The issue of how to organize and implement a European security and defence `identity' has been discussed at both the political and the academic level throughout the past decade. Initially, it was basically related only to NATO or, at best, to the NATO-WEU interface. As such, it did not make much progress, in spite of the commitments taken especially in Berlin (1996) and the limited decisions adopted in the WEU framework in 1997. Even at that time, the main bones of contention were the extent to which NATO `assets and capabilities' would be put at the disposal of `European-led' peace support operations and, as a consequence, the role and the rights of those European allies that were not full members of the WEU. With the onset of the ESDP and the de facto withering away of the WEU, the issue has become a bilateral one between the European Union and the Alliance. The controversial points have remained more or less the same, but the political and legal contexts have changed. Ever since, apparently, the main obstacle to an arrangement between the two organizations allowing the EU to have `assured access' to NATO planning capabilities has been Turkey's attitude. The article examines in detail all the problems involved, assessing the current state of affairs and drawing some conclusions for the future.
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References
1.
`European Security and Defence: The Case for Setting “Convergence Criteria”', European Foreign Affairs Review, no. 4, 1999. An earlier version of this article was given at a meeting of the `Venusberg Group' of the Bertelsmann Research Foundation held in Ankara in November 2001, but the author alone is responsible for its contents.
2.
1 First formulated in the June 1992 Petersberg Declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers, these entailed `humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking'. The term `peace-making' (which in UN jargon is instead linked to purely diplomatic actions) was commonly interpreted as `peace-enforcement'. According to former WEU secretary-general Wim van Eekelen, the term was chosen `because Germany found it difficult to accept an earlier version: “tasks of combat forces in crisis management, limited armed conflict and armed conflict”' (see his Debating European Security 1948-1998 [The Hague: SDU Publishers, 1998], p. 127). Curiously enough, the inclusion of the `Petersberg tasks' in the TEU was proposed at the 1996-97 Intergovernmental Conference by non-NATO and non-WEU members Sweden and Finland.
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2 For an analysis from a Turkish perspective, see Münevver Cebeci, `A Delicate Process of Participation: The Question of Participation of WEU Associate Members in Decision-Making for EU-Led Petersberg Operations, with Special Reference to Turkey', Occasional Papers, no. 10, November 1999 (Paris: WEU ISS).
4.
3 When Greece became the WEU's 10th Full Member (1995), it did so on the basis of Part III, Section A of the Petersberg Declaration, which states, inter alia, that `the security guarantees and defence commitments in the treaties which bind the member States within WEU and which bind them within the Atlantic Alliance are mutually reinforcing and will not be invoked by those subscribing to Part III of the Petersberg Declaration in disputes between member States of either of the two organisations' [italics added]. In other words, Greece could not resort to Article V mBT guarantees (collective defence and automatic support) in the event of a conflict with Turkey.
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4 It was US Defense Secretary Les Aspin who, in September 1993, first raised the idea of setting up Combined Joint Task Forces for running peace support operations without necessarily engaging all NATO countries. Formally launched by the North Atlantic Council held in Brussels in January 1994, the concept was further developed in Berlin in June 1996. Accordingly, three `formats' were envisaged: (1) `NATO-only' CJTFs, (2) `NATO-plus' (with reference also to the new Partnership for Peace programme) and (3) `WEU-led' ones. Potentially, all three formats (but especially the third) entailed the possibility of NATO peace support operations led by Europeans. It was in that context that the notion of the ESDI was first articulated, although the acronym appeared for the first time in June 1992 in the final communiqué of the Oslo North Atlantic Council ministerial (van Eekelen, note 1 above, pp. 359-360).
6.
5 The membership of the group, traditionally at 13 (Full plus Associate Members), was extended to the three new allies (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) and the non-allied EU partners minus Ireland (i.e. Sweden, Finland and Austria) at the Marseilles WEU Council of Ministers in November 2000.
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6 In 2000, after the three new Central European allies joined, Norway and Turkey covered 1.9% of the WEU budget, Poland 1.39, Hungary 0.54, the Czech Republic 0.52, Iceland 0.1: the `key' is marginally different for the separate budget on the WEU's Transatlantic Forum (TFA) activities, in which Denmark replaces Iceland and covers 3.0% (as does Norway, while Turkey pays 1.8%). For a comparison with the Full Members: the Big Four covered 16.75% each, Spain 10.3, the Netherlands 6.15, Belgium 5.9, Portugal and Greece 2.0 each, Luxembourg 0.3 (with marginal shifts for the TFA).
