The British Army and Wireless Communication,1896–1918

I. The British Army and Wireless Technology, 1896–1914

Despite the groundbreaking work on electromagnetic radiation by pioneers such as James Clerk Maxwell and Heinrich Rudolf Hertz, the invention of wireless will forever be associated with Guglielmo Marconi. After demonstrating the practicality of his invention in England in the early summer of 1896, Marconi was granted a patent on 2 June. Barely three months later, and following widespread publicity, observers from the General Post Office, the Royal Navy, and the British army gathered on Salisbury Plain to see for themselves the potential of this manifestly revolutionary means of communication. ¹⁰

The British Admiralty immediately recognized the significant implications of Marconi’s invention, since it would provide the Royal Navy for the first time with a method of ‘real-time’ ship-to-ship communication that was not limited to the distances at which flag or lamp signals could be read. On 24 July 1903 an agreement was signed between the Marconi Company and the Royal Navy for the general use of Marconi wireless equipment for an initial period of 11 years. Marconi granted the Admiralty full use of all patent rights, the supply of all apparatus, and priority over all messages. ¹¹ Although by late 1904 less than half the fleet was wireless capable, from 1908 all new battlecruisers entering service were fitted with high-power sets as standard. ¹² By 1914 wireless not only provided the Royal Navy with a revolutionary mechanism for command and control, but it also formed a vital component of an imperial communications system that spanned the globe. ¹³

In contrast to the Royal Navy, the British army was much less enthusiastic about the prospects of wireless. As with the telephone, technical limitations meant that wireless was slow to win a place within the army’s communications system prior to the First World War. ¹⁴ Wireless sets in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were large, heavy, and unreliable. While size was not a major issue for the Royal Navy, no portable, man-carried set for army purposes existed in 1914. Moreover, the sets were ‘almost exclusively Morse-operated with crystals or magnetized tape-detection for receivers, and arc or spark-gap radiation for transmission’. ¹⁵ This meant that their oper- ational range was limited, channel selectivity was poor, and very few sets could be employed on a given frontage without risk of mutual interference. Wireless telephony – the transmission of human speech by radio waves – required the use of the thermionic valve (also known as the vacuum tube amplifier), the development of which was still at an experimental stage at this time. ¹⁶

In light of these drawbacks, wireless had potentially little value for army purposes on the field of battle. Nevertheless, the British army did show a readiness to conduct wireless tests during the Second South African, or Boer, War (1899–1902). In November 1899 five wireless stations and six Marconi engineers arrived in Cape Town. However, owing to the temperamental nature of the technology and the unsuitable meteorological conditions that prevailed, the tests produced rather disappointing results. In February 1900 the director of army telegraphs, Major Richard Hippisley, ordered the equipment to be dismantled and removed. Viewed merely as an ‘experimental toy’, wireless played no subsequent active role in the army’s communications system during the course of the war. ¹⁷

During the 12 years which elapsed between the end of the Second South African War and the start of the First World War, doubt, suspicion, and scepticism hampered wireless development within the army. Despite the establishment of a small experimental staff at the Army Signal School in Aldershot in 1903 and the creation of an Army Wireless Section in 1905, by 1912 it was clear that the army had not been keeping abreast of the latest developments. ¹⁸ In July a committee chaired by Sir Henry Norman MP was set up to address the situation and suggest how wireless communication could be improved to suit the needs of the army. ¹⁹ In November the committee witnessed a series of demonstrations in Aldershot. The first test involved a standard pack set, which required four horses to carry, each with a load of at least 80kg. The first horse carried the transmitter, while the second, third, and fourth horses bore the two 30foot masts, receiver, and 0.5kilowatt petrol engine. It took between 10 and 15 minutes to set up and had a range of no more than 30 miles. ²⁰ According to the committee’s report: ‘As soon as communication was attempted this set was found to be out of order. The fault was not located during the whole time of the visit – about five hours.’ The second test involved a wagon set, which comprised a four-horsed limbered wagon equipped with an 80foot ‘umbrella-like’ aerial mast, transmitter, receiver, and a 1.5kilowatt petrol engine. Although it had a range of approximately 100 miles, when given the task of transmitting a message to a corresponding station 90 miles away, this set also failed to impress. ²¹

The Norman committee delivered its final report to the War Office in September 1913. Although it acknowledged that ‘wireless communication between the different parts of an army in the field may be of the utmost value, rendering services with which no other method of communication can compare’, the committee stated that ‘the inefficiency of the wireless service … is to a great extent due to the present type of apparatus employed’. The report concluded that unless the army could acquire the services of highly trained officers and men, and could obtain equipment ‘of the most scientific construction’, simple in operation and ‘rapid in movement, erection and dismantling’, then ‘the efficiency of our forces in time of war would be better promoted by the abandonment of wireless communication altogether … as an inefficient wireless service in war would be a constant source of doubt and danger’. ²² The chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir John French, agreed with the committee’s findings, stating: ‘An inefficient wireless service is worse than none at all.’ ²³

Doubts over the reliability of the army’s wireless equipment were further augmented by the poor performance of wireless during the army’s 1913 autumn manoeuvres, which tested the GHQ of the planned expeditionary force. A report written shortly after the exercises noted that because GHQ had only one code book for its wireless operators, when GHQ moved, ‘either the old or the new HQ could not read code messages during the period taken by the carrier of the book to move from one to the other’. The report concluded:

Wireless is one of the last methods by which important messages should be sent on service, because (i) All messages must be sent in cipher, (ii) Foreign fortresses have instruments which can locate, both in direction and range, any stations working, (iii) There is always a danger of the cipher being read … Messages going by wireless should be usually, and if possible, of transient importance, so that if read within say 12–18 hours not much harm is done. ²⁴

Thus, as a result of its lack of portability for mobile operations, its technical unreliability, and the overwhelming fear of insecurity that it generated, in 1914 the use of wireless in the British army was confined to the fixed and relatively stationary position of GHQ. ²⁵ Wireless was also provided to the cavalry, since it was recognized that ‘a Cavalry Division cannot usefully communicate by any means of communication employing wire or cable’. ²⁶ GHQ was equipped with one motor lorry set and three portable wagon sets, while a further three wagon sets were allocated to the Cavalry Division headquarters, and each cavalry brigade was equipped with a standard pack set. ²⁷

Limited experiments in wireless communication between aeroplanes and the ground were also conducted in the years immediately prior to the Great War. ²⁸ Yet while Lieutenant Raymond Fitzmaurice had been able to send a clear signal from his aeroplane flying over the English Channel to the commander of HMS Ouse some 45 miles away on 22 January 1913, ²⁹ in a letter dated 16 June 1913 the president of the Signal Committee, captain RN Barracks, confided to the secretary of the Admiralty that ‘owing to the small amount of expertise which has so far been gained in the possibilities of W/T from aircraft, and to the fact that aeroplanes are still unable to receive W/T messages’, progress in wireless communication between aeroplanes and the ground remained ‘slow and unsatisfactory’. ³⁰

Overall, when war broke out in August 1914 the British army was caught in a period of transition as it sought to integrate newer and more elaborate means of communication with the older, more traditional practices. Despite the addition of wireless and telephones, British commanders continued to place greater emphasis on despatch riders and visual signalling as the primary means of communicating orders, reports, and other vital information. By way of comparison, the German army in 1914 ‘went into the field with radio (wireless) and telephone exclusively’, with little provision for alternative means of communication. ³¹ As well as OHL, the headquarters of each of the seven armies deployed on the Western Front was equipped with a 2kilowatt Telefunken set, which had a range of between 150 and 180 miles. Two smaller Telefunken sets with a range of approximately 40 miles were also provided to each cavalry division. ³² In light of the fact that the German Telefunken sets suffered from the same technical constraints as the British Marconi sets, why did German commanders in 1914 place a greater dependence upon wireless than did their British counterparts?

