Agents without agency: Assessing the role of the audience in securitization theory

Abstract

This article assesses the role of the audience in securitization theory. The main argument is that in order to accurately capture the role of the securitization audience, it must be theorized as an active agent, capable of having a meaningful effect on the intersubjective construction of security values. Through a meta-synthesis of 32 empirical studies of securitization, this article focuses on two central questions: (1) Who is the audience? (2) How does the audience engage in the construction of security? When assessed against the theoretical works on securitization, this analysis reveals that the manner in which the audience is defined and characterized within securitization theory differs with the empirical literature that investigates securitization processes. Where the empirical literature suggests securitization is a highly intersubjective process involving active audiences, securitization theory characterizes audiences as agents without agency, thereby marginalizing the theory’s intersubjective nature. This article sketches a new characterization of the securitization audience and outlines a framework for securitizing actor–audience interaction that better accounts for securitization theory’s linguistic and intersubjective character, addresses this theoretical/empirical conflict, and improves our understanding of how groups select and justify security priorities and costly security policies.

Keywords

Audience Copenhagen School intersubjectivity securitization security

Introduction

How do political groups decide what is threatening to their security and select policies to address threats? Securitization theory, which argues that security threats are constructed through intersubjective processes between securitizing actors (socially authorized security ‘speakers’) and audiences, represents one of the most innovative answers to this question in security studies today. This innovation stems from securitization theory’s intersubjective nature – the idea that threats and security are defined ‘among the subjects’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 31) – which stands in sharp contrast to other security theories.

Yet, though intersubjectivity is a key component of securitization theory, the understanding of the concept within the theory is limited. Intersubjective beliefs are a product of social and group interaction and provide meaning to the social and material world through the creation of shared meanings, norms, values, and identities. These shared beliefs not only facilitate our interpretation of objective reality but also construct our interests and inform our behavior (Guzzini, 2000). Within the theory of securitization, however, the concept of intersubjectivity occupies a precarious place. In its original formulation, securitization is defined as an illocutionary speech act (Wæver, 1995), meaning that the use of security language does not offer an interpretation of reality but instead has ‘the potential to create (new) reality’ (Stritzel, 2007: 361). At the same time, securitization is held to be an ‘intersubjective process’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 30), implying that security threats are produced through a social process of constructing shared understandings regarding their existence and character within a group.

Though its original proponents, the Copenhagen School, claim that securitization theory is ‘a combination of language and society’, built upon the actions of illocutionary speech and the construction of intersubjective values through the recognition and authorization of that speech (Buzan et al., 1998: 32), there is an inherent contradiction present in this view. Defining securitization as an illocutionary speech act seems to preclude its definition as an intersubjective process. The terminology itself – ‘act’ versus ‘process’ – is problematic. One implies a single, definitive instance of security definition, while the other implies a longer and more indefinite security construction procedure.

The basic logic is as follows: One cannot argue that the speaking of security creates a threat and that an intersubjective understanding of the issue as a security threat must be established before it can be perceived as such. As an illocutionary speech act, language is imbued with such power as to be able to create social reality through the actions of a speaker, leaving little room for social interaction or authorization. Conversely, as an intersubjective process, language is not ‘productive of security’ but is instead ‘one component of the inter-subjective construction of security’ (McDonald, 2008: 566), thereby opening the door for greater consideration of social interaction and authorization in the creation of shared security values.

This contradiction is heavily rooted in the concept of the securitization audience. The audience is portrayed as being fundamental to the intersubjective character of securitization theory and an essential aspect of the creation of shared security meanings and the justification of security policies, as the success of a securitizing move (the speech act through which the securitizing actor presents something as a security threat), and in turn the entire securitization process, depends on audience acceptance (Buzan et al., 1998; Balzacq, 2005; Stritzel, 2007). However, scholars have yet to fully understand how the audience operates within securitization processes, or with what effects. The audience has been called ‘radically underdeveloped’ (Williams, 2011: 212), and securitization theory has been criticized for leaving ‘the actual politics of acceptance … radically under-determined’ (Salter, 2008: 324). The treatment of the audience within securitization theory has been inconsistent and at times non-existent, creating confusion surrounding both its identity and its purpose (Salter, 2008; Williams, 2011; Léonard and Kaunert, 2011; Vaughn, 2009). Some scholars have gone so far as to argue that the Copenhagen School ‘negate[s] the audience’ (Balzacq, 2005: 179), while others have suggested that the securitization audience is ‘not an analytical concept at all, but rather a normative concept in analytical disguise’ (Floyd, 2010: 50, 2015) and ought to be dropped from securitization analysis. This has served only to exacerbate the tensions concerning the intersubjective character of the theory and to perpetuate criticisms regarding its contradictory nature.

This article undertakes a meta-synthesis of the treatment of the securitization audience within the empirical and theoretical literature. It examines 32 studies of securitization and, in doing so, highlights two major themes regarding the securitization process and the audience. When these themes are assessed against the original securitization framework and its subsequent revisions, it is revealed that the manner in which the audience is defined and characterized within securitization theory differs with the empirical literature that investigates securitization processes. Where the empirical literature suggests securitization is a highly intersubjective process involving an active and engaged audience, securitization theory characterizes the audience as agents without agency, marginalizing the theory’s intersubjective nature. Audiences are central to the securitization process and its outcome; however, the ability of audiences to engage actively in the process is nearly non-existent within securitization theory. This not only analytically prevents the audience from having any significant effect on the nature and outcome of securitization processes but also dilutes the intersubjective disposition of securitization theory, producing a linear and rigid view of the securitization process that conflicts with the empirical literature regarding security threat construction.

