Knowledge flow in the ICT sector

Abstract

The author conducted a case study of Anggerek Desa Technology Park in Brunei Darussalam, using an economic sociology approach, to understand the knowledge flow process among small and medium businesses in the ICT sector. Anggerek Desa is a technology park that was designed by the Government of Brunei Darussalam in a top-down manner. The field study and analysis employed a mode of thick description in which data was collected through a combination of in-depth semi-structured interviews with 51 companies and policymakers in the Brunei Economic Development Board (BEDB), E-Government National Centre (BEDB) and Authority for Info-Communications Technology Industry (AiTi), observation and archival analysis from 2013 to 2015. The author contends that knowledge flow among smaller ICT start-up companies in Anggerek Desa takes place via informal networking activity and channels of communication. The informal communication links between the ICT companies have persisted, even after the companies relocated outside Anggerek Desa. The government has taken initiatives to tap into the existing knowledge flow by setting up a business incubator named iCenter and by providing training to ICT workers in the CRAFT facility.

Keywords

Anggerek Desa Technology Park Brunei Darussalam ICT knowledge flow start-up companies

This article explores how knowledge in the ICT sector is transmitted, especially among small and medium business ICT enterprises, in a government-initiated technology park in Brunei Darussalam. The article takes an economic sociology approach.¹ It examines two issues: the first explores social ties of communication enabling knowledge flow and the second focuses on government initiatives to enable individuals working in the ICT sector to exchange knowledge. Specifically, I focus on a government-initiated technology park, namely that of Anggerek Desa Technology Park located in the Brunei-Muara District, Brunei Darussalam.

The analysis relies on empirical data collected in Negara Brunei Darussalam in the period 2013–2015. It is a qualitative exploratory study that infers its analysis through a mode of thick description usually carried out in anthropology (Geertz, 1973). The data collection involved in-depth semi-structured interviews with 51 companies. I started with the AiTi (Authority for Info-Communications Technology Industry of Brunei Darussalam) list of companies to find the business firms, and then proceeded with field findings. In addition, I also conducted expert interviews with policymakers from the BEDB (Brunei Economic Development Board), EGNC (E-Government National Center) and AiTi. This article represents part of a knowledge cluster study that was completed in 2013–2014.² It asks the following principal research question: how does knowledge flow between ICT companies in a government-sponsored technology park? The overall aim of the article is to provide an understanding of industry-government collaboration to enable knowledge flow in the ICT sector specifically, and in South East Asia more generally.

ICT brings about a transformation in the ways that information and knowledge are produced, stored and diffused. The usage of ICT for knowledge sharing calls social and cultural contexts into question, as well as values; in this case, national cultural values (Chay et al., 2005; Li, 2008). Different indicators may be associated with respect to the usage of ICT, ranging from the usage of mobile (cellular) phones and the intranet to Internet subscription. On a cluster level, the usage of ICT could amount to the formation of a virtual cluster. China, for example, is embarking on this type of initiative. The suppliers for Nokia, located in Xingwang Park, Beijing, enjoy a virtual bonded area. This enables a well-timed electronic customs procedure with duties to be paid after products are sold and sent (Yeung et al., 2006). The usage of Kanban for the Toyota Production System has been integrated with an online system referred to as e-Kanban.³

This article makes a contribution to the overall discussion of both economic diversification and government-industry collaboration, particularly within the ICT sector, and how knowledge is utilised in this collaboration. By ‘knowledge’ I refer to tacit knowledge arising from Level One and Level Two knowledge produced by ICT companies in their daily operations. Level One knowledge is the implementation and troubleshooting of an IT product. Level Two knowledge may include some knowledge beyond problem-solving. Tacit knowledge requires spatial proximity for it to be shared and/or exchanged. The formation of industrial clustering enables the flow of tacit knowledge.⁴ The extent to which this tacit knowledge enables product development in industrial clusters in South East Asia is contentious, particularly when one takes into account that most of the companies located in these clusters are part of a global production network.⁵ In small start-up companies in the ICT sector, what kind of knowledge do they produce and share? What kinds of social ties facilitate knowledge flow in Anggerek Desa Technology Park?

The article is organised into three sections. The next section discusses what knowledge is based on the empirical data and then engages in a conceptual discussion of knowledge flow and knowledge sharing. The third section considers initiatives embarked on by the government of Brunei Darussalam in the Park through its business incubator and training programmes. The fourth section delves into the type of collaboration that enables knowledge flow among the firms and the existing typology of social ties. The last section sums up the discussion and offers avenues for further research based on the findings.

