In science communication,why does the idea of the public deficit always return? Exploring key influences

Abstract

Despite mounting criticism, the deficit model remains an integral part of science communication research and practice. In this article, I advance three key factors that contribute to the idea of the public deficit in science communication, including the purpose of science communication, how communication processes and outcomes are conceptualized, and how science and scientific knowledge are defined. Affording science absolute epistemic privilege, I argue, is the most compelling factor contributing to the continued use of the deficit model. In addition, I contend that the deficit model plays a necessary, though not sufficient, role in science communication research and practice. Areas for future research are discussed.

Keywords

deficit model epistemic privilege public deficit science communication

1. Introduction

Science communication is “a complex and contentious topic that encompasses a spectrum of issues from the factual dissemination of scientific research to new models of public engagement whereby lay persons are encouraged to participate in science debates and policy” (Bubela et al., 2009: 514). Despite the broad spectrum of issues encompassed by science communication, there is one concept that has historically driven a vast majority of science communication: the public deficit, or deficit model. The deficit model has been heavily criticized for being overly simplistic (Hansen et al., 2003; Sturgis and Allum, 2004), largely ineffective (Holland et al., 2007; Nisbet and Mooney, 2007), and unfairly characterizing those opposed to scientific endeavors as necessarily deficient or ignorant (Priest, 2001). Despite these criticisms, it remains widely utilized (Besley and Tanner, 2011; Davies, 2008; Miller, 2010).

In this article, I review the persistence of the public deficit in science communication research and practice. The purpose of this article is not to over-generalize or erroneously simplify science communication scholarship or practitioner activities as these efforts cross geographic (Schiele et al., 2012), disciplinary (Cheng et al., 2008), and cultural (Van Dijck, 2003) boundaries. The purpose of this article, rather, is to illuminate key factors that support the persistence of the public deficit to greater or lesser extents across these heterogeneous domains. To begin, I briefly summarize the concept of a public deficit and the different components of the deficit model. Then, I overview each factor and utilize existing science communication research and practice to elucidate their significance. Finally, I argue for the necessary, though not sufficient, role the public deficit plays in science communication and highlight key opportunities for future research.

2. The public deficit

The deficit model aims to remedy the fractured relationship between science and society. This relational fracture is demonstrated through a broad spectrum of issues including scientific literacy (e.g. National Science Foundation, 2014), public health (e.g. McMurray et al., 2004), declining scientific funding (e.g. Harris and Benincasa, 2014), and public policy (e.g. Mossman et al., 1990). There are three distinct components of the deficit model: that of product, process, and remedy. The first component of the deficit model emphasizes the products of science (i.e. scientific knowledge) and claims that there is a problematic gap between non-specialists and “selected nuggets of high-quality [scientific] knowledge” (Gregory, 2011: 307). Whether it be individuals looking online for health-related information (e.g. Treise et al., 2003) or scientists seeking to provide information to inform public policy (e.g. Khanna, 2001), the goal within this context is to transfer scientific knowledge from one individual or group to another. This component of the deficit model centers on public understanding of scientific facts (i.e. scientific literacy), surrounding topics like evolution (Nisbet and Nisbet, 2005). The second component of the deficit model emphasizes science as a process and claims that public skepticism and negative attitudes toward modern science are due to “a lack of adequate knowledge about science” (Besley and Tanner, 2011: 243; emphasis added). In contrast to product, this component focuses on how to improve attitudes toward science as an activity (Winkleby and Ned, 2010) and legitimate the place of science in the modern world. The third component of the deficit model posits that the remedy for less-than-desirable public understanding of science (both product and process) is improved communication. That is, the deficit model “centers on an explanation of the relationship between science and society as one of communication” (Wright and Nerlich, 2006: 332). While the deficit model has been heavily criticized, it remains an integral component to science communication research and practice.

3. Why we persist

The failure of the deficit model to adequately represent the relationship between science and society (Engdahl and Lidskog, 2014) and to remedy the gaps that exist (Wilkinson, 2010) has been repeatedly demonstrated. In addition, there has been a large push to move beyond the deficit model toward more deliberative, participatory models of science communication (Palmer and Schibeci, 2014), where the public is encouraged to actively participate in scientific processes. Even so, the deficit model remains an integral component of science communication research and practice. In this section, I outline three key factors that foster and reinforce the idea of the public deficit, including the purpose of science communication, the conceptualization of communication processes and outcomes, and how science and scientific knowledge are defined.