Building on the identified themes, this article provides the foundation for a reimagination of the securitization audience as an active agent within an iterative and contextually situated securitization process, capable of having an independent effect on securitization outcomes. Reimagined as such, the position and status of the audience is solidified in relation to other units of analysis, thereby offering a reformulation of the securitizing actor–audience relationship that bolsters the intersubjective nature of securitization, addresses the theoretical/empirical conflict, and provides a more robust framework through which to examine the construction and legitimation of security threats and policies.

The article proceeds as follows. The first section discusses the importance of the audience for securitization theory. The second section explains the selection of studies analyzed. The third and fourth sections undertake an analysis of the empirical and theoretical literature and put forward a new characterization of the securitization audience and framework for actor–audience interaction. The final section uses two illustrative case examples in order to demonstrate the analytical and explanatory utility of this new characterization.

The importance of the audience

Recently, some scholars have argued that the notion of audience acceptance represents a rigid adherence to the original Copenhagen School framework, unfounded in reality (Floyd, 2010, 2011). The most forceful argument of this position contends that the commitment to ‘intersubjectivity’ by the Copenhagen School is a misguided normative allegiance (Floyd, 2010: 50–51, 2011: 428, 2015: 15) and, given this, that the audience should be overlooked or outright rejected as a key component of security analysis. Accordingly, these scholars remove the traditional notion of ‘audience acceptance’ from revised theories of securitization in favor of a focus on security action, either in the form of a concrete policy change (Salter, 2011; Collins, 2005) or ‘a change of behaviour (action) by a relevant agent’ (Floyd, 2015: 8).

Though this approach highlights key dilemmas within securitization theory and exposes the underdefined nature of the audience, it represents a selective reading of the Copenhagen School. Notably, it overlooks the commitment to the discursive legitimation of security speech, a key theoretical element separating securitization from other political and security theories (Williams, 2003; Wæver, 2011). For the Copenhagen School, this commitment, vested in the audience, imbues securitization theory with its intersubjective character (Wæver, 2011).

While a selective reading of the Copenhagen School is not problematic per se, it creates lingering theoretical and empirical complications that highlight the significance of the securitization audience. Theoretically, it sets the requirement for securitization success too high by placing the threshold for success at the ‘implementation of security policy into practice’ (Floyd, 2015: 9). This overlooks the notion that the acceptance of a securitizing move is, itself, a security action. Securitization is a redefinition of the rights, responsibilities, and relationships of agents that legitimizes the use of actions that go beyond standard political procedure (Vuori, 2008; Watson, 2009; Wæver, 2015). Therefore, pushing the threshold of securitization success so high as to require policies to be implemented obscures the idea that successful securitization (as a political status transformation) can have its own independent effect on domestic and external political relations.

Furthermore, despite arguments that the concept of the securitization audience envisioned by the Copenhagen School does not manifest itself in empirical reality, there is little empirical evidence provided to substantiate such claims. In many cases where audiences are marginalized or explicitly excluded, the choice to do so is methodological rather than ontological (Salter, 2011; Peoples, 2011). Further, as will be demonstrated in later sections, there is a significant body of empirical evidence that suggests a vital role for the audience in the creation of shared security beliefs and the selection, legitimation, and implementation of security actions.

As the ‘addressee of the speech act’, to borrow Rita Floyd’s (2015: 12) terminology, the audience is a distinct and unique component of the securitization process and is distinguished from other units such as aggressors (the addressee of security actions), referent objects (the entity to be protected), or functional actors (key security influencers that do not have the capacity to legitimize new security meanings alone but can affect the dynamics of actor–audience interaction) (Floyd, 2015: 12; Buzan et al., 1998: 36), though it may share strong connections with these other units. This distinctiveness originates from the key insight of securitization theory: security is a flexible concept, socially and linguistically defined, that often (if not always) must be ‘justified’ (Floyd, 2015: 3), ‘accept[ed]’ (Balzacq et al., 2015: 2), ‘authorize[d]’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 32), ‘facilitate[d]’ (Bourbeau, 2011: 41–42), minimally ‘tolerated’ (Stritzel, 2007: 361), or in some way ‘legitimized’ by individuals or groups, thereby creating new security meanings and legitimized responses.

Thus, the audience is a key component of securitization theory owing not to a normative commitment, unreflected in empirical reality, nor to a rigid adherence to the original Copenhagen School framework, but instead to the ‘crucial importance’ (Balzacq et al., 2015: 6) of the audience to the core of securitization theory’s explanatory uniqueness and capacity. Rather than a call for audience omission or marginalization, the literature discussed above instead highlights the importance, yet vagueness, of the concept of the audience and emphasizes the need to adequately elucidate its status and role within securitization theory.

Unraveling the audience in the securitization literature

This article focuses on exploring the concept of the audience through a meta-synthesis (Newig and Fritsch, 2009; Walsh and Downe, 2005) of 32 empirical studies of securitization (see Appendix). Each study seeks to directly trace a securitization process and addresses the role of the audience in a substantive, if sometimes indirect, fashion. Analytically, this examination is concerned with two overarching questions: (1) Who is the securitization audience? (2) How does the audience engage in the construction of security threats and values? Therefore, the primary objectives of this analysis are to better explicate the identity and capacity for engagement of the securitization audience.

As is true in most cases, decisions surrounding ‘case’ selection are not without their drawbacks. For this analysis, two come to mind. First is the question of whether empirical studies are adequately sufficient as analytical foundations for theory development, as they are exclusively secondary sources. This raises questions regarding the reliability of the analysis, as it depends on primary source data collected and analyzed by others. This has the potential to create problems of indirect selection bias, in which elements omitted in the original analysis are, by definition, omitted in the analysis here.

While the problem of indirect selection bias is taken seriously, the use of empirical studies as the basis for a meta-synthesis of the treatment of the securitization audience can at least partially be justified with reference to other securitization literature that engages in similar analysis. For example, reviews of empirical studies have been used to identify biases in securitization case selection (Lupovici, 2014a), to locate security debates within larger sociopolitical foundations or contestations (Bilgin, 2011), and to explain reticence/receptiveness to the securitization approach (Watson, 2012). In addition, the use of empirical studies as the basis for a critical analysis of the securitization audience development may actually increase the analytical rigor of this project. If general themes can be found throughout the analysis of secondary sources, then the case can be made that it is all the more likely that these themes represent generalizable conclusions that are worthy of theoretical inquiry and analytical development.