Conceptualising knowledge in the ICT sector in Negara Brunei Darussalam

Brunei Darussalam is an Islamic monarchy with a population of 400,000 people. It explicitly pursues an economic diversification policy, the goal of which is to accomplish a balance between the creation of employment, equity, economic stability, management of risk and economic growth, whilst maintaining Brunei’s cultural and religious traditions (Bhaskaran, 2010). The idea of economic diversification originally surfaced in 1961, in a speech given by His Highness Sultan Haji General Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin III at a time when the on-shore oil wells were thought to be draining (Duraman, 2011: 81). However, it was during the 1990s that economic diversification efforts became more strongly expressed. This meant that areas outside eco-tourism, food processing and transportation received attention (Bhaskaran, 2010). Economic diversification strategies called for increased industrialisation and the government responded to this call. In Brunei Darussalam, the government appointed two local contractors to build a Zone Village and accompanying infrastructure at the Sungai Liang Industrial Park (SPARK).⁶ It was constructed to be a leading petrochemical hub⁷ in Kuala Belait. Another industrial cluster is the Pulau Muara Besar Cluster, encompassing a 955-hectare island situated in Brunei Bay. This cluster, according to Global Maritime and Port Services Pte Ltd, which was appointed by BEDD to provide consultancy for the cluster, will be designed to be a sea container port.⁸

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Brunei Darussalam also faced internal weaknesses in creating an enabling environment that supported economic diversification. Several of these weaknesses are the result of a culture of risk aversion combined with structural conditions of the private sector, especially with regard to the financing of new business ventures, which tends not to rely on bank loans but on family savings.⁹ The government responded to industrialisation by, among other initiatives, establishing the Ministry of Industry and Primary Resources in 1989 (Duraman, 2011).

The 2012–2017 Economic Development Planning document stated that one of the pillars (teras) of Brunei Darussalam’s economic diversification process is productive and progressive economic development based on knowledge and innovation (EPU-Office, 2012). On the one hand, research carried out in Brunei with regard to tacit knowledge has hinted at how small enterprises have a weak knowledge base (Anwar, n.d.) and have adopted an ethnocentric type of marketing. Afzal and Lawrey (2012) observe knowledge utilisation in terms of ICT goods export to show the knowledge utilisation dimension. They have also affirmed how knowledge is under-utilised in Brunei. On the other hand, infrastructure development for the clusters is underway. It was acknowledged that the corporate sector has a weakness in that, when it comes to control of land, it is the government that has excessive control.¹⁰ It does not mean that the government was idle. In 2013, the Centre for Strategic and Policy Studies with SGS Economics and Planning Pty Ltd, in collaboration with the Ministry of Development and Department of Economic and Planning Development, published a study on the Land Optimisation Strategy for Industrial and Commercial Growth in Brunei Darussalam (Lennon, 2011). Moreover, the Wawasan Brunei 2035 Goals – a national vision authorised by his Majesty Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah – stipulate three broad aims: 1) the accomplishments of its educated and highly skilled people; 2) increasing the quality of life; and 3) developing a dynamic and sustainable economy (Hashim, 2010).

The recruitment of workforce and experts, such as software engineers, is one way of attaining knowledge in Brunei’s ICT sector. However, renewal of Level One and Level Two knowledge may be tied to the companies’ project-based activities: thus, they are dependent on the kinds of services they provide to their clients and the products they implement from their principals. The workforce that deals with Level Two knowledge would usually be certified in terms of training in the ICT sector. Such staff, in some cases, constitute part of the creative team¹¹ or the research and development team¹². A respondent described this eloquently, during an interview:

We are partners of Microsoft and other IT companies…We are introduced to an approach by a company that develops a certain kind of application and then we work with them, and partner [them] in tendering bids. We want a particular tender that would not incur various expenses. They [Microsoft and other IT companies] also rely on us to maintain their product because, in their case, they come over and implement things, and then they go to another country to [deal with another] bid, so they…rely on their local partner to maintain all the ICT applications they have implemented in Brunei. So, basically, we need to have all the people right from the start, and work with them hand-in-hand [on the product]. And then, once it’s implemented, it’s going to be all those people who maintain it. Basically, this is what we call the first level. The second level (we don’t have that kind of expertise)…we call them and they come [back] over to resolve things. That’s what we call second level.¹³

Level One and Level Two knowledge is being shared and exchanged between ICT companies in Brunei. The terms ‘sharing’ and ‘flow’ of knowledge warrant further elaboration. Knowledge sharing is a term used mainly in organisational culture. Several scholars, such as Nonaka and Nishiguchi (2001), Eisenhardt and Santos (2002), Leonard-Barton (1992; see also Leonard et al., 2013) and Menkhoff et al. (2011) have discussed factors that influence knowledge sharing. Such studies usually focus on the organisational level and the individual level.¹⁴ Human capital and social capital¹⁵ contribute towards knowledge sharing. Ikujiro Nonaka (1994) argues that a knowledge-based organisation becomes a generator of innovative knowledge only when it has grasped the precarious intersection points between explicit and implicit knowledge in routine organisation processes. ‘Ba’ is a concept coined by Nonaka and Nishiguchi (2001) describing a physical, virtual and/or mental space shared by two or more individuals or organisations. It is a platform where knowledge is created, shared and exploited (Nonaka et al., 2000). There are also specific cultural antecedents for knowledge sharing, with Mueller (2013) specifying that there are three indicators (shared leadership, time and organisational structure) and six values (learning orientation, openness, team orientation, growth orientation, output orientation and employee orientation) that may determine a culture’s conduciveness to cross-boundary knowledge sharing.

