Abstract
Disarmament of non-state groups during peace processes is rarely comprehensive and weapons usually continue to circulate. Nevertheless, disarmament is a normal component of final peace agreements and its modalities are often intensely negotiated by all parties. We unpack the puzzle of why disarmament is seemingly both crucial and not completed by building a novel theory of its role as a symbol of the transformation from war to peace. In doing so, we build upon findings from conflict studies, social psychology, anthropology, and feminist research in order to explore what weapons and disarmament mean for combatants, their armed group, and communities impacted by conflict. We posit that after joining an armed group combatants are socially fused through ritual behavior which often features weapons, and disarmament functions as a symbolic inversion process in which the weapon is transformed into a symbol of peace. This inversion process is observable through language and acts, such as public destruction of arms or turning weapons into works of art. We empirically illustrate our propositions by examining the case of FARC-EP’s 2016–2017 disarmament in Colombia. Our theoretical framework pushes existing academic boundaries of war-to-peace transitions in general, and research on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in particular.
Introduction
Weapons have a clear military utility, but ‘in societies shaped by war, a weapon is never just a tool to kill’ (Esch, 2018: 5). Arms have individual and social meanings beyond their functional value as tools of violence and these meanings are used, manipulated, and contested during and after conflict. During the period of peacebuilding guns need to be silenced. A weapon being handed in or destroyed is a powerful symbol that a rebel group has given up the armed struggle and the society has moved on from the war. While research has extensively focused on the challenges associated with convincing groups to agree to and implement disarmament (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; Muggah, 2005c; Walter, 1997), the symbolism of disarmament has received virtually no attention from social scientists.
In this article we address this gap by developing a novel interpretivist-rationalist theory on non-state groups’ disarmament 1 by conceptualizing it as a symbolic inversion process. We do so by combining four distinct bodies of research. To understand what the weapon which is to be laid down symbolizes (and for whom), we examine combatant socialization processes by building on conflict studies (Cantin, 2021; Checkel, 2017; Nussio and Oppenheim, 2014). To unpack what activities, i.e. rituals and symbols, constitute the socialization process, we draw on anthropology and social psychology (e.g. Cohen, 1974; Kertzer, 1988; Lobato and Sainz, 2020; Swann and Buhrmester, 2015; Turner, 1975; Whitehouse and Lanman, 2014). To sufficiently account for heterogeneity both in case of individual combatants’ socialization trajectories and in case of rituals and symbols interpretation by individuals, we incorporate feminist work on militarization and on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) (Enloe, 1983; MacKenzie, 2009; Mazurana et al., 2018).
We start by observing that armed groups need to socialize their members into the norms and rules of their organization. They do so through rituals and symbols which lead members of armed groups to become fused, i.e. experience a ‘visceral sense of oneness with the group’ (Swann and Buhrmester, 2015), meaning that they view each other and their group as family, and are willing to fight and die for each other. To put it differently, rituals and symbols enable fighters to become ‘brothers in arms.’ We conceptualize weapons or representations of them as symbols that are deployed by armed groups during various rituals, such as marching, singing songs, drilling, featuring on the group’s flag and uniform insignia. Given the symbolism of weapons in rituals, we argue that disarmament is not merely a technical exercise, but a symbolic inversion process by which the meaning of the weapon as a symbol (and its associated rituals) is being transformed and communicated to in- and out-group members. We posit that this symbolic inversion process is what makes disarmament a politically contentious and often emotional process for combatants and communities alike. We empirically illustrate disarmament as symbolic inversion by analyzing language and acts related to FARC-EP’s 2016–2017 disarmament in Colombia.
Our contribution to peacebuilding literature is twofold. First, our theory demonstrates the benefits of greater interdisciplinary dialogue, which enables us to move beyond a materialist perspective of weapons and to unpack hitherto untheorized aspects of non-state groups’ disarmament. Second, by conceptualizing disarmament as a symbolic inversion, we provide an explanation for how and why disarmament may contribute to building peace in the aftermath of an armed conflict, even if many of the weapons are not given up.
Research on post-conflict disarmament
During the late 1990s and early 2000s an orthodoxy was developed according to which disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of non-state actors is seen as a normal means to build peace after an agreement has been signed (Muggah, 2005c). While early research on DDR was characterized by a focus on the disarmament component, in the past two decades scholarly attention has shifted to the reintegration component (Annan et al., 2011; Bowd and Özerdem, 2013; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007; Mazurana et al., 2018). We suggest that recent advances in studying various reintegration outcomes should be complemented by revisiting and updating past research on disarmament because of the strong interconnectedness between the three components of DDR programs. Combatants’ participation in reintegration programs is often conditional and based upon their handing in serviceable weapons and being verified as a combatant.
