Before and after the Chinese gene-edited human babies: Multiple discourses of gene editing on social media

Abstract

This study examines discourses in Chinese online discussions of gene editing by multiple social actors on Weibo before and after a significant scientific crisis, the 2018 scandal of Chinese gene-edited human babies. A content analysis of 2074 posts was done to identify frames, emotions, and metaphors. Findings reveal that Chinese social media have opened up new spaces for multiple social actors to generate multiple discourses. This has resulted in a more participatory public engagement with science and technology on Chinese social media, potentially influencing the online agenda and policy decisions on science and technology. Finally, findings indicate that a scientific crisis can serve as a trigger for significant changes in public attitudes and opinions regarding gene editing.

Keywords

discourse emotion gene editing public engagement with science scientific crisis social media

With a shift of research focus from public understanding of science (PUS) to public engagement with science and technology (PEST), science communication has become more open, egalitarian, and participatory (Kouper, 2010; Schäfer, 2009). Increased uses of social media enable diverse users to participate in public discussions over scientific issues, with scholars regarding social media as effective tools in facilitating PEST (Kouper, 2010). One of the most publicly contested scientific issues is emerging genetic technologies, especially gene editing (also called genome editing or engineering), which is a group of genetic technologies used to insert, delete, modify, or replace DNA in the genome of living organisms. Media discourses (Holliman, 2004; Petersen, 2001, 2002) and public attitudes regarding genetic technologies (Bates, 2005; Gaskell et al., 2000) have been widely examined within Western contexts since the birth of Dolly the sheep in 1997, the world’s first cloned adult mammal, born in Scotland. However, systematic inquiries of multiple discourses generated by multiple social actors on social media regarding gene editing are lacking, especially in non-Western contexts, such as China, where advances in science have raced ahead (Zhou and Leydesdorff, 2006) and a unique social media landscape has been developed in the last decade.

Recently, a scientific crisis known as the scandal of Chinese gene-edited human babies (hereafter the GHB scandal) first brought gene editing into nationwide discussions in China. On 25 November 2018, Chinese scientist Jiankui He announced that the world’s first twin babies with edited CCR5 genes had been born in China. His announcement immediately shocked the world and triggered widespread criticisms and discussions from not only professionals but also ordinary publics due to its unsettled ethical and technical issues. Such a scientific crisis can be a significant threat to the reputation of relevant scientists and even the whole scientific community, which can reshape the way various social actors perceive and discuss gene editing.

Therefore, using the GHB scandal as a dividing point, this study aims to examine not only discourse differences among multiple social actors, who engaged in public discussions of gene editing on Sina Weibo (hereafter Weibo), but also discourse changes following a scientific crisis. Specifically, using a content analysis of Weibo posts related to gene editing, this study examined and compared such online discourses in terms of frames, emotions, and metaphors. Findings from this study (1) identified and compared discourses generated on social media by different social actors when discussing such controversial scientific issues as gene editing, (2) offered empirical and theoretical insights on science communication under a scientific crisis context, and (3) provided a better understanding of PEST within the Chinese social media context.

1. Literature review

Multiple social actors and discourses in science communication

As science communication research has evolved to emphasize PEST, in which multiple social actors with varied backgrounds and expertise are enabled to articulate their knowledge, opinions, and values in public discussions of scientific issues (Chilvers, 2013), scholars have identified various social actors engaged in science communication. For example, Burns and colleagues (2003) have argued that “the public” in science communication is a very heterogeneous group, consisting of at least six overlapping groups within society: scientists, mediators (i.e. science communicators, journalists, and other members of media), decision-makers (i.e. policy makers in government and scientific institutions), general public, attentive public, and interested public.

Previous research in science communication often makes comparisons between two major social actors: scientists and laypeople (Liang et al., 2019), sometimes termed as experts and non-experts (Moore and Stilgoe, 2009). Discourses generated by experts and non-experts when discussing emerging sciences and technologies have been compared and found to be different. For instance, through a series of in-depth interviews with British scientists, laypeople, and other stakeholders on the genetic modification (GM) debate, Cook and colleagues (2004) found that the “rationality” of expert discourses is often contrasted with the “emotion” of non-expert discourses.

Scholars have also explored governmental discourses mainly generated by policy makers in government (Jones and Salter, 2003; Smallman, 2018). Analyzing 30 policy documents related to human genetics in Britain, Jones and Salter (2003) identified six frames in governmental discourses: “mistrust and public ignorance,” “accountability to a higher level of authority,” “management of conflicting interests,” “controlling science,” “transparency,” and “accountability and public consultation.” Comparing expert, non-expert, and governmental discourses of emerging sciences and technologies in Britain, Smallman (2018) found obvious differences in framing risks and social or ethical issues, which were portrayed as “unpredictable but inherent parts” of science developments by non-experts, and by contrast, were described as “manageable and quantifiable with more research and knowledge” by experts and policy makers.

Media discourses constitute another key type of discourses in science communication. Mass media discourses of emerging sciences and technologies have been analyzed in comparison with public discourses shared by mass audiences. For example, Durant and colleagues (1996) examined similarities and differences between media and public discourses on the Human Genome Project in Britain by comparing analyses of press coverage and focus group interviews. Although two main frames of “great promise” and “concern” were identified in both groups, they differ in their distribution, with the frame of “concern” prevailing for the public and “great promise” dominating in the media (Durant et al., 1996).