There are two main explanations. First, from a military-specific point of view, the German army embraced a much more flexible, decentralized style of command and control than the British. Wireless communication was ideally suited to this delegated mode of command which encouraged subordinates to use their initiative. The more rigid, ‘top-down’ method of command practised in the British army, however, meant that commanders preferred a more personalized style of communication, relaying orders to their subordinates face-to-face, or at most via a trusted staff or liaison officer. Wireless simply did not conform to the favoured British communication style. ³³ Second, from a wider sociopolitical perspective, the German government showed a much greater willingness than its British equivalent to integrate wireless within the framework of its global communications system before the war. In Britain the General Post Office, which had a complete monopoly over Britain’s telecommunication network, felt threatened by the potential competition that wireless might bring. Following legal proceedings, the 1904 Wireless Telegraphy Act made it compulsory for any organization wishing to use wireless to obtain a licence from the postmaster general. This limited somewhat the commercial growth and appeal of wireless in Britain for the next few years to the extent that by August 1914 only 5000 licences had been granted. ³⁴ More significantly, unlike the British Empire, Germany’s overseas colonies were not linked together by an extensive network of undersea cables. Given that by 1908 Britain controlled 56 per cent of the world’s total submarine cable and that the Royal Navy ‘ruled the waves’, ³⁵ in the event of war between the two states it was almost certain that what little undersea cable Germany possessed would be severed immediately as hostilities broke out. ³⁶ Thus, for Germany cables were a liability. ³⁷ The growth and development of wireless was therefore vital, since it would provide an invaluable means of communication with Germany’s colonies in times of war. ³⁸

II. The British Army’s Wireless Technology, 1914–18

Before assessing the contribution of wireless communication to British operations on the Western Front, it will first be necessary to provide a brief overview of the types of wireless apparatus that the British army employed during the war. Besides the aforementioned wagon and pack sets, the latest pre-war development in army wireless equipment had been the motor lorry set. Powered by a 1.5kilowatt petrol engine, the set was carried within the confines of a lorry, had two 70 foot masts, and had a range of approximately 100 miles. ³⁹ Given their size, weight, and fragility, the wireless sets available to the British army at the outbreak of the First World War were not only ill-suited to the demands of mobile warfare, but they were also ill-adapted for tactical use in the trench conditions which prevailed on the Western Front in the winter of 1914/15.

Indeed, it was not until mid-1915 that the army began to look seriously into the possibility of developing portable wireless sets suitable for trench warfare. Between 15 and 17 June, experiments were carried out using four small Sterling spark transmitters and four ‘short-wave’ receivers borrowed from the Royal Flying Corps (RFC). These sets had been designed originally to fit within aeroplanes for the purpose of one-way communication between aerial observers and artillery batteries on the ground. ⁴⁰ They were now being tested for communication between the headquarters of one battalion, one brigade, and two divisions in V Corps, on a short-wave length of 280 metres. The results of the experiment were promising, and it was followed by further tests involving communication between observation posts and the headquarters of heavy artillery batteries. ⁴¹ On 9 August the first attempt to establish communication between division and brigade headquarters using portable wireless sets in active operations occurred during a small-scale engagement at Hooge. ⁴² Although on this occasion communication failed, a subsequent test during the battle of Loos in September brought much more favourable results. Two motor lorry sets, two pack sets, and six short-range sets were provided to 1st Army as a means of emergency communication between division and brigade headquarters. On at least three occasions during the battle, important messages were passed by wireless when all other means of communication had failed. ⁴³

The successful results of the various tests carried out in 1915 led to the design and initial manufacture of 100 portable wireless sets. With some slight modifications, this eventually resulted in the development of the 50 watt spark British Field (BF) trench set, which came into service in 1916. Theoretically, the BF trench set could be carried by three men. In reality, it required a further six to help move it and its spare accumulators under battle conditions. Thus, in the strictest sense of the word, it could not be regarded as ‘mobile’. Its range of communication was approximately 4000 yards and its conspicuous 12foot aerial made it liable to attract unwanted enemy attention. ⁴⁴ As one wireless operator later remarked, it was ‘the simplest instrument you could imagine but it was big, heavy and very awkward to carry … They didn’t hold the tuning and the thump of a shell outside the dugout … would knock the adjustment off course.’ ⁴⁵

Given the BF trench set’s obvious drawbacks, something much more suited for forward tactical use was required. This need was met by the 20 watt spark set, also known as the ‘loop’ set, which entered service in 1917. It was an improvement on the BF trench set, but only just. ⁴⁶ It was lighter, more compact and its aerial – ‘a tubular loop one square yard supported on a bayonet fixed in the ground’ – was much less conspicuous. ⁴⁷ However, although the loop set was more suitable for operations beyond brigade headquarters, its operational range was limited to between 2000 and 3000 yards, and it still required broad tuning which ‘forced a large number of stations to operate on the same narrow band, where they so interfered with one another as to be ineffective’. ⁴⁸

As the army sought to develop a portable wireless set suitable for forward tactical purposes, it also began to look for a more powerful set for use as a directing station at corps headquarters. The solution came in the form of the combined Wilson spark transmitter and Mark III service short-wave receiver. First introduced in the summer of 1915, the Wilson set was used to monitor divisional and brigade wireless traffic, ensuring official procedure and protocol were observed by all wireless operators and in cases of emergency, or when wireless traffic was particularly heavy, helping facilitate the transmission of messages between brigades and divisions. With a 30foot mast for an aerial, its communication range with the BF trench set was between 4 and 10 miles. ⁴⁹

