A Hermeneutic of Pause(ing): A Considered Responding to Other as “Not-I”

Loving God-Loving ‘Other’

In order that we might love God we need to love the other. It is tempting to convince ones’ self, that in order to most fully love and appreciate those who are ‘Not-I’ we must be primarily focused on our own experiences (or not) of connectedness with and service to God, and in this participate in our own reconciliation with what it is to be a person, ⁴ existing primarily in relation to a personal understanding of what, who and how God is. This approach is flawed and ‘anyone who thinks that (he) ⁵ has understood the divine scriptures or any part of them, but cannot by (his) understanding build up this double love of God and neighbour, has not yet succeeded in understanding them’. ⁶ Loving God is only possible by loving ‘other’, ‘when I am yours then I am at last completely myself, for I am not myself until I am yours’, (God’s and other’s). ⁷ A paradox as a human is the realizing of wholeness of self as we give of who we are to and with the other.

It is not by chance that this thinking has become somewhat overshadowed by a contemporary concept of the self as particular in relation to God, a binary understanding of relatedness to God with any understanding of the place of an-other in relation to God and ‘I’ as being ultimately non-essential. Further more, if we allow an impeded perspective of the other (who is not like me and therefore is not able to be easily loved by me), the one who is ‘Not-I’ can then be viewed as a separate entity, actually and theologically. God can therefore be construed as ‘mine’, faith being understood as a transaction between God and (my) self – a binary relating.

In a more contemporary sense (maybe in response to this prominent theological understanding that we can ‘own’ God), Rowan Williams warns of the need to be careful not to read Augustine as a using of the other to some how ‘get’ to God, but rather to ‘use the “love of neighbour” and the love we have for our own bodies, to simply allow the capacity for … such loves to be opened still further’, ⁸ therefore participating in what it means to love God: loving those who are ‘Not-I’, loving the ‘other’.

Williams ⁹ insists that enquiry into and engaging with another needs to be grounded in ‘a realistic epistemology’. ¹⁰ Fundamentally this is a statement about enquiry, and I argue that a realistic epistemological approach towards an other, ‘needs’ to be based on the assumption that the other is not known to me in this moment and so, enquiry is fundamentally essential. What is thought to be known about another needs to be tested, not assumed as correct. Unless we test what might be a phantasy ¹¹ about the other, an assumed ‘knowing’ can with alarming speed, become fact and therefore imposed upon about the other with a certainty, which destroys any need for faithful enquiry about the other.

Phantasies leave, as it were, their imprints on the mind, imprints that do not fade away but get stored up, remain active, and exert a continuous and powerful influence on the emotional and intellectual life of the individual. ¹²

To project such ‘knowledge’, (phantasy) onto another, disables the other, objectifying them, into what it is ‘I’ think they are, with very little concern for who it is they actually are as a self, as a person. The real tragedy lies within what is missed in this lack of exchange: an opportunity to actively participate more fully within the abundance of selfhood(s) that are present in those who are ‘Not-I’, and the world as ‘I’ do not see it.

A realistic epistemology of other-ness, takes into account a reality of the human condition, that we do, as persons, sometimes experience the world as if we are alone within it, and in this, existence can be understood as surviving rather than thriving, difference being a confronting obstacle rather than a potential resource and place of connection. Other-ness – that which is not me, or perceived to be like me, (or the me that I am not reconciled with) ¹³ – can be therefore viewed with suspicion and fear, with very little room for the person who is other, to be seen as an ‘I’ … a person not me.

By absolutising the other, otherness becomes un-thinkable … the other becomes an area of something like sacred terror, not the occasion for developing an often deeply ironic self articulation, and the discovery of a way of transcending scarcity. ¹⁴

By allowing the other to actually become ‘unthinkable’ as Williams suggests we essentially prohibit the person who is ‘Not-I’ to be present and available, paradoxically abandoning what is essential for living, not just surviving; engagement with the other, our neighbour, in order that we, me, ‘I’ might actually experience life as abundant.