With the rise of social media as spaces for public discussions on scientific issues, however, there is little systematic analysis of multiple discourses simultaneously generated on social media. As a group of Internet-based applications designed for the creation and exchange of user-generated contents (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010), social media enable social actors to engage in science communication by creating and sharing discourses of scientific issues. Therefore, this study seeks to examine multiple discourses of gene editing generated on social media by different social actors, and to map the online discourse changes before and after the GHB scandal, one significant scientific crisis in this field.

Media discourses and public attitudes to genetic technologies

When it comes to emerging genetic technologies, such as gene editing and cloning, relevant media discourses play an important role in science communication, because for most people, media is a major source of science information that is generally outside of direct experience of ordinary people. Scholars have thus examined the coverage of genetic technologies in traditional mass media, such as newspapers and magazines (Kohring and Görke, 2000; Petersen, 2001, 2002). A variety of recurring frames, rhetoric, and metaphors have been identified in previous studies of media discourses of genetic technologies.

Drawing upon Entman’s (1993) notion of frame, which was defined as the way we “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient to a communicating text” (Entman, 1993: 52), scholars have identified different frames in media coverage of genetic technologies (Horst, 2005; Tranter, 2010). For example, Tranter (2010) outlined three major frames of “anxiety,” “progress,” and “compromise” in Australian media coverage on cloning and stem cell research. Specifically, in the “anxiety” frame, one subframe mainly involves negative images and tropes from science fiction, and the other one portrays these technologies as offending human dignity. In the “progress” frame, one subframe is concerned with cures and the other one mainly discusses economic benefits.

Hope and fear have been identified as two major types of rhetoric in media coverage of genetic technologies. The rhetorical distinction of “hope” and “fear” was first developed by Mulkay (1993) in his analysis of rhetoric used in the British debate on embryonic research and has since been widely discussed in studies of genetic technologies (Horst, 2005; Nerlich and Clarke, 2003). In the rhetoric of hope, genetic technologies are presented as fundamentally beneficial and a potential means to generate therapeutic benefits in the future. In contrast, in the rhetoric of fear, the same technologies are presented as fundamentally problematic, full of inherent risks, and out of control. The rhetoric of hope, along with hyped claims of future cures, was found to permeate Western media discourses (Jensen, 2008). These two types of rhetoric constitute two major emotions in reporting of genetic technologies.

Mass media were found to use recurring metaphors in covering genetic technologies, especially cloning, one controversial genetic technology used to produce a genetic replica of biological objects. Cloning has gained prominence on the media agenda since the birth of Dolly the sheep in 1997. News coverage on cloning thereafter invoked metaphors derived from popular Western science fiction, including Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, and Ira Levin’s The Boys from Brazil. Metaphors from science fiction have been quoted in media stories to vividly describe the “out-of-control scientist,” the “standardized mass production of human beings,” and the duplication of evil individual resulting in catastrophic consequences (Van Dijck, 1999: 13–14). As a result, negative metaphors such as “Frankenstein’s monster,” “playing God,” “opening Pandora’s box,” and “crossing a line” have pervaded Western media on genetic technologies (Nerlich and Clarke, 2003; Petersen, 2001, 2002).

Scholars have also examined public attitudes toward genetic technologies by conducting national surveys (Gaskell et al., 2000; Priest, 2000) and focus groups (Bates, 2005; Lassen and Jamison, 2006). National surveys on public attitudes toward genetic technologies have been conducted mainly in Europe (Frewer et al., 1997; Gaskell et al., 2000) and America (Priest, 2000; Singer et al., 1998) since the 1980s. Findings from these surveys have shown that publics are generally positive about genetics and genomics, and in contrast, negative about human cloning (Condit, 2010). Other studies have used focus groups to explore the nuances of public opinions on genetic technologies. For example, to clarify public concerns about genetic technologies, Lassen and Jamison (2006) conducted a series of focus group interviews in Denmark. Their findings indicated that public concerns can be divided into three main types: economic (i.e. economic threats and opportunities), social (i.e. environmental and health risks), and cultural (i.e. ethical and moral concerns).

In general, media discourses and public attitudes regarding genetic technologies, on one hand, express hope and optimism about therapeutic benefits that might accrue from these technologies, but, on the other hand, invoke fear and skepticism about potential risks and uncertainties. However, most studies in this line were conducted in Western contexts and mainly focused on traditional mass media. With the rapid development of genetic technologies in non-Western countries such as China, and with the popularization of social media as information sources and discussion avenues, the current literature may not adequately reflect the multiplicity of such discourses in these different contexts. Thus, further research on discourses of genetic technologies in the Chinese social media context becomes necessary.