In this section, we overview theoretical work on disarmament and contrast it with (the lack of) empirical reality. We show how research on disarmament failed to integrate symbols to their agenda, and how research on the symbolism of weapons paid insufficient attention to disarmament.
Drawing on Giustozzi (2016), we identify four schools of thought on disarmament. All the authors cited were active in the late 1990s and early 2000s when the disarmament orthodoxy was being developed and academic research focused upon the subject. The first, neo-realist school emphasizes that non-state actors in a peace process face a ‘security dilemma in reverse’ and need reassurance that they will not be attacked when they disarm. Walter (1997: 340) proposes that robust third-party security guarantees are necessary to ensure that disarmament can occur while groups are vulnerable. The second, neo-liberal perspective emphasizes the importance of institutions and the re-establishment of law and order as a prerequisite for a group having the confidence to give up its weapons. Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) suggest that power-sharing and power-dividing institutions that build trust hold the key to convincing armed actors to lay down their weapons. The third, ‘root causes’ school emphasizes that social relations need to be transformed by the peace agreement, that ‘by disarming, the combatants are forging a new social contract with the government and the international community’ (Knight and Özerdem, 2004: 506). The fourth, ‘political will’ school emphasizes the importance of dealmaking by the leaders of the armed groups, their counterparts in the government, and the international community in order to get parties to agree to disarm (Muggah, 2005c; Peceny and Stanley, 2001).
None of the four schools which established the DDR orthodoxy have empirically proved that disarmament programs have actually helped to build peace (Muggah, 2007). The relationships between disarmament and violence and its cessation have been undertheorized and scholars have not explained the mechanisms by which group-level disarmament or DDR are supposed to work or influence such macro-level outcomes as peace or conflict (Jennings, 2007; Knight and Özerdem, 2004; Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010).
We argue that this lack of both empirical and theoretical foundation is based upon a conventional wisdom that the removal of weapons is self-evidently a necessary condition for peace, and therefore it is not necessary to demonstrate empirically or explain theoretically. Such conventional wisdom would not be a great problem if it is correct (in spite of its lack of empirical or theoretical foundation). However, in general it is not. Post-conflict disarmament is rarely comprehensive, and the normal state of affairs is that weapons are easily available (Bourne and Greene, 2013; Giustozzi, 2016; Muggah, 2005b). For example, in Mozambique tens of thousands of weapons remained hidden in caches after the disarmament phase of the 1992 peace agreement (Vines, 1998), but the agreement held for two decades. In Colombia in 2017 or in Guatemala in 1996, disarmament of an armed group occurred in countries where weapons were widely and easily available, but the peace agreements have so far been upheld.
The conventional wisdom has two consequences. First, criteria for the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of disarmament processes has often been tautologously assessed solely in terms of the number of weapons or ammunition handed in (for a summary of the ‘disarmament bias’ see Muggah, 2005a, 2005b). Second, the diverse motivations for acquiring, holding, and giving up weapons have largely been ignored in research on disarmament. Weapons have social and cultural meanings beyond their use as tools of violence (Ashkenazi, 2012). In particular, men, women, youth and child ex-combatants are all likely to have a different relationship with the weapons they carry, as are those from dominant or minority ethnic groups or different socio-economic classes. For example, holding weapons could be seen as an expression of masculinity, means of emancipation, or a way to be regarded as an adult. All of these perspectives are obscured by a materialist focus upon the weapon as a tool of violence.
The lack of comprehensive disarmament in practice is in contrast with the salience of disarmament in peace negotiations. Instead of being viewed as an irrelevance, the modality and timing of disarmament is a priority for negotiators, and failure to agree can delay peace negotiations or their implementation (Buchanan and Chávez, 2008; Marsh and Palik, 2021). The simultaneous importance of disarmament as a political issue despite its general lack of practical success presents a puzzle: why do parties care about it so much if it is unlikely to result in the comprehensive removal of weapons held by a rebel group or its combatants?
As we explain below, we posit that disarmament is important because weapons are crucial symbols for armed groups and these symbols are continuously deployed in rituals which enable group members to socialize and to fuse with each other, and in turn motivate members to sacrifice themselves for the group.
Scholars and practitioners have mentioned the symbolic importance of disarmament (Karp, 2009: 181; Muggah, 2005b: 246) and Özerdem (2009: 15) even asserts that disarmament’s ‘real importance is at a symbolic level,’ but they have failed to elaborate on the concept. While disciplines ranging from sociology to international relations have examined the symbolism of weapons (Metzl, 2019; Warner and Ratcliff, 2021), this work offers little illumination regarding disarmament. For example, scholars within international relations have examined the role of symbolism in related activities such as arms production (Kinsella and Chima, 2001) and arms exports (Spindel, 2018). Similarly, scholars from diverse fields as cultural studies, sociology, and social psychology have examined the symbolic meaning of firearms within societies, especially the United States (Cooke and Puddifoot, 2000; Johnson, 2017; Jouet, 2019). While such contributions advance our knowledge on the ‘importance of guns as cultural objects’ (Steidley and Yamane, 2022: 5), they usually do not consider places which have experienced a modern transition from war to peace.