If it is understood that the other’ can be accessed in ‘negotiable and revisable ways it may be possible to recognise potential abundance’. ¹⁵ This is what Christ meant when he said I have come that you might have life and have it in abundance (cf: Jn 10:10), abundance as a self, with the other and in God. In a capacious sense, this approach draws an enquiry into the concept of otherness, deep into creation as a whole, the ‘Not-I’-ness of another being, an alternative environment … other-others. In consideration of ‘other’ creaturely-ness, an enquiry about world-view, existence and purpose moves beyond a human issue, and into the realm of what it is to co-exist as sentient beings. I have wondered if a biological enquiry into the place and relatedness of all creatures could assist in a more specific enquiry about the place, purpose and meaningful existence for all human persons. I am suggesting that a (brief) foray into the worlds of creaturely existence could enable a further enquiry and an innovative exploration into what it is to be ‘Not-I’, and so with more effect, enter into a dialogue with ‘other’, with an understanding that this is a conversation on one level about emergent creation and the place each being has within it.

A Biological Approach to An Ontological Reality: the World Inhabited by ‘Not-I’

In 1909, the biologist Jakob von Uexküll, (a ‘hyper Kantian scientist’ ¹⁶ ) proposed and tested a thought that was radical at the time and that I argue is still profoundly unknown in a conscious sense, and so still a vital consideration. Uexküll considered all living organisms to be subjects that experienced their own ‘universe’, their own way of seeing the world as distinct, specific and with meaning. In this he challenged the more traditional assumption that an animal is nothing more than a selection of suitable effect-tools and perception-tools … made thereby into pure objects. ¹⁷ Uexküll’s observations reinforce the very practical reality that all beings understand the world, literally, as they ‘see’ it. Uexküll understood an organism’s perception, communication and purposeful behaviour as part of the purpose and sensations of a nature that is not limited to human beings. ¹⁸ In this, there is an inherent implication that human beings (as organisms), also share such distinct perceptions to their given environments. This approach essentially clarifies a fundamental reality that all beings (including persons, not exclusive to persons,) are subjects, and view ‘their’ world through a lens particular to them and in this, are a mystery, (in a sense) to any other – other.

In order to establish that all living beings are indeed subjects, not objects, Uexküll posits a dialogue between a physiologist and a biologist, the question being the existence of a tick as object (machine part), or subject (machine operator). The physiologist proposes that as all the receptors in the tick are connected to the central nervous system and that all reactions are reflexes, the tick is in fact a machine, an object, with no capacity for its identification in an environment; ‘the whole reflex arc was with the transfer of motion, just like any machine’. ¹⁹ ‘Exactly the opposite is the case’ the biologist argues, ‘all individual cells of the reflex arc act by transfer of stimuli … a stimulus has to be noticed by a subject and does not appear in objects’. ²⁰ The biologist insisted that as subjects, all beings exist in relation to their immediate environment and therefore actually have the capacity to notice and to respond.

Uexküll insists that all life is experienced in its own context, and is formed within a distinct meaningful habitat, ‘each environment forming a self-enclosed unit, which is governed in all its parts by its meaning for the subject. ²¹ In the forward to his published work on this thinking ²² he contextualizes his work not as an introduction into a new science, ‘but rather what one might call a description of a walk into unknown worlds’. ²³ His Kantian approach is established as an essential framework for his science, and his metaphysical awareness of the ‘unknown’ nature of the noumenal reality of otherness, is throughout his text, a philosophical fundamental on which he bases his biological hypothesis.

