The Duality of Human Nature

Abstract

In the present article, I argue for a shift in perspective regarding aggression, prosociality, and social affinity. Psychological approaches construe antisociality and prosociality as serving opposing functions. In contrast, I here consider them to serve the same function and to form the behavioral foundation of human status striving as early as the preschool years. Children who have mastered both coercive and prosocial tactics show themselves to be socially competent, materially successful, and socially attractive. I compare models in psychology derived from the field of medicine with models stemming from evolutionary theory.

Keywords

evolution child development popularity power social dominance status

[There’s] always going to be the girls who are the most popular . . . and they know that they can be mean to people and still be loved by everyone. You have nothing to lose, so why don’t you go ahead and be mean to everybody that’s not as good as you? (Glass, 2003)

In the above quote, 15-year-old Lillie Allison describes popular girls in an episode of This American Life. It is not hard to imagine “the mean girl” gaining popularity and high social status—this has been the topic of Hollywood treatments for decades and scholarly research for years. However, it may be harder to imagine her being beloved, much less “loved by everyone.” Common sense (along with predominant models in psychology) dictates that “meanness,” or aggression (i.e., behavior intended to harm another), invites censure and backlash from the social group. Aggression may pay, but not for long, because of presumed long-term social costs.

Moreover, prevailing models in developmental psychopathology view aggression largely as an outcome of a process of maladaptation to perturbations in a child’s ecology—such as coercive parenting, economic disadvantage, or criminogenic urban ecology (Tremblay et al., 2004)—that ultimately lead to dysfunction. For example, social-information-processing models of aggression have suggested that a history of maltreatment can lead one to see hostile intent even where there is none and promotes aggressive responses in self-defense, thus leading to a pattern of dysfunction (Dodge & Albert, 2012). Clinical work inspired by medical models invokes the language of disease and pathogens for behaviors deemed unacceptable by society (Jessor, 1991). Persistent and extreme forms of aggression are referred to as “externalizing symptoms” that can lead to a diagnosis, and “contagion” is the learning of similar behaviors by others. A persistently aggressive child is “treated” as “disordered.”

A Shift in the View of Human Aggression: Dysfunction Versus Function

The dysfunction model has a good deal of merit and has garnered support for decades (Coie & Dodge, 1998). At the same time, however, humans and many other species have been routinely exposed to harsh environments and suboptimal ecologies, and rather than responding in ways that undermine their evolutionarily relevant goals (e.g., survival and reproduction), they adapt both ontogenetically (developmentally) and phylogenetically (evolutionarily). Through medically inspired lenses, however, their responses may appear maladaptive. Schistocerca gregaria (desert locust), for example, will develop into a harmless, solitary grasshopper if the nymph is hatched under conditions of low population density. But if the nymph is hatched under conditions in which it is touched and jostled by others (conditions typically associated with resource scarcity), it will develop into a ‘‘social,” swarming locust as an adult. Though the swarming variety imposes a steep cost on humans, this insect’s function is not ‘‘harm’’ per se. The species has evolved to detect suboptimal conditions and adjust its survival and reproductive strategies accordingly.

Might human aggression be fruitfully viewed through similar evolutionary-developmental lenses? Might aggression be “calibrated” by cues from the local ecology? The function of this form of behavior has not been in dispute in fields traditionally guided by evolutionary theory. Animal researchers, ethologists, and anthropologists, for example, have long considered status attainment, the acquisition of material and social resources (e.g., food and mates), and defense to be important functions of aggression and aggressive displays. That is, aggression is seen as adaptive under certain conditions, both ontogenetically (for the individual) and phylogenetically (evolutionarily).

However, this adaptationist perspective on children’s aggressive behavior has generally not been adopted by child developmentalists on the whole (though openness to it has changed markedly over the past 20 years). There are several reasons for this lack of adoption. First, it may be difficult to view developing locusts and developing humans using a similar calculus. Indeed, work on humans and work on other animals reside in different literatures that seldom cross disciplinary boundaries. Second, few worry about the moral implications of insect behavior. When it comes to humans, however, there may be a tendency—or a worry about the tendency—to commit the naturalistic fallacy; that is, to define “goodness” as being based in part on what is found in nature, or, in other words, to conclude that aggression must be “good” because it is “natural.” Functional and moral perspectives must be kept separate. Third, because aggressive behavior is a real social problem that stands to disrupt the well-being of children, it is first seen as a problem to be solved in human social ecologies.