Overall, despite being occasionally acknowledged as important, the symbolic role of disarmament is undertheorized. The remainder of this article develops a starting point for addressing this omission.
Theoretical framework: Disarmament as symbolic inversion
In this article we aim at theory development and adopt a pluralist epistemological stance, combining rational and interpretivist models. The rationalist part of our theory focuses on the strategic dimension of symbols, i.e. who deploys and transforms them for what purpose, while the interpretivist aspect of our theory examines emotions that are mobilized by weapons as symbols. Our conceptualization covers two different forms of symbolism. One form is the way that the weapons themselves are used or presented, for example if guns are destroyed during a ceremony. Another form of symbolism lies in the representation of weapons through words or images, for example when they are portrayed on flags or in songs.
In the next section, we first examine how weapons can be conceptualized as symbols within a system of rituals that constitute a foundational aspect of an armed group’s socialization process. We then conceptualize disarmament as a symbolic inversion process observable through language and acts. We emphasize that this framework is a tool for theory building, that an individual can be a member of different audiences simultaneously, and that the different phases are not clear-cut time periods. 2
The role of rituals and symbols in conflict
Our starting point is that there are usually strong individual psychological and societal (laws and norms) barriers to using lethal violence. At the group level, the rebel leadership needs to constitute identities, rules and norms which encourage violence in certain circumstances, but discourage it in others to maintain internal cohesion, discipline, and avoid harm to supporters (Grossman, 1996; Hoover Green, 2017). This happens through socialization, ‘a process through which actors adopt the norms and rules of a given community’ (Checkel, 2017: 592). Rituals (both repeatedly performed and extraordinary) 3 are the foundations of within-group socialization processes. Painful and self-defining rituals, such as hazing or various initiation rituals, can lead to what social psychological research terms identity fusion, a visceral feeling of oneness between personal and group identity (Swann and Buhrmester, 2015). Fused individuals view themselves and their fellow group members as family. Such strong ties predict costly pro-group action, such as willingness to fight and die for the group (Swann and Buhrmester, 2015; Whitehouse, 2021; Whitehouse and Lanman, 2014). For example, research examining 179 Libyan revolutionaries who fought against the Gaddafi regime in 2011 showed that members who were especially fused were most engaged in frontline combat (Whitehouse et al., 2014). Importantly, identity fusion is characterized by the principle of irrevocability, which means that once individuals are fused with their groups, they remain as such over time (Fredman et al., 2015).
The rituals used in socialization to fuse individuals use symbols which can be observed and analyzed. Anthropological work finds that symbols are important because they are value- and emotion-laden (Rothman, 1981: 285), have the ‘ability to instigate action’ (Klatch, 1988: 138), and connect past to present and present to future (Kertzer, 1988: 9). Importantly, symbols are multivocal, different groups assign different meanings to symbols, they have layers of meaning, and those meanings can change over time. 4 Examples of the symbolic repertoire used by armed groups include flags and banners, uniforms, public murals, parades, and songs (Mampilly, 2015: 78). They are part of rituals that forge shared identities (and exclude others) and at the individual level serve as personal objects. During a war, representations of weapons are some of the most potent and common symbols. For example, members of armed groups may dress in uniforms every morning and regularly parade in front of the movement’s flag. Arms feature on the flags of non-state groups such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Shan State Army in Myanmar, or the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement in Peru. Miniature versions of the flags are often worn on combatants' uniforms. Another important use of symbolism is singing songs that often feature weapons. For example, in the UK The SAM Song valorized the Provisional Irish Republican Army’s acquisition of surface-to-air missiles. During the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, the song Umshini Wami, meaning ‘my machinegun,’ was sung by members of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the military wing of the African National Congress, while their song Dubuli iBhunu means ‘shoot the Boer’ (Malisa and Malange, 2013: 309). In short, rituals and symbols foster socialization and can lead to identity fusion, which can help to overcome individual and societal level barriers to using violence.