Second are concerns raised about the inclusion and/or exclusion of empirical studies in the analysis. The choice of the 32 studies analyzed here is justified on the basis that they address a wide variety of issue-areas, geographic regions, time frames, securitizing actors, audiences, security narratives, and outcomes. Given this, these studies offer a diverse view of the securitization process and audience. In addition, they represent some of the most widely cited studies of securitization. However, they are not an exhaustive representation of the entirety of the securitization literature. Owing to concerns of brevity and clarity, this meta-synthesis eliminates empirical literature that examines other aspects of securitization theory such as the role of functional or securitizing actors (Sjöstedt, 2007), the content of securitizing narratives (Watson, 2012), the function of security practice in the construction of security threats (Huysmans, 2006), or the mapping of security contexts (Hayes, 2013). This should be read not as selection bias but rather as a reflection of the enormity of the securitization literature and the variety of angles from which securitization theory can be assessed.

Related to this are concerns regarding the decision to include only studies that address the audience and the manner in which the audience is addressed within each study. On the one hand, focusing only on literature that includes the audience risks skewing the analysis towards conclusions that favor audience significance. On the other hand, relaxing this limitation jeopardizes the internal coherence of the analysis through the introduction of varied notions of the securitization audience, making it difficult to adequately assess all chosen studies under a single conceptual framework.

Considerable variation exists within the studies regarding the analytical focus given to the audience. In some instances, there is an intense focus on the role of the audience as a central figure. In others, the audience is analytically marginalized or excluded. Thus, the discussions of the securitization audience in each study are not equal, congruent, or, in many cases, in agreement with one another. While this variation addresses problems of audience bias, it amplifies concerns regarding the incompatibility of assessing varying notions of the securitization audience. For two reasons, this should not be interpreted negatively. First, the widely varied treatment of the audience within the empirical work on securitization speaks directly to the necessity of its further study. The theoretical underspecification of the audience and its role creates important obstacles to establishing ‘the merits of one explanation over another’ (Balzacq et al., 2015: 6). Because of this, the empirical application of the audience will necessarily produce varying results. Conducting a meta-synthesis of a wide variety of empirical and theoretical works has the potential to highlight similarities and gaps in the theorization and application of the audience, as well as to illuminate the manner in which the audience can be better conceptualized.

Second, the diversity of these studies creates a broad range of analytical potential and makes the discovery of idiosyncratic patterns or themes a relatively low risk. Given this, the studies chosen for analysis here provide a more than adequate representation of the general application of securitization theory and the securitization audience from which to conduct a meta-synthesis.

Assessing the securitization audience in empirical studies

Within the empirical work, the identity of the audience varies widely. Many studies focus either explicitly or implicitly on the general public within a democratic state (Roe, 2008; Abrahamsen, 2005; Hughes, 2007; Hayes, 2012; Salter, 2008; Floyd, 2010). In some studies, however, the audience is a specific branch of government (Bright, 2012; Roe, 2008; Salter, 2008; Vuori, 2008), local elites (Curley and Herington, 2011), donors (Vaughn, 2009), organizational colleagues (Vaughn, 2009; Salter, 2008), or technical experts (Salter and Piché, 2011), among others. Many studies highlight the existence of multiple audiences (Salter, 2008; Bright, 2012; Roe, 2008; Vaughn, 2009; Bourbeau, 2011), even in cases where the audience is marginalized in securitization analysis (Peoples, 2011). While there is little generalizability that can be gleaned from the empirical work regarding the identity of the audience, the empirical work demonstrates that the identity of securitization audiences is often dependent on the context of the securitization process in question, as well as the differential capacity of groups to authorize security speech and legitimize the actions sought by the securitizing actor. Given this, any definition of audience identity requires confronting the audience’s contextualized nature while, at the same time, delineating its universal legitimizing character.

The empirical work also reveals a central role for the securitization audience. For the purpose of this analysis, two themes are apparent. The first is that securitizing actors and audiences engage in repeated, contextually situated interactions. In much of the empirical literature, ‘securitizing moves do not exist in isolation’ (Wilkinson, 2007: 20) but are instead connected to other moves that occur within specific contextual circumstances, placing the securitization process within ‘a particular setting and in time’ (Salter, 2008: 322).¹ Therefore, a common phenomenon is the analysis of multiple securitizing moves and audience responses regarding a single issue over time (Roe, 2008: 624–632; Bourbeau, 2011: 53–63, 2014: 196–205; Wilkinson, 2007: 17–20; Salter and Piché, 2011: 938–944; Bright, 2012: 870–875; Collins, 2005: 576–584; Hughes, 2007: 89–91; Wishnick, 2010: 457–461; Watson, 2009: 54–79; Hayes, 2009: 990–994; Salter and Mutlu, 2013: 820; Lupovici, 2014b: 11–13; Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014: 6–8; Stritzel, 2012: 561–562). These repeated interactions tend to produce modified securitizing moves designed to secure audience acceptance (Roe, 2008: 633; Bright, 2012: 872; Hughes, 2007: 90). This suggests that securitization proceeds in an iterative fashion, where previous actor–audience interactions affect future securitizing moves.