Genetic technologies in China

Genetic technologies have rapidly advanced in China. In 2011, the Chinese government made biotechnology a major priority for spending on science and technology, resulting in various flourishing avenues of research on genetic technologies in China. Chinese scientists had not only applied genetic technologies in food crops but also in animals to create genetically modified animals including monkeys, dogs, goats, and pigs by directly manipulating their DNA (Larson, 2015). In a world’s first, Chinese scientists in 2015 reported editing the genomes of human embryos by using CRISPR-Cas9 (Cyranoski and Reardon, 2015). According to George Church, a professor of genetics at Harvard Medical School, the level of scientific research using CRISPR in China is “about the same” as in Europe and America, where CRISPR was co-developed (Larson, 2015).

With recent scientific advances in China, researchers have recently explored Chinese public attitudes toward genetic technologies and their applications. For example, to study Chinese attitudes toward gene therapy, Wang and colleagues (2017) conducted an online survey and found their participants were more amenable to genetic enhancement for non-medical reasons than clinicians, although both groups were wary about using gene therapy for germline cells. Chen and Zhang (2018) found that people in China were generally supportive of gene editing research and applications, although they mostly reported that they knew little about gene editing. Public attitudes toward genetically modified foods (GMF) in China is another major area of research. Studies have revealed varied attitudes toward GMF among different social actors: compared with general publics, Chinese government, journalists, and scientists generally express more positive attitudes toward GMF (Cui and Shoemaker, 2018; Zhao et al., 2019).

Some scholars have analyzed Chinese media discourses of genetic technologies and their applications, such as genetically modified organisms (GMO; Du and Rachul, 2012) and genomics medicine (Zhao et al., 2014). Their findings indicated an unbalanced and inadequate media coverage of emerging genetic technologies on Chinese news media. Du and Rachul (2012) revealed that the benefits of GMO were much more frequently discussed in Chinese mainstream newspapers compared to the possible risks, and that the overall tone of media coverage was highly positive toward GMO. Zhao and colleagues (2014) found that despite growing scientific output in academic journals, the amount of media coverage of genomics medicine in Chinese newspapers declined recently. Yet, similar to their counterparts from the West, these studies have mainly focused on traditional news media, calling for further investigations on the multiple discourses of genetic technologies on Chinese social media.

Media ecosystem in China

The Chinese media ecosystem has long been distinctive from those in Western democratic countries. Before the economic reforms started in the late 1970s, all media were state owned and financed. As part of the marketization reforms, Chinese news media have been deregulated, commercialized, and partially privatized (Stockmann and Gallagher, 2011). Today most media organizations finance themselves with advertising revenues, although some continue to receive indirect or small state subsidies. Despite the media marketization, the state still exert control over the news media, as all major news media outlets are owned at least 51% by the state, and they report to the propaganda department that has the authority to give editorial guidelines and dismiss personnel (Hu, 2003). Under the double pressure from the state and the market, Chinese news media have to accord with state demands and meanwhile satisfy public needs to sustain their business. For instance, general journalists from Chinese news media are often torn between the two demands of following state orders (e.g. helping the government to explain their policies) versus making profits (e.g. using scandals to attract eyeballs).

While reporting of sensitive or controversial issues in Chinese news media is carefully controlled by the state, social media appear to offer alternative views. Chinese publics have been found to often turn to social media to seek information and share opinions about public issues of their concerns (DeLisle et al., 2016). A variety of social media platforms such as Weibo and WeChat have developed to form China’s own social media landscape, where publics can access more diverse information and voices, although the Chinese government can still intervene using a range of control measures (Yang, 2016). For example, the diversity of voices can be found in Liang and colleagues’ (2019) study, which revealed that Chinese scientists have acted as “public experts” on Zhihu, a popular Chinese question and answer (Q&A) site, to facilitate public discussions on GMF. Experts, or professionals who claim expertise in scientific issues, become another important category of social actors who may wield influence on public perceptions. Last but not least, Chinese publics, who used to passively receive information from the government and experts through news media, now can make their voices heard on social media.

The recent GHB scandal caused by Jiankui He, a Chinese professor in the Southern University of Science and Technology, has sparked intensive online discussions on gene editing related to the scandal, especially on social media such as Weibo. On 25 November 2018, He announced that the world’s first twin babies with CCR5 genes edited using CRISPR-Cas9 to be naturally immune to the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), had been born in China. Then, hundreds of Chinese and international scientists cosigned a letter to condemn He’s conducting human embryo gene editing intended for reproduction. The Chinese government immediately suspended He’s research activities and launched an investigation, and on 30 December, He was sentenced to 3 years in prison and fined three million yuan. This announcement and various social actors’ subsequent responses made gene editing a trending topic on Weibo, which provides a rare opportunity to explore how social actors publicly discuss gene editing on Chinese social media. Drawing upon previous Western-based studies on relevant media discourses, this study aims to explore the multiplicity of such online discourses in terms of frames, emotions, and metaphors, which, respectively, capture the thematic, affective, and symbolic dimensions of such discourses. Therefore, we asked:

RQ1: How do various types of social actors differ in frames, emotions, and metaphors adopted in discussing gene editing on Weibo?