Rituals and symbols used in socialization are embodied experiences (Fuji, 2017; Hockey, 2003). For example, recruits spend considerable amounts of time collectively learning to assemble, clean, handle, and conceal weapons. Uniforms and insignia are worn by members while taking part in parades and collective singing. These are physical and emotional experiences. The embodiment helps to reinforce a particular interpretation of a symbol in an individual, and because rituals are performed jointly and symbols are experienced together, they help to fuse individuals. Importantly, rituals and symbols carry ‘specific messages about gender’ (Hoover Green, 2017: 689). Wartime rituals contribute to the development of military masculinities (Hearn, 2003; Kovitz, 2003; MacKenzie, 2009), which establish a relationship between weapons, masculinity, and violence that makes it difficult for combatants to access civilian symbols of masculinity (Theidon, 2009: 5).
Weapons symbolize a multitude of abstract concepts, such as freedom from oppression, masculinity, individual and collective honor, empowerment, or embodiments of fear and threat (Ashkenazi, 2012; Hultin, 2022; Springwood, 2007). These meanings are situated in a specific time and space and closely connected to the role guns play in a given society, which might exist prior to the conflict or evolve during the conflict. The role of weapons in a given society is far from monolithic and not necessarily associated with war. This is relevant to emphasize because, as we will see below, rituals and symbols impact not only in-group members.
This article focuses upon socialization within armed groups. We do, though, touch upon the use of weapons in symbolic or ritual activities directed at the wider population. Armed groups attempt to mobilize societies around their causes (for example, when they start to take up arms, or in order to sustain support for their struggle). At the societal level, the use of ritual can help to establish and strengthen emotional ties between the rebel group and its supporters, for example, through the collective singing of anthems. Peace agreements need to be ‘sold’ to the wider population who may have made many sacrifices during the fighting, and this may be especially important if difficult compromises needed to be made or if rival groups want to continue the fighting. We suggest that the symbolism of disarmament can be used to help mobilize a society around a peace process. Later in this article we mention examples of the public destruction of weapons that had been used in fighting. Societal mobilization is, however, beyond what could be covered in depth in this article and so it is only mentioned in passing.
Disarmament as symbolic inversion
We argue that after a peace agreement many of the symbols described above need to be revised in a process of ‘symbolic inversion’ (Kertzer, 1988: 131–133). Symbolic inversion occurs when prominent symbols (in our case, weapons or representations of them) are transformed and their meanings are revised. Disarmament as a symbolic inversion is not merely a technical but an emotional process, because the symbol which used to mark group belonging and foster identity fusion is given up or given a new meaning, thereby communicating a changing intent (from violent to nonviolent) at the individual level.
Importantly, we do not posit that symbolic inversion is able or aimed at ‘de-socializing’ or ‘defusing’ ex-combatants (Fredman et al., 2015). Such psychological processes are much more complex and lengthy (if they happen at all), but symbolic inversion is nevertheless part of the transition from combatant to civilian identities (Kaplan and Nussio, 2018). We argue that symbolic inversion occurs in the peacebuilding phase in which societies, armed groups, and individuals are encouraged to adopt new identities and relationships for which existing symbols need to be transformed and communicated both within the group and to outsiders. Symbols are used in the peacebuilding phase in order to evoke emotional responses intended to support the implementation of a peace agreement. A key concern is often to promulgate symbols at the societal level which suggest that the war is over without giving the impression at the group or individual level that the rebels have been defeated or humiliated (Marsh and Palik, 2021).
Disarmament is both a practical and a symbolic act, and unsurprisingly the weapon lies at the heart of the symbolism. The public destruction of weapons is an obvious example of symbolic inversion in which the symbol of the weapon is replaced by a symbol of one being destroyed. For example, in a 2005 ceremony attended by hundreds of people, six Free Aceh Movement rebels presented their guns to members of the Aceh Monitoring Mission, who then cut up the weapons (Al Jazeera, 2005). Similarly, in 2007 La flame de la Paix or the flame of peace took place in a sports stadium in Côte d’Ivoire. It involved military leaders proclaiming that the war was over and handing over weapons which were then burnt (Fleuranceaux, 2007). The UN has produced and disseminated videos of guns being publicly burnt as part of the 2017 disarmament process in the Central African Republic. 5 One assessment of peace processes finds that ‘the symbolic dividends of public destruction ceremonies were regarded as critical in promoting collective trust’ (Muggah, 2005a: 22–23).
A second aspect of symbolic inversion is the deliberate absence of a symbol associated with war during the peacebuilding phase. Within a rebel group the process of being demobilized and reintegrated may involve ex-combatants being cut off from the symbols and rituals associated with their former role, something that can be enforced by hierarchies within the rebel group (Cardenas et al., 2018). The absence of collective observance of symbols may over time reduce cohesion within the group. At an individual level, some ex-combatants may still cherish the symbols of their former occupation (and keep possession of flags or insignia, or continue to sing songs).