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7 It is worth noting, however, that Associate Members actively participated only in the WEU's Multinational Advisory Police Element Operation in Albania (MAPE, 1997-2001), while, for example, Observer Sweden became the `framework nation' for the WEU's De-mining Assistance Mission in Croatia (WEUDAM, 1999-2001), the first (and only) operation conducted by the WEU on the `request' of the EU - and with EU financing - on the basis of Article J.4.2 of the Maastricht Treaty.
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8 On this whole set of problems, see Stephen De Spiegeleire, `The European Security Identity and NATO: Berlin and Beyond', in Mathias Jopp & Hanna Ojanen, eds, European Security Integration: Implications for Non-Alignment and Alliances (Helsinki, UPI-FIIA, 1999), pp. 57-99. Aside from SHAPE, the Alliance operates only one supranational capability, namely Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS), which is funded through NATO, consisting of 18 Luxembourg-registered aircraft, shared among members and manned by many nationalities. Troops are committed to the Alliance but remain under national control.
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9 See, for example, Constanze Stelzenmüller, `Bizarrer Konflikt' [Bizarre Conflict], Die Zeit, 2 March 2000.
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10 It is worth stressing that the `interface' function was only virtual - it was never put to the test - and not particularly efficient. A tentative `flow-chart' drawn up on the occasion of a joint EU-WEU exercise held in June 1998, in fact, showed that no fewer than 25 distinct procedural steps across the two organizations might have been necessary to trigger the management of an international crisis. The steps would have amounted to 37 (or 45, depending on the type of `interface') if NATO assets were to be used [WEU CM (98) 39, Modus Operandi of Article J.4.2/Article 17.3 and Flow Chart (13 November 1998)].
12.
11 See Maartje Rutten, ed., From St.Malo to Nice - European Defence: Core Documents, Chaillot Papers, no. 47 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, May 2001), which includes all the relevant declarations and texts.
13.
David Barchard , Turkey and the European Union (London: Centre for European Reform, 1998).
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13 Roughly 1,000 Turkish soldiers serve in K-FOR, and Ankara has `offered' to the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) an infantry brigade of 5,000 men, two air squadrons (and two transport aircraft) and one amphibious infantry battalion (plus seven ships and one submarine).
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14 See also `Turkey and NATO', Financial Times, 19 December 2000, p. 15.
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15 See, for example, Ismail Cem, `A Necessary Role in Defence', Financial Times, 29 May 2001, p. 15.
17.
Ideally, Turkey would have the droit de regard extended to the Middle East, the Caucasus and the whole of the Balkans. This is also why Turkish officials claimed that, out of 16 possible scenarios for the use of the ERRF, 13 affected Turkey's `neighbourhood': see Laurent Zecchini, `Ankara assouplit sa position sur la cooperation OTAN-UE' [Ankara softens its position on NATO-EU cooperation], Le Monde, 1 June 2001, p. 3.
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17 Precisely such a factual development, however, may also be seen as dangerous for the accountability and even legality of the ESDP, let alone the `decisionmaking autonomy' of the Union: see, for example, Lydia Pnevmaticou, `Aspects juridiques de la PESD' [Juridical Aspects of the ESDP], Occasional Papers, no. 31 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, November 2001).
19.
and Gareth Jenkins, `Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics', Adelphi Papers, no. 337 (London: IISS, 2001).
20.
See also Nicole Pope, `Les dirigeants chypriotes grecs et turques reprennent le dialogue sous l'égide de l'ONU' [Greek Cypriot and Turkish leaders resume their dialogue under the aegis of the UN], Le Monde, 5 December 2001, p. 8.
21.
The government led by Costas Simitis would be harshly attacked by the opposition, in the wake of Laeken, for not having used a formal veto. For a recent general assessment of the state of affairs between Athens and Ankara, see Dimitris Keridis & Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, eds, Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalisation (London: Brassey's, 2001).
22.
21 Dana H. Allin & Jonathan Stevenson, `Anchoring Ankara', Wall Street Journal, 14 December 2001, p. 8.