In addition, the GHB scandal, as one of the most significant scientific crises in China, posed a great threat to the reputation of scientists and even the whole scientific community, which might lead to a public opinion change or even reversal. While the people in China were found to be generally supportive of gene-editing research and applications before the scandal (Chen and Zhang, 2018), how gene editing is publicly perceived and discussed after the scandal remains unclear. Therefore, using the GHB scandal as a dividing point, this study also aims to explore before-and-after changes following such a scientific crisis in online discourses of gene editing. Thus, we proposed the following question:

RQ2: How do frames, emotions, and metaphors adopted in discussing gene editing on Weibo differ before and after the GHB scandal?

2. Method

Data and sample

A content analysis was carried out to examine posts related to gene editing on Weibo, a Chinese Twitter-like microblogging platform launched by Sina Corporation in August 2009. As one of the most popular social media in China, Weibo had 550 million monthly active users in March 2020 (Weibo Corporation, 2020). Similar to Twitter, Weibo allows users to post and forward messages, use hashtags, follow other users, and address other users with @ symbol (Rauchfleisch and Schäfer, 2015). Weibo has a verification scheme that helps identify different types of user accounts. Verified users, also known as “Big Vs,” are identified by a capitalized letter “V” added alongside their account names (Wang et al., 2014), which is used to distinguish those accounts that have passed Weibo’s identity check.

A total of 20,741 unique Weibo posts, containing the keyword of “gene editing (基因编辑)” within a 1-year period before and after the GHB scandal first came to light on 25 November 2018, were collected by using a web crawler written in Python language. In addition to the post content, information such as user account name, user authentication, user brief introduction, post ID, and post date was included in the dataset. Then, we randomly sampled 10% from the entire dataset of collected posts, yielding a sample of 2074 posts for content analysis, among which 10.3% (n = 214) and 89.7% (n = 1860) were generated before and after the scandal, respectively. The distribution of our sampled posts matched with the population of posts and reflected a sharp increase in social attention toward gene editing following the scientific crisis. The number of sample posts by months is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1.

Number of sample Weibo posts by months.

Coding procedure

We constructed five coding categories including (1) time periods, (2) social actors, (3) frames, (4) emotions, and (5) metaphors. A pilot content analysis, using semi-open coding, was performed to define categories of frames, emotions, and metaphors. First, according to the above literature on media discourses of genetic technologies, preliminary categories were developed. Then, we randomly sampled 20% from the sample posts for the pilot coding, in which two of the authors followed the rules of open coding and had several rounds of back-and-forth discussions to determine final categories. Example accounts and posts of each category are listed in the supplemental material (Tables S1 to S4).

Time periods

Each post was coded into either (1) before the GHB scandal, including posts generated from 25 November 2017 to 24 November 2018, or (2) after the GHB scandal, including posts generated from 25 November 2018 to 24 November 2019.

Social actors

Drawing upon Burns and colleagues’ (2003) classification, and based on the information from each post’s user authentication and brief introduction, each post was manually coded as being created by one of the following four types of social actors: (1) government, including different levels and departments of the Chinese government; (2) professionals, including individuals and various organizations that claim expertise in science, or more specifically, in relevant fields of genetics, bioscience, and medical science; (3) general journalists, including non-science focused news media organizations and those working in non-science focused news media organizations; (4) laypeople, including those who explicitly reveal their identity to be other than above three categories or do not disclose their identities.

Frames

A total of ten frames was adopted to characterize major thematic frames in each post, including (1) “science developments” that inform or celebrate new developments and important events of gene-editing technologies; (2) “risks” that discuss potential risks caused by gene-editing technologies, including but not limited to health risks; (3) “laws and regulations” that discuss or call for laws and regulations on genetic research and practices; (4) “ethics” that discuss ethical and moral issues related to genetic research and practices; (5) “economics” that discuss economic and capital issues related to genetic research and practices; (6) “social issues” that discuss social issues likely caused by or associated with gene-editing technologies, such as social inequality; (7) “international issues” that discuss international competition or conflicts on or reflected by genetic research and practices; (8) “science scandals” that discuss science scandals, such as the GHB scandal, and inform follow-up developments; (9) “scientists” that discuss famous or notorious scientists, such as Jiankui He; and (10) “others.” Each post may contain more than one frame.

Emotions

In addition to the two emotions of hope and fear derived from research on rhetoric used in media discourses of genetic technologies, this study included more diverse types of emotions found in recent studies of emotions in public discussions on social media (Choi and Lin, 2009; Liu and Chen, 2015). A total of eight emotions was adopted to assess the emotions of each post: (1) fear, (2) worry, (3) surprise, (4) anger, (5) shame, (6) disgust, (7) hope, and (8) rejoicing. Posts without above emotions were coded as (9) no emotion. Each post may contain more than one emotion.

Metaphors

A total of seven metaphors were found and coded for each post. They include (1) “Pandora’s Box” that signifies the source of disasters; (2) “Playing God” that signifies those who try to take on the role of God in controlling life processes; (3) “Brave New World” that signifies standardized mass production of human beings; (4) “Nineteen Eighty-Four” that signifies a totalitarian society where humanity is completely strangled by power; (5) “Mad scientist” that signifies out-of-control scientists; (6) “Villain or Demon” that signifies morally degraded scientists; and (7) “Cyborg” that signifies the realization of transhumanism, in which human beings are artificially enhanced beyond their original biological characteristics. Posts without the aforementioned metaphors were coded as (8) no metaphor. Each post may contain more than one metaphor.