Science communication’s purpose

Concern regarding public understanding of science became mainstream in the mid-1980s following the publication of the Bodmer Report (Bennett and Jennings, 2011; Wilkinson, 2010). Since that time, initiatives to increase public understanding of science through the use of science communication have flourished on a global scale (Bucchi, 2008). Science communication practice has had a much longer history compared to its scholarly counterpart (Bucchi, 2008) and includes efforts like science centers and museums, public awareness programs, public policy outreach, and science journalism (Bruyas and Riccio, 2013). The general purpose of science communication practice is to improve the relationship between science and society and promote science within the public sphere through a variety of means, including improving scientific literacy (Utz et al., 2007), connecting science and policy (American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), 2013), cultivating positive perceptions of science (Aurentz et al., 2011), or disseminating scientific information to the public (Colson, 2011).

Similar to science communication practice, science communication research often carries with it an underlying responsibility to promote science within the public sphere or, at the very least, foster a better relationship between science and society. Surely, there is research that seeks only to examine popular perceptions of science (e.g. Ruiz-Mallén and Escalas, 2012) or study how science is portrayed in the public realm (e.g. Alcíbar, 2008). However, a large portion of science communication scholarship carries with it an underlying “responsibility to nurture and optimize the relationship between science and society” (Nan, 2008: vii).

Science communication’s foundation and the very notion of “responsibility” assume that the relationship between science and society is not automatic and must be created, nurtured, and sustained through communication. Importantly, this communicative relationship between science and society is often (although certainly not always) conceived as unidirectional, where science stands to improve society but society does not stand to improve science. While this unidirectional relationship has been challenged within fields like science and technology studies (e.g. Jasanoff and Markle, 2001) and philosophy of science (e.g. Barker and Kitcher, 2013), it still lingers in some facets of science communication research and practice. Part and parcel with this conceptualization of the science–society relationship is a one-way model of communication from scientific sources to lay audiences or public deficit. So long as science communication research and practice is founded upon the desire to resolve a problematic gap through the use of (often) one-directional communication, the public deficit will have an integral role within that process.

Communication

As noted above, the deficit model rests on the assumption that the ideal relationship between science and society is one of communication (Wright and Nerlich, 2006). Given this communicative relationship, it is worthwhile to examine how communication as a process is conceptualized in science communication and explore how that conceptualization might support the concept of a public deficit. The practice of science communication has undergone a similar shift to science communication research: that of “deficit to dialogue” (Trench, 2008). Most notably, it has broadened its efforts to better foster dialogue between scientists and the public (Bruyas and Riccio, 2013) and has moved from focusing on scientific literacy to focusing on the role of science in society (Bauer, 2009). Even so, the deficit model is demonstrably present in current science communication practice (Trench, 2008).

For the bulk of science communication research, scholars have echoed practitioners and utilized a linear, diffusion model of communication (Bucchi, 2008) that typifies communication as information transfer. Diffusion is a fairly common communication model within and outside of science communication scholarship (Sheperd et al., 2006). According to Dearing (2006), a proponent of the diffusion model

To conceptualize communication as diffusion is quite efficient, for doing so is to focus on what really counts: the most important communications; the messages we interpret as both risky and rewarding; and the ideas that have real consequences, good and ill. For diffusion, whether concerned with purposive intent by some to spread an innovation to others, or whether focused on imitative behavior that constitutes a real change by thousands or millions of people, is the study of meaningful and consequential ideas, the ideas that catch on and that wash over whole social systems of people, organizations, communities, and populations … Diffusion is a social process by which innovation is communicated over time among the members of a communication network or within a social sector. An innovation can be an idea, knowledge, a belief or social norm, a product or service, a technology or process, or even a culture, as long as it is perceived to be new. (p. 175)

That is, communication as diffusion defines communication as a process by which new ideas, knowledge, beliefs, social norms, products, services, technological advancements, and culture are communicated across a social group.