The absence of symbols can also be recognized at the societal level. For example, in Northern Ireland a feature of the conflict has been large murals painted on the side of buildings. Prior to the 1997 Belfast Agreement it was common that the murals portrayed fighters holding weapons. One observer notes that an influence of the peace process was that murals supporting Sinn Féin or the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) stopped depicting contemporary paramilitaries holding guns. 6 Doing so was a means of advocating that the days of the armed struggle were over. Similarly, it has been noted that in the years after the 1994 establishment of a democratic government in South Africa there was a deliberate silencing of songs such as Umshini Wami or Dubul’ ibhunu (see above) in the interest of national reconciliation and healing (Malisa and Malange, 2013: 305–306). Occasions when these songs were sung by political leaders were controversial.
Observing symbolic inversion
In the following section we focus our attention on what we term as two observable manifestations of symbolic inversion: language and acts. Symbolic inversion has to be done by someone (agent) through some means and communicated to others (audiences). We posit that concerning disarmament symbolic inversion can be observed by accounting for the language used to describe the disarmament process (such as in songs, or in the text of peace agreements) and the symbolic acts aimed at transforming the previously held meaning of weapons. Both language and acts are directed towards three audiences (individual, group, societal) and are aimed at signaling changes in motivation.
Language: The word disarmament itself is often not preferred by conflict parties because in several contexts disarmament is associated with surrender and signals defeat (Muggah, 2013: 23). For example, the Arabic translation of disarmament connotes forcible removal of weapons, a very different conception than that embraced by a voluntary DDR program (Ong, 2012: 22). In Afghanistan, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) soldiers were instructed during the disarmament of the Taliban that ‘the terms “surrender’’ and ‘‘laying down of weapons” should NEVER be used in any conversation, discussion, or reference’ (cited by (Munive and Stepputat, 2015: 5, emphasis original). Several peace agreements contain alternative formulations to the term disarmament, such as ‘laying down weapons’ (Colombia), ‘decommissioning’ (Philippines and Northern Ireland), or the ‘management of arms and armies’ (Nepal). Such alternative language, we argue, can be viewed as symbol of resistance against the language of disarmament used by international actors. The technical language of DDR is often associated with defeat and loss of dignity (Berghof Foundation and UN DPO DDR section, 2022), which are not hard security issues, but they can be viewed as part of one’s ontological security (Mitzen, 2006).
Acts: As we mentioned before, several disarmament processes have included public ceremonies in which arms were collected, publicly displayed, destroyed, or transformed into monuments. We conceptualize these acts as ceremonies which include an audience, have a well-defined beginning and ending, might include performative language, and feature evocative and often dramatic staging (O’Neill, 1999: 60). The aim of weapons and ammunition destruction is on the one hand practical: to remove them from circulation and to prevent illicit proliferation. On the other hand, these ceremonies mean to communicate changing intents (from violent to nonviolent) regarding the aims of the groups whose weapons were destroyed. As Karp (2009: 161) argued, ‘destruction is valued as a symbol of commitment more than a physical impediment to the resumption of fighting.’
In the next section, we operationalize our theory by empirically examining the symbolism of weapons and disarmament as a symbolic inversion in the case of FARC-EP in Colombia. Rather than being a theory-testing exercise, this section shows how the theoretical framework can help us to move beyond the material view of weapons and their removal from combatants. The Colombian case was selected as it is a typical case (Seawright and Gerring, 2008: 299) among well-organized rebel groups that have attributes such as training programs, i.e. members have undergone socialization in which rituals and symbols feature heavily, and their identities are likely to be fused. As such, the purpose of the case is to explore mechanisms that may be applicable in other cases. 7 Our empirical material was identified in a previous research project in which we interviewed key stakeholders involved in the design of FARC-EP’s disarmament (Marsh and Palik, 2021) and background discussions with a former FARC-EP member. Our empirical material is meant to illustrate our theory, hence we gathered data from secondary sources, including a collection of FARC songs, NGO reports, previous academic work related to the peace process, and local media sources. Given that we are interested in understanding how combatants and civilians perceived weapons (i.e. what do weapons symbolize for which people) we aimed to find direct quotes that feature weapons (and the disarmament process) from the above sources. We encourage future research to gather primary data in the form of observations, interviews, and media analysis to gain additional insights.
Empirical illustration: The laying down of FARC-EP’s weapons
Growing out from the period of intense conflict between Liberals and Conservatives (La Violencia) in the 1950s, FARC-EP was founded in 1964 as the armed wing of the Colombian Communist Party. FARC-EP embraced a Marxist ideology and its aim was to overthrow the Colombian government and to address historic economic inequalities, chiefly those related to land. Over time, it transformed from a peasant self-defense organization to a people’s army (Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2018). By the early 1980s FARC-EP adopted an institutionalized, hierarchical, and militaristic structure which was based on lifelong membership, permanent training and drilling, ideological education, and strict separation from civilians (Sanín and Carranza Franco, 2017: 773). A majority of FARC-EP members joined the organization voluntarily, seeking to escape poverty and violence (Hauge, 2021).