The developmental perspective has traditionally focused on the costs (e.g., “adjustment outcomes”) associated with aggression (Ellis et al., 2012; Hawley, 2011), such as depression and externalizing symptoms (Prinstein, Boergers, & Vernberg, 2001). In contrast, and similar to economic views (and perspectives in behavior analysis), adaptationist perspectives consider costs and benefits. The benefits of effectively executed instrumental aggression include personal goal attainment, material gain, and status enhancement.¹ Given that some of the negative effects of aggression are in part a function of a presumed social loss associated with rejection (Lansford, Malone, Dodge, Pettit, & Bates, 2010), a key question arises: Can one act explicitly against the social group and still be embraced by it? To consider a shift in our view of aggression, we must first address a shift in our thinking about prosociality.

A Shift in Perspective on Prosocial Behavior

Prosocial behavior, or “voluntary behavior intended to benefit another” (Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2006, p. 646), includes helping, cooperating, and reciprocating. As such, prosocial behavior may be enacted in response to several underlying motivations, ranging from the egoistic (i.e., self-serving; e.g., driven by the desire to win social regard or material gains) to the altruistic (i.e., other-serving; e.g., driven by empathic concern; Eisenberg et al., 2006). Work in children has largely focused on altruistic motivations (but see Carlo & Randall, 2002).

In contrast, resource-control theory (Hawley, 1999) aligns one of its central constructs—prosocial strategies of resource control—not with altruism but with personal goal attainment. Positively valenced behaviors (e.g., helping, cooperating, reciprocating) are proposed from this perspective to advance the interests of both the self and others. Subsequently, prosocial strategies lead to strong (resource-yielding) alliances with others who will return favors in the long run, the ecology permitting (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Trivers, 1971). Psychologists might call these “friendships.” Although human infants are prepared to behave prosocially from a very young age (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006), there are marked individual differences in this strategy use over the course of development. Prosociality requires social skill (perspective taking), agreeableness, and, because gains are often not immediate, impulse control and self-regulation. Individuals who are incapable of prosocial behavior are not well incorporated to normative, modern social life and stand to bear the costs of ostracism. Therein lies its selective advantage. In contrast, those who can perform prosocial behaviors—out of a host of underlying psychological motivations—are well positioned to rise in rank and social-dominance status.

Prosocial behaviors are not traditionally thought of as explicitly ascendency related because, as mentioned, developmental psychologists have historically focused on documenting altruistic motives underlying prosocial behavior (but see Charlesworth, 1996; Strayer & Trudel, 1984; Weisfeld & Weisfeld, 1984). On the flip side, animal researchers align dominance and ascendency not only with resource acquisition and defense but also firmly with “struggles,” “contests,” and “agonism” (and not cooperation and reciprocation; cf. De Waal, 1982). This aggression-based view of social dominance, applied across species and taxa, persists today (e.g., Alcock, 2005). The utility of agonistic contests, however, cannot be overstated; indeed, agonism has been incorporated into resource-control theory in its other central construct, coercive strategies of resource control (i.e., instrumental aggression).

Depending on youths’ relative employment of the two strategies, coercive (aggressive) and prosocial (reciprocative, cooperative), our program has included a focus on types of resource-controlling individuals. Individuals can be characterized based on how much they employ particular strategies, relative to other group members. Thus, children (and adolescents and adults) tend to use one strategy over another (prosocial controllers, coercive controllers), both strategies to an average degree (typical controllers), neither strategy (noncontrollers), or both strategies frequently, relative to other group members (bistrategic controllers). This person-centered approach has uncovered aspects of social functioning unavailable to more commonly employed variable-centered approaches characterized by regressions and correlations, including some interesting and counterintuitive (from most views) aspects of aggression and prosociality.

First, this revised view of power recognizes a group heretofore undocumented by those who study social dominance—specifically, prosocial controllers, who control resources (and ascend hierarchies) without resorting to aggression. Individuals in this group are characteristically socially skilled (friendly, morally astute, extraverted; Hawley, 2003b; Hawley, Little, & Pasupathi, 2002) and well received by their peers as early as the preschool years (Hawley, 2003b). They are not altruistic in the biological sense. Rather, they are prosocial to a degree that serves their material goals. By adulthood, prosocial controllers explicitly recognize that being liked is important for material success (Hawley, Shorey, & Alderman, 2009). Across multiple age groups, they show a profile that suggests that they are shining examples of human social competence and citizenship (see also Rodkin, Farmer, Pearl, & Van Acker, 2000, on “model boys,” and Logis, Rodkin, Gest, & Ahn, 2013, on prosocial popular adolescents) and have a strong female representation. Importantly, their mere existence demonstrates that dominance (resource control) need not entail agonism. This group also illustrates a tidy congruency between ontogeny and phylogeny: They enjoy positive developmental outcomes and, presumably, long-term reproductive success.