As persons we develop tools of understanding, methods of translating what we intuit (of the other) into what we understand in a conscious sense. In doing this we (according to Kant) learn to mediate, that is we enquire and formulate a conscious view of a person who is ‘Not-I’, and in this we are able (in some way) to consciously approach the other. ²⁴ Kant calls the world as it appears to our senses (after mediation through our tools of understanding), the phenomenal world. The world as it is before mediation Kant calls the noumenal world, the Das Ding an Sich, a phrase which literally means ‘the thing in itself’, but whose sense would be more accurately caught by translating it as ‘the thing (or world) as it really is’(as distinct from how it appears to ‘I’). It is the dialectic between these states of what is unknowable (nomena) and what appears to be knowable, (phenomena) that interests me particularly in relation to the hypothesis that Uexküll not only proposes, but argues, convincingly; that all beings, as subjects, exists in their own environmental understanding of the world, in meaningful interaction with other-ness, and this otherness is essentially unknowable, yet recognizable in the sense that we are aware, we ‘sense’ that it is present.

The most theologically essential link to be made between the philosophy of Kant and the biology of Uexküll is the acknowledgement of the unseen and unknowable lived reality of the other, the noumenal actuality of all beings, the world as it really is – the Das Ding an Sich and in this the identification of the philosophical dilemma of the paradoxical unknowability of that which we ‘sense’ existing as every beings particular environment. Uexküll makes the biological link, and I argue theological observation, that an environment unrecognized by one, is no way diminished in its vitality to the subject to whom this place is home. This philosophical and biological thinking is theological in essence and I argue vital as it helps to identify than any assumption of sameness, from one person to another, not only annihilates the other but also paradoxically cripples any capacity for an experience of abundance in the otherness of the one who is not ‘I’.

Uexküll’s primary concern is in his insistence in meaning ‘having priority in all living beings’. ²⁵ He objects to the understanding that nature, and sentient beings, are random in their actions, ultimately concluding that meaning has priority, right down to a cellular basis, is not random, and that subject to subject relate in response to lived reality of a particular environment. He saw:

nature around us, be they beetles, butterflies, gnats, or dragonflies who populate a meadow, as having a soap bubble around them, closed on all sides, which closes off their visual space and in which everything visible for the subject is also enclosed. ²⁶

My neighbours have an experience of life that is unique to them and therefore unknown and (yet) known of by myself. They, (as the dragonflies, bees and bumblebees), are contained by the boundary of being a subject and can only ever be understood and see the world as who they are as a subject. A task of the theologian is to recognize that the ‘other’ is ‘Not-I’ and to identify in some way with the absurdity yet necessity of such a consideration – of course the ‘other’ is not ‘I’, and yet, we can operate as if the other is the same as ‘I’ or dismiss other-ness as not being in any way connected to, or vital in, the experience ‘I’ have of the world. I am arguing that the reality is that we have a particular and communal experience in life where we see others and can be seen as a person in our differences as well as any experienced familiarity.

Uexküll understood environment as more than a place to survive, he attributed the environment particular to all subjects as a place in which a subject exists in a meaningful way. Having identified the inner world of organisms (including human beings), namely innerwelt, (inner world), the external place in which the collective reside he refers to as umgebung, (neighbourhood) he suggested that there was another lens in which all subjects in some sense understand them selves in relation to other.

Life is not just about matter and how it immediately interacts with itself, but also how that matter interacts in interconnected systems that includes in their separately perceiving worlds. ²⁷

These systems co-reside, and in a very real sense parallel the lived experience of all beings in a particular environment, identified by Uexküll as the umwelt, the world as it is, the Das Ding an Sich of all beings, the world as it is for ‘I’.

Umwelt: A Lived Experience of the World as ‘I’ See It

Uexküll named this ‘perceptual life world’ the umwelt, ²⁸ the outer world as perceived, specifically, by the organism within it, as he wanted a word to express a simple observation; different beings in the same ecosystem pick up on different environmental signals and therefore literally view their impression of the world through a most intimate and specific lens, exclusive to the individual.

