Charles Townshend’s Advance on Baghdad: The British Offensive in Mesopotamia,September–November 1915

I. Introduction

The siege of Kut-al-Amara occupies a prominent position in the historiography of the First World War in Mesopotamia (Figure 1). Major General Charles Townshend’s surrender of the Iraqi town of Kut-al-Amara to the Ottoman Army in April 1916 is seen as a direct result of the parsimony and ineptitude that characterized Britain’s conduct of operations in the region from 1914 to 1916. It also marks a turning point in British fortunes, as it compelled administrative reforms that contributed to the capture of Baghdad and the eviction of Ottoman forces from the region in 1917. In addition, historians have displayed a morbid fascination with the human tragedy of Kut, detailing the plight of the 13,000 British and Indian personnel who faced starvation and disease during the five-month siege and abuse at the hands of their captors in its aftermath. While the siege is worthy of study on a variety of levels, it has overshadowed the battles that preceded it in the autumn of 1915. In late September, Charles Townshend’s 6 Indian Division defeated Ottoman forces under Nurettin at Kut-al-Amara. Townshend subsequently continued his advance up the Tigris towards Baghdad, but did not engage substantial enemy forces again until nearly two months later. From 22 to 25 November, 6 Indian Division, with a fighting strength of approximately 14,000 men, attempted to dislodge Ottoman forces at least 18,000 strong from prepared positions around Ctesiphon, just below Baghdad. After failing to achieve this objective during three days of costly fighting, Townshend initiated a hasty retreat that ended in his ill-fated decision to stand at Kut and await relief.

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Figure 1.

Lower Mesopotamia.

These engagements had pivotal consequences. The inability of 6 Indian Division to defeat the enemy decisively left Baghdad under Ottoman control. In addition, the heavy losses suffered at Ctesiphon contributed to Townshend’s decision to seek refuge at Kut. Nonetheless, Townshend’s conduct of operations during this period remains poorly understood. Historians have examined the autumn 1915 offensive from a variety of perspectives. The late 1960s saw a flurry of publications examining the Mesopotamia campaign and particularly the siege of Kut-al-Amara. The most comprehensive of these studies, A.J. Barker’s The Bastard War, explains the rationale for the British offensive in Mesopotamia as well as the battles that took place in the autumn of 1915. Barker does not subject Townshend’s command decisions to serious scrutiny, however, suggesting that the numerical superiority of Ottoman forces at Ctesiphon made victory prohibitively difficult for 6 Indian Division. ¹ Other accounts published in the same period offer similar assessments of the 1915 campaign. Russell Braddon has suggested that once the British government sanctioned the advance to Baghdad, ‘the fate of thirteen thousand of Townshend’s troops was sealed; and the deaths of thousands more in the Relief Force became inevitable’. ² Ronald Millar concurs. Given the superiority of Ottoman forces in the region, Millar has called Ctesiphon ‘a totally unnecessary battle’. ³

More recent scholarship has shed light on the decision-making process that led to the advance on Baghdad. David French has placed the Mesopotamia campaign in the broader context of British strategy in 1915, demonstrating how concerns for British prestige in the Muslim world encouraged senior leaders in London and India to support the offensive plans of the senior commander in Mesopotamia, Sir John Nixon. ⁴ Paul K. Davis has focused in particular on Nixon’s role in instigating the disastrous advance despite the objections of his subordinate Townshend. According to Davis: ‘Nixon’s blindness and the resulting ignorance in Simla and London forced Townshend’s retreat to Kut.’ ⁵ Richard Popplewell’s examination of British intelligence in Mesopotamia places Nixon in a more sympathetic light, demonstrating how erroneous intelligence reports influenced his decision to advance on Baghdad. Nonetheless, Popplewell shares with Davis, French, and earlier writers the assumption that the superiority of the Ottoman Army at Ctesiphon precluded victory by 6 Indian Division. As Popplewell argues: ‘the deciding factor [at Ctesiphon] was not just the quantity of Turkish troops unaccounted for but also their quality’. ⁶

More recent studies of the armies involved in the conflict in Mesopotamia have reinforced the assumption that Townshend’s advance on Baghdad was a doomed enterprise. Edwin Latter has noted the deteriorating morale of Indian soldiers during the advance towards Baghdad, as well as the relatively rudimentary tactics employed by British commanders in Mesopotamia. ⁷ Kaushik Roy has highlighted the logistical shortcomings that hindered Townshend’s advance. ⁸ Edward Erickson’s recent study of Ottoman military effectiveness has provided significant new insights into the capabilities of Townshend’s adversary at Ctesiphon. ⁹ By emphasizing Ottoman defensive prowess, however, Erickson’s work lends support to the existing interpretation of the battle as an inevitable British defeat.