Whilst knowledge flow extends beyond organisational boundaries, the ‘triple helix’ concept is grounded in the flow of knowledge within separate academic, industrial and governmental spheres. Helices that make up the boundaries of academia, industry and government ‘represent specialisation and codification in function systems which evolve from and within civil society’ (Leydesdorff, 2012: 30, as cited from Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz, 2003). In Triple Helix I, for example, there is a dominant role for the nation-state. A specific historical condition exists whereby the nation-state encompasses academia and industry and thus controls the relations between them.¹⁶ The triple helix concept touches on an aspect not typically covered in knowledge-sharing literature; that of the role of government. Speaking about Hungary, in terms of inquiring how the government facilitates partnerships between academia and industry and how enterprises relate to universities, Inzelt (2004) identifies how the collapse of socialism forced transition economies to redefine the government’s role as ruler and regulator. The role of government has also been discussed with regard to national innovation systems (NIS). In early NIS literature, government and related agencies are seen as supporting innovation by means of standard-setting, basic research funding, public-private partnerships and regulation (Watkins et al., 2015). The concept was later extended to developing countries and emerging economies. China’s innovation system, for instance, may be a product of a single political party and a tendency towards central planning with reliance on a downward mode of information transmission (Watkins et al., 2015). For the purpose of this article, I define knowledge flow as tacit knowledge, arising from Level One and Level Two knowledge, that extends beyond organisations. The terms ‘transmission’ and ‘exchange’ will be used interchangeably with ‘flow’.

Empirical research results show that the role of government is vital for innovation. In South Korea, the government is important with respect to providing financial support for technological innovation, as this is an important driver in the patent and new design registrations of regional small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).¹⁷ Meanwhile, a case from Sweden exemplifies how a government-sponsored IT programme stimulated economic growth and provided future value to the participants of the programme when there was collaboration between local government, universities and funding agencies (Leven et al., 2014). It currently remains unknown how ICT companies might benefit from government-provided technology park facilities in a controlled economy like Brunei Darussalam. By ‘benefit’, I refer specifically to knowledge-related advantages. Capitalising on knowledge attainment may hinge on successfully localising outside Level Three knowledge,¹⁸ or Level Two knowledge in the ICT sector, brought in by external experts. The next section provides an analysis of two initiatives from the Government of Brunei Darussalam aimed at facilitating knowledge flow in Anggerek Desa Park through human capital training and a business incubator set-up.

Initiatives from the Brunei government to enable knowledge flow: CRAFT and iCenter in Anggerek Desa

This section will examine the role of CRAFT¹⁹ and iCenter, each located in the Technology Park, in facilitating knowledge flow among ICT companies. The integration of ICT on a governmental and nationwide basis is relatively recent in Brunei. It started in 2009, as explicated in the 2009–2014 E-Government Strategic Plan.²⁰ The plan contains five strategic priorities. Those directly relevant to ICT-related knowledge are first, second and third priority. They are as follows: firstly, the development of training capacity and capabilities. Training programmes are to be developed and government servants’ skills are to be certified. Secondly, the development of ICT human resources, incorporating training and awareness programmes and including IT security awareness, for the civil service.²¹ The third strategic priority is the strengthening of ICT security.²² ICT industries are viewed as the implementing agencies of the overall strategic plan.²³ Following this, I now present a case study of Anggerek Desa Technology Park, which is designed to host ICT companies in Brunei Darussalam and includes a business incubation programme initiated by the Brunei Economic Development Board (BEDB).