Inter-coder reliability was tested between two trained coders who independently coded a random sub-sample of 20% (n = 415) of the sampled posts. During the training session, the pairwise intercoder reliability was calculated using Krippendorff’s alphas. Categories with low reliability (<.75) were discussed and coded again until an acceptable level of agreement was reached. Finally, Krippendorff’s Alphas for all categories ranged from .76 to 1.00 (Table 1).

Table 1.

Krippendorff’s alphas of variables.

Variables	Krippendorff’s alpha
Time periods	1
Social actors	.83
Frames
Science developments	.94
Risks	.91
Laws and regulations	1
Ethics	.79
Economics	.85
Social issues	.92
International issues	.87
Science scandals	.85
Scientists	.83
Other	.82
Emotions
Fear	.91
Worry	.90
Surprise	.77
Anger	.89
Shame	.81
Disgust	.82
Hope	.86
Rejoicing	.80
No emotion	.76
Metaphors
Pandora’s Box	.89
Mad Scientist	.80
Playing God	1
Brave New World	.80
Nineteen Eighty-Four	1
Villain	1
Cyborg	1
No metaphor	.86

3. Findings

This study focuses on online discourse differences in terms of frames, emotions, and metaphors among Chinese government, professionals, general journalists, and laypeople as well as the before-and-after changes in such online discourses of gene editing following the GHB scandal. Regarding frames and emotions, we conducted chi-square tests by using SPSS to investigate their differences among the four types of social actors, and we estimated incidence rate ratios (IRRs) and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) to examine the changes between the two time periods. As for metaphors, due to the low number of posts using metaphors that impedes us running chi-square tests (n = 127), we calculated their percentages by the four types of social actors and by the two time periods (Figures S1 and S2 in the supplemental material).

Discourse differences by multiple social actors

RQ1 asked about possible differences in the use of frames, emotions, and metaphors by different social actors when discussing gene editing on Weibo.

Frames

Results from chi-square tests (Table 2) show that professionals were more likely to use the “science developments” frame (54.0%, χ² = 300.37, p < .001), followed by the government (39.0%) and general journalists (32.7%). In comparison, general journalists more frequently adopted frames of “science scandals” (55.5%, χ² = 69.55, p < .001) and “laws and regulations” (28.8%, χ² = 167.95, p < .001). Similarly, the government showed the same preference of using frames of “science scandals” (48.3%) and “laws and regulations” (24.4%). In contrast, laypeople were more likely to use frames of “scientist” (23.9%, χ² = 182.10, p < .001) and “social issues” (14.8%, χ² = 85.41, p < .001). Moreover, general journalists and laypeople shared a preference for using frames of “ethics” (χ² = 7.99, p < .05) and “economics” (χ² = 9.86, p < .05) compared to the government and professionals.

Table 2.

Frame and emotion differences by social actors.

	Social actors (%)				χ²
	Government (n = 315)	Professionals (n = 311)	General journalists (n = 434)	Laypeople (n = 1014)	df = 3
Frames
Science developments	39.0 (n = 123)	54.0 (n = 168)	32.7 (n = 142)	10.1 (n = 102)	300.37***
Risks	1.6 (n = 5)	6.4 (n = 20)	5.5 (n = 24)	3.1 (n = 31)	14.96**
Laws and regulations	24.4 (n = 77)	12.2 (n = 38)	28.8 (n = 125)	5.4 (n = 55)	167.95***
Ethics	5.7 (n = 18)	3.9 (n = 12)	8.1 (n = 35)	8.1 (n = 82)	7.99*
Economics	.3 (n = 1)	2.9 (n = 9)	3.2 (n = 14)	3.7 (n = 38)	9.86*
Social issues	6.3 (n = 20)	2.9 (n = 9)	1.8 (n = 8)	14.8 (n = 150)	85.41***
International issues	0.0 (n = 0)	3.5 (n = 11)	2.1 (n = 9)	2.4 (n = 24)	10.13*
Science scandals	48.3 (n = 152)	25.4 (n = 79)	55.5 (n = 241)	43.4 (n = 440)	69.55***
Scientists	1.0 (n = 3)	6.4 (n = 20)	3.9 (n = 17)	23.9 (n = 242)	182.10***
Other	2.2 (n = 7)	2.6 (n = 8)	1.4 (n = 6)	6.9 (n = 70)	30.60***
Emotions
Fear	2.2 (n = 7)	1.3 (n = 4)	2.5 (n = 11)	6.7 (n = 68)	27.47***
Worry	5.4 (n = 17)	10.3 (n = 32)	8.1 (n = 35)	9.7 (n = 98)	6.66
Surprise	1.0 (n = 3)	1.3 (n = 4)	.7 (n = 3)	2.6 (n = 26)	8.36*
Anger	1.0 (n = 3)	3.2 (n = 10)	1.8 (n = 8)	22.7 (n = 230)	209.55***
Shame	16.2 (n = 51)	12.5 (n = 39)	24.4 (n = 106)	20.7 (n = 210)	19.38***
Disgust	0.0 (n = 0)	0.0 (n = 0)	.5 (n = 2)	6.8 (n = 69)	68.78***
Hope	32.7 (n = 103)	38.9 (n = 121)	28.3 (n = 123)	7.2 (n = 73)	221.79***
Rejoicing	5.4 (n = 17)	10.0 (n = 31)	5.5 (n = 24)	5.1 (n = 52)	10.45*
No emotion	42.9 (n = 135)	29.9 (n = 93)	35.9 (n = 156)	27.2 (n = 276)	31.51***