One of the key proponents of this interpretation was Charles Townshend himself. In communications with Indian military authorities during the siege, Townshend asserted that Sir John Nixon had compelled him to advance on Baghdad against his better judgement. He expanded upon this argument in his 1919 memoir, portraying Ctesiphon as an ill-advised engagement, brought about by the incompetent decisions of his superiors. According to Townshend:

Personally I had no doubts in my mind as to the extreme gravity of the results of this advance – an offensive undertaken with insufficient forces, and not only that, but an offensive undertaken in a secondary theatre of the war, where our strategy should have been to have remained on the defensive with minimum forces sufficient for that purpose. All my study indicated disaster to me. ¹⁰

Townshend’s version of events influenced the report of the Mesopotamia Commission, and it has been integral to historians’ understanding of this period. Significantly, however, this interpretation diverts attention from the actual battles of Kut-al-Amara and Ctesiphon, and particularly Townshend’s conduct of them. Reconstructing these engagements is no easy task, given the destruction of unit war diaries during the siege of Kut. Nonetheless, it is essential if we are to understand fully the British campaign in Mesopotamia. Using a variety of sources, including memoirs, the report of the Mesopotamia Commission, the correspondence of the British official historian, F.J. Moberley, and the account of an Ottoman staff officer, this essay will challenge the prevailing view that the British offensive was destined for failure, culminating in the siege and surrender of Kut. It will argue that Charles Townshend’s attitude toward the offensive was more complex than he subsequently claimed. While he had genuine concerns about his ability to capture Baghdad, he was confident that he could defeat Nurettin in battle, furthering his career in the process. Townshend’s performance on the battlefield, however, did not match his aspirations. After struggling to influence events at the battle of Kut-al-Amara, he took a more direct role in commanding his force at Ctesiphon, but his decisions under fire undermined its success and contributed to heavy casualties, sapping his confidence even as his chances of victory increased.

II. The Advance on Baghdad and the Battle of Kut-al-Amara

In order to assess Townshend’s command in this period, it is important to understand his relationship with Sir John Nixon. Historians have generally accepted Townshend’s assertion that pressure from the reckless Nixon compelled him reluctantly to embark on an offensive about which he had serious reservations. ¹¹ There is some truth to this claim. Nixon clearly pressed Townshend to undertake an advance that both officers recognized to be fraught with danger. Moreover, Townshend believed that Nixon hoped to claim credit for victory while leaving him to take the blame for defeat. Townshend did not simply acquiesce, however, to the machinations of his superior. Despite its risks, the commander of 6 Indian Division saw an advance on Baghdad as an irresistible opportunity that might vault him from the relative backwater of Mesopotamia to a more prominent posting on the Western Front. He therefore worked assiduously throughout 1915 to highlight the weakness of his force and thereby deflect responsibility for any potential setbacks, while at the same time portraying himself to senior Indian military and political leaders as the principal architect of an offensive that he believed would ultimately end in victory.

Townshend took command of 6 Indian Division in the spring of 1915, quickly distinguishing himself by capturing the town of Amara in early June. Shortly afterwards a bout of ‘relapsing fever’ forced him to return to India for a short convalescence. According to his memoir, Townshend took this opportunity to articulate his views to the commander-in-chief of the Indian Army, Sir Beauchamp Duff. Townshend reminded Duff of the ‘grave risks’ of an advance on Baghdad in insufficient strength, opining that a full corps, or at least two infantry divisions, would be necessary to capture and hold the city. He nonetheless ‘guaranteed’ that he would evict the Ottoman Army from formidable defensive positions below the town of Kut-al-Amara, driving it ‘into the Tigris’. ¹² Townshend expressed similar sentiments in a letter to Lord Curzon upon his return to Mesopotamia. On 4 September, Townshend wrote to the former viceroy of India, informing him that ‘we are dangerously weak in Mesopotamia’, and that the enemy ‘may be superior to us in numbers’. Nonetheless, Townshend predicted: ‘If I can get them on the run … I shall hammer them I hope all the way to Baghdad.’ Confident of victory, he contrasted his allegedly underappreciated exploits with the stalemate in France, commenting derisively: ‘all the generals in France are given knighthoods after each indecisive combat where not one of them has had to manoeuvre one yard! A double company commanders’ war in trenches & mines & rabbit warrens. Here at least we do advance.’ ¹³