The second is that audiences actively engage in the securitization process. In large portions of the empirical literature, audience members actively participate in the intersubjective construction of security meaning. This is true even in cases where audiences are analytically marginalized or excluded (Floyd, 2010; Bourbeau, 2011). In the majority of cases, audiences challenged the securitizing actor’s presentation of the issue, forcing the securitizing actor to either abandon its attempt at securitization or reengage the audience with a new or modified securitizing move or security narrative (Salter, 2008: 336; Bourbeau, 2011: 53–63; Bright, 2012: 871–872; Roe, 2008: 633; McInnes and Rushton, 2013: 126–127; Lupovici, 2014b: 15–16; Floyd, 2010; Watson, 2009: 54–79). In many cases, audience action had a direct effect on substantive policy outcomes (Curley and Herington, 2011: 163; Bright, 2012: 871; Salter, 2008; Bourbeau, 2011; Roe, 2008; Åtland and Ven Bruusgaard, 2009; Wilkinson, 2007; Lupovici, 2014b: 15–16), though the degree of influence was not uniform. In some cases, audience responses were split, causing ‘partial’ or ‘uneven’ securitizations (McInnes and Rushton, 2013: 128; Jackson, 2006: 314; Caballero-Anthony, 2006: 115), disagreements among audience members (Salter and Piché, 2011: 939; Roe, 2008: 625; Bright, 2012: 872), or a combination of acquiescence and rebuttal (Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014: 7). In several cases, differing audience interpretations of similar securitizing moves led to significant variations in security outcomes (Hansen, 2011: 63–64; Stritzel, 2014: 117–175; Stritzel and Schmittchen, 2011: 170–186). In one case, anticipation of audience responses by securitizing actors, in conjunction with expressed audience unease, contributed to a weak securitizing move, well below the level of urgency and policy response desired by the securitizing actor (Hayes, 2012: 84). In another, the audience actively punished securitizing actors by voting them out of office for pursing extraordinary measures without their acceptance (Collins, 2005: 578). In still another case, the audience engaged in actions that went well beyond the original intentions of securitizing actors, thus intensifying the urgency and extremity of the securitization (Wilkinson, 2007: 19).

Taken together, these themes reveal that securitization is a highly intersubjective, iterative process, involving interactions between contextually situated securitizing actors and active audiences. While the actions and influence of audiences vary significantly across cases, a general conclusion that can be reached from the empirical literature is that audiences have, at a minimum, the potential to exert influence over securitization processes and the policies selected to address perceived threats. Similarly, while the level of audience engagement varied across cases, the presence of active audiences in a large number of cases, combined with their potential to influence securitization outcomes, suggests that to adequately answer the question posed above – how does the audience engage in the construction of security threats and values? – requires acknowledging this potential for agency and influence.

Evaluating the audience in securitization theory

It has been convincingly argued that the securitization literature has thus far outlined the notion of the audience in vague terms (Léonard and Kaunert, 2011). Though the Copenhagen School claims to follow in the Arendtian tradition (Wæver, 2011; Buzan et al., 1998) by placing the power to define threats ‘in-between humans’ (Wæver, 2011: 468), it has otherwise been silent on the exact nature of the audience and its role. While subsequent attempts to revise securitization theory have sought to better explicate the role and function of the audience, a gap, in terms of both the identity of the audience and its capacity for engagement, continues to persist between the portrayal of the audience in securitization theory and its manifestation in empirical investigations.

Audience identity

Originally, the Copenhagen School defined the audience as ‘those the securitizing act attempts to convince to accept the exceptional procedures’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 41) or, more recently, as ‘those who have to be convinced in order for the securitizing move to be successful’ (Wæver, 2003). These definitions, unfortunately, do not provide significant insight. They reveal very little about the audience itself but are instead restatements of the audience’s task in the securitization process. Further work has suggested that multiple audiences may exist within a single securitization process, and that audiences often possess differential powers and influence, leading to differing effects on securitization outcomes (Balzacq, 2005; Léonard and Kaunert, 2011). According to these views, audiences are defined by their connection to the legitimization and authorization of security speech (Balzacq, 2005), by their position within different phases or ‘settings’ of securitization processes (Léonard and Kaunert, 2011; Salter, 2008), or by their potential to authorize security action (Collins, 2005; Roe, 2008).

Consistent with the empirical literature reviewed above, this work shares an understanding that audience identification is a case-specific consideration. Audiences are not the same across different instances of securitization, nor are they necessarily defined by a universal task or trait. While defining the audience in this way retains significant flexibility, it offers little guidance regarding the identification of the audience in empirical situations. How can audiences be identified in specific cases? Who exactly needs to be convinced of the existence of a security threat? Why is convincing them necessary?

Conversely, outlining a specific definition of ‘who’ the audience is risks decontextualizing the audience and assigning it an essential characteristic, thereby limiting the scope of audience analysis to political collectivities that contain an audience that fits this essential characteristic. This has the effect of pigeon-holing securitization theory into particular conceptions of politics, notably democracies (Wilkinson, 2007), and risks marginalizing alternative voices in the construction of shared security values (Hansen, 2000).

To resolve this definitional conundrum, this article builds on the work of Vuori (2008) and Balzacq (2005; Balzacq et al., 2015) to put forward a ‘capabilities’ definition of the audience. Vuori claims that audiences are defined by their ‘ability to provide the securitizing actor with whatever s/he is seeking to accomplish with the securitization’ (Vuori, 2008: 72, emphasis added). Similarly, Balzacq et al. (2015: 7) emphasize the notion of an ‘enabling’ or ‘formal’ audience that ‘empowers the securitizing actor … to act’. These definitions represent important departures from previous ones, as they define audiences by what they contribute to the securitization process rather than by a task or characteristic.

However, as part of an intersubjective process, audiences do not simply provide securitizing actors with an outcome or an accomplishment; they also sanction the view of the issue presented by the securitizing actor, or, said differently, provide moral support to the securitizing move (Balzacq et al., 2015), thereby establishing it as an intersubjective security value (Buzan et al., 1998: 32). With this in mind, this article contends that the securitization audience is best defined as the individual(s) or group(s) that has the capability to authorize the view of the issue presented by the securitizing actor and legitimize the treatment of the issue through security practice. By adopting this definition, it is possible to outline a defining audience characteristic (capability) and, simultaneously, to contextualize the audience within different environments without resorting to task- or context-specific definitions.