We have to take the language of “impression” absolutely seriously and think about the self as showing the reality it encounters through the perceptible effect upon it of the agency of another. To be aware of the self is to be aware of something that bears the marks of otherness, not of a pristine independent subjectivity. ²⁹

This independency identifying a subjective self, intimately and intricately connected to all other subjects and enquiry into another’s ‘umwelt’ is universally crucial to all persons if we are to more fully understand what it is to be ‘Not-I’.

We keep going, locked into our little umwelts, only occasionally remembering to look up. When we do, more often than not, we find only more reflections of ourselves. ³⁰

Umvelt as a concept is an equalizing construct, relevant to all persons (and in a very real sense all sentient beings, all subjects), and is an understanding that can enable a dialogical enquiry into a space that is not colonized wholly by an individual, by ‘I’. This enquiry into another’s umwelt is a stepping into unknown territory in an attempt to locate what it is to be ‘Not-I’.

I think it would be useful if the concept of the umwelt were embedded in the public lexicon. It neatly captures the idea of limited knowledge, of unobtainable information, and of unimagined possibilities. Consider the criticisms of policy, the assertions of dogma, the declarations of fact that you hear every day — and just imagine if all of these could be infused with the proper intellectual humility that comes from appreciating the amount unseen. ³¹

This unseen-ness, this place that is real (the umwelt of the other), can be consciously unacknowledged, and yet it is vital in our enquiry and encounter of otherness if we are to engage with the reality that the appercipient other is ‘Not- I’. By responding to the first and ‘greatest’ commandment to love God, we must turn to our neighbour, the one who is ‘not I’ and encounter the revivifying, recognizing and revealing of the one who is ‘Not-I;’ the neighbour. In order to most effectively enquire of and be enquired of, we need to be aware of difference in hearing and seeing, If we can understand that all who are ‘Not-I’ exist in an umwelt that is particular to them we are at least on the way to a more conscious understanding that what ‘I’ see and understand to be real, may not be seen, heard or even processed in a similar way by another.

Uexküll argues that we comfort ourselves all too easily with the illusion that the relations of another kind of subject to the things of its environment play out in the same space and time as the relations that link us to the things of our human environment. This illusion is fed by the belief in the existence of one and only one world, in which all living beings are encased, and a singular understanding of what this world is and how it appears to all who are in it. ‘From this arises the widely held conviction that there must be one and only one space and time for all living beings’. ³² The assumption that the world is experienced by others even in a similar way to the experience ‘I’ have as a person is misleading. The truth is that every animal, no matter how free in its movements, is bound to a certain dwelling-world. ³³ Not only do all beings exist in the context of what it is to be themselves, but also have within the context of their lives, a boundary and a restriction particular to their own experience. An assumptions that our neighbour has any experience of life other than one that is unique to them and therefore unknown and possibly viewed as strange by myself, is missing the point that they too, are bound by the boundary of being a person.

Having identified that this is indeed an area that needs further thought and exploration, I have come to the conclusion that what is needed, is in fact, a conscious halting and considering, of the other, in relation to any ‘thing’ the other has that we desire. This halting is a place in which we participate consciously, drawing near too, and considering the other as subject as we examine the intention with which we approach what it is that the other has, (narrative, story, experience that we want to use). A place where there is a context in which we may reconsider and turn back, or in fact, be refused entry. This is a conscious halting, a lacuna … a pause.

A Hermeneutic of Pause-ing ³⁴

A pause is an active and expectant state of being, and becoming in the ‘pausing’. A pause has within is essence check a waiting, an implicit … and then. We can pause before we move, before we speak, before we act in a state of preparedness. A pause is defined by the act that follows it, or it would not be a pause, it would be an ending, or a silence, it is a space before … what is yet to be. A pause is an act of participation with what follows. We do not enter into pause, or hold a pause, or participate in a moment of pause, it is a place in which we breathe and move from, a living space that is I am suggesting, a dialogue, an active consideration of and a gathering in what is present, God, self and other. A pause can contain and clarify what is innately possible within the created order, not (although limited by) a person’s desire and capacity to engage with a reality of another.