p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Emotions

As seen in Table 2, significant differences of emotions by social actors indicate that professionals were most likely to express the positive emotion of hope (38.9%, χ² = 221.79, p < .001), followed by the government (32.7%) and general journalists (28.3%). While general journalists were more likely to express the negative emotion of shame (24.4%, χ² = 19.38, p < .001), laypeople more frequently expressed negative emotions of anger (22.7%, χ² = 209.55, p < .001), fear (6.7%, χ² = 27.47, p < .001), and disgust (6.8%, χ² = 68.78, p < .001). In comparison, the government predominantly expressed no emotion (42.9%, χ² = 31.51, p < .001) when discussing gene editing on Weibo.

Metaphors

Generally, metaphors were rarely used by the four types of social actors when discussing gene editing on Weibo. Laypeople more frequently used metaphors of “Mad Scientist” (2.3%), “Pandora’s Box” (1.8%), “Nineteen Eighty-Four” (1.8%), and “Playing God” (.9%) as compared to other three social actors. In addition to a similar preference for use of the metaphor of “Pandora’s Box” (1.8%), general journalists were more prone to use the metaphor of “Villain or Demon” (1.4%). The government more frequently adopted the metaphor of “Cyborg” (1.0%) when talking about gene editing on Weibo.

Discourse differences before and after the GHB scandal

RQ2 was proposed to examine any changes in the use of frames, emotions, and metaphors in online discussions before and after the GHB scandal.

Frames

The results of IRRs and 95% CIs (Table 3) demonstrate that before the scandal, one dominant frame in Chinese online discussions of gene editing was “science development” (73.8%), the use of which significantly decreased by nearly three-quarters after the scandal (IRR: 0.27, CI: 0.24–0.31). Similarly, the use of the “economics” frame decreased by more than 60% compared to its use before the scientific crisis occurred (IRR: 0.36, CI: 0.21–0.63). In contrast, after the scandal, the most frequently used frame was “science scandals” (48.8%), the use of which experienced a 20-fold increase (IRR: 20.87, CI: 8.77–49.69). In a similar vein, frames of “ethics” (IRR: 8.34, CI: 2.08–33.43), “scientists” (IRR: 7.80, CI: 3.01–21.24), “laws and regulations” (IRR: 5.54, CI: 2.50–12.28), and “social issues” (IRR: 2.04, CI: 1.09–3.79) were used significantly more following the scandal.

Table 3.

Frame and emotion differences before and after the GHB scandal.

	Before and after the scandal (%)		Incidence rate ratio (95% CI)
	Before (n = 214)	After (n = 1860)	Incidence rate ratio (95% CI)
Frames
Science developments	73.8 (n = 158)	20.3 (n = 377)	0.27 (0.24–0.31)***
Risks	3.7 (n = 8)	3.9 (n = 72)	1.04 (0.51–2.12)
Laws and regulations	2.8 (n = 6)	15.5 (n = 289)	5.54 (2.50–12.28)***
Ethics	.9 (n = 2)	7.8 (n = 145)	8.34 (2.08–33.43)**
Economics	7.0 (n = 15)	2.5 (n = 47)	0.36 (0.21–0.63)***
Social issues	4.7 (n = 10)	9.5 (n = 177)	2.04 (1.09–3.79)*
International issues	2.8 (n = 6)	2.0 (n = 38)	0.73 (0.32–1.70)
Science scandals	2.3 (n = 5)	48.8 (n = 907)	20.87 (8.77–49.69)***
Scientists	1.9 (n = 4)	14.9 (n = 278)	7.80 (3.01–21.24)***
Other	7.5 (n = 16)	4.0 (n = 75)	0.54 (0.32–0.91)*
Emotions
Fear	3.3 (n = 7)	4.5 (n = 83)	1.36 (0.64–2.91)
Worry	7.5 (n = 16)	8.9 (n = 166)	1.19 (0.73–1.95)
Surprise	.5 (n = 1)	1.9 (n = 35)	4.03 (0.55–29.25)
Anger	0.0 (n = 0)^a	13.5 (n = 251)	58.11 (3.64–928.32)**
Shame	1.9 (n = 4)	21.6 (n = 402)	11.56 (4.36–30.64)***
Disgust	0.0 (n = 0)^a	3.8 (n = 71)	16.52 (1.03–265.75)*
Hope	55.1 (n = 118)	16.2 (n = 302)	0.29 (0.25–0.35)***
Rejoicing	9.8% (n = 21)	5.5 (n = 103)	0.56 (0.36–0.88)*
No emotion	25.7% (n = 55)	32.5 (n = 605)	1.27 (1.00–1.60)

CI: confidence interval.