The support of the government is visible when one carefully observes the role of the BEDB in regard to iCenter. The BEDB is mainly an investment promotion agency in Brunei Darussalam, with the building of knowledge-based industries as a particular area of focus. ²⁴ The Assistant CEO of the BEDB has described its operation as being like an ecosystem, as follows:

So within the BEDB, my area of responsibility is really looking at how we work on this ecosystem, so that the ‘Asian’ knowledge (in this context, this means knowledge produced in Asia) is one priority where we link industry, meaning foreign investors…or industry people, to locals so that jobs are then created, knowledge is created and entrepreneurship flourishes. So that is primarily what the innovation area is, and within that we are organised into an area of R and D facilitation, which involves talking to investors who are from overseas and who may have specific technology, or specific interests, that they want to pursue. We would try to work with them to bring them to Brunei, explaining to them the various incentives that we offer as a country.²⁵

In light of this ecosystem view, the BEDB has offered grants, providing not only financial support, but also assistance with infrastructure building, such as the provision of physical facilities.²⁶ Anggerek Desa Technology Park in Brunei Darussalam represents such a BEDB initiative and started operating in 2008. In addition to the construction of physical buildings and amenities,²⁷ the BEDB also began setting up business incubation grants.²⁸ There are several facilities for ICT companies in the Park: CRAFT, iCenter and Knowledge Hub (K-Hub). Creative Art Facility (CRAFT) has been supported by the BEDB to provide assistance, in the form of training, to ‘incubatees’. CRAFT is located in K-Hub, whilst some of the incubatees are located in iCenter.²⁹ Two relatively high-rise buildings are visible when one steps into the Park; these are the Knowledge Hub building and the iCenter building. The Park and the buildings can be seen in Figure 1.

Figure 1.

Anggerek Desa Technology Park aerial map.

iCenter and Knowledge Hub (K-Hub) are located next to each other. Despite being physically separated, they are nonetheless socially adjacent and complement each other. The coming subsections will discuss how iCenter functions as a business incubator and how CRAFT functions as a training facility.

iCenter as a business incubator

The BEDB established iCenter in 2008 with an explicit focus on creativity and the ICT industry. Through such focus, decision-makers attempted to stimulate creativity and innovation and move away from reliance on the main growth motor in Brunei Darussalam, namely the oil and gas sector. iCenter was pioneering in Brunei Darussalam, in terms of functioning as a business incubation centre with a focus on start-ups.³⁰ After reviewing various incubation models around the world and in the neighbouring countries of Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, it was decided that the most suitable model of incubation was the National University of Singapore’s (NUS) model. Consequently, Kent Ridge Consulting Pte Ltd has assisted in iCenter’s initial management with a localisation process currently ongoing. The iCenter is supported by mainly local staff and is linked with the NUS incubation centre in order to tap into what is happening in Singapore and globally.³¹

However, this does not mean that iCenter is simply a copy of the NUS incubation model. Indeed, it has been developed with a specific historical consciousness of the different social ties innate in local companies. Taking risks during its early inception, a firm may rely on already existing social networks. This is corroborated in new business ventures, and risk-taking therein relies on family networks instead of starting from scratch. Business venture entrepreneurs typically have genealogical links to their enterprise (e.g. their grandparents were in the same business), thus enabling local knowledge to be maintained on the basis of family ties.³² Such consciousness is part of what was understood by officials in iCenter as ‘networking’.

Two types of status are applicable to firms within iCenter: resident and non-resident. Seven companies are resident: they are focused on publishing, advertising, design and website content management. The four non-resident companies concentrate on GPS technology and online shopping, among other things. iCenter allows its residents and non-residents to make use of historical networks. It also enables meetings with government officials, including those from the BEDB. Networking with the BEDB is a significant advantage of being located in iCenter. This is iterated by one of the founders of a company residing there:

There’s always another new update and we are quite close with these authorities, so the BEDB is just a call away. They always have these (social) functions and workshops.³³ They always drop by: sometimes it’s informal so that we know the latest happenings – stuff like this. Like you said, I think proximity works.³⁴

In another interview, officials in iCenter stated that it mainly offers the BEDB’s network, through which there will be connections to the ministries and to the private sector.³⁵ In the networking sessions, often organised by iCenter, both resident and non-resident companies may participate.

The interior of iCenter offers flexible and relaxed spaces for its company residents. These occupants can be categorised as former academics or start-up entrepreneurs who are following business ventures because of family business or because of the fact that they are passionate about starting such enterprises. Upon entering, there is a 24/7 reception area and guest lounge. On the right, there is a kedai kopi (coffee shop). A private meeting room is available to the left. Resident companies have full access to facilities including meeting rooms, boardrooms, conference rooms and an auditorium. In addition to these formal settings, informal meetings in the kedai kopi enrich a working day in iCenter.