Within science communication, the diffusion model conceptualizes communication as a means of disseminating scientific information including ideas, knowledge, technologies, or processes. It is worthy to note that some science communication scholars explicitly employ diffusion theory “which describes how innovations spread through society” (Dumlao and Duke, 2003: 288). Diffusion uses the traditional, linear, one-way model of communication (Shannon and Weaver, 1949), wherein there is a sender, a receiver, and a message, all three of which exist separately from each other and can be broken down into individual units. Communication as diffusion assumes that the ultimate goal of communication is the acquisition and utilization of scientific information by non-scientific audiences. The diffusion framework can be seen in the following excerpts from science communication literature (emphases added):

People today may take advantage of the accessibility of the Internet to acquire information about a much broader range of [health] topics than they previously would have investigated. (Treise et al., 2003: 330)

Within the ecological scientific community, communication frequently has been recognized as a factor that plays an important role in the utilization of research findings. (Castillo, 2000: 49)

A researcher’s job is not over until the research findings have been peer reviewed and published, have been disseminated to all those who can use the information (including laypeople), and (where applicable) have led to the desired policy impact. (Khanna, 2001: 51)

The goal [is] to provide the public with the best information available on teach topic from trusted organizations. (Lacroix, 2001: 285)

The widespread use of communication as diffusion does not mean that all science communication scholarship embraces diffusion, nor does it mean that this diffusionist conceptualization has not been previously challenged. Rather, it suggests that the diffusionist model is still very prevalent in research and practice and, therefore, still stands to influence the prevalence of the public deficit.

There are multiple suppositions embedded within communication as diffusion that relate to both science communication research and practice. First, diffusion understands communication to be a broad process “concerned with the transfer of knowledge from one subject or group of subjects to another” (Bucchi, 2008: 58). That is, the ultimate and solitary goal of communication within a diffusionist framework is the transfer of information from a sender to a receiver, and communication success is “defined as the achieved transfer of information from one party to another” (Bucchi, 2008: 66). Second, the diffusionist model views science communication as a linear, one-way process where the contexts of the communication sender (e.g. a scientist) and receiver (e.g. the public) “can be sharply separated, only the former influencing the latter” (Bucchi, 2008: 58). In other words, this model does not allow for the inclusion of communicator context or the existence of mutual influence between communicators. Third (and relatedly), the diffusionist model takes knowledge to be something that can be transferred “without significant alterations from one context to another, so that it is possible to take an idea or result from the scientific community and bring it to the general public” (Bucchi, 2008: 58). That is, it views knowledge as a fixed, context-independent phenomenon that ought to be taken from the scientific community and delivered, unchanged, to the public. Fourth, and finally, the diffusion model takes the public as a passive consumer of information “whose default ignorance and hostility to science can be counteracted by the appropriate injection of science communication” (Bucchi, 2008: 58). The default assumption of public ignorance rests, in part, on the idea that science is too complicated for the public to understand. The assumption of inherent public ignorance “underpins a widespread conception, if not an outright ideology, of the public communication of science” (Bucchi, 2008: 58).

Bucchi (2008) claims that this final tenet of science communication as diffusion is what we refer to as the deficit model and that the deficit model is part and parcel to our use of communication as diffusion. However, I argue that all four of these tenets mirror the propositions and assumptions central to the deficit model, including a focus on communication as a means for information transfer, communication as a linear, one-way process where senders (scientists) and receivers (lay audiences) can be sharply differentiated, an understanding of scientific knowledge as an objective, package-able product (see discussion below), and the assumption that improved communication will remedy less-than-desirable public understanding of, and attitudes toward, science. This is not to say that this particular understanding of communication causes the deficit model, or vice versa, but rather that both function to reinforce each other.

Defining science and scientific knowledge

In addition to science communications’ purpose and characterization of communication, how scholars and practitioners understand science as an endeavor can have a significant impact on how they conceptualize and implement its communication. The scientific process is, by its very definition, inextricably linked to knowledge acquisition (“Science,” 2014), meaning that we accept science as a method of discovering things about our world that would likely otherwise be left undiscovered. Conceptualizing the scientific process as a means to produce new knowledge necessitates a view of a public deficit in that science is providing society with information it does not yet have (Miller, 2010). Presumably, the scientific community is given the charge of acquiring said knowledge, differentiating them from non-scientific publics and supporting the idea that the public are inadequately informed about science topics (Besley and Nisbet, 2013). In addition, science is represented in popular culture as a product of individual “great men” producing scientific knowledge in isolation (Hook and Brake, 2010), and subsequently disseminating that knowledge to a less educated public.