In contrast to the prosocial controllers, coercive controllers are impulsive, unskilled, and aggressive in early childhood and adolescence (e.g., Hawley, 2003a, 2003b). Males comprise the majority in this group across all ages. By the age of 5, coercive controllers are already being rejected by their peers, in accordance with predictions made by prevalent models in psychology (Hawley, 2003b). This group is well documented in the literature; we know, for example, that low socioeconomic status, parental conflict and family dissolution, and birth to a teen mother put children at risk for these behavior patterns generally (Dodge, Coie, & Lynam, 2006), and that these patterns can persist over the life course (Moffitt, 1993). This group raises questions about a potential ontogenetic and phylogenetic incongruity; namely, developmentally, these behavior patterns can be very costly, as medically inspired models have shown (e.g., those who display them may be incarcerated or become victims of homicide), but in certain ecologies, they can yield long-term (reproductively relevant) material and social rewards.

The group that challenges our ideas about who wins esteem and what constitutes social competence are the bistrategic controllers—those who use both strategies to a high degree. First, bistrategic controllers across all age groups have shown themselves to be the most successful at resource control. Part of their success is due to the fact that they are high in aggression yet mitigate the costs of aggression by employing prosociality (McDonald, Wang, Menzer, Rubin, & Booth-LaForce, 2011; Pellegrini et al., 2007; Roseth et al., 2011). This latter feature makes them stand out because, as a consequence, they possess attributes associated with social skills, much like the prosocial controllers, in both childhood and adolescence. For example, bistrategics are extraverted and socially perceptive and enjoy intimacy in their interpersonal relationships (e.g., Hawley, Card, & Little, 2007). They are strategic in their employment of aggression as early as fifth grade (Wurster & Xie, 2014). Over time, preschool bistrategics are likely to shift from coercive means of status attainment to prosocial means of status maintenance (e.g., Roseth et al., 2011). Their aggression notwithstanding, bistrategic college students seek social approval (Hawley et al., 2009). Finally, preschool bistrategics appear to have an advanced understanding of moral expectations and the norms of the social group (Hawley & Geldhof, 2012). Elsewhere, I have referred to this profile as “Machiavellian” (Hawley, 2003a).

This latter characteristic warrants elaboration. Moral behavior is consistent with behaving prosocially, such as reconciling after conflict (Roseth et al., 2011). On that note, in a study involving preschoolers (Hawley & Geldhof, 2012), bistrategic controllers demonstrated an understanding of rules and rule violations, and these preschoolers’ teachers reported that they publicly behaved in accordance with these rules like most children. Where they differ from prosocial controllers, however, is in the emotional aspects of morality; namely, teachers report that prosocial controllers exhibit moral emotions reflecting guilt and shame (i.e., internalized conscience), whereas bistrategic controllers do not. Moral emotions are considered to be the motivational core of morality insofar as they inhibit immoral action (e.g., aggression; Stuewig, Tangney, Heigel, Harty, & McCloskey, 2010) and motivate moral behaviors, such as apologies and reparations (Eisenberg, 2000). Coercive controllers show deficits similar to bistrategics in the emotional domain, but unlike bistrategic controllers (and those in the other groups), coercive controllers are the least likely to engage in socio-moral behavior (e.g., issuing apologies, reparations, and comfort to their peers).

In summary, young bistrategic controllers seem to understand accepted rules appropriate for their age, but they do not appear to be guided by moral emotions. This outlook appears to allow them to engage in another fascinating behavior pattern I and my colleagues have called selective moral engagement. Bistrategics appear to make good with their teacher when they themselves have violated a rule and to correct and report on peers who do so (see also Roseth et al., 2011). When these behaviors are strategically and competently enacted to garner favor by authority figures, they stand to help bistrategics ascend the hierarchy. Tattling, an arguably similar form of behavior employed in early childhood, has been shown to yield similar results (Ingram & Bering, 2010). Bistrategics consequently seem to be in a strong position to mitigate social censure when they themselves have violated norms. In this sense, their moral reasoning “is more like a lawyer defending a client than a judge or scientist seeking the truth” (Haidt, 2001; p. 820).