FARC-EP agreed to end its 52-year-long conflict against the Colombian government in 2016. The circa 300-page peace agreement contained several provisions related to land, transitional justice, and the transformation of FARC-EP into a political party. The section on the End of the Conflict contained a detailed plan for a ceasefire, FARC-EP’s DDR, and monitoring and verification carried out by a UN mission. Implementation began in December 2016, when FARC-EP troops marched towards the 26 transitory zones of normalization (TZN), or cantonment areas. By August 2017, UN observers had received and removed over 8000 weapons which had been handed over by FARC-EP (UN News, 2017).
Socialization within FARC-EP
The symbolism of weapons played a central role in the socialization employed by FARC-EP. The most immediate symbol is found in the movement’s flag, which during the war was the Colombian flag on which a book and two rifles are overlaid, the rifles symbolizing the armed nature of their revolution. FARC-EP’s recruitment strategy built on weapons being symbols of power for marginalized communities. FARC-EP recruiters were equipped with firearms to impress potential new members (Bjørkhaug, 2010: 14). A former female combatant recalled that ‘I liked the FARC-EP because I saw these women in uniform, with rifles looking very beautiful. I decided that (when I was old enough) I would have my equipment and a rifle’ (Herrera and Porch, 2008: 616).
FARC-EP’s recruitment process went through changes during the five decades of conflict, but once being coerced or admitted to the group, new recruits went through a practical and ideological period of training which included intense rituals. The day started with physical exercise, followed by so-called ‘close order’ skills pertaining to in-camp life, such as weapons training, arms assembly and cleaning, parade ground routines, whereas ‘open order’ skills entailed both offensive and defensive combat training. During training, members learnt how to handle different automatic assault rifles and handguns (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 62). While in these rituals weapons came to represent a militarized masculinity, anthropological literature shows that FARC-EP members referred to their weapons as their ‘woman, their mother, and their lives’ (Fattal, 2018: 224), a formulation which suggests that weapons were also equated with such feminized traits as care.
Ritual aspects of FARC-EP’s military training were embodied practices. The FARC flag, replete with crossed rifles, was worn as a patch on soldiers’ uniforms (especially upon their shoulders). Former combatants were taught to apply a specific facial expression (Los malencarados) to convey machismo and aggression in the wake of killing (Theidon, 2009: 25–26). Embodied practices were deliberately used to symbolize who belongs to which group (state or non-state). Marching drills provided an important bodily expression for uncovering government spies who infiltrated the ranks of FARC-EP; in the army and police, members turn with their right foot, but in FARC-EP they do so with the left foot (Theidon, 2009). This embodiment was different for male and female FARC-EP members. Women went through the same military training and performed the same tasks as men, which might give ‘an impression of gender equality’ (Avoine and Tillman, 2015: 221), but as Enloe (1983: 168) observed, non-state groups ‘are not automatically non-sexist merely because they are non-statist, decentralized and reliant on women.’ While women sometimes became combatants, the top leadership of FARC-EP remained an only male body. FARC-EP women used their bodies to perform information gathering and spying or to seduce men as means to buy illegal arms for the group (Herrera and Porch, 2008).
Symbolic inversion: Language
Two forms of symbolic language are examined in this section. First, we undertake a content analysis of a corpus of popular songs played by FARC-EP members. Following that we analyze discussions on the terms used for disarmament in the peace negotiations.
Songs played an important socializing role within FARC-EP. In particular, each FARC-EP encampment organized a compulsory ‘Cultural Hour’ involving music, reading and theatre (Martel, 2021: 112). The songs were routinely performed and the lyrics served to overtly support political education and to legitimate FARC-EP’s ideology, its use of violence, and its leadership (Martel, 2021: 112–114). Collective singing of songs that contained carefully crafted symbolism helped to inculcate new recruits. Singing is an embodied and shared social experience which often produces an emotional reaction and feelings of connectedness. As well as being performed among groups living in FARC encampments, FARC-EP also organized the distribution among the wider Colombian population of recorded albums featuring the most popular songs (Martel, 2021: 115–119). In many parts of the country FARC-EP musicians played an important role in local culture, and they used the rhythms and instrumentation typical of the regions in which they operated (Quishpe et al., 2019).