Cases where zeros cause problems with the computation of incidence rate ratios (IRRs) and 95% CIs are managed by adding .5 to all cells of the contingency table (Pagano and Gauvreau, 2018).

p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Emotions

As shown in Table 3, there were significant changes in emotions before and after the GHB scandal. The positive emotions of hope (IRR: 0.29, CI: 0.25–0.35) and rejoicing (IRR: 0.56, CI: 0.36–0.88), two of the most frequently expressed emotions in Chinese online discussions of gene editing before the scandal, significantly decreased by approximately 70% and 40%, respectively. In terms of negative emotions, the expression of anger (IRR: 58.11, CI: 3.64–928.32) experienced a sharp 58-fold increase following the scandal, while the expression of disgust (IRR: 16.52, CI: 1.03–265.75) and shame (IRR: 11.56, CI: 4.36–30.64), respectively, experienced a 17-fold and 12-fold increase.

Metaphors

In general, metaphors were rarely used to discuss gene editing in the two time periods. Specifically, before the GHB scandal, metaphors of “Cyborg” (3.3%), “Playing God” (1.4%), and “Brave New World” (0.5%) were more frequently used. In contrast, metaphors of “Mad Scientist” (1.6%), “Pandora’s Box” (1.5%), “Villain or Demon” (1.2%), and “Nineteen Eighty-Four” (1.0%) emerged more frequently after the scandal.

In addition, our results from chi-square analysis demonstrate that laypeople have significantly more engaged in online discussions of gene editing after the GHB scandal. While such online discussions were once mainly undertaken by professionals (35.5%, χ² = 97.81, p < .001), after the scientific crisis occurred contributions to these discussions were mostly from laypeople (51.7%), followed by general journalists (20.8%) and the government (14.9%).

4. Discussion

Although this study is situated in the Chinese context, online discourses of gene editing are prominent on the global agenda when various genetic technologies are rapidly developing worldwide. The findings provide an opportunity to understand how a controversial scientific issue is discussed on a comparatively free social media beyond the Western context, and to explore how multiple social actors feel and talk about gene editing following a significant scientific crisis such as the GHB scandal.

Social media as spaces for multiple discourses

As Xiao (2011) argued, social media are changing our daily communication, giving Chinese netizens an unprecedented capacity to create diversified discourses. When it comes to science communication, our results reveal that Weibo as one of the less censored social media platforms in China has opened up space for social actors to express their distinctive concerns and opinions on controversial gene-editing issues. For example, some laypeople expressed concerns about social inequality that might be intensified by gene editing as a privilege of the rich to “design” babies, and others discussed social discrimination against HIV carriers as the first gene-edited babies were announced to have genetic resistance to the HIV. These concerns expressed by laypeople within the frame of “social issues” fill the discourse void left by the other three types of social actor, who focus on scientific and legal issues such as “science developments,” “risks,” and “laws and regulations.” These concerns that are often regarded by Chinese government as affecting social stability would be rarely expressed in news media, if they were not put forward by laypeople in online discussions.

In addition to the above discourse differences, it is worth discussing the discourse convergence between different social actors in online discussions, which serve as a precondition of interactive dialogues among social actors. For example, our results show that Chinese journalists observed governmental discourses closely, on one hand, sharing similar preferences for highlighting “laws and regulations” when framing gene editing, and, on the other hand, their discourses resonated with public concerns about “ethics” and “economics” that were frequently discussed by laypeople on Weibo. This is in line with the double duty of news media in China, acting as the “mouthpieces” of the state and satisfying information needs of the public (Stockmann and Gallagher, 2011). As such, we argue that Chinese media not only mediate between science and publics as suggested in previous Western-based research (Peters, 2012), but also bridge the gap between the Chinese government and its publics in discussing such controversial issues as gene editing. In general, our findings coincide with the claim of “mediated science” as a product of multiple social actors (Peters and Dunwoody, 2016: 896), whose discourses generated on social media play key roles in co-constructing the meaning of science and technology.

Public engagement as an influence on policy making

Although the Chinese government has generally been considered as powerful in online agenda-setting (Jiang, 2014; Luo, 2014), our findings indicate that in public discussions of gene editing, the online agenda was influenced by not only the government but also other social actors, especially laypeople who have increasingly engaged in online discussion after the GHB scandal. For example, many laypeople criticized controversial scientists (e.g. Jiankui He) and discussed social issues (e.g. social inequality and social discrimination) related to gene editing, which were rarely mentioned by government. As Luo (2014) argued, public discourses different from official discourses can serve as “a competing agenda-setting force” when online publics collectively advocate for attention to be given to particular issues. Multiple social actors with varied backgrounds and expertise are enabled to articulate their opinions and thus contribute to a more open and participatory science communication, or PEST, on social media (McCallie et al., 2009), which is potentially influencing the online agenda. However, it is noteworthy that our findings do not reveal an absence of the governmental influence on the online agenda. The direction of online agenda-setting deserves more careful examination.

