Abstract
This paper examines the causes, course, and consequences of the Nam Ky uprising in Cochin China in the final weeks of 1940. It argues that weakening French power both in Europe and in Indochina – the surrender to Germany in June 1940, compromise with the Japanese military in September 1940, and confrontation with the Thais over Cambodia during October and November – convinced the Indochinese Communist Party that the time was ripe for an insurrection. But the rising failed to materialize in Saigon, and was soon defeated in the rural areas. The principal reasons for these failures were that the communists had insufficient men and arms and that the colonial police and security services had broken into the party's communications networks. In the repression which followed the uprising, the party in the south lost its leadership – through execution and imprisonment – and its networks were virtually destroyed. As a result, the regional balance of support and leadership within the Indochinese Communist Party shifted decisively towards the north.
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