The battle of Kut-al-Amara fell short of Townshend’s highest expectations. On 28 September, 6 Division, comprising approximately 11,000 combatants, attacked the Ottomans just downriver from Kut (see Figure 2). The Ottoman commander Nurettin had taken charge after Townshend’s capture of Amara in June and had spent several months preparing new defences. Thus, for the first time in the war, Townshend faced ‘a properly organized trench system’ extending for more than 5 miles on both sides of the river, anchored by impassable marshes. ¹⁴ Given the scale of the enemy position, Townshend planned to divide his force into two columns. Column ‘B’, a single infantry brigade under Brigadier General C.I. Fry, would hold the enemy in place with a frontal attack against Ottoman positions just north of the Tigris. Meanwhile, column ‘A’, comprising two and a half infantry brigades and the cavalry, all under Brigadier General W.S. Delamain, would turn the enemy’s left flank by pushing through a gap between the northern end of the Ottoman line and the nearby Ataba marsh, which had apparently receded northwards since the construction of the position. ¹⁵ Friction diminished the impact of this turning movement. Part of column A, the 17th Infantry Brigade under Brigadier General F.A. Hoghton, mistakenly advanced around the north side of the Ataba marsh, increasing the length of its march and delaying by several hours its engagement with the enemy. Moreover, upon encountering strong enemy positions, Hoghton proved reluctant to advance without reinforcement, further diluting Townshend’s intended concentration of force against the Ottoman left flank. As Sir John Nixon’s chief of staff, Major General George Kemball, related after the war, Hoghton’s delay was ‘disastrous to the complete success of Townshend’s scheme’. ¹⁶

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Figure 2.

Kut-al-Amara and vicinity, September 1915.

By dusk, elements of 6 Division had established themselves in rear of the enemy positions, forcing Nurettin to initiate a withdrawal under the cover of darkness. ¹⁷ In his memoir Townshend portrayed the battle as an outright victory, describing it as ‘one of the most important in the history of the British Army in India’. ¹⁸ In reality, however, 28 September proved frustrating for Townshend. Rather than routing the enemy, his force had allowed the Ottomans to retire intact. Moreover, throughout the battle he had struggled to discern, let alone influence, the course of events. While the relatively small scale of his previous engagements in the spring of 1915 had enabled him to lead from the front, Townshend spent the battle of Kut in a wooden observation tower several miles from the front, his view marred by mirage and sandstorms. As the battle progressed, he received sporadic and increasingly infrequent information from his subordinates. A lack of telephone cable forced him to rely solely on aerial reconnaissance reports after 11 a.m., and for three full hours during the afternoon he received no news whatsoever. ¹⁹ The commander of 6 Indian Division thus passed the day waiting apprehensively as the misdirection and the apparent hesitancy of Hoghton’s 17th Brigade impeded the timely execution of his plan.

Townshend also had to contend with an uninvited guest in the form of Sir John Nixon, who chose to observe the battle at his side. In his study of the Mesopotamia campaign, A.J. Barker has suggested that ‘Townshend’s personality was such that the presence of his commander made no difference.’ ²⁰ It is difficult to believe, however, that the proximity of his superior, who was eager for victory, did not add to Townshend’s frustration as he waited impatiently for news from the front. In personal correspondence Barker himself acknowledged that, during the autumn of 1915, Nixon ‘was breathing down Townshend’s neck the whole time. All the time he was sending optimistic messages back to India and to London and pressing Townshend very hard.’ ²¹ Nixon’s deployment of his chief of staff, Kemball, to observe the battle at Delamain’s headquarters compounded Townshend’s anxiety. Nicknamed ‘the Flammenwerfer’, Kemball apparently acted as Nixon’s prod, egging on ostensibly hesitant field commanders. ²² His presence at a subordinate headquarters closer to the front is likely to have diminished Townshend’s sense of control over the battle. It is therefore not entirely surprising that he admitted in his memoir: ‘No one knew – I am sure none of my staff did – how very anxious I had been over the success of this turning attack, with its unaccountable delays.’ ²³