Apart from influences on the online agenda, we suggest that the emerging PEST on social media might potentially influence policy making. As McCallie et al. (2009) claimed, PEST involves seeking public inputs into policy decisions regarding developments and applications of science and technology. That is, how publics discuss gene editing can influence the process and outcomes of related policy formation. As the GHB scandal aroused national attention to relevant legislation problems in China, where gene editing is forbidden by guidelines rather than laws (Araki and Ishii, 2014), our results show that an increasing number of users on Weibo criticized the poor regulation on genetic research and called for immediate legislation in China. Subsequently, the National Health Commission promulgated new regulation in February 2019 to establish an administrative approval system for clinical research and application of new biomedical technologies including gene editing. On 28 May 2019, the China State Council further announced new regulations, which created a report-and-registration mechanism for research involving human genetics and granted the Ministry of Science and Technology the right to impose penalties for breaching the regulations. Although we cannot establish any causal relationship, it is worth discussing the possibility of such online PEST as a potential influence to shape scientific policy decisions. As public opinions are easily accessible online, the authorities are increasingly taking note and responding to them, and this trend, as Xiao (2011) contended, will surely continue in Chinese society.

Scientific crisis as a trigger for changes

Finally, it is worth discussing the impact of a scientific crisis on online discourses of controversial scientific issues. Our empirical findings indicate that the GHB scandal served as an influential crisis that has significantly changed dominant frames and emotions in public discussions of gene editing on Weibo. First, as the scandal sparked intense public discussions on various aspects of gene editing, the once dominant “science development” frame has been replaced by diverse frames including “science scandals,” “science development,” “laws and regulations,” “scientist,” “social issues,” and “ethics” in such online discussions. These findings extend what Chyi and McCombs (2004) termed “frame changing” from news production to public discussions. That is, when an issue is covered in the news or, in our case, discussed online, the frames used generally change so that different aspects of the issue are emphasized at different points in time (Houston et al., 2012). The changes in frames thus reflect different public orientations toward gene editing before and after the scientific crisis, shifting from predominantly praising developments and benefits of gene-editing technologies toward critically discussing relevant social, legal, and ethical issues.

Second, in terms of emotions, the predominance of positive emotions including hope and rejoicing show a generally positive public attitude toward gene editing before the scientific crisis, which coincide with previous survey findings on public attitudes toward gene editing (Chen and Zhang, 2018). After the crisis, however, Chinese public emotions expressed online have become more complex, showing a mixture of positive emotions and various negative emotions such as shame, anger, and worry, which is more in line with previous Western-based studies on relevant media discourses suggesting a mixture of “hope” and “fear” (Petersen, 2001; Turney, 1998). Besides, it is worth noting that there have been slightly more posts expressing no emotion after the scandal, which can be a result of the regulatory effect of Chinese governmental and journalist discourses that were prone to express no emotion so as to stay objective and reassure publics following the scientific crisis. In general, the diversification of frames and emotions following the GHB scandal reveals that the scientific crisis can also be an opportunity to raise public awareness and facilitate more diversified discourses by triggering intense public discussions among multiple social actors on controversial gene editing.

Several limitations should be noted. First, there was a considerable difference in the amount of posts generated before and after the scandal. But most of our analyses relied on percentages instead of absolute counts. The statistics we applied on the samples also accounted for potential sample size differences. Second, despite it being one of the most popular social media platforms in China, our analysis focused on a single social media platform, Weibo, and future research can provide a comparative perspective by including other platforms. Moreover, given that gene editing becomes prominent in the global scientific agenda, future research can draw comparisons on features of online discussions among different national contexts. Finally, this study only randomly sampled 10% of posts for content analysis. Using computer-assisted content and network analyses, future research can analyze all relevant posts and comments to investigate the interactions among social actors in online discussions.

This study analyzed discourses of gene editing generated by multiple social actors on Weibo, providing insights into the emerging PEST on Chinese social media and its potential influence on the online agenda and policy decisions, and discussing the impacts of a scientific crisis on changing public attitudes and opinions regarding controversial gene editing.

Supplemental Material

sj-pdf-1-pus-10.1177_0963662520987754 – Supplemental material for Before and after the Chinese gene-edited human babies: Multiple discourses of gene editing on social media

Supplemental material, sj-pdf-1-pus-10.1177_0963662520987754 for Before and after the Chinese gene-edited human babies: Multiple discourses of gene editing on social media by Xing Zhang, Anfan Chen and Weiyu Zhang in Public Understanding of Science

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the 2019 New Humanities Funding of USTC (Grant Number: YD2110002015) and the Science Popularization and Risk Communication of Transgenic Biotechnologies project (Grant Number: 2016ZX08015002).

ORCID iDs

Xing Zhang

Anfan Chen

Weiyu Zhang

Supplemental material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Author biographies

Xing Zhang is a PhD candidate at the Department of Communications and New Media, National University of Singapore. Her research focuses on science communication, crisis communication, public relations, public opinion, and social media.

Anfan Chen, PhD, is a postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Science Communication and Science Education, University of Science and Technology of China. His research focuses on computational communication, science communication, and new media.

Weiyu Zhang, PhD, is an associate professor at the Department of Communication and New Media, National University of Singapore. Her research focuses on civic engagement and ICTs, with an emphasis on Asia. She is the author of the book “The Internet and New Social Formation in China: Fandom Publics in the Making.” Her current project is to develop and examine an online platform for citizen deliberation.

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