The most significant development concerning British wireless technology during the war was the introduction of continuous wave sets in 1917. In technical terms, CW sets relied upon a thermionic valve (or vacuum tube amplifier) for the generation and amplification of radio waves. ⁵⁰ According to one wireless operator after the war, ‘the valve was a sweet, tuneful sort of note … and was a joy to the receiving operator to listen to because it was so clear’. ⁵¹ Compared to spark sets, CW offered greater range (6000 yards) and enhanced channel selectivity for much less power expenditure. Being smaller and lighter, and requiring aerials only 2 to 3 feet high, the sets were more portable and less conspicuous than their predecessors. ⁵² Nevertheless, despite these favourable characteristics and the fact that the German army never developed CW during the course of the war, ⁵³ the shortage of available sets in the British army during 1917–18 meant that its use was restricted to counter-battery communications, though it was also later utilized for anti-aircraft, tank, and Royal Air Force ⁵⁴ ground station signals. ⁵⁵

One of the most intriguing means of communication developed during the war was the earth induction set, also known as the power buzzer and amplifier, and referred to by many signallers as ‘ground wireless’. ⁵⁶ Power buzzers used a 150–200 yard baseline for the transmission of electrical impulses through the ground, which were picked up by a receiving amplifier up to 4000 yards away. ⁵⁷ Although the principles of earth induction telegraphy were already well known to the British before the war, it was the French, under the direction of Colonel Gustave-August Ferrié, the head of French military wireless, who led the way in research and design during the war. ⁵⁸ The first instrument, known as the Parleur, was tried and tested in 1916. Sir Henry Norman, working as a liaison officer with the French Ministry of Inventions, informed the British Munitions Invention Department (MID) in June 1916 that the French had ‘perfected’ the sets and that the army required them ‘with the utmost urgency’, since ‘[w]e have lost thousands of men and our chief offensives have largely failed for want of them’. ⁵⁹

However, far from offering the solution to the army’s communications dilemma, power buzzers suffered from a number of inherent flaws. First, as the director of army signals, Brigadier General John Fowler, noted in June 1916, not only could the sets be jammed by telephone buzzers operating within the vicinity, but their signals were also extremely prone to enemy interception. ⁶⁰ SS. 148. Forward Inter-Communication in Battle, a training pamphlet issued by GHQ in March 1917, acknowledged this latter imperfection, and insisted that all messages had to be sent in code and be as short and concise as possible. ⁶¹ Second, power buzzers worked on a one-way process only. If two-way communication was required, an additional power buzzer and amplifier had to be in use at either end. The drawback, however, was that both power buzzers could not operate at the same time because of the risk of mutual interference. ⁶² Therefore, once he had sent his message, the operator had no idea if it had been successfully received and understood at the opposite end. ⁶³ Third, and finally, as many signallers after the war observed, the major disadvantage of the power buzzer was its size and weight. According to one signal NCO after the war: ‘The idea was alright but the gear was cumbersome, and meant a lot of extra weight to the already loaded Signaller.’ ⁶⁴ The power buzzer and its accumulator weighed 7lb and 26lb respectively, while the amplifier (consisting of an instrument box, heavy battery box, heavy accumulator, small accumulator, two reels of cable, and 12 earth pins) weighed a total of 108lb. ⁶⁵ All this meant that while the power buzzer worked relatively well in position warfare, it was less suited to the conditions of mobility that were to characterize the battles of 1918. ⁶⁶

III. Wireless and British Operations on the Western Front, 1914–16

The main characteristics of the wireless technology employed by the British army during the war having been outlined, it is now possible to assess the contribution of wireless communication to British operations on the Western Front. Given the mobile nature of the opening weeks of the war, ⁶⁷ by far the most widely used means of communication in the British army was the motorcycle despatch rider. ⁶⁸ In comparison, wireless was seldom used as a means of conveying information. Although some commanders did utilize wireless, the majority did not take full advantage of it. This reticence can be explained partly by the limitations of the technology itself, but also by the fact that its use was limited to GHQ and the Cavalry Division. In any case, the wagon and pack sets available were not very reliable. On 30 August 1914, for example, the Cavalry Division had to destroy and abandon one of its pack sets as a result of wear and tear. ⁶⁹ In addition, many officers disliked wireless because it involved a fairly lengthy and complex process of Morse encryption and decryption. Fears over security and secrecy acted as a ‘ball and chain’ for wireless development during the early phase of the war. However, these doubts were not completely unfounded, since the British and French intelligence services managed to intercept no fewer than 50 German plain-language wireless transmissions between September and November 1914. ⁷⁰ The consequences of poor cryptographic procedure were graphically illustrated on the Eastern Front at the end of August when, after intercepting unciphered wireless messages, the German 8th Army inflicted a crushing defeat on the Russian 2nd Army at Tannenberg. ⁷¹ It is easy to understand, therefore, why so many British commanders in 1914 had such little faith in transmitting information via the medium of wireless.

It was not until the advent of trench warfare on the Aisne in mid-September that British officers began to appreciate the value of wireless. Responding to the challenges posed by this new and unfamiliar style of warfare, the army began modifying existing practices and applying new technology to improve the overall effectiveness of its communications system. As a report by I Corps observed: ‘The Germans appear to be superior to us both in ingenuity and science. We must learn from their methods.’ ⁷² One such method was the use of aerial observation to improve the effectiveness of artillery fire. As early as 18 September, Lieutenant General Sir Douglas Haig, commanding I Corps, had noted in his diary that ‘much use had been made of observers in aeroplanes to locate the enemy’s guns and trenches, as well as to direct the fire of our own artillery’. ⁷³ The first experiments with this innovative measure involved visual signalling from air to ground. However, it was found that ‘unless wireless is available this procedure becomes so slow as to be practically ineffective’. ⁷⁴ After the aerial observer had provided the location of the German artillery batteries to be targeted, ‘an hour at which fire is to be opened is fixed. At that hour the aeroplane again goes up, observes the fire, and signals any necessary corrections by wireless.’ ⁷⁵ The results of this revolutionary procedure were so impressive that ‘almost every Field Battery Commander applied for a wireless mechanic and a ground station to be detailed for their guidance, and to effect improvement in their gunnery’. ⁷⁶ Although there were obvious limitations, such as the inability to carry it out during periods of bad weather and, in the initial months of the war, the limited number of aeroplanes available, ⁷⁷ the technique improved the effectiveness of the artillery, helping raise the profile of wireless in the process.