Upon discovering that Nurettin had abandoned his positions on 29 September, Nixon urged Townshend to pursue the retiring enemy force. Despite encountering multiple delays embarking troops onto ships and then negotiating the shallow waters of the Tigris, Townshend obliged for several days. On 3 October, however, after reaching the town of Aziziya, 60 miles upriver from Kut, he halted. Townshend had legitimate reasons to interrupt his advance. Aerial reconnaissance indicated that the Ottomans were establishing themselves in strong defensive positions at Ctesiphon, just below Baghdad. Even if his force managed to dislodge them, it would be left in a weakened state hundreds of miles from its base at Basra, vulnerable to Ottoman counter-attacks as well as hostile elements of the indigenous population. ²⁴

To make matters worse, upon arriving at Aziziya, Delamain informed Townshend of his doubts regarding the reliability of at least some of his Indian troops, who had retired in disorder during the battle of Kut-al-Amara. It is possible that this led Townshend to overestimate the fragility of his Indian units, which accounted for approximately three-quarters of the total strength of his force. In post-war correspondence Delamain indicated that his concerns were based primarily on the actions of a single battalion, when in fact the morale and performance of Indian soldiers in Mesopotamia seems to have varied significantly, depending on factors such as caste, religion, and ethnicity. ²⁵ Townshend’s worries, however, were not entirely groundless. By the autumn of 1915 several factors were contributing to the erosion of discipline and morale in Indian battalions in Mesopotamia. During the first year of the war, heavy casualties had reduced the cadre of British ‘King’s Commissioned Officers’ (KCOs) in each Indian battalion from 13 to just 7. ²⁶ Moreover, many of these officers were hastily commissioned reservists with little combat experience or knowledge of languages spoken by the soldiers they were expected to lead. While up to 17 Indian ‘Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers’ (VCOs) also served in each battalion, most of these officers were illiterate, and they were neither permitted nor trained to carry out the same roles as their British counterparts.

Casualties in the ranks also weakened the cohesion of Indian units. In 1914 Indian companies and even entire battalions were composed of soldiers from specific ethnic and religious groups, often from single communities, but it proved impossible to maintain their homogeneity in the face of heavy losses. Thus, sepoys were increasingly asked to serve alongside men with whom they had ‘no caste or tribal affinity’. ²⁷ Homesickness further undermined the morale of Indian soldiers, particularly in light of drought, famine, and plague in the Punjab in the summer of 1915. ²⁸

The specific circumstances of the Mesopotamia campaign also eroded Indian morale. Many Indian Muslims had reservations about fighting the Turks, who were not only fellow Muslims, but served the Ottoman Sultan, recognized by Sunnis as the Khalifa, the spiritual and temporal head of Islam. In addition, from the outset of the campaign, some sepoys had expressed opposition to fighting near holy sites in the region. ²⁹ Thus, Townshend was forced to send a Muslim battalion back to Basra after several of its members deserted to the enemy prior to the battle of Kut-al-Amara. The inadequacy of the British logistical system in Mesopotamia also contributed to disaffection. In 1915 British soldiers and sepoys alike suffered from a lack of medical care and insufficient rations. The latter was a particular problem for Indian soldiers, however, as their rations were smaller than those of their British counterparts, partly owing to their specific dietary restrictions, but also because they received an allowance with which they were expected to purchase supplementary items. In Mesopotamia additional sources of food proved inadequate. Sepoys’ diets were consequently lacking in essential nutrients, leaving them susceptible to diseases such as scurvy. ³⁰

While Townshend had legitimate reasons for concern regarding the vulnerability of his force and the morale of its Indian units, his decision to halt stemmed in no small part from a fear of his own culpability for any setbacks that might occur if he continued his ‘pursuit’ without explicit orders from Nixon. As H.A. Holdich, the chief of staff of Delamain’s 16th Brigade, related after the war: ‘Nixon irritated Townshend in many ways with the object (as we thought) of driving him to take the bit between his teeth and advance without orders. T. was too leery to be caught out like that!’ ³¹ Thus, upon reaching Aziziya on 3 October, Townshend sent a lengthy telegram downriver to Nixon, articulating his reservations about continuing the pursuit. He also requested an order ‘in writing over Sir J.N.’s signature’. ³² The commander of 6 Indian Division received a reply the same day directing him to develop a plan to ‘open the way to Baghdad’. ³³