A unique project called ‘Between Rifles and Accordions’ collected some 700 FARC-EP songs. 8 This endeavor was the result of a close collaboration between academic researchers and members of FARC-EP. In 2019, the project published three anthologies, each of which contain 12 of the most popular songs on three themes: daily life, geography, and peace and reconciliation. We carried out a content analysis using the three anthologies (Bolívar et al., 2019; Quishpe et al., 2019; Valbuena et al., 2019) in order to highlight how the symbolism of weapons was present in many of the songs, and especially the symbolic inversion concerning weapons which occurred in songs about peace and reconciliation. 9
Among the 12 popular songs presented in the anthology on daily life (Quishpe et al., 2019), eight include references to weapons, something which reflects the centrality of arms in the life of a guerilla. 10 References to arms are especially poignant in the songs that focus upon emotional relationships and on the everyday rituals of the FARC-EP member. Some songs refer to friends or relatives who had been killed by enemy weapons, while others present the rifle as a means to create a better society. Others refer to the beauty of weapons carried by the guerillas. In particular, the song entitled ‘Song, Guitar and Rifle’ portrays both the guitar and rifle as being weapons carried by the guerilla, with the rifle being used to banish tyrants and the guitar used to proclaim the advent of socialism. The 12 songs in the anthology on geography include four with references to weapons, for example of arms being supplied from abroad, or of weapons being used by state forces or members of FARC-EP to commit acts of violence. 11
Of the 12 songs in the anthology on peace and reconciliation, eight include references to weapons. 12 These eight songs are examples of symbolic inversion as the role of weapons was transformed. In one song, the singer says that they want to carry a flower instead of a rifle, in another that they wish to build a field of love and abolish cannons. Another song promises a society in which there is no intervention of weapons in politics. Some songs contained explicit examples of symbolic inversion that echo other uses of art in the peace process (see below). One song presents an optimistic dream in which rifles are melted down and transformed into swings for children. Similarly, another song refers to the steel and copper used to make weapons being melted down into an arsenal of love for humanity.
The second form of symbolic language examined here concerns the negotiations on the terms for disarmament to be used in the peace process. Language that enters into the peace agreement is shaped by negotiating parties and mediators. It is only high-ranking officials who participate in negotiations, hence they have the authority to frame the language describing the process.
The negotiations leading up to the agreement were fraught with disagreement over disarmament. In particular, FARC-EP and the government of Colombia were very sensitive to language which encompasses what is described in this article as being symbolic inversion (affecting both FARC-EP members and society in general). These sensitivities caused the peace process to stall for six months, because the conflict parties had different views with regards to the language used to describe disarmament and its timing. While the government insisted on rapid disarmament, FARC-EP wanted a more gradual process (Levin, 2016). 13 Early in the peace negotiations, the parties agreed to use the term ‘dejación de armas’ or the ‘abandonment’ or ‘laying down’ of arms as an alternative to the term disarmament. Importantly, the term ‘dejación’ conveyed a voluntary decision to transform a guerrilla group into a political party. This meant that an important FARC-EP condition regarding disarmament was taken into account: not to be perceived as defeated or surrendered (Cortés and Millán, 2019). Giving up weapons did not mean dismantling the organization, but a transformation from a military force to a political party. As part of this process a symbolic inversion took place. Between 2017 and 2021, acting as a political party, while FARC-EP retained its acronym, it stood for Alternative Revolutionary Force for the Common People. In 2021, the party’s name was changed to Common People’s Party because the old acronym symbolized the violent conflict (Al Jazeera, 2021).
Symbolic acts
Weapons in the Colombian peace process were not simply laid down, but were systematically transformed through a symbolic inversion process observable in many acts, and in this section we summarize four of them. In the 2017, the FARC-EP flag which had featured rifles (see above) was changed to a red rose, a shift which signaled the end of the armed revolution. Second, the peace agreement was signed with a pen made from metal obtained from bullets fired from rifles that were used during the conflict and marked with the slogan ‘Bullets wrote our past, education our future’ (Reuters, 2016). The connection between past, present, and future in this case vividly illustrates the temporal relevance of the symbolic inversion of weapons (or representations of them). Third, in the 2017 ceremony which marked the completion of FARC-EP’s laying down of weapons, former rebels wore white shirts with the slogan ‘Our only weapon are words’ while a Colombian musician performed a song using an escopetarra, a Kalashnikov rifle converted into an electric guitar (Associated Press, 2017). Fourth, during the event, President Juan Manuel Santos gave FARC-EP Commander-in-Chief Timochenko a gold sculpture of a Kalashnikov that had been converted into a shovel (El Colombiano, 2017). The above acts directly used deactivated weapons to communicate changing intent and a renewed focus on education, nonviolent conflict resolution, and land rights.
