Abstract
Meyer aims to bring to light a seeming conflict between the didactic aspirations of science communication aligned with science’s search for truth and the dialectic aspiration of democratic politics in which science plays a key role. Through a series of essay-style writings, Meyer draws heavily on Aristotelian ideas, along with a swathe of other classical literature, as she covers issues from science’s place as a dominant knowledge form, to ideas of the public and elitism, to politics and technocracy.
Ultimately, Meyer argues for a political form of science communication, one where the communication ‘preserves the ambiguity’, the uncertainty and the conflict inherent and arguably necessary in democratic politics. And as far that broad aspiration is concerned, it is hard to disagree with her. Unfortunately, while the conclusions are appealing, the volume is light on substance, not particularly well argued, and feels somewhat out-dated.
Fundamentally, Meyer’s view of science communication is as didactic. While not incorrect when looking at much of what is practised as science communication, this is quite out of touch with the theoretical arguments that have been made for over 20 years in the field. Which aspect is Meyer’s target, the practical or the theoretical, is never made clear. This lack of clarity is a recurring issue for the book. If Meyer’s target is the still-dominant practice of didactic science communication (and that is a fair target), then solid practical suggestions would have been required.
But the volume is very largely theoretical, with no truly useful applicable suggestions. Indeed, some of the practice aimed at bridging the gap she identifies – such as Irwin’s notion of citizen science – fails to get a mention in the book. On the contrary, if Meyer’s target is the theoretical developments in science communication, then claiming that it is predominantly didactic simply fails to acknowledge the literature of the past two decades. Indeed, by drawing so heavily on older sources (Aristotle, Dewey, Arendt, etc.), she does not capture much of the current discussion.
Perhaps this would work as a volume in the public intellectual tradition, rather than as an academic manuscript. But again, the lack of clear definition complicates the issue. The book is too specific to be truly broad in appeal and content to generate or engage with the kind of public discussion one might wish for of a public intellectual volume. As an academic work, it is not quite thorough enough and examples are too obviously cherry-picked to provide the intellectual rigour one might hope for.
Meyer aims high and shows moment of brilliance, as in her discussion of science’s dance with elitism, but the book fails to deliver much in terms of depth, novelty or applicability. I suspect readers with a practical bent may find the volume interesting, but will be left disappointingly empty-handed in terms of what do with the content. Readers with a theoretical bent will be left somewhat frustrated by the lack of depth and engagement with recent moves in the literature.