In his memoir Townshend claimed that he had serious doubts about the success of the advance, and argued that Nixon ‘should have taken command himself’. Nonetheless, he resolved to comply with the directive despite his misgivings. ³⁴ In reality, however, the receipt of a written order from Nixon seems to have assuaged many of Townshend’s concerns. Significantly, Townshend wrote to senior figures in England in early November, predicting victory in his next battle. Rather than attempting to shift responsibility to Nixon, he emphasized his own autonomy in planning and executing the advance. On 3 November he informed Lord Lansdowne that he intended ‘to attack Ctesiphon and occupy Baghdad in ten days, that he again had the command and that it was his own plan’. ³⁵ On 7 November he again informed Lord Curzon of the unfavourable odds he faced, explaining: ‘I shall have just 11000 combatants & 28 guns. Nureddin has got reinforcements & is at least as strong as I am and in a very strong position just like Kut al Amara astride of the Tigris.’ Despite these disadvantages, Townshend emphasized that his aim was to ‘drive the Turks into the river itself if I can & occupy Baghdad’. He was sufficiently confident in his ability to do so that he asked Curzon to facilitate his transfer to Europe ‘when I have occupied Baghdad’. ³⁶ Townshend probably believed that conveying timidity or indecision would not help elicit Curzon’s support. If he genuinely doubted his ability to defeat Nurettin, however, it made little sense to make his transfer to the Western Front contingent upon the capture of Baghdad, effectively treating victory at Ctesiphon as a foregone conclusion. That Townshend was willing to do so is indicative of his continued confidence.

Notwithstanding this confidence, Townshend’s recognition of the vulnerability and weaknesses of his force influenced his planning of the battle. In specific terms, it led Townshend to believe that decisive victory was only possible at Ctesiphon if he struck quickly. To compensate for his lack of numerical superiority and the perceived fragility of his Indian units, Townshend devised a plan that contemporary military planners might recognize as a rudimentary ‘effects-based operation’. Unable to rely on sheer numbers or firepower to destroy the enemy force, he proposed to execute a series of rapid, precisely timed attacks at distinct locations throughout the enemy’s position in order to create confusion and panic in the Ottoman command system.

Townshend clearly underestimated the size of the Ottoman force at Ctesiphon, which consisted of over 30,000 troops, including at least 18,000 infantry. He also misjudged the quality of the troops that had joined Nurettin since Kut. Rather than receiving piecemeal reinforcements to fill the depleted ranks of 35 and 38 Divisions, Nurettin was joined by 45 and 51 Divisions, both composed of Anatolian soldiers with better training and much higher morale than the Arab conscripts on whom he had been forced to rely previously. ³⁷ Nonetheless, Townshend’s plan recognized the weaknesses in the Ottoman position. Nurettin had spent nearly two months preparing two defensive lines on the left bank of the Tigris around Ctesiphon, but his only line of retreat across the Diala River to his rear was exposed to envelopment. ³⁸ Townshend thus divided 6 Indian Division into three columns, each under one of his brigade commanders. On Townshend’s left, a ‘Minimum Force’, consisting of the 17th Brigade and the divisional artillery under General Hoghton, would commence the attack at 6.30 a.m. on 22 November. Supported by fire from barges and naval vessels on the Tigris, Hoghton was to advance boldly with the intent of convincing the enemy that his column constituted the main thrust of the British attack. ³⁹ In Townshend’s words: ‘by making a great display and fight, he should induce [the enemy] to use up his reserves’. At 7.30 a ‘Turning Attack’, comprising the 18th Brigade under General Hamilton, supported by a column of cavalry under General Melliss, was to begin advancing against the enemy’s left flank and rear, ‘seriously menacing his vulnerable line of retreat’. ⁴⁰ With the enemy fully occupied on either flank, Townshend’s ‘Principal Mass’, comprising the 16th and part of the 30th Brigade under General Delamain, would deliver the decisive blow against a position on the right of the Ottoman front that Townshend dubbed ‘Vital Point’, or ‘V.P.’ ‘I hoped’, Townshend explained in his memoirs, ‘either to throw the Turks into the Tigris or to compel them to a disastrous flight across the Diala River.’ ⁴¹