Another prominent feature is the social events organised by (or in) iCenter, which may lead to networking and collaboration activities. Most of the residents know each other. Networking events are available from iClub, including initiatives such as networking during visits to other countries, such as Japan, India and Indonesia, facilitated by BEDB. A respondent described his experience of participating in an iClub event at iCenter. He stated that sometimes this event took place during a breakfasting meet-up in the fasting month of Ramadhan or during breakfast time in the morning. During this event, he would interact with the general public, including University of Brunei Darussalam (UBD) students, BEDB executives, CRAFT staff and students trained at CRAFT. These networking events take place in the coffee shop and normally conversations would be conducted in Brunei-Malay language.³⁶ In some cases, experts are invited from overseas and they engage in a more formal meeting with iCenter residents. A respondent explained this in an interview in English:

They do organise networking sessions and they do organise workshops where they fly in experts from overseas and when these experts come in, they normally mix around people, you see. So these people come here and share the knowledge and they want us to also share our knowledge by putting us together to do something. So that is the formal ones but I don’t think that’s very effective: it’s too formal, too crowded. It always happens informally; coffee with one of the colleagues then start talking about [it]. Who knows? This idea can be done so I think the informal one is effective. Even before I came in, I was told by a staff member that most things actually happen over coffee shop. For me, I could see I benefit more from informal means.³⁷

These informal meetings, enabling interactions, tend to be more beneficial to new start-up companies, allowing them to network. Representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) and the BEDB once travelled to India with companies resident at iCenter. Informal discussions between employees from an online shopping company and a publishing company took place during the trip. This led to a collaboration, as explained by one of the employees:

There is a publishing company which is close to us, as we are neighbours. We talk a lot when there are trips; we go together. MOFAT (Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade) brings companies to India. We start talking – hey, what can we do with people in India, like a programmer, just to find out what they do? It turns out they are interested in [different things]. Let’s say agriculture or hospital or post-office stationaries [related goods]. They alternate things for Brunei. We have these networks for publishing. The MOE [Ministry of Education] likes this idea. I will say – hey, why don’t we do have projects over here? You can meet up with the MOE; I can link out with private companies and we could bring up a technology that has something in the pipeline.

Thus, the informal meetings may lead to a joint cooperation between companies in iCenter and may facilitate networking between government ministries and companies in Brunei Darussalam.

iCenter, as a business incubator, invests in organising meetings and talks. Investing in these types of events may nurture social capital, which is a prominent term often employed in economic sociology. According to Bourdieu (1986: 248), ‘Social capital is the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition’. There are criticisms of Bourdieu’s conceptualisation, as aired by Michel Callon (1998: 11–12):

The notion of social capital is the Trojan horse of dualism since it severs the formal identity between agent and network; it splits the agent-network again by introducing the usual opposition between the action and the resources of that action.

In response to categorisations of social capital, Bhuiyan and Evers (2005) highlight three more facets. Two of which are relevant to the study. First is a focus on ‘social capital as a characteristic of the structure of the internal linkages that constitute collective actors (groups, organisations, communities, regions, nations, etc.) as distinct from individual actors that can give these actors cohesiveness and its associated benefits’.³⁸ The second facet includes a collective actor, such as a company, that is influenced both by its external linkages to other companies and institutions and by the fabric of its internal linkages. Its ability for effective action is typically a function of both.³⁹ Investing in social capital requires resources; in this case, time, energy and money. Bollingtoft and Ulhoi’s ethnographic study (Phan et al., 2005) of the ‘networked incubator’⁴⁰ shows that firms that have invested time and effort in social activities are more inclined to collaborate. By investing in social events, iCenter deliberately attempts to nurture social capital among its resident companies.

Start-up companies require funding. In the case of iCenter, the government approaches this need through means of competition. Not all the resident companies in iCenter received incubation funding directly from the government. iCenter facilitates queries regarding funding, in general, by directing them to other government agencies, such as the AiTi for private incubation funding. The BEDB and the AiTi partner together to create another ground ecosystem. The BEDB, for instance, has an entrepreneur-enterprise competition for prototypes. The competition incorporates innovation, as well as technology. A committee examines the proposals, agrees on the best one and provides a grant to support its development. The AiTi has a similar initiative, specifically concentrating on the ICT sector. The AiTi has traditionally provided market-creation grants, marketing grants and product and management grants to established companies. However, there has been a lack of grants for start-up organisations. Thus, in mid-2013, the BEDB initiated a new start-up fund, called Start-up Brunei, to help new companies purchase necessary equipment, furniture and facilities. The BEDB is now putting efforts into developing a whole start-up ecosystem. In terms of funding, an array of grants is being made available for start-ups, including financial assistance for prototyping, market creation and marketing.⁴¹ Thus, iCenter is a top-down initiative from the Brunei Government to cultivate and tap into existing social networks between ICT companies. It shows how the government intends to utilise social capital in its business incubation initiatives. It should be noted, however, that there is no emphasis, or special treatment, given to smaller start-up companies: iCenter’s approach is to cultivate competition among smaller and medium-sized ICT companies.