Taken together, these dynamics create a linear, top-down (read deficit) model of knowledge dissemination. Wright and Nerlich (2006) highlight the link between how we understand the scientific process and our communication:

[The] arguments structuring the deficit model tie in with concurrent assumptions about the nature of science itself. Namely, that science lies outside of society, inhabited by professional scientists with whom lines of communication need to be built. Although this belief has been challenged … it remains a durable and popular concept inside and outside the sociology of science. (p. 333)

Put simply, so long as science is conceptualized as a process that takes place outside of society and provides us with new information, particularly information that can be utilized by non-scientific audiences, the public deficit will remain an essential component of science communication research and practice. This is not to imply that the definition of science is a given. What science is and ought to be is rigorously studied and debated, and there are entire academic fields (e.g. philosophy of science) dedicated to parsing out exactly what science is and how it functions in society (e.g. Bird, 2006). How individuals outside of those highly specialized realms understand science, though, primarily comes from its representation in popular culture (Hook and Brake, 2010) and previous experience (Wilkinson, 2010). It seems unrealistic (and fairly unnecessary) for science communication scholars to critically evaluate their understanding of science at this time. However, it is important to consider the connection between how science as a process is understood and how its communication is conceptualized.

Scientific knowledge

In addition to how science is conceptualized, how scientific knowledge is defined and positioned in relation to other knowledge sources has an equally important role to play in fostering a deficit model of science communication. Often, science is assumed to have epistemic authority or “a source on whom an individual may rely in her or his attempts to acquire knowledge on various topics” (Kruglanski et al., 2005: 351). This view is not only held by scientists and science communication professionals, but often by the public, especially in matters of public policy (O’Brien, 2013). Scholars who study epistemic authority maintain that knowledge acquisition is interpersonal in nature (Bar-Tal et al., 1991) and that the authority we afford various sources to produce and provide us with knowledge has a substantial impact on our decision-making processes and behavior (Kruglanski et al., 2005). People assign epistemic authority to different sources for different reasons, including seeing a source prove their knowledge (e.g. when a prediction pans out), seeking approval from a source (e.g. parents), the desire to see a source as authoritative (e.g. a religious leader), or the need to affirm one’s own beliefs and views (Kruglanski et al., 2005). It is important to note that epistemic authority is context-specific, in that some sources exert authority in numerous life domains, like a therapist or priest, while others may exert influence only in specific contexts, like a mechanic or statistician (Kruglanski et al., 2005). Epistemic authority has been deliberated by philosophers in relation to a variety of topics (e.g. Zagzebski, 2012), and it has been studied within the context of political beliefs (Bar-Tal et al., 1994), collaborative science (Zagzebski, 2012), physician expertise (Bar-Tal et al., 2013), and college professors (Blumberga, 2012; Raviv et al., 1993).

Affording a source epistemic authority is incredibly powerful, “so powerful, in fact, that it may override all else and exert a determinative influence on the individual’s judgments and correspondent behavior” (Kruglanski et al., 2005: 352). The role of science as an epistemic authority drives the concept of a public deficit, in that it forces communication to function in a top-down, one-way structure where knowledge trickles down from an epistemic authority (scientists) to a knowledge-deficient audience. That is, when science is selected or assumed as the epistemic authority for a domain (or numerous domains), the deficit model is sure to follow.

In addition to explaining why the deficit model persists in science communication, understanding the role of epistemic authority in decision-making may shed light on why the deficit model is effective in some science communication contexts and ineffective in others. That is, affording science epistemic authority is not inherently problematic, but it can become problematic for science communication when we assume that those we are communicating with afford science the same superior epistemic position. The job of the science communicator from an epistemic perspective, then, is to establish or maintain the epistemic authority of science and to leverage that authority in an effort to transfer information, improve attitudes, or alter behavior. Within this framework, the deficit model becomes ineffective if those who we are communicating with do not assume science to have epistemic authority regarding the topic or phenomenon at hand: that is, the deficit model can become problematic if and when the view of science as an epistemic authority is not shared among communicators.