This creates the potential for widely varying audiences within securitization processes. Audiences are not necessarily confined to the general public within a democratic political system (Salter, 2008), nor is the notion of the audience necessarily confined to democracies (Vuori, 2008). The audience may, in fact, be the government itself (Salter, 2008; Roe, 2008) or, in other cases, ‘the power elite [or] … a group of fundamentalists’ (Vuori, 2008: 72). In some cases, multiple audiences may be able to exert influence over a securitization process; in others, the capacity to authorize security speech and legitimize security action may be vested in a single audience. Therefore, while audience identification remains a case-specific consideration, the adoption of a capabilities definition focuses the identification of the audience on individuals or groups that possess the capacity, discursively and practically, to authorize the reorientation of rights, responsibilities (Vuori, 2008; Wæver, 2015), and relationships (Watson, 2009) that the successful completion of the securitizing move in question would entail.

This approach has the advantage of allowing for a wide array of different audiences, thereby moving the audience beyond the democratic or ‘Westphalian’ straitjacket that previous theories of securitization have been accused of wearing (Wilkinson, 2007; Vuori, 2008) without falling victim to definitional vagueness. In addition, a capabilities definition does not overlook the role of audiences in authorizing security speech or rigidly separate audiences into categories such as ‘formal’, ‘technical’, or ‘elite’, which allows it to explain cases that are not accurately captured by previous definitions. Two types of cases in particular come to mind. The first are cases in which a single audience is both moral and formal, able to authorize security speech and enable security action (Salter, 2008; Bright, 2012). The second are cases in which audience action is the desired security outcome; however, secondary audiences (both domestic and external) are key to legitimizing the extreme action of the primary audience (Vaughn, 2009), thereby creating numerous layers of enabling and authorization.

Audience engagement

Within the original framework, the audience is omitted as a unit of analysis (Buzan et al., 1998: 36). Therefore, the Copenhagen School offers little guidance regarding its examination. As a result, it is difficult to adequately analyze the relationship between the speaker and the audience and, in turn, assess the role and influence of the audience as arbiter of intersubjective security reality. The omission of the audience within the Copenhagen School framework implies that securitizing moves require no ‘backing up’ (McDonald, 2008: 566) from audiences, leaving securitizing actors relatively unconstrained in their ability to make decisions concerning the exceptionality and extremity of security and threat. This view is largely incompatible with the highly intersubjective view of security construction portrayed in both the Copenhagen School’s own framework and the empirical works reviewed above.

In order to address this oversight, subsequent revisions and critiques have attempted to draw attention to the importance of audiences in the generation of security beliefs; however, the notion of audience engagement in securitization remains unclear. Some, notably so-called Paris School scholars (c.a.s.e. collective, 2006; Bigo, 2002), have located the concept of the audience within a highly structured, Bourdieu-inspired field of (in)security (see Bourdieu, [1982] 1991, 1992) and, in doing so, often explicitly exclude external audiences from securitization processes (Balzacq, 2008) or construct them as purely passive actors. In these cases, the field of security defines the boundaries of the audience; security meanings are produced through the practices of security professionals (police officers, military personnel, etc.) and the intersubjective authorization of these practices as ‘normal’ by these same professionals. These security meanings are then imposed on the larger group. Thus, the construction of shared security beliefs is confined to an extremely select few, often with little consideration of the manner in which the position of security agents as security agents is ‘constructed through … performativity’ (Butler, 1999: 122) or of the active role of external audiences in the construction and authorization of the security agent and field (Vuori, 2008), as is evident in the empirical work (Collins, 2005: 578; Salter, 2008: 336).

Others have sought to redefine the actor–audience relationship in order to place a stronger emphasis on the audience. Thierry Balzacq (2005, 2011a), in a central alteration to securitization theory, seeks to do so by questioning the linguistic underpinnings of the original securitization framework and arguing that the emergence and dissolution of security threats extends beyond the illocutionary speech act and towards its perlocutionary effects. In doing so, Balzacq places the audience as a central figure in securitization, thereby forcing the securitizing actor to take the audience and its response (acceptance/rejection) into consideration when making the securitizing move (Balzacq, 2011a: 9). Similarly, Phillipe Bourbeau (2011) argues that audiences form part of the ‘domestic context’ within which securitization occurs and, as such, have the ability to confer authority to particular speakers and narratives, thereby facilitating or constraining securitization processes. This, according to Bourbeau, makes the audience a key factor in securitization processes. Finally, Holger Stritzel (2011, 2014), using the concept of ‘translation’, redefines the actor–audience relationship to describe how certain threat texts, such as the term ‘rogue state’ (Stritzel and Schmittchen, 2011; Stritzel, 2014) or ‘organized crime’ (Stritzel 2014), become reproduced in new locales. In this case, Stritzel eschews the concept of an identifiable audience completely, instead focusing on ‘the entire interaction of speaker(s) and audience(s), which happens on a continuous rather than momentary basis’ (Stritzel, 2014: 175) and is deeply embedded in local contexts.

In attempting to redefine the relationship between securitizing actors and audiences, these authors emphasize their commitment to the intersubjective construction of security threats (Balzacq, 2005; Stritzel, 2014; Bourbeau, 2011) and vest this commitment in the presence of the securitization audience. By placing the audience in a central role, these authors argue that the actor must tailor the securitizing move to the audience in order to make it more conducive to acceptance/facilitation/translation. This deviates from the rigid speech act model of the Copenhagen School by arguing that while speech acts follow a particular grammar of security, the articulation of security speech is contextually situated as a result of the need to appeal to an audience. Given this, securitization success can only be produced through an intersubjective understanding created between the securitizing actor and the contextually situated audience (Balzacq, 2005; Stritzel, 2014; Bourbeau, 2011; Salter, 2008).