CRAFT as a training facility for ICT workers

Most of the resident companies located in Knowledge Hub and iCenter are ICT businesses. Training is vital in order for the companies’ human capital to be able to capitalise on ICT knowledge and to integrate this into their work. For this reason, CRAFT, or Creative Art Facility, was established in February 2013. It is located in the Knowledge Hub building. It emerged after the BEDB formed an agreement with the US software company, Autodesk, to set up a consulting agency, providing training to incubates.⁴² From a sociological perspective, this is an explicit government-industry collaboration that seeks to intersect ICT companies conventionally focusing on hardware with software companies focusing on animation.⁴³ Nurturing creative industries based on ideas related to ICT and software/multimedia is one of the objectives pursued by CRAFT and is part and parcel of the government support for Anggerek Desa Technology Park.

CRAFT itself has a relaxed and open environment, despite being nascent in its operation. Students from institutions such as the University of Brunei Darussalam (UBD) may interact with consultants employed by CRAFT. They do so during a drawing class, held on Thursday nights, and at a story-boarding class for film and media students. An introduction to MAYA software for UBD students is held in a class called a sketch club.⁴⁴ During the period when interviews were being conducted, and due to its relatively young age, a few resident companies at iCenter referred to it not as CRAFT but as Autodesk. CRAFT facilitates learning for companies interested in animation by introducing them to a pool of experts and inviting them to participate in the open discussions they organise. This was iterated by a respondent in an interview:

Expertise from outside Brunei is being brought here; for example, Autodesk. They have a sharing session. There is an individual from Singapore who was involved in a Dreamworks project. The actual guy himself was involved in a movie project. Now he’s in Singapore in one of his studios. The BEDB did assist us significantly.⁴⁵

The first function of CRAFT is to mentor resident companies who have received AiTi grants. Employees from these companies subsequently receive three-month-long internship training. After this training, they are asked to develop projects based on their proposals. They have a strict timetable during which they have to produce a project, such as a video animation. They also learn how to market their project. The 2013 batch was involved either in film or TV series production. Each of them had milestones to meet in order to then be eligible to receive the next infusion of money for their project. CRAFT’s current instructors trained them in two respects: first is the preproduction phase, covering design, script-boarding, script, story and other elements related to preproduction. Second is training in terms of promotion of the kind of products they have. This is the post-production phase.⁴⁶ Hence, the grants are structured according to performance in training and delivery of project outputs.

Next is a function whereby CRAFT temporarily absorbs risks or time usually spent on prototype or project developments. Generally speaking, ICT companies in Brunei Darussalam only embark on this kind of risk-taking during project preparation after it has been approved and funded by a client.⁴⁷ A CEO of an ICT company described the extent of risk that his company is willing to take in designing applications.⁴⁸ He stated that prototyping of systems is essential as tools must be adjusted to clients’ needs. Prototyping, in this case, refers to a pilot test. Configuration and customisation of software or ICT applications are not the norm, as these companies are mostly determined to deliver and set up their projects. Prototyping would normally be done once, or at most twice, as it is costly and time consuming. Specifically, the CEO shared how his company ensures an application’s feasibility and viability. In a government-related project, the company would have to liaise with multiple departments. The government department chosen by a ministry is typically one that has an active profile and is critical in voicing its views in terms of performance. Some government departments, according to him, are more critical than others, and when they can accept the software, or application, the others will likely follow suit. This is how the company refines project implementation. Relying solely on customers’ input during the pilot period is difficult because conditions and policies change in Brunei Darussalam.⁴⁹ Start-up companies in iCenter receive continuous feedback from CRAFT and consultants when there are missteps and errors in developing a project they initiated. They are provided with targets and advice from consultants who are well versed in the competitive Singapore market.⁵⁰

CRAFT has developed a ‘risk-absorber’ role, in which incubatees are able to take risks, explore and, when necessary, make mistakes as part of their learning process during project development and implementation. CRAFT also provides mentorship to ICT workers who have received grants from the AiTi. Furthermore, CRAFT also ties Anggerek Desa-based ICT companies and workers with the Singapore ICT hub.

Informal ties of communication among ICT companies in Anggerek Desa

In this section, I pursue a two-fold argument: firstly, a technology park thrives in terms of knowledge flow thanks to its informal ties of communication; secondly, the flow of knowledge is most likely to occur in informal networking activity between smaller start-up companies.

The research data suggests that collaborations enabling knowledge to flow and be shared between companies are most likely to take place in smaller start-up companies. Indeed, companies in Knowledge Hub and iCenter are typologically different. Most of the start-up companies are located in iCenter. It was denoted as Phase One and was meant to nurture and increase the industry in Anggerek Desa. Knowledge Hub was referred to as Phase Two and was designed to be a Research and Development centre.⁵¹ Companies located in Knowledge Hub are not generally start-up companies. They are larger-sized companies, with more than 10 employees, and most of them are already holders of ICT certifications. They participate in bidding for projects and these projects serve as learning mediums for them. These companies resemble other ICT companies located in the Brunei-Muara District. They are vendor companies offering services such as system integration and software training. In other words, they rely on leading ICT companies, such as IBM and Microsoft, for the products that they sell to the local market in Brunei Darussalam. These ICT vendor companies also offer certification, training and expertise alongside the products that they sell. They have an internal mode of knowledge sharing and the type of knowledge they possess is mostly related to problem-solving and information concerning local expertise in Brunei Darussalam.