The success of Townshend’s plan depended on his ability to orchestrate precisely the attacks of his three columns. In order to achieve the intended effect on the enemy commander, he could initiate the Turning Attack only once the frontal attack by Hoghton’s Minimum Force had attracted the enemy’s attention, and he could unleash his Principal Mass only once Nurettin had focused on his threatened left flank. The battle of Kut-al-Amara, however, had demonstrated the difficulty of directing separate formations from a command post several miles behind the front line. In an attempt to enhance his control over his force at Ctesiphon, Townshend decided to move his headquarters forward, so that he could observe more of the battle directly and issue timely instructions to his subordinates.

The commander of 6 Indian Division was certainly not the only senior officer to struggle with a sense of detachment caused by the unprecedented scale of operations and the limitations of real-time communications in the opening campaigns of the First World War. In 1914 British commanders such as Sir John French and Sir Douglas Haig attempted to overcome this detachment by visiting the front lines in the midst of battle. Townshend’s response was more extreme, however, in that he intended not just to observe the battlefield briefly, but to exercise command from the front. This approach enabled him to respond to events more rapidly than he had at the battle of Kut-al-Amara. While the scarcity of telephone cable and the mirage precluded reliable communication by phone or heliograph, Townshend could send and receive information to his subordinates using messengers more quickly than had been possible at Kut. Moving forward also reduced opportunities for Nixon or Kemball to interfere with his conduct of the operation. Significantly, however, it also threatened to warp Townshend’s perspective of the battle. Given the flatness of the terrain around Ctesiphon and the distorting tendencies of the mirage, it was impossible to observe the entire battlefield. Moreover, as French and Haig had both discovered, proximity to live fire could narrow a decision-maker’s perspective dramatically. ⁴² Developments in Townshend’s immediate vicinity could therefore have a disproportionate influence over his decisions regarding the entire operation. Thus, while the limitations of 6 Indian Division’s communications system left him with few more effective means of controlling his force, Townshend’s approach actually held the potential to undermine his efforts to achieve his intended effect upon the enemy.

III. The Battle of Ctesiphon

Townshend’s location, along with his belief in the necessity of a rapid victory, influenced his decisions from the outset of the battle of Ctesiphon. On the morning of 22 November the commander of 6 Indian Division established his headquarters with the divisional artillery, just behind Hoghton’s Minimum Force (see Figure 3). Townshend certainly planned to achieve a decisive victory. Prior to the battle, his staff issued detailed maps of enemy positions at Ctesiphon and the nearby city of Baghdad, accompanied by instructions detailing ‘the methods to be adopted to push the enemy through and out of the city’. ⁴³

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Figure 3.

The battle of Ctesiphon.

Hoghton began his advance on schedule at 6.30 a.m., but by 7.40 he had encountered no opposition. Meanwhile, Hamilton, on the right flank, was growing impatient. At 7.45 a.m., he sent a message to Townshend asking permission to commence his advance. Despite the fact that Hoghton’s diversionary attack had yet to make an impact, Townshend agreed and the Turning Attack began at 8.30. Shortly afterwards, Delamain, commanding the Principal Mass, observed what appeared to be the rearward movement of enemy forces and asked permission to initiate his own advance against V.P. Townshend consented, and by 9 a.m. the ostensibly decisive attack had been unleashed. ⁴⁴ Apparently convinced that the enemy was about to collapse, Townshend moved forward to join the Principal Mass. This bold initiative undoubtedly encouraged the troops, but it almost certainly undermined Townshend’s ability to control the battle. As B.T. Reynolds, a British artillery officer at Ctesiphon, observed in a post-war history of the battle: ‘Townshend was now in a position where superhuman judgment and coolness would be required to avoid being influenced by events within his immediate and restricted circle of vision.’ ⁴⁵

