Sir Francis Wheler's Caribbean and North American Expedition,1693: A Case Study in Combined Operational Command during the Reign of William III

The historiography of command of amphibious operations during the early modern era is typically addressed in one of two ways. One explanation discounts the treatment of command, suggesting that army—navy discord was inevitable and, in the absence of systemic amelioration of this friction, command as an operational variable always had a negative impact upon operational progress. The other approach more subtly reduces the emphasis placed upon the impact of command in joint operations and argues that its operational exercise through an executive council of war meant that it was largely a settled issue for contemporaries. By drawing upon the evidence of an amphibious campaign undertaken first in the Caribbean and then off the north-eastern American seaboard during the Nine Years War, 1688—97, this article rejuvenates another understanding of combined operational command, which harks back to the views of the principal eighteenth-century author on amphibious warfare, Thomas More Molyneaux. In this analysis, combined operational command is shown to be a negotiated operational construct between the service commanders and the government, as a result of which disagreements related to the command structure and the subsequent dilution of authority through an executive council of war significantly impacted upon operational success.