This problem-solving knowledge deals with the software, services and/or products that these companies sell; a form of Level One knowledge, as discussed in this article’s introduction, predominant in Anggerek Desa. A technical manager would be the company’s expert and would work with the team handling the project to discuss how to resolve an issue. A general manager working for an ICT software company in Gadong, Brunei Darussalam, described the process of problem-solving. He stated that every time there is a problem, the technical manager in his office will go to the software team and speak with them. They will sit down and discuss the situation together. There are times when it might not be those who are working in the software division who comment or give feedback on how to solve a problem, but they may have encountered similar problems before with other customers and environments. They will share their experiences regarding these.⁵² Usually they have a meeting every Friday or share lunch meetings.⁵³ This is akin to what is practiced by a company based in the Knowledge Hub.

Respondent: ‘Yes. We have one here. We’re budgeting for eating out but the company decides that every Friday we gather here in our company for lunch. The company provides lunch, so we all come here. We can choose whatever we want to eat for lunch. That’s one of the fun parts of a Friday!’

Interviewer: ‘Do you discuss problems relating to work in these informal meetings?’.

Respondent: ‘Yes. Just now we are discussing one of our own department’s problems with other departments…with someone from the technical department and someone from the training department, as well. We identify the problems and how we are going to resolve them and who will be in charge of resolving them’.⁵⁴

Most of these meetings are informal and take place inside the company. They are usually closed to other companies, as the problem-solving is related to a company’s own projects and training.

Owing to the different typologies of knowledge, i.e. Level One and Level Two, and the fact that an expert is likely to be loyal when working in a middle-sized ICT company,⁵⁵ cooperation for project development is more likely to take place between companies in iCenter. Start-up companies typically have a flatter organisational structure, predisposing them towards being open to ideas and cooperating with other start-up companies. Analysis of interviews and observations made during fieldwork highlighted how the term ‘my team’ was frequently used as a discursive response every time an interviewee was asked about problem-solving in iCenter. A distinct answer was normally provided by ICT companies located outside of iCenter, in the Brunei-Muara District: they would say ‘a senior trainer’, ‘a technical manager’, ‘the division head’, rather than ‘team’. But flatter organisational structures affect the nature of collaboration. This was illustrated by an interviewee from iCenter. He works for a start-up company that receives a grant from the AiTi. During the pre-production process, he shared some of his ideas concerning the development of a new animation with another company located in iCenter. Initially he saw this as a drawback, due to the pressure of competition. He then presented his animation video to the public, based on what he had shared with others, including his competitor. Following the presentation, he realised that the other company with which he had shared his ideas was better at presenting the overall proposal, but his own company was superior at developing the character⁵⁶ of animation. By exchanging ideas and information with another company and then delivering a presentation to the public, his own company became aware of its specific competitive advantage. This collaboration took place after informal networking in Anggerek Desa and substantiates our argument that collaborations leading to knowledge flow within the ICT sector are more likely to occur through informal networking between smaller start-up companies.

It has been discussed how Anggerek Desa was developed by the BEDB with a consciousness of the need to explore trade links outside of Brunei Darussalam, and internally there has existed a historical link,⁵⁷ even before the companies were based in Anggerek Desa. It has also been demonstrated how interactions are enabled through meetings and social events. Such events foster informal ties of communication that may persist and extend even after a company relocates out of Anggerek Desa. Companies and start-up companies that have spent time in Anggerek Desa and then relocated to other business areas in the Brunei-Muara District are likely to retain the social ties that they established with companies in the first location. This is shown in the following example of a company that provides ICT training, located in the Brunei-Muara District.

The company, henceforth referred to as ‘AR’, was established in 2007 with an explicit focus on ICT human resource development. It is experienced in managing ICT training, such as the Internet and Computing Core Certification (IC3) Citizen exam and the International Computer Driving Licence (ICDL). For the IC Citizen exam, AR provided training for over 120 teachers in Brunei Darussalam in 2012. The company has a long-established working relationship with the Ministry of Education and mainly concentrates on training human resources in ICT literacy. In interview, one of the top managerial-level officers explained how good social skills are vital, as this enables successful interactions with people regardless of their age or seniority.⁵⁸ The company has a cohort of young trainers who seem to be communicating well with trainees.⁵⁹ A software engineer by training, the interviewee reflected on his experience when he was previously based at iCenter. There was a limit to what he would share with his trainees; for example, he would not share ICT literacy materials, as these are his company’s key product. Yet knowledge exchange takes place with regard to general ICT system operations without the intricate details of specific training manuals being divulged. There are times when this knowledge flow relates to problems that the company is facing or something that the interviewee cannot resolve, due to his/her own limited knowledge or experience of the issue. In these instances, he engages in discussions with some of these people that he knows from his time based at iCenter. Such informal channels of communication enable problem-solving and the flow of knowledge between AR and companies still located in iCenter in Anggerek Desa.