On the morning of 22 November, Townshend did not possess these qualities in sufficient measure. Around 11 a.m. he received a message from Hoghton suggesting that the Principal Mass had advanced too rapidly, leaving the Minimum Force unable to dislodge the enemy forces in front of it. ⁴⁶ Townshend responded by ordering Hoghton to move immediately to the right in order to support the ostensibly decisive attack by Delamain’s Principal Mass. This was among the most controversial decisions of the battle, and the rationale behind it remains unclear. It probably stemmed in part, however, from Townshend’s lack of confidence in Hoghton. Whatever the reasons for the slow pace of Hoghton’s advance at the battle of Kut in September, it had subsequently tarnished his reputation in the upper ranks of 6 Indian Division. As Kemball observed after the war: ‘T[ownshend] was never cordial to poor Hoghton afterwards!’ ⁴⁷

From the rather narrow perspective afforded by Townshend’s position at the front, it probably seemed that Hoghton was once again vacillating while the Principal Mass was heavily engaged and on the verge of inducing an enemy retirement. Townshend’s decision, however, had unfortunate consequences for the entire force. His order required the Minimum Force to break off its engagement with the enemy and traverse an open plain in full view of Ottoman positions. An officer in Hoghton’s brigade, W.C. Spackman, described this movement: ‘It is a great tribute to our troops and their officers that the extremely difficult manoeuvre of changing the direction of its attack to half right in mid-career was rapidly performed but it inevitably resulted in some confusion and intermingling of units, carried out as it was under increasing Turkish fire.’ ⁴⁸ Thus, Hoghton’s brigade joined the Principal Mass, but at considerable cost. As B.T. Reynolds argued: ‘Had Townshend been able to view the battle as a whole from further back, he would probably have allowed Hoghton to go ahead and capture the trenches in his immediate front before moving north to join Delamain’s men. As it was, a certain amount of time was saved, but Hoghton’s brigade had suffered crippling casualties.’ ⁴⁹ As the official historian of the Mesopotamia campaign, F.J. Moberley, related in post-war correspondence, Hoghton’s flank march ‘was responsible for heavy losses which directly affected the result’ of the battle. ⁵⁰

By early afternoon on 22 November, 6 Indian Division had also inflicted significant casualties on the Ottomans, but Townshend’s attack had not induced the collapse he expected. On the contrary, resistance stiffened as enemy infantry counter-attacked and artillery bombarded British and Indian units that had captured parts of the Ottoman defensive line. This resistance was undoubtedly due in part to the size of the Ottoman force, which exceeded Townshend’s expectations. At least as important, however, was the fact that the Ottoman command system did not respond as he expected to his orchestrated attack. While Townshend’s location left him highly sensitive to the ebb and flow of the fighting, Nurettin remained well insulated from the front. His headquarters stood more than 6 miles from the front line, while the mirage made it impossible to see even 2 miles in the direction of the battle. Telephone lines laid between Ottoman headquarters and lower formations quickly broke down, forcing commanders to rely on messengers who frequently lost their way. According to the Turkish historian Muhammad Amin, who served on Nurettin’s staff at Ctesiphon: ‘In this area, presenting no accidents of ground to serve as a guide, mirage ridden by day and obscure by night, it was an extraordinary piece of luck if a man succeeded in going and returning a few kilometres or sometimes a few hundred metres without making detours and losing his way.’ ⁵¹

Thus, it appears that the Ottoman command system was not sufficiently sensitive to recognize the subtleties of Townshend’s attack, let alone respond to them. Townshend assumed that Nurettin would react to the attacks of his three columns in sequence, shifting his forces to meet them as they occurred. After responding to pressure from Hoghton’s column on his front, Nurettin would interpret Hamilton’s Turning Attack as a repetition of Townshend’s flanking movement at Kut-al-Amara, and accordingly send as large a force as possible to stop it. This would leave his centre relatively vulnerable to the attack by the Principal Mass. In reality, Nurettin’s headquarters does not appear to have noticed Hoghton’s attack before becoming aware of Hamilton’s flanking movement. Nor did Nurettin react to Hamilton’s attack before Townshend unleashed the Principal Mass. As a result, rather than attacking a weakened Ottoman centre, Delamain struck the strongest point in the enemy line, which was well defended and supported by reserves. ⁵²