However, these approaches neglect to define an explicit analytical space for the audience, instead choosing to subsume securitization audiences within the ‘domestic context’ of securitization (Bourbeau, 2011), group securitization audiences together with securitizing actors under the category of ‘agents’ (Balzacq, 2011a), or place securitization audiences within localized discursive contexts through which indefinite securitization processes occur without ‘clearcut’ and identifiable actors or audiences (Stritzel, 2011, 2014). In doing so, these works cloak the analysis of the participatory and influential actions taken by audiences – a key feature of the empirical work – behind the examination of the manner in which contextual constraints affect securitization processes and outcomes. This poses a serious challenge to adequately analyzing the supposed intersubjective securitization process, as a key participant in this process (the securitization audience) is analytically marginalized.

As a result, the notion of intersubjectivity in these amended theories is manifested only through the need for the actor to couch his/her securitizing moves in pre-existing, contextualized rhetoric and practices in order that they have a better chance of success. In essence, by expressing security appeals in contextually consistent ways, securitizing actors are more likely to solicit audience acceptance. When viewed this way, audience acceptance becomes mechanical; audiences will accept contextually consistent securitizing moves while rejecting all others. Thus, the centrality of the audience in these revised theories solidifies the importance not of the intersubjective nature of securitization (vested in the audience) but rather of the social and contextual circumstances within which securitization processes take place.

Viewed this way, securitization continues to be portrayed theoretically as a highly formalized, though contextually contingent, speech act, in which the audience is conceptualized as the entity that simply accepts or rejects the interpretation of security put forward by the securitizing actor but cannot actively contribute to the creation of security meanings. These speech acts, if successful, create intersubjective security meanings, but these meanings are not generated through ‘intersubjective process[es]’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 30), in which social deliberation produces shared security beliefs. This is not simply a semantic distinction but is rather a fundamental break with the empirical work, which stresses the ‘actively debated’ (Salter, 2008: 333) nature of securitizing actor–audience interaction and the capacity for audiences to undertake actions that have a significant influence on securitization outcomes that are not necessarily contextually bound or dictated.

For example, the empirical literature contains instances in which audiences actively challenged, questioned, and/or supported claims made by the securitizing actor (Bright, 2012; Lupovici, 2014b; Salter, 2008; McInnes and Rushton, 2013), or undertook independent actions to modify, bolster, or destabilize security meanings, prompting engagement by securitizing actors (Bright, 2012; Wishnick, 2010; Salter, 2008) and creating important effects on securitization outcomes and legitimized security policies. Further, the empirical literature suggests that securitization audiences are not inextricably linked to their contextual circumstances but can instead act to create, reproduce, reappropriate, or transform these contextual circumstances through their interactions with securitizing actors (Collins, 2005; Salter, 2008; Hayes, 2012). Similarly, the presence of inter-audience disagreements or a combination of audience responses in multiple studies (Roe, 2008; Salter and Piché, 2011; Jackson, 2006; McInnes and Rushton, 2013) suggests that audience actions are not necessarily produced by contextual circumstances, but rather that audiences can interpret contextual limitations and act within them. Thus, securitization audiences do not necessarily adhere to strict, predetermined contextual rules to determine securitization success or failure. Instead, audiences actively engage securitizing actors within mutually constituted social, bureaucratic, and linguistic circumstances that are (re)created and transformed through this engagement.

In sum, the theoretical work on securitization places significant importance on the intersubjective nature of securitization, demonstrated by the emphasis placed on the ‘authorization’, ‘facilitation’, or ‘acceptance’, by audiences, of security speech or actions. However, while external audiences are portrayed as central to the production of shared security meanings, they are analytically excluded from actively participating in the production process, which raises questions concerning how truly intersubjective these theoretical interpretations actually are. In much of the theoretical work, it is as if securitization is happening to the audience, whereby the latter is caught between the power of the securitizing actor and the influence of contextual circumstances rather than participating in the process. This creates a perception of securitization as a linear, straightforward event, in which securitizing actors speak at (or act towards) the audience rather than engage with the audience.

This theoretical portrayal of the audience – as agents without agency – conflicts with the empirical literature. Where the empirical literature suggests securitization is a highly intersubjective process that can involve an active and engaged audience, the theoretical literature marginalizes the intersubjective nature of securitization by characterizing the audience as a passive receiver of security arguments. In doing so, it continues to perpetuate the uncomfortable relationship between intersubjectivity and securitization, as the nature of the production of shared security meaning through social interaction ‘among the subjects’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 31) or ‘in-between humans’ (Wæver, 2011: 468) remains underspecified.

Remedying this requires a new conception of audience engagement. Building on the themes identified above, this article wishes to put forward two principles upon which a framework of audience engagement can be formed. The first is that audiences are active participants in securitization processes with the potential to undertake independent actions that can produce tangible security effects. This is crucial, as it introduces the potential for deliberative social interaction between securitizing actors and audiences that is seen in the empirical work yet absent in securitization theory. Through this deliberative process, intersubjective security meanings are produced, leading to shared perceptions of issues as security threats and the authorization of security action. When securitization is viewed this way, securitizing actors must now engage with audiences that can challenge their threat interpretations and shift security understandings.

To some extent, work towards the realization of this principle has already begun. For example, sociopragmatic approaches to securitization suggest that securitization is best viewed through a ‘processual interpretation … [with] both speaker and audience treading a “common negotiation” path together’ (Klüfers, 2014: 280), as opposed to a one-way securitizing move. When it is viewed this way, the actions of the audience become crucial, as the ‘intersubjective meaning’ of an issue becomes intimately linked to the manner in which the audience interprets the securitizing move and, in turn, responds in the negotiation process.