In the winter of 1914/15, a defensive stand-off descended, with both sides settling into the deadly monotony of trench warfare. ⁷⁸ The static nature of the fighting in 1915 resulted in the construction of an extensive telecommunications network, which in turn led to a huge increase in the volume of signal traffic generated. ⁷⁹ As a result, the army’s communications system often overloaded at critical moments. In order to relieve some of the pressure on the telephone system, therefore, British officers began to advocate a range of alternative means of communication. Though wireless was an obvious solution, attempts to establish communication in battle using portable wireless sets met with mixed success in August and September. On the whole wireless remained ‘a somewhat doubtful proposition’ throughout 1915. ⁸⁰ This was clearly reflected in SS. 100. Notes on Wireless, issued by GHQ in January 1916, which stated that wireless sets were ‘far more complicated and delicate than those of an ordinary telephone and much less able to stand rough handling in transport and exposure to wet and dirt’. It added that restrictions as to the use of wireless were essential because the process of coding, decoding, and transmitting messages was extremely time-consuming, and ‘the risk of important information being given to the enemy is so great’. Consequently, it stressed that wireless was ‘not suitable to replace the normal means of communication by telegraph and telephone’. ⁸¹

Thus, at the beginning of 1916 the forward tactical use of wireless in the British army continued to be very limited. This is evident when examining British communication preparations for the battle of the Somme. ⁸² The mainstay of the army’s communications system for the battle was to be provided by an elaborate network of deep-buried telephone lines. ⁸³ Forward of all divisional headquarters telephone cables were to be ‘duplicated and triplicated wherever possible’, and laid to a depth of 6 feet up to battalion headquarters. ⁸⁴ However, as a memorandum issued in June by X Corps Signal Company noted: ‘Preparation must be made to make full use of every other available means of communication … in case of a cable breakdown and during the assault and after, till communication by wire can be re-established.’ ⁸⁵ Of the supplementary methods of communication, visual signalling, carrier pigeons, and runners were all given higher priority status than wireless. ⁸⁶ A Wilson set was issued to all corps headquarters to act as a directing station, while each attacking division was provided with just two BF trench sets. ⁸⁷

In the event, the opening day of the battle of the Somme was a costly failure for the British. Contrary to the claims of one recent work, it was a situation that wireless could do little to alleviate. ⁸⁸ The experience of XIII Corps pretty much sums up the value of wireless as a means of communication on the Somme: ‘The useful results obtained from the Wireless System during two months offensive operations were practically nil … The number of casualties to wireless personnel exceeded the number of useful messages for the whole period.’ ⁸⁹ Although a few notable successes were recorded, such as the transmission and receipt of over 100 messages in 30th Division throughout mid-October, ⁹⁰ on the whole post-battle reports concurred that wireless was a very vulnerable method of communication and that ‘sets should not be put forward of Brigade HQ’. ⁹¹

In addition, many aerial observers of the RFC, whose task it was to fly over the front line at designated times and report the progress of the attacking troops to the commanders in the rear by either transmitting wireless messages or dropping written messages and sketches in a bag at corps headquarters, preferred to use the latter method since ‘messages dropped allow of fuller information being given than can be sent by wireless’. ⁹² It was also noted that RFC receiving sets were often jammed by ground wireless sets ‘being sited so close to them as to prevent reception from aeroplanes when the Short Range Set is sending no matter what the difference in wave lengths of the [two sets] … may be’. In future, better cooperation between the Signal Service and the RFC was required so that the position of all wireless sets was known and ‘any moves or proposed moves of sets mutually communicated’. ⁹³ An arrangement was reached whereby the RFC would operate on wavelengths up to 300 metres for artillery reconnaissance, while the army would use 350, 450, and 550 metres for general communication purposes. ⁹⁴

Finally, the first use of tanks in September 1916 opened up yet another inroad for wireless communication. Three channels of communication were necessary: first, communication between tanks and supporting infantry; second, communication between the tanks themselves; and third, communication between tanks and command headquarters in the rear. ⁹⁵ However, since the fragility of wireless sets in 1916 did not render reception inside tanks possible, ‘owing to noise and engine vibration’, the only means of establishing communication between tanks and the supporting infantry and between the tanks themselves was through the use of visual signalling. ⁹⁶ Meanwhile, carrier pigeons were found to be ‘the most rapid means of communication’ between tanks and headquarters in the rear. ⁹⁷

Overall, the battle of the Somme proved to be a testing ground for a variety of communication methods. ‘All these means’, Lieutenant General Sir Walter Congreve stressed, ‘have justified their existence and all should, therefore, be used in future attacks.’ ⁹⁸ However, from the foregoing discussion it is evident that, in spite of its more widespread adoption in 1916, wireless was still regarded as a far less attractive means of communication than telephones, visual signalling, and carrier pigeons. This makes the events of early 1917 all the more interesting, for in March GHQ issued SS. 148. Forward Inter-Communication in Battle, the British army’s first ‘authoritative manual’ devoted entirely to the issue of communications. ⁹⁹

IV. Wireless and British Operations on the Western Front, 1917–18

Encapsulating the lessons learnt from 1916, SS. 148 was, according to the history of the Royal Corps of Signals, ‘a milestone in the history of army intercommunication in that it established a code as between the users of communications and the Signal Service, which clarified the parts to be played jointly in order to obtain the best results’. ¹⁰⁰ Consisting of nine separate sections, SS. 148 dealt primarily with communications forward of divisional headquarters, with section four listing the various means available in the order in which they were to be used. With telephones and telegraph at the top of the pecking order, the next favoured method of communication was, rather surprisingly, wireless. ¹⁰¹ Although it is difficult to pinpoint exactly why, in light of its rather lacklustre perform- ance in 1916, wireless suddenly found itself as the most important alternative means of communication in early 1917, it is important to remember that none of the communication methods employed by the British throughout the Somme campaign had proven infallible. Therefore it is entirely plausible that British commanders were beginning to realize that wireless communication held greater potential for the successful conduct of offensive operations than the older, more traditional practices, and thus were willing to exploit this potential in order to improve the army’s military effectiveness. In a GHQ memorandum issued in late May 1917, the director of army signals acknowledged ‘the probability that communication by means of simple Wireless gear will in the near future replace to a greater or less extent the use of other means of communication in front of Brigades’. ¹⁰² This newfound faith was to prove somewhat justified, as the battles of 1917 gradually won over the prejudice and opposition that had been widespread among commanders and staff officers during the first half of the war. ¹⁰³

Although the offensives of 1917 failed to break the deadlock on the Western Front, they did demonstrate the growing tactical and operational sophistication of the British army. ¹⁰⁴ The most significant development in communications was of course the introduction of CW wireless. Although the number of CW sets available was extremely limited, on the occasions when it was used the results were very favourable. In October, for example, a CW set was successfully employed between a counter-battery observation post and a corps headquarters on the 2nd Army front at Ypres. Once established, communication ‘was practically uninterrupted and signals received at Corps HQ 17 miles away’. ¹⁰⁵ Similarly, at Passchendaele on 7 November, a test carried out by the Canadian Corps Heavy Artillery ‘had quite a favourable affect on the general feeling throughout the Army, about the practicability of C.W.’ ¹⁰⁶ These successes compelled the army to place an order for 882 CW sets in December. ¹⁰⁷

In the absence of a plentiful supply of CW sets, division and brigade signallers were forced to make do with the BF trench set for much of 1917. However, wireless operators were becoming much more proficient in its use. By the middle of the year, for example, VI Corps had established a process whereby each set within the corps area transmitted two to three messages to its neighbouring formation every night after sunset in order to ‘add to the efficiency of the wireless personnel, enable valuable information to be obtained regarding the efficiency of the instruments, and give opportunities to Commanders of formations concerned to keep in close touch’. ¹⁰⁸ All this resulted in greater confidence being placed in wireless as a primary means of communication.

The most successful use of wireless in 1917 occurred at the battle of Cambrai in November. The battle was unlike any operation that the British army had undertaken since the commencement of trench warfare, as it was planned in absolute secrecy in order to achieve complete surprise. ¹⁰⁹ Indeed, with the mass use of tanks and, more importantly, the silent registration of artillery, Cambrai heralded methods which were ‘destined to revolutionise the entire theory and practice of land warfare’. ¹¹⁰ The implication of this for communications was that the digging of trenches for an extensive deep-buried cable network was completely out of the question, since it would betray the element of surprise. ¹¹¹ Therefore, without the comfort afforded by an elaborate maze of deep-buried telephone lines, British commanders were forced to place a much greater emphasis upon wireless to convey important tactical information once the battle began. ¹¹²

Besides the allotment of Wilson sets at army and corps headquarters, pack sets for the Cavalry Corps, and BF trench sets for the infantry divisions and brigades, one wireless tank was also allotted to each attacking division. ¹¹³ During the initial advance, these tanks were to act as mobile signal stations for both the infantry and artillery, carrying wireless sets which had to be offloaded and erected at preselected sites. ¹¹⁴ However, as a report by the 1st Tank Brigade noted, ‘the sets for these operations were only makeshift and exceedingly clumsy’. ¹¹⁵ Furthermore, with so many wireless sets operating within close proximity of each other, units were warned that a certain amount of interference was going to be inevitable. In an attempt to reduce some of this interference, commanders were cautioned against the ‘useless exchange of signals’, and wireless operators were explicitly told to adhere at all times to the ‘correct wireless procedure’. Finally, in accordance with the general policy of absolute secrecy, no wireless set was to indicate its presence in any way before ‘Z’ hour. ¹¹⁶

The initial attack at Cambrai was a resounding success, with the British army managing to penetrate German defences in most places to a depth of 4 to 5 miles. Most divisions reported very favourable results from the use of wireless. For example, 51st Division Signal Company noted that ‘over 80 messages were sent and received during three days’ working’, while 62nd Division Signal Company recorded that 16 of the 18 messages sent by a brigade wireless set on 21 November were successfully received at division headquarters. ¹¹⁷ Similarly, Major General Frederick Dudgeon, commanding 56th Division, reported after the battle that ‘Trench Wireless Sets were used with success from positions within 200 yards of the Germans, being erected only at night and dismantled by day’. ¹¹⁸

Clearly wireless was used on a far greater scale at Cambrai than in any previous British offensive of the war. Nevertheless, although the work done by wireless proved invaluable, it was widely acknowledged that a far greater proportion of messages could have been sent by this means, which suggests that the army was still not taking full advantage of it. ¹¹⁹ However, there were many instances where wireless communication proved extremely difficult to establish under mobile conditions. A report by the 1st Tank Brigade noted that the use of wireless in fighting tanks proved ‘most unsatisfactory’. It cited one occasion when a wireless set was divided between two fighting tanks, but before it could be utilized one of the tanks was ‘knocked out’ by enemy shellfire. ¹²⁰ A faulty pack set was also blamed for the slow transmission of information between 2nd Cavalry Division and Cavalry Corps headquarters on the afternoon of 20 November. ¹²¹ Overall, in spite of the very favourable results obtained by the more widespread use of wireless at Cambrai, the difficulties of utilizing the sets under the fluid conditions remained far from resolved.

The other notable wireless development of 1917 was the introduction of the power buzzer and amplifier, to be employed chiefly between brigade and advanced battalion headquarters. ¹²² Although there were some noteworthy exceptions, ¹²³ on the whole power buzzers proved disappointing. Four key problems were identified. First, as a relatively new method of communication, there was a lack of experience on the part of the brigade and battalion signallers in handling the sets. This inexperience resulted in numerous operator errors which contributed to the inability to send and receive messages. ¹²⁴ Second, as 2nd Canadian Division Signal Company reported during the battle of Arras, power buzzers ‘failed to work on account of amplifiers being jammed by earthed telephone circuits’. ¹²⁵ Indeed, it was the conclusion of 1st Canadian Division Signal Company that ‘this form of communication would be more suitable for a raid than extensive operations, as earth return circuits cause so much interference that reception is rendered difficult’. ¹²⁶ Third, many officers complained about the difficulties caused by the fact that power buzzer communication was a one-way process only. In order to work more efficiently, there needed to be ‘some pre-arranged signal for the amplifier to inform the power buzzer station that its message has been read’. ¹²⁷ Fourth, and finally, the bulk and frailty of the sets made power buzzers an unsuitable means of communication in mobile operations. During the Third Ypres campaign 5th Army Signal Company observed that amplifiers were ‘too fragile for very forward work. Sending them in front of Brigade Forward Stations is seldom justified’. ¹²⁸ It was also noted in the aftermath of Cambrai that the depth of the initial advance created ‘distances which were too great to allow for adequate communication’ between the operators. ¹²⁹

In light of these reoccurring problems it is perhaps strange that the army did not abandon power buzzers altogether. However, as a report by 14th Division Signal Company suggested: ‘It may be concluded that this means of communication is not suited for work beyond the Trench System, but that within the limits of the Trenches it may prove invaluable, provided the personnel is thoroughly trained.’ ¹³⁰ Furthermore, when power buzzer communication was established, it was found to be a much quicker and more efficient method than some of the other alternative means. As a report by 51st Division Signal Company in September highlighted, messages sent by power buzzer took an average of 40 minutes from advanced battalion to brigade headquarters, whereas the best pigeon message took 50 minutes. ¹³¹ Thus, as 1917 came to a close, both wireless and power buzzers were beginning to cement their position within the army’s communications system, yet they were still regarded as subordinate means to the telephone and telegraph. ¹³²

The re-emergence of semi-open warfare in the wake of the German spring offensives in March 1918 forced British commanders to ‘shake off some of their trench-bound habits’. ¹³³ One such habit was the reliance on the telephone. ¹³⁴ It was noted at a 3rd Army conference that, as a result of three years of trench warfare, ‘many commanders appear to be lost when separated from their telephones’. ¹³⁵ However, as a report by GHQ in April made clear, since telephonic communication ‘cannot be extensively maintained in warfare of movement … units must accustom themselves to rely entirely upon other methods of communication’. ¹³⁶ These words were echoed in May by Lieutenant General Sir Ivor Maxse, commanding XVIII Corps, who stressed that ‘Officers must learn to discard the “telephone habit” as soon as open warfare commences and concentrate on alternative methods of communication.’ ¹³⁷ Although many commanders and staff officers initially found it difficult to break free from their reliance on the telephone, as the retreat went on the value of wireless over the telephone in mobile warfare could no longer be ignored. ¹³⁸ Indeed, some divisions handled between 100 and 120 wireless messages per day, far exceeding the average daily number of messages transmitted during the operations of 1915–17. ¹³⁹ In April a report by Lieutenant Colonel W.H. Bradley, commanding 25th Division Signal Company, stated that wireless ‘was used extensively’ and was ‘to a great extent responsible for keeping the General Staff posted as to the trend of events along the whole front’. ¹⁴⁰ Lieutenant General Sir Alexander Hamilton Gordon, commanding IX Corps, similarly testified to the growing importance of wireless as an essential means of conveying information while units were on the move. ¹⁴¹

Although there was a greater realization on the part of commanders and their staff that wireless ‘must be exploited to the full’, ¹⁴² the nature of the German attack and the subsequent retreat created a number of dilemmas. For example, not only were a large number of wireless sets destroyed by German shellfire, but many wireless messages were often difficult to read on account of the success of German field stations in jamming the signals. ¹⁴³ In addition, the novelty of being on the defensive, combined with ‘the previous calm on the front, and the experience gained by divisions in attack’, meant that many units had placed their wireless sets too far forward. Subsequently, when the Germans overran the British forward defensive position many units had no choice but to abandon their wireless equipment. ¹⁴⁴

In spite of these drawbacks the experience of the retreat convinced many British commanders as to the importance of wireless in mobile warfare. Though wireless had still not attained the same level of status as telephonic or telegraphic communication, the feelings of anxiety, scepticism, and mistrust that it once generated had now been replaced by confidence, reliance, and expectation. ¹⁴⁵ As the instructions issued by the Australian Corps to its divisions prior to the battle of Amiens in August made clear, wireless was to be ‘exploited to the full’. ¹⁴⁶ By the summer of 1918 British divisions were issued with four BF trench sets: one at division headquarters, one at advanced division headquarters, and the others at the two leading infantry brigade headquarters. Brigades were also equipped with five loop sets, four of which were allotted to the attacking battalions. A growing number of CW sets were also being employed within the artillery for counter-battery fire, and for tank and RAF ground station signals. ¹⁴⁷

Throughout the Allied offensives in the summer and autumn of 1918 wireless established itself as the most prominent of the British army’s alternative methods of communication. As a report by 4th Canadian Division Signal Company in early September observed, wireless was ‘proving to be a most valuable, vital and reliable supplementary method of communication and it is hoped that all Staffs will be persuaded to appreciate its value and utilise it as much as possible’. ¹⁴⁸ However, the success of wireless varied according to the level of command. Generally speaking, the further down the chain of command the more difficult wireless communication became. For instance, the Wilson sets at corps headquarters were used very successfully for directing and monitoring divisional wireless traffic. ¹⁴⁹ The value of wireless communication between division and brigade headquarters was also noteworthy. For example, on the night of 28/9 September, during 2nd Army’s Flanders offensive, wireless kept communication alive between 41st Division and its brigades after all other methods had failed, ¹⁵⁰ while the 5th and 7th Australian Infantry Brigades ‘disposed of eight priority [wireless] messages’ on the afternoon of 2 October when telephonic communication to 2nd Australian Division headquarters broke down. It was noted shortly afterwards that wireless communication proved more efficient than ever, ‘no doubt due to Brigade Staffs, and Brigade Signal Officers taking more interest in this method of communication, and employing it to a greater extent’. ¹⁵¹ Thus, as Major E.F. Churchill, a signal officer with the 1st Tank Brigade, noted after the war, ‘communications [during the Hundred Days] were stretching a tremendous distance and if it had not been for wireless we could not have maintained them’. ¹⁵²

It was at the brigade and battalion levels of command where wireless faced the toughest challenges during the last months of the war. Although many successful results were obtained from the use of loop sets, ¹⁵³ by and large wireless communication forward of brigade headquarters was not a resounding success. This can be attributed to three main factors. First, the close proximity of the enemy meant that security restrictions were often vigorously enforced. ¹⁵⁴ The experience of 4th Canadian Division in early September, for instance, led it to advocate afterwards that ‘urgent operation priority messages should not be sent by wireless, on account of the dangers of interception’. ¹⁵⁵ In combination with the difficulties experienced in encoding and decoding long operation messages, the amount of traffic generated by loop sets fell to negligible proportions. ¹⁵⁶ Second, the value afforded by loop sets was often discounted by the lack of sufficiently trained oper- ators. ¹⁵⁷ Some of the difficulties experienced at Amiens were attributed to the fact that ‘wireless instruments had only been in use with Brigades and Battalions a short time and were not properly adjusted’. ¹⁵⁸ Third, and finally, wireless was still not suited to the hostile environment that lay beyond brigade headquarters. The aerials of loop sets were too conspicuous and therefore ‘vulnerable under concentrated shelling’. ¹⁵⁹ Even if they managed to avoid damage from German artillery and machine-gun fire, mutual interference made signals ‘impossible to read’, ¹⁶⁰ while ‘the distance of Battalion Headquarters from Brigades was usually greater than the efficient range for these sets’. ¹⁶¹ To compound matters, power buzzers dropped out of use almost completely during this period. The sets were simply too cumbersome and fragile in the semi-mobile conditions that prevailed, while the distances between headquarters were often far greater than the communication range of the sets would allow. ¹⁶²

While the infantry’s use of wireless in the summer and autumn of 1918 brought about mixed fortunes, the artillery’s use of CW wireless for counter-battery work proved to be ‘a technical triumph for the British’. ¹⁶³ According to a report by 4th Australian Division Signal Company in August, CW wireless became ‘a most important method of communication in Field Artillery … Without wireless, Brigades were out of touch for some considerable time after each move.’ ¹⁶⁴ Similarly, after the successful performance of CW during the operations at Arras in late August and early September, the commander of the Royal Artillery of 4th Canadian Division stated that ‘he would not go into action again without these sets’. ¹⁶⁵ CW was also employed for use within the Tank Corps, where, according to one signal officer, ‘although the distances were far greater than the set was intended to work, the signals were quite clear’. ¹⁶⁶ Finally, CW provided the British and Allied forces with the opportunity to develop and experiment with wireless telephony. At a conference held at RAF headquarters on 18 July it was agreed that ‘all fighter reconnaissance, bombing, and single-seater squadrons ought eventually to be equipped with [wireless] telephones’. ¹⁶⁷ However, when the war ended, only two squadrons of Bristol Fighters had been equipped and they were forbidden to fly over enemy lines for fear of being shot down and the sets captured. ¹⁶⁸ Wireless telephony between tanks and between tanks and aeroplanes was also at a very basic experimental stage when the war ended. ¹⁶⁹

V. Wireless and British Operations in the ‘Peripheral’ Theatres, 1914–18

Although the Western Front was the main focus of its military effort, Britain also fought campaigns in the Middle East, East Africa, the Balkans, and Italy, highlighting the truly global nature of the First World War. ¹⁷⁰ As on the Western Front, the success of the British army’s operations in the ‘peripheral’ theatres depended to a large extent on its commanders embracing new technologies and harnessing their full military potential. To what extent, though, did British commanders in these theatres make greater and more effective use of wireless communication technology than did their counterparts on the Western Front?

Perhaps the most infamous of Britain’s military endeavours outside Europe was the Gallipoli campaign of 1915. ¹⁷¹ From a communications point of view, the amphibious landings, which began on 25 April, are of particular interest since they required joint army-naval cooperation. A pamphlet entitled Signal Organisation for Combined Operations was drafted and issued to all ships and army units taking part in the landings in order to reconcile as far as possible the differences in the methods of the two services. It was agreed that the navy would be responsible for communications between the landing beaches and the escort and transport vessels, while the army would take charge of communications ashore. ¹⁷² During the initial phase, wireless was to play an important role alongside cable and visual signalling in establishing communication between the landing beaches and the covering ships. A party of naval signalmen would establish three signal stations on each beach – one base and two flanking stations. The wireless set at the base station would be used for army traffic, while the wireless sets established at each flanking base would be employed for naval fire-control purposes. ¹⁷³ Unfortunately, although it had been agreed that naval wireless procedure be adopted, serious delays occurred in the transmission of wireless messages during the course of the landings on account of army operators being unfamiliar with naval ciphering methods and operating frequencies. ¹⁷⁴ This, as well as other communication failures, contributed profoundly to the general confusion and lost opportunities of the opening stage of the campaign. ¹⁷⁵ Thereafter, trench warfare set in along the Gallipoli peninsula until the British and Allied forces were eventually evacuated between December 1915 and January 1916. Although the army and navy became ‘exceedingly proficient at working together’ throughout this period, apart from communication between forward observation officers on land and the ships providing covering fire at sea, wireless did not play a major role in the army’s communications system at Gallipoli. ¹⁷⁶

Britain fought two further campaigns against Turkey in the Middle East. The first was in Mesopotamia and the second in Egypt and Palestine. ¹⁷⁷ The nature of the fighting in these theatres was, for the most part, markedly different from the Western Front, in that long distances, wide open spaces and a much smaller concentration of forces and artillery resulted in campaigns of greater mobility and manoeuvre. The strategic geography and climatic conditions of the Middle East not only imposed much of their own logic on the way in which the wars in Mesopotamia and Egypt and Palestine were fought, but they also had an important bearing on British communication practice, particularly on the army’s use of wireless.

From the opening stages of the campaign in Mesopotamia, wireless was used extensively since it was the only means of communication that could adequately bridge the considerable distances between the formations. ¹⁷⁸ Until the autumn of 1915 pack sets formed the nucleus of the British army’s wireless equipment. Each set was powered by a 2.75horsepower Douglas motorcycle engine, and required six horses to carry it and ‘all the sundry paraphernalia’ needed for operating for long periods away from force headquarters. ¹⁷⁹ Functioning on three fixed wavelengths – 500, 600, and 700 metres – the communication range of these sets in the flat, wide open territory of lower Mesopotamia could reach 100 miles. The introduction of wagon sets in late 1915, each powered by a 6 horsepower Douglas engine, increased the communication range to between 150 and, on occasions, 350 miles. ¹⁸⁰ Combined with the absence of strict security measures during the first two years, when all but the ‘most secret’ messages could be transmitted in clear, wireless very quickly gained the respect and confidence of commanders and staff officers in Mesopotamia. Even after the introduction of tighter security restrictions in 1916, GHQ continued to impress upon all commanders ‘the importance of keeping in closest touch by wireless throughout operations’. ¹⁸¹ Thus, unlike on the Western Front, in Mesopotamia the less intense nature of the fighting, the long distances involved, and the initial absence of rigid security procedures meant that wireless quickly became an efficient, reliable, and accepted primary means of communication.

Wireless was also employed effectively by the British in Egypt and Palestine. Communications between cavalry formations and between GHQ and the Desert Mounted Corps in 1917–18 in particular relied to a large extent on wagon and pack sets. ¹⁸² During the last months of the war, wireless was also used between the aerial observers of the RAF and the artillery to direct fire onto enemy guns and positions. ¹⁸³ However, although the operations in Egypt and Palestine were by nature not too dissimilar to those in Mesopotamia, the infantry placed a much greater degree of reliance on telephones and telegraph as the principal means of communication. The chief reason for this was the general lack of concentrated Turkish artillery fire, which meant that cables stood a much better chance of remaining intact than those laid on the Western Front. As a report by 54th Division Signal Company in September 1918 noted, although some newly arrived BF trench sets were made available to the 162nd and 163rd Brigades, ‘owing to cables holding up no necessity arose for the use of wireless’ during operations. ¹⁸⁴ In addition, as well as the implementation of strict security measures from the start of the campaign, which did little to alleviate some of the pre-war doubts of British officers, ¹⁸⁵ the hot temperatures, frequent dust storms, and high incidence of static disturbances in Egypt and Palestine presented further obstacles that limited the effectiveness and general appeal of wireless. ¹⁸⁶ Nevertheless, despite these difficulties, during the final drive towards Damascus and Aleppo in September and October 1918 the rapidity of movement and high degree of mobility attained forced many commanders to make much more use of wireless than had hitherto been the case. ¹⁸⁷

In East Africa, wireless was widely employed as a primary means of communication. ¹⁸⁸ Initially, the shortage of equipment meant that wireless was employed exclusively along the lines of communication. However, from 1916 as more wagon and pack sets became available they formed a primary means of communication between widely dispersed mobile columns and between the advancing columns and GHQ at Dar es Salaam. ¹⁸⁹ Given the difficulties encountered in building and maintaining a long and elaborate cable network in adverse climatic and topographical conditions, and in light of the scarcity of suitable roads for despatch riders, British commanders quickly appreciated the value of wireless. As the deputy director of army signals, Lieutenant Colonel H.C. Hawtrey, wrote in March 1916: ‘Wireless should be able to go anywhere where the guns can go … and should therefore always accompany a mounted detached force.’ ¹⁹⁰ However, as in Egypt and Palestine, the weather conditions created numerous problems for the successful transmission and receipt of wireless messages in East Africa. The hot and humid equatorial climate, combined with the onset of sudden and violent thunderstorms, resulted in strong atmospherics which in turn made portions of some wireless messages unintelligible to receiving operators. ¹⁹¹ The tropical conditions and thick bush country also limited the communication range of wireless. According to one signal officer who served in Africa between 1915 and 1916, the range of a standard wagon set was often reduced to 25 miles, while that of a pack set to just 12 miles, ‘a desperate come down from [what] one can usually get in England’. ¹⁹² Nevertheless, in spite of these dilemmas wireless provided an invaluable service throughout the East African campaign.