Townshend’s attacks took a heavy toll on Nurettin’s force. By the end of 22 November, Amin described 38 and 45 Divisions as ‘crushed’, while 51 Division ‘had lost extremely heavily’. ⁵³ The events of the day also shook the confidence of the Ottoman commander, who was forced to abandon the formidable front line of a defensive position he had spent weeks constructing. According to Amin: ‘It was an irreparable loss for the commander-in-chief that his first line of defence prepared and strengthened with the efforts of months and from all the local sources which the district could furnish should be captured by the enemy with such ease in the course of a few hours.’ ⁵⁴ At least one observer, B.T. Reynolds, believed that if Townshend had renewed his attack on 23 November, Nurettin ‘would have withdrawn the remains of his army across the Diyala in the morning’. ⁵⁵

The events of the day, however, had an even greater impact on the commander of 6 Indian Division. Townshend’s plan had failed to overwhelm the Ottoman command system in the way that he had hoped. Moreover, by early afternoon on the 22nd the attack had lost momentum as the enemy counter-attacked. At this point he observed the unsettling spectacle of able-bodied soldiers retiring from the fight. Townshend argued in his memoir that: ‘It was evident that all control must have been lost owing to very heavy casualties amongst the British officers of Indian units. Here were hundreds of Indian soldiers streaming to the rear, because there were not enough white officers to keep them steady and in hand.’ ⁵⁶ Whether or not Townshend’s assessment of its causes was correct, this voluntary retirement was significant in that it seemed to confirm his worst fears about the fragility of his force.

The condition of 6 Indian Division at the end of the day extinguished the remaining confidence of its commander. When the fighting subsided at dusk, Townshend remained at the front, where he was witness to scenes of chaos and abject misery. While the divisional staff had planned for the transport of wounded soldiers forward into Baghdad, the failure of the attack on the 22nd forced them to improvise, with unexpectedly large numbers of wounded to collect at V.P. In his memoir Townshend recalled: ‘If I live a hundred years I shall not forget that night bivouac at “V.P.” amongst hundreds of wounded, who were being brought in, loaded on commissariat carts, by which they were collected for hours during the night.’ ⁵⁷ It is tempting to dismiss this account as an exaggeration intended to justify Townshend’s subsequent decision to retreat. B.T. Reynolds, however, described the situation at V.P. in similar terms:

When I got there the confusion was far worse. Guns, teams, transport, prisoners, and hundreds of wounded were all collected together in a narrow space, cut up in all directions by a maze of trenches and pitted with shell holes. The trenches were choked with dead. Hoghton and Hamilton were sorting out men from every regiment in the force, and setting them to clear out and man a line facing the Turks. In the midst of this confusion I found Townshend and the remains of his divisional staff, working by the light of a hurricane lamp, writing orders for the morrow. ⁵⁸

The disorganization and suffering around him almost certainly reinforced Townshend’s concerns about the vulnerability of his force. As Reynolds explained:

He knew that the Turks had been heavily reinforced. As the casualty reports came in he saw that his own ranks had been sorely depleted. His mind must have turned to the long line of communications – some 350 miles of river – between him and the sea, with a bare two brigades to guard and keep it open until such time as reinforcements could arrive from overseas. ⁵⁹

Surrounded by casualties and faced with an apparently defiant enemy, Townshend elected not to renew the attack, ordering his division to concentrate at the Tigris to secure ammunition, food, and water.

From 23 November the tempo of the battle slowed considerably. The failure of his attack and the heavy losses suffered by 6 Indian Division depleted Townshend’s enthusiasm for offensive operations. Nurettin proved to be more resilient, but he struggled to organize and execute an attack. It was not until early in the afternoon of the 23rd that Nurettin recognized the abatement of Townshend’s offensive. Apparently owing to poor communications and faulty intelligence, the Ottoman counter-attack developed slowly and largely missed its target. Unaware that Townshend’s force had moved southward, 51 Division, the strongest formation in Nurettin’s force, ‘lost its way in the dark and never even found an enemy’. The other Ottoman formations suffered heavily in attacking entrenched units of 6 Indian Division, which remained capable of mounting a stubborn defence. ⁶⁰

The morning of 24 November saw little activity on either side as both commanders waited pensively for the other to act. With several aircraft at his disposal, Townshend is likely to have had a better understanding of his enemy’s position than had Nurettin, who relied on the infrequent and often inaccurate reports of observers on the ground. Neither method of gathering intelligence proved entirely accurate, however, and exhaustion and apprehension led both commanders to interpret reports in the bleakest possible light. Given the condition of his force and the continued presence of the enemy, Townