies. Available at: http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/jomec/resources/Mapping_Science_Journalism_Final_Report_2003-11-09.pdf (accessed 24 November 2013).

48.

Ziman

(2000) Real Science: What It Is and What It Means. New York: Cambridge University Press.