However, as a truly active participant in securitization processes, audiences take on a contributory rather than permissive role. Rather than simple ‘accept’ or ‘reject’ responses based on interpretations of securitizing moves, it is more apt to consider audience responses as reactions to securitizing moves, consisting of agreements, disagreements, questions, and/or counterpoints that emerge out of the audience’s interpretations. These reactions are not necessarily going to be united, purposeful responses towards the actor. For this reason, they are not the same as a securitizing move. However, reactions parallel securitizing moves in that they are meant to convey ideas and perceptions of the issue in question and contribute to the establishment of shared security meanings. Viewed this way, audience reactions not only authorize or forbid security speech and action but can also influence the substance of security speech and action, shift and shape future securitizing moves, and influence the perception of shared security understandings and accepted policy responses.

The second is that securitization is less of a one-way, linear process in which the actor articulates a security reality to the audience, and more of a deliberation between actor and audience, consisting of multiple iterative, contextually contingent interactions between actor(s) and audience(s) regarding a single issue over time. Viewed this way, securitization success comes via the construction of shared security meanings produced through these repeated deliberative interactions, with past interactions affecting the nature of future interactions. Securitization therefore continues to be linguistically focused, as the process places significant importance on the production, deliberation, and legitimation of security ideas and meanings through speech; however, the introduction of an active audience places this discursive focus within a truly intersubjective framework, forcing the use of language to be understood within an iterative process in which both securitizing actor and audience contribute to the construction of shared security meanings and legitimized outcomes.

This type of actor–audience relationship and framework for interaction implies that audiences are not solely a product of exogenous contextual circumstances but instead are at least partially produced and reproduced through securitization processes. Audiences have the potential to exploit contextual advantages and/or modify structural constraints in order to exert greater or lesser influence on the process. In this way, audiences can use their potential for action in much the same way securitizing actors can – to interact in the pursuit of security outcomes.

Furthermore, by engaging in securitization processes, audiences reproduce and transform themselves and their relationship with securitizing actors, thereby facilitating their own creation, solidification, strengthening, and/or weakening. This reproduction and transformation, in turn, can shape the ability of audiences to exert themselves within future securitization processes. This shares an affinity with the work that examines ‘power relations’ within securitization processes (Balzacq et al., 2015: 8–9); however, by connecting the power of the audience to its own activity, the view proposed here highlights the manner in which audience actions, in addition to external contextual constraints, can affect the audience’s differential capacity to influence securitization processes. Thus, an active audience contributes not only to the substance and outcome of specific securitization processes but also to its own place within the shared meanings of security and the future of intersubjective security construction. This insight provides the potential to explore not only the conditions under which audiences can have a greater or lesser effect on securitization outcomes but also how these conditions are reproduced or changed.

In this type of actor–audience relationship, the audience is no longer dominated by the securitizing actor, nor is it ‘at the mercy of sociopolitical boundary conditions’ (Hayes, 2013: 36). Instead, audiences have the ability to reproduce and transform their contextual limitations, yet must interact with securitizing actors within these same limits. Similarly, intersubjective understandings of security and threat are not something that securitizing actors automatically receive by remaining faithful to fixed contextual conventions, nor are they produced through the ‘social magic’ (Butler, 1999) of speech. Instead, they are shifted and shaped over time in a complex conversation among actor(s) and audience(s), consisting of various communicative techniques such as arguing and bargaining, and mediums such as written text (Hansen, 2006), spoken word, visual imagery (Hansen, 2011; Williams, 2003), and physical action (Wilkinson, 2007).

Taken together, this framework shifts the focus of securitization theory towards the processes of deliberative interaction between securitizing actor(s) and audience(s), in which the mobilization of multiple security discourses enables securitizing actors and audiences to contribute shared perceptions of ‘security’. This view provides securitization theory with a more robust depiction of the process through which groups define security, and select and justify often costly and extreme policies to address threats, in which securitizing actors do not act alone but must instead engage with an audience that has the potential to actively respond to them.

Rethinking the audience in securitization studies

Though space constraints prevent an in-depth empirical study of the securitization audience, this final section seeks to highlight how the approach presented here helps to better explicate the role and effect of audiences, using two illustrative examples based on the empirical studies reviewed earlier.

Phillipe Bourbeau’s (2011) study of migration in Canada and France demonstrates how a view of the audience as an active participant in the securitization process allows for a more complete assessment of the social interactions between securitizing actors and audiences that produce shared security beliefs. Bourbeau (2011: 109–122) makes a convincing case that elite audiences in the Canadian legislative branch facilitated the securitization of migration through the passage of legislation. In particular, Bourbeau (2011: 112) points to bills C-55 and C-84 as ‘telling’ owing to their quick passage (with strong majorities) in the Canadian House of Commons, and eventually the Senate, in 1989.

Interestingly, Bourbeau (2011: 112) notes that both bills were, at one point, ‘amended [in the Senate] … and referred back to the House. In turn, the House of Commons did not accept all amendments and the bills died when Parliament was dissolved in 1988.’ When audiences are viewed as active participants, the amendment and referral of both bills is a critical juncture in the securitization process, as it suggests the Senate was actively rebuffing the government’s securitizing move. This raises important questions about the nature and substance of the Senate’s actions, including: What was the nature of the Senate amendments? On what grounds were these amendments suggested? What was the government response to these amendments? What amendments, if any, did the government accept? Were subsequent bills changed in any way to reflect the Senate’s objections?

Bourbeau (2011: 98), who specifically excludes the audience as an ‘agent’ and argues that audiences ‘do not speak for themselves’ but can only ‘relate’ to securitizing moves in an enabling or limiting fashion, overlooks these important questions, instead focusing on the final passage of the bills as evidence of ‘facilitation’ on the part of the legislature. However, when the audience is viewed as an active participant in the securitization process, these questions become a key aspect of securitization analysis. More importantly, answering them can provide a deeper insight into the manner in which the Senate’s actions affected the securitization outcome (the final laws) and, in turn, provide a greater depth of understanding regarding the level and type of securitization facilitation by the audience.