To pause is to be in an anticipatory state of hiatus and it is a ceasing, for a moment, an active codifying and yet, paradoxical moving beyond and around language and views of the world as we think we see it. This space I am proposing is an essential element in an articulation of enquiry.

Most people do not and will not think around and beyond the language they consume, or maybe have not acquired the skills to do so. The words and language can codify a view of the world, and the language itself confirms, reinforces or even directs people’s attitudes and beliefs. ³⁵

I am suggesting that what we need to do in order to most creatively dialogue and listen to the voices of others, is to institute a discipline within the linguistic construct of dialogue and engagement with other(s). In order to resist ‘codifying’ such an intention, I am suggesting we need to actually pause, and consider the consequences that may arise out of this approach. Such a consideration could potentially alter the way in which we employ the notion of the other and the reality of this other being actually a person, not just an apologue. To pause hermeneutically, is a re-considering of what it is to engage in a dialogue with another, specifically in the context of a narrative of a life being lived with purpose and meaning. It can become a discipline that presents an opportunity to listen and understand that in the recognition of the other, and the recognizing of this other voice, there may well be a need to reconsider what has been assumed or even in some way ‘known’ about the other. As previously stated, I have a great deal of unease about the telling of another’s story. Actively participating with a narrative to make a point, or illustration to gain polemical ground, I am also very clear that we can only gain an understanding of the other by and through dialogue, story and encounter. I am therefore contending that there needs to be a creative and practical re-thinking of how discourse with and about the other is considered and held honourably, with dignity in theological dialogue, written and in conversation.

A group of high school students from Lincoln High School ³⁶ recently preformed a slam poem exploring exactly the point I am attempting to make in this article. When faced with the pain of another; ungraspable on an intellectual (theological) level and unresolvable in an immediate sense, they, like I (though with so much more eloquence and efficiency), have come to the conclusion that to realize most fully the place of confluence that is present when narratives collide; they pause.

Pause

I would write a love poem, but I am not sure I have ever been in love. Paul said to write about something I hate, but I am not sure I can make my hate eloquent. Westborough Baptist Church, mushrooms and inequality provoke less sophisticated language than I am fond of. But I was inspired once, twice, a few times. Sometimes I see things and they make me … pause.

They stop my thoughts and all I feel is my beating heart. I see crisscross scars on the wrists of my closest friends. They are razor blades turned into Zeus’ lightening bolt.

I pause.

I see a woman sitting by herself in the car, the picture on my computer screen bent, too distraught for tears, with the phone held to her ear and her hand pressed to he ?? check chest because she does not know if her sister, a teacher at Sandy Oak Elementary School survived. I hear her voice; “what do you mean you don’t know”? It says, “tell me” it begs, “TELL ME” and I …

Pause … Because I don’t know to what else to do.

I see hundreds of Nebraskan’s holding candles in a vigil against violence, united in sorrow, in call to action, and even if that hate crime was staged that solidarity wasn’t.

Pause.

I see eight year old me being told we can’t be friends any more because you’re Jewish.

Pause.

I see two young boys petitioning to make their boy-scout troop and troops around the nation accept them and not reject them just because they are gay,

Pause.

I hear stories of thousands of men and women rising up in India against rape, turning a tragedy into a symbol of hope.

Pause.

I stop and I identify and empathize, the earth spins fast and it is a ride we cannot get off easily, but we can …

Pause … temporarily halting speech in action.

Plays without intermissions are overwhelming, and so is life. So surround yourself with something that will make you break away, break away from your mechanized actions and rote logic. Take a moment to feel and to understand. Wait a moment and cease to be a cog in the machine and be a being, a soul.

People always say; go, go, GO … Stand up and do, make something, change something!

I will write a love poem to the world and maybe we will discover that before we can create reform we have to learn to … pause.

Pause.

Pause … together. ³⁷