It is important to note, too, that the deficit model is inadequate as a means for establishing the epistemic authority of science:

As with other beliefs, then, the assignment of epistemic authority may involve the joint influence of informational and motivational factors. Thus, the mere presence of relevant information may not suffice to produce an impression of epistemic authority. In addition to the information being “given,” one would need to be motivated to “take it.” (Kruglanski et al., 2005: 355)

A key example of this inadequacy can be found in the anti-vaccination movement. This movement has had moderate success in Europe and the United States, despite repeated efforts by medical professionals to inform the public about the safety and necessity of vaccination (Kata, 2010). Following the deficit model and providing anti-vaccination audiences with scientific information are likely ineffective in some cases because these audiences either question the epistemic authority of science or are more persuaded by non-scientific influences (Poland, 2011).

Affording science epistemic privilege is, I argue, one of the most powerful and underexplored factors serving to support the use of the deficit model in science communication. Previous work has examined the connection between epistemic authority and communication (Origgi, 2008). In addition, recent work within science communication has utilized epistemic authority as a framework to understand how competing voices battle with science for epistemic voice (e.g. Harambam and Aupers, 2015) and the a priori decision to trust sources other than science (e.g. Hildering et al., 2013). Even so, very little work exists that examines the role of epistemic authority as a meta-theoretical structure for science communication scholarship, particularly within communication studies. Notably, there are some academic disciplines that address these issues that could provide guidance for science communication scholars to move in this direction, including the philosophy of science and science and technology studies.

Summary

Taken together, these three factors serve to support the persistence of the public deficit in science communication research and practice to greater and lesser extents across a variety of contexts. Importantly, these factors do not exist in isolation, nor do they exist in any kind of causal structure. Rather, they coexist and reinforce each other. For example, how we understand science as a phenomenon greatly impacts our understanding of scientific knowledge, and vice versa. Similarly, how we conceptualize scientific knowledge impacts how we view the role of communication in promoting that knowledge which, in turn, impacts how we conceptualize knowledge and so on. While some academic efforts attempt to refine and address these issues (as noted above), there is plenty of work left to be done within science communication research and practice.

4. Discussion

As highlighted throughout this article, the deficit model is not in and of itself problematic, and there is ample evidence that supports the concept of a public deficit (Miller, 2010). What’s more, it is not the case that alternative models (e.g. dialogue, knowledge co-production) remedy all of the shortcomings of the deficit model (Bucchi, 2008), nor does the presence of alternatives indicate that the deficit model is obsolete. According to Brake and Weitkamp (2010), “[not all] science communication activities need to involve dialogue. Strategies that inform the public of new scientific research or excite the public about scientific discoveries are still important” (p. 2). This sentiment is mirrored by Wright and Nerlich (2006):

Success in studying the influence of contextual factors on the public understanding of science has raised the hope that the deficit model will soon, to borrow a term from Trotsky, be consigned to “the dustbin of history.” Indeed, it is tempting to discuss the use of the deficit model as an archaic model, long replaced in the march of progress that characterizes the social study of “making sense of science.” However, the outright rejection of the deficit model in favor of “alternative” explanations of the public understanding of science overlooks the importance of the deficit model as a shared cultural resource used to discuss science. (p. 332)

Other scholars have agreed and highlight that the deficit model can coexist with other communication models (Trench, 2008). I echo these sentiments and argue that the deficit model is a necessary, though not sufficient, model for science communication. The deficit model is particularly useful, for example, when communicators concurrently assume the epistemic authority of science. There are key areas for future research that may aid in using the deficit model more suitably and developing new methods for communicating science.