In contrast to the British army’s ventures in the Middle East and East Africa, the nature of the fighting in both Macedonia and Italy more closely resembled the trench stalemate endured on the Western Front. ¹⁹³ Very little use was made of wireless by British forces in Macedonia on account of two factors. First, there was a severe shortage of wireless equipment and trained operators throughout the entirety of the campaign. By December 1916, for example, there was only one wagon wireless section at army headquarters and one pack wireless section with each corps. ¹⁹⁴ Second, in the static conditions which prevailed commanders and staff officers alike became accustomed to the relative comfort and efficiency afforded by cable, visual signalling, and despatch riders. Only in two instances did wireless contribute something worthwhile to the campaign. The first was the development in 1916–17 of an efficient early-warning anti-aircraft system, in which pack wireless sets were used to connect forward observation stations with the aerodromes and gun positions in the rear. ¹⁹⁵ The second occurred in February 1918 when a severe snowstorm destroyed 18 miles of the main telephone and telegraph route between GHQ and the headquarters of XII and XVI Corps, and did considerable damage to the lines between corps and division headquarters. For the next three months wireless became the principal means of communication while the lines were repaired. However, once the line system was up and running wireless dropped out of use completely. ¹⁹⁶

Slightly better use was made of wireless by British forces in Italy in 1917–18. Upon arrival at the front it was immediately realized that, as the civilian telegraph and telephone lines were overland, and that cables could not be buried to any significant depth in the mountainous areas because of the rocky nature of the ground, a much greater reliance would have to be placed upon alternative methods of communication. ¹⁹⁷ Wireless very quickly became ‘an established part of Divisional communications’, while power buzzers were employed at brigade and battalion headquarters. ¹⁹⁸ Both means, for example, were of ‘incalculable value’ to 7th Division as it crossed the Piave in late October 1918. ¹⁹⁹ However, there was still a tendency on the part of some commanders to neglect wireless during periods of calm and when telephone and telegraph lines were working well. ²⁰⁰ As on the Western Front until 1918, therefore, wireless in Italy was still viewed primarily as an emergency means of communication.

VI. Conclusion

In submitting his draft report to the ‘Committee on the Lessons of the Great War’ in May 1932, Major General A.E. McNamara made the following recommendation in the section dealing with the problem of intercommunication in battle: ‘Importance of paramount – develop wireless.’ ²⁰¹ This rather short and simple observation does, upon first reflection, seem to support the argument of some historians that the British army did not make the most effective use of some of the technologies that were available to it. ²⁰² However, the evidence presented within this article suggests that this was certainly not the case with regards to wireless communication technology. On the whole, the British army was remarkably successful at recognizing the utility of wireless and exploiting its full military potential during the First World War.

Between 1896 and 1914 there is little denying that the development of wireless in the British army lagged far behind that in either the Royal Navy or the German army. When the First World War began, the only formations equipped with wireless were GHQ and the cavalry. By the summer of 1918, however, portable BF trench sets and loop sets were in operation as far forward as battalion headquarters – something that British commanders on the Somme in 1916 would almost certainly not have foreseen. Although wireless technology did not come of age between 1914 and 1918, it did undergo a sudden and rapid transition from infancy into late adolescence. ²⁰³ Indeed, ‘it was the First World War which provided the major impetus to develop the wireless transmission valve’. ²⁰⁴ In this respect, the British development and use of CW wireless for artillery, tank, and RAF communications in 1917–18 was highly significant, particularly in light of the fact that, having never employed CW during the course of the war, the German army issued special instructions in June 1918 ‘to salve enemy wireless equipment of this description’. ²⁰⁵ Combined with these developments, the transition from static to semi-mobile warfare in 1918 finally allowed wireless to shine as a prominent means of conveying tactical information. Wireless played an important part in the British and Allied victory in 1918. As the British commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, stated in a letter to the Marconi Company on 1 December 1918: ‘The good services performed by the wireless telegraphists throughout the war … has been one of great and increasing importance, and the zeal and efficiency with which it has been carried out has been of great value to their country.’ ²⁰⁶

Nevertheless, a major question arises: should British commanders have made greater use of wireless a lot sooner? From examining the experiences of both the German army on the Western Front and British forces in the ‘peripheral’ theatres, it is tempting to suggest that wireless could have been employed more effectively and much earlier by the British on the Western Front. At the beginning of the war, every German army headquarters and cavalry division, as well as GHQ, was equipped with wireless technology. By mid-1916 nearly all of the most advanced infantry units on the front line had been furnished with small wireless trench sets. Furthermore, between May 1917 and May 1918 the number of divisional wireless sections in the German army increased from 107 to 192. ²⁰⁷ All this supports the conclusion of a lecture given to newly appointed officers of the American Expeditionary Force in early 1918, which stated that the Germans had so far in the war made much better use of wireless than either the British or the French. ²⁰⁸

However, the Germans had much greater incentive than the British and French to develop wireless. This can be attributed to two factors. First, as a result primarily of the Allied naval blockade, from 1916 the German army began to suffer from acute shortages of the necessary raw materials, such as copper, to manufacture large quantities of telephone cable; this in turn forced the high command to invest more in the development of wireless. ²⁰⁹ Second, unlike the British and French, the German army on the Western Front adopted a largely defensive strategy. Therefore, since they did not have to worry about the difficulties involved in using bulky, cumbersome, and fragile wireless sets in offensive operations, the Germans could position their wireless equipment within the static and relatively safe confines of their dugouts. In other words, the defensive strategy employed by the Germans on the Western Front was much more conducive to the widespread and effective employment of wireless than was the British and French offensive strategy, which exposed the scientific and technical limitations of the wireless sets of the era, hindering its chances of success in the inhospitable conditions which lay beyond brigade headquarters.

What about the use of wireless by the British army in the ‘peripheral’ theatres? Certainly in Africa and the Middle East wireless was employed from the very beginning of the war and proved to be of much greater relative value. However, these theatres exhibited conditions which were completely absent on the Western Front. Vast distances, wide open spaces, and a lighter concentration of forces and artillery presented much more favourable circumstances in which wireless could be used successfully. In the case of East Africa and Mesopotamia in particular, not only did the initial absence of strict security procedures enhance the reputation of wireless with British commanders, but also there was a much greater incentive to use wireless on account of the difficulty, often impossibility, of using line communication in these theatres. Where trench warfare prevailed, in Italy and Macedonia and at Gallipoli, the use of wireless followed a very similar pattern to that on the Western Front.

Overall, the use of wireless by the British army between 1914 and 1918 offers plenty of evidence to support the argument of historians such as J.P. Harris that British commanders were receptive to new technologies and were eventually able to harness their full military potential. ²¹⁰ The coordination of the combined arms battle, involving infantry, artillery, tanks, and aeroplanes, necessitated a flexible and sophisticated communications system, without which the army would have consisted of a collection of unconnected, and therefore relatively useless, pieces of equipment. Given the scientific and technical limitations of the wireless sets of the era and the conditions which prevailed in each of the theatres, particularly the scale and intensity of the fighting on the Western Front, it is difficult to see how British commanders could have made greater use of wireless communication during the First World War.