Conclusion

At the beginning of the field research, one company’s CEO, located outside of iCenter and outside of Knowledge Hub, expressed an air of scepticism. He stated that his company did not do much in the way of innovation, which would include taking a new product to market and so forth. He repeatedly stated how creating or taking a new product was risky. ‘It will not work’, he said, in an interview. As he saw it, creativity in the ICT field is limited; his company can fulfil only what a customer requests. He added that there can be a design aspect: this is the area that can encourage creativity.⁶⁰ The data analysis suggests the opposite. Cooperation is a possible scenario for small and medium start-up companies and the government attempts to nourish this in Anggerek Desa. The founder of an ICT company located at iCenter acknowledged that its main assets were not its products but its people.⁶¹ This may be an area that can be developed further, despite the growth of artificial intelligence in knowledge sharing and the sociology of knowledge.⁶² Developing human capital is one of the reasons why CRAFT and iCenter were established.

This article has argued that knowledge flow in Anggerek Desa involves mostly Level One problem-solving and tacit knowledge. This knowledge flow is geared more towards informal networking and collaborations, with knowledge sharing likely to take place between smaller start-up companies. The government, on the other hand, is more focused on providing further training and meet-up sessions through iCenter and CRAFT. To pursue this argument, the article has explored different strands of knowledge prevalent in the ICT sector in Brunei Darussalam. The levels of knowledge in the ICT sector are mainly twofold: Level One knowledge is applied knowledge and may involve troubleshooting of an IT product, whilst Level Two knowledge may cover knowledge beyond problem-solving, such as sending a faulty product to a principal ICT company. The ICT experts who deal with Level Two knowledge normally hold qualifications such as the Cisco certification.⁶³ Investing in knowledge through ICT clusters has been one of the paths chosen by the government in its economic diversification policy, as evidenced in the case of Anggerek Desa Technology Park.

The article’s first strand of analysis concerned initiatives for human capital training in the ICT industry and business incubators being established by the government. As an example of the former, CRAFT provides mentorship to companies receiving start-up grants and at the same time plays a role in absorbing risks arising from the exploration of new projects. Medium enterprises can only risk developing a prototype after a project receives funding approval from the client, whereas start-up companies can develop a prototype in the pre-production process. As an example of the latter, iCenter is a business incubator designed with an awareness of the need to tap into existing historic linkages. It hosts various social events during which knowledge flow takes place among resident companies who know each other relatively well.

The article’s second strand of analysis focused on knowledge flow among small and medium-sized enterprises in iCenter, in contrast to Knowledge Hub. Level One knowledge is shared and transmitted among resident companies in iCenter, which facilitates, with support from the BEDB, networking and social functions for entrepreneurs. Activities stimulating knowledge flow are found more in smaller start-up companies. This is in contrast with what the government presents as its initiative, where competition is the keyword and a generalised approach is in place for both medium and smaller-sized enterprises. The article has also demonstrated that informal ties of communication, fostered between companies initially based together in iCenter, may persist even after these companies have relocated outside the Technology Park. Such social ties may facilitate knowledge flow when they are activated by companies facing problems relating to the ICT products they sell.

The presented argument and findings suggest the need for further studies of innovation and the ICT sector in Borneo – an island known to be rich in biodiversity and natural resources. How can Brunei Darussalam capitalise on its trading links to enable the country to tap into markets outside Borneo? And what are the strategies employed by ICT companies to localise Level Two and Level Three knowledge, so as to enable product development and/or further human capital development in their companies? These questions shall inform the direction of future analyses arising from the research undertaken in Brunei Darussalam.

Footnotes

Acknowledgement

I am thankful to the sharing of ideas on sociology of knowledge with Hans-Dieter Evers, Anthony Banyouku Ndah and Syamimi Ariff Lim for this paper. I am also grateful to University of Brunei Darussalam for providing financial support for the fieldwork of this article. Rachel Harrison and an anonymous reviewer provided feedback for the article. Judy Heckstall Smith and Ratnasari Nugraheni had been helpful in editing the article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The author received funding from University of Brunei Darussalam seed fund grant with reference number UBD/PNC2/2/RG/1(271) in 2013-2014 for the research of this article.

Notes

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