The fourth act of symbolic inversion involving weapons concerned the intended transformation of FARC-EP arms into three monuments in Havana, New York, and Bogota as stipulated by the peace agreement. In 2018, Doris Salcedo, a Bogota-based artist, turned 37 tons of weapons handed in by FARC-EP guerrillas into what she terms as an anti- or counter-monument called Fragmentos (Fragments) (Violi, 2019). The artist convened 20 women who were sexually assaulted during the conflict, and together they shaped the metal into 1300 tiles which now form the floor of a contemporary art centre (Violi, 2019). Interestingly, Salcedo originally wanted to involve female FARC-EP members too, but their commander did not allow them to participate (Huyssen, 2021), an episode which highlights the often contentious and disruptive nature of symbolic inversion.
The artist referred to her project as an ‘anti-monument’ because she did not want to design a conventional monument to which people would look up, but instead she wanted visitors to look down on the weapons (Keener, 2018). The artist explained that the floor is meant to symbolize the new foundations on which Colombia could be built and the weapons to be stamped on. The work is described as a counter-monument because it does not depict the conflict and peace by erecting large sculptures featuring fighters with their weapons. The women who formed the tiles were given a hammer, and through the repeated hammering of the tiles were thought to have released anger and transformed their status from victim to agent (Mantilla, 2019). The design and development of Fragmentos involved all conflict parties, including the military, FARC-EP, and victims. The Colombian military assisted with the project, as their foundry is the only one in the country capable of reaching the extreme temperatures required to melt down the weapons (Daniels, 2018). Initially, FARC-EP was resistant to the construction of the monument since commanders ‘envisaged 48 mini Arc de Triomphe-style monuments to honor each of the 48 rebel battalions that disarmed’ (Shaw, 2018), but they eventually agreed to the work. The second monument in New York illustrates the public and private dynamics involved in rituals. The monument for the UN Headquarters used seven tons of ammunition to form a canoe. The artwork is called Kusikawsay, the Quechua term for ‘peaceful and happy life.’ This art piece, however, never had a handover ceremony, and the third planned monument in Cuba has not been developed because of disagreements between the governments of Colombia and Cuba (Cortés, 2020).
Conclusions
In this article we develop a novel theory of non-state actors’ disarmament. We argue that while academics and practitioners have usually assumed that disarmament is only a technical undertaking, we conceptualize disarmament as a symbolic inversion process which is directed at individual combatants, the armed group, and the society impacted by war. We show that disarmament in this framework can be viewed as a process that communicates commitment (through language and acts) rather than a necessary condition for removing the means of violence. Although we examined the symbolism of disarmament in one specific case, we refer to other cases which suggest that our findings are generalizable to other non-state groups, at least the well-organized ones.
What does our symbolism framework mean for disarmament practice? This is a difficult question, because of the inherent tension between the policy community’s need to use templates that are applicable in different contexts and our approach, which strongly emphasizes the context of a given disarmament case (and hence may appear not to be generalizable). One might be tempted to conclude that compelling relevant actors to transform the meaning of symbols can help disarmament processes to be ‘successful.’ This is, however, a dangerous route, resembling what Rubinstein called ‘imperial policing,’ because to change one’s symbol is to attempt to change a culture (Rubinstein, 1993). This is not what we advocate. We argue that before engaging in discussions about ‘how to do disarmament,’ one has to comprehensively understand what disarmament is, why it matters, and for whom. We demonstrate that by combining distinct research traditions (social psychology, anthropology, conflict and gender studies), one can gain fresh perspectives in a topic that has been severely undertheorized.
While previous research advocated for the use of quantitative, experimental designs to study DDR processes (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010), we urge scholars to complement such methods with qualitative work that focuses on understanding how symbols feature in rituals and in identity fusion processes. We suggest three future avenues to study disarmament as a symbolic inversion process. First, we encourage scholars to expand the range of actors we consider by integrating external actors undertaking disarmament. Previous research showed that peacekeeping is fraught with cultural challenges (Fetherston and Nordstrom, 1995; Rubinstein, 2005), and external actors who negotiate, design, finance, and implement disarmament programs can facilitate or hinder symbolic inversion processes. Second, while we have focused upon symbolism used within FARC-EP and other armed groups, the use of symbolic inversion is also relevant to how political actors mobilize a society to support a peace process. The sociological mechanisms involved in the use of symbolic inversion would be a fruitful area for future research. Third, we encourage researchers to compare cases in which aspects of symbolic inversion are observable (such as in the case of FARC-EP’s disarmament) with disarmament processes that include aspects with little readily observable empirical manifestations (such as the disarmament process in Northern Ireland in which weapons were decommissioned in private). Examining the private and public manifestation of symbolic inversion can further our understanding of what weapons, ‘arguably the most significant, highly charged register of material culture in the world today’ (Springwood, 2007: 2), mean for different audiences at different times.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
Both authors contributed equally to this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This article has received funding from the Norwegian Research Council, Grant number: 324997.