Similarly, Mark Salter’s (2008: 336) study of Canadian aviation security demonstrates the capacity of audiences to maintain and/or strengthen their influence over securitization processes through the (re)creation and fortification of contextual factors, creating lasting effects on security. Salter argues that securitization processes occur within ‘settings’ that affect their nature and outcome, effectively defining the parameters of securitization, including the relevant audiences. For example, Salter (2008: 334–336) convincingly argues that, in relation to Canadian aviation security, the minister of transport is the ‘final audience’ within the ‘elite’ setting and was a key factor in rejecting a securitizing move made by the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA), which was seeking to take greater control of aviation security from the ministry of transport and transform itself into a counter-terrorism agency.

While Salter effectively argues that settings drastically alter the conduct and process of securitization, his analysis highlights important questions regarding the manner in which these settings are created or changed. Said differently, how do settings become settings and, once formed, how are they reproduced or transformed? By taking a view of the securitization audience as an active participant in the securitization process, answers to this question can be found in the actions of the audience itself.

While the rejection of the securitizing move by the minister of transport is a crucial aspect of the failed expansion of the CATSA mandate, equally as important was the effect that this rejection had on the elite setting itself. In rejecting CATSA’s securitizing move, the minister was a crucial component of maintaining aviation security interaction within the context of the ministry of transport (Salter, 2008: 336), thereby reproducing the minister as the ‘elite’ audience. Conversely, had the move been accepted, the minister’s status as the elite audience would have disappeared, greatly affecting the nature and composition of the elite setting. Thus, when understood through the framework outlined in this article, audiences are not simply determined and dictated by contextual circumstances but have a clear role in creating and reproducing the contextual boundaries of security interaction. This insight provides securitization theory with the capacity to explain not only how issues come to be securitized but also how the contextual circumstances that surround securitization processes are created and changed through securitization interactions.

Conclusion

Through a meta-synthesis of literature on the securitization audience, this article has argued that a reformulated view of the audience as an active agent within an iterative and deliberative securitization process provides a strong framework through which to examine securitization processes and audiences. The necessity for this reformulation arises out of the problematic relationship between securitization theory and the concept of intersubjectivity, as well as the conflicting portrayal of the securitization audience in empirical and theoretical analysis. Though there has been significant progress in our understanding of securitization, the current theoretical literature continues to portray the audience as fundamental to the intersubjective nature of securitization while at the same time marginalizing the role of the audience in the construction of shared security meaning. This presents securitization theory as, at best, marginally intersubjective, perpetuates claims that the securitization audience is unimportant or irrelevant to the production of security meaning, and gives credence to the criticism that securitization cannot be both an illocutionary speech act and an intersubjective process. Furthermore, this depiction of the securitization audience is not reflective of empirical analysis, which demonstrates both the importance of the audience in the construction of shared security values and its active engagement in securitization processes. Finally, by overlooking a potentially key contributor, it prevents a full analysis of the manner in which security threats and practices are constructed and legitimized.

By reimagining securitization as a deliberative, iterative process between the securitizing actor and an active audience, this article has established a framework for securitization theory that better accommodates its linguistic–intersubjective relationship, addresses the theoretical–empirical gap, and provides more robust insight into explaining how groups select security priorities and justify the use of costly, extreme, and potentially violent security policies. In doing so, it offers a reformulation of securitizing actor–audience interaction within the securitization process. It bolsters the intersubjective nature of the securitization process yet continues to place significant emphasis on the use of communicative techniques and tools in the production, deliberation, and legitimation of shared security values.

Significant work remains to be done. In particular, two areas stand out as critical. First, a greater exploration of the interaction between securitizing actors and audiences is necessary. While this article has laid out a framework for interaction, further specification is required on both the role of the securitizing actor within this framework and the means through which the interactions of securitizing actors and audiences produce security outcomes.

Second, further exploration of the audience is required. A shift towards the deliberative interaction between securitizing actor and audience entails the need for a greater focus on the audience as a complex unit of analysis within securitization theory. Given this, it is important to delve deeper into the concept of the audience and the nature of its actions. What elements of the securitizing move does it generally agree/disagree with, and why? Did audience actions modify the outcome of the securitization process? Did the actor take the audience reactions into account? If so, with what effect on the securitizing move? Do characteristics such as audience use of power relative to the securitizing actor (Hayes, 2013; Balzacq, 2005), unity (Hayes, 2012; Hughes, 2007; Roe, 2008), level of perceived knowledge (Curley and Herington, 2011), access to information (Bright, 2012; Vuori, 2008; Collins, 2005), and intensity of engagement (Collins, 2005; Wilkinson, 2007) provide audiences with greater or lesser influence over securitization processes and outcomes? By addressing questions such as these, securitization analysts will be in a position to provide a much stronger assessment of the role and potential influence of the audience within securitization processes.

In conjunction with the further exploration of these two areas, the framework of securitizing actor–audience interaction presented here sets the audience as a crucial unit of analysis within securitization theory with a much greater potential to contribute to the production of security norms, beliefs, ideas, and practices. In doing so, it provides new insight into how security priorities are formed, altered, and sustained, and opens up new avenues for research investigating new actors, mechanisms, and restrictions on how security threats are created, justified, or curtailed.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2014 Midwest Political Science Association Conference. I am thankful for the helpful feedback I received there. In addition, I would particularly like to thank Jim Keeley, Maureen Hiebert, Valerie Sugrue, Margaret Côté, and the editors and reviewers of Security Dialogue for their helpful comments on this and earlier drafts.

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

Adam Côté recently received his PhD from the University of Calgary. His research focuses on securitization theory, outer space security, the creation and diffusion of security norms, and the linkages between domestic and foreign security policies and processes.

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