Future research

In contrast to the practice of communicating science, science communication as an academic endeavor is fairly new (Bucchi, 2008). In recognition of our youth as an academic field and the factors outlined above, I contend that there are two key opportunities for future research. First, it is clear that the absolute rejection of the deficit model is not appropriate (Wright and Nerlich, 2006) nor is the unconditional application of alternative dialogic models (Brake and Weitkamp, 2010). Furthermore, it remains unclear “under what conditions … different forms of public communication of science emerge” (Bucchi, 2008: 70) or under what conditions they ought to emerge. Moving forward, science communication scholars ought to focus on how to effectively utilize different communication models (e.g. deficit, dialogue, co-production) within different communicative environments. This charge undoubtedly requires that science communication scholars focus on developing methods for understanding and evaluating science communication contexts in new and innovative ways.

Second and related to this call, I contend that engaging in a deeper evaluation of the role of epistemic authority in science communication research and practice is paramount. A small number of scholars have noted that the deficit and dialogue model hold scientific knowledge as the epistemic standard of knowledge production (Bucchi, 2008). Given this epistemic supposition,

the need has been invoked for another, more substantial shift to a model of knowledge co-production in which non-experts and their local knowledge can be conceived as neither an obstacle to be overcome … nor an additional element that simply enriches professional expertise … but rather as essential for the production of knowledge itself. (Bucchi, 2008: 68)

That is, there is a need for science communication scholars to reevaluate the underlying assumption that science is the epitome of knowledge production. To aid in this reevaluation, I argue that we ought to first understand how epistemological assumptions impact science communication processes and outcomes, if they do at all. It is likely the case, for example, that affording science epistemic privilege significantly impacts science communication in some contexts, but not in others. Additionally, within contexts that it does have an impact, we need to understand the nature and magnitude of that impact before we cultivate and advocate for epistemologically sensitive science communication practices. There is existing work that looks at epistemic authority indirectly through issues of trust and information sources (e.g. Buys et al., 2014), but a more specific focus on epistemic authority is warranted.

In addition to key opportunities for future research, there is considerable room for theoretical development within science communication scholarship, particularly within communication studies. First, scholars ought to have a critical conversation regarding the overall ethos of science communication scholarship. While I contend, as explicated above, that science communication scholarship carries with it an ethical responsibility to foster and improve the relationship between science and society, a critical examination of this commitment is warranted. More specifically, science communication scholars ought to have spirited debates about the place of science in society, the assumptions and implications of its promotion, as well as our implicit ethical assumptions and commitments. In addition, scholars ought to engage in a discussion regarding how they define and understand science as an endeavor, including a critical examination of the place of scientific knowledge in different contexts. These debates are already taking place in similar fields, as noted above, and we would do well to echo their efforts.

Second, scholars ought to critically examine how communication is conceptualized as a phenomenon. As highlighted above, diffusion is the most ubiquitous conception of communication in science communication scholarship. As long as communication is viewed as the diffusion of scientific information, the deficit model will continue to be predominantly (and inappropriately) utilized. There is incredible diversity and nuance among communication theorists regarding what communication is, what it ought to be, and how it functions (Sheperd et al., 2006). Assuming science communication scholars echo communication theorists’ contention that “it matters whether we take communication to be one sort of phenomenon or process or idea … or another” (St. John et al., 2006: xi), a critical examination of this sort would only be beneficial to our field as a whole.

5. Conclusion

In this article, I argue that there are three key factors that drive the continued use of the public deficit model within science communication research and practice: the purpose of science communication, how communication as a phenomenon is conceptualized, and how science and scientific knowledge are defined. It is important to note that the use of the public deficit is not, in and of itself, problematic. However, it is not suitable for all science communication contexts, and more research ought to focus on how to better characterize science communication contexts and better utilize different communication techniques within those contexts. I suggest that this process can be greatly aided by focusing on the role of epistemic authority in science communication processes and outcomes.

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This project was supported by National Science Foundation award #IIA-1330691 to Maine EPSCoR at the University of Maine.

Author biography

Brianne Suldovsky is a Ph.D. candidate in communication at The University of Maine. Her research aims to understand and improve the connection between science and society and promote science within the public sphere. Her work to date focuses on stakeholder engagement and communication in postnormal science, cross-disciplinary communication, and representations of science within mass media. As of July 2016 she is joining the Annenberg Public Policy Center at The University of Pennsylvania as a postdoctoral fellow in the Science of Science Communication.

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