The bistrategic approach may seem similar to psychopathy, a theme common to the personality literature on Machiavellianism (Zeigler-Hill, Southard, & Besser, 2014). In fact, I have argued that this pattern, even when it includes elements of psychopathy, represents a form of human social competence—one that balances interpersonal communion and personal agency, or “getting along” and “getting ahead” (Hawley, 2002; 2003a). But the question I posed earlier is an important one: Can one act against the social group and still be embraced by it?

A Shift in Perspective on Social Affinity

Few will doubt that this two-sided approach to the world—embracing both aggressive self-assertion and “niceness”—can lead to material gain. The profile of the bistrategic easily conjures images of the social climbers, politicians, and status seekers among us. But do these aggressive power holders win the social approval they seek?

To be sure, there is a difference between high status defined by reputation (e.g., popularity) and liking (Cillessen & Rose, 2005). Those who are reported as “popular” by their peers have drawn comparisons to bistrategic youths because many popular youths also employ a mixture of prosocial and antisocial behaviors. But those who wrote on popularity early on were quick to note that having high status does not mean being well liked; aggressive popular adolescents were therefore expected to be prone to future adjustment difficulties. In the meantime, however, strong evidence for the negative effects of power on mental health and peer relationships has not been forthcoming (Rose & Swenson, 2009; Troop-Gordon & Ranney, 2014). Indeed, popular youths, especially if they also have prosocial traits, have been shown to receive more (not fewer) friendship nominations, especially from other high-status youths (Logis et al., 2013). Even “bullies” have been shown to win high status and affection from members of their in-group (Huitsing & Veenstra, 2012). Thus, blanket claims that aggression is unilaterally socially repellant have not been substantiated.

Resource-control theory suggested early on that the powerful (i.e., socially dominant) are socially attractive even if they wield their power aggressively (i.e., bistrategically, a la Machiavelli’s treatise; Hawley, 1999). This social-centrality hypothesis of resource-control theory is derived from the vast animal-behavior, ethological, and anthropological literatures that suggest that socially dominant group members are sought as alliance partners and mates because they have shown themselves to be effective in their material ecology (Hawley, 1999). Thus, there are material rewards and learning opportunities associated with being favored by them. And if socially dominant bistrategics attract powerful others (which they appear to do), others will receive social rewards for being in their company as well (e.g., basking in reflected glory; Dijkstra, Cillessen, Lindenberg, & Veenstra, 2010). These benefits appear to outweigh many of the costs that may be incurred by fraternizing with a potentially aggressive social partner. Preschoolers are drawn to bistrategic peers (naming them as peers they “like to play with”; Hawley, 2003b), as are adolescents and preadolescents, who describe them as their “best friends” and as having high status (i.e., being popular) and being well liked (Hawley et al., 2007; Wurster & Xie, 2014). In adolescents’ eyes, bistrategics bring intimacy and fun to relationships (Hawley et al., 2007), and conflict appears to be a cost youths are willing to bear. One college student described bistrategics as making great friends, but horrible enemies.

What about the noncontrollers, or, in the parlance of social dominance, social subordinates? In preschool and adolescence, these children, like prosocial controllers, are “nice” and nonaggressive. They stay well out of the competitive fray and yet are not admired for their noncompetitiveness (see also Rubin, Coplan, & Bowker, 2009, on “socially reticent” individuals). Indeed, across multiple age groups, they are as socially rejected as the aggressive coercive controllers (Hawley, 2003a, 2003b). And, like subordinate individuals of other primate groups, they are at risk for being bullied by peers. Thus, concluding that we like “nice” people and dislike “mean” ones, as suggested by traditional views of social inclusion, is a vast oversimplification.

Conclusions

Human social affinity appears to be much more interesting than “nice people are liked” and “aggressive people are disliked.” A more nuanced view emerges when considering the evolutionary functions of behaviors as they relate to dominance. The bulk of psychology considers antisociality and prosociality as opposite ends of a single continuum and, as such, assumes that they serve opposing functions. Here, I have considered them as serving the same function as two sides of the same coin. Though the medical model describes and explains well the proximal (ontogenetic) functioning of the unistrategists (e.g., prosocial and coercive controllers) without phylogenetic and functional considerations, it fails to capture the adaptive face of aggression and the success of the mixed strategist (bistrategic controllers). Resource-control theory attempts to capture concretely this dualism that characterizes human nature and success, and to identify additional roots of behavioral development within the inherently competitive climate of human social groups.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no conflicts of interest with respect to the authorship or the publication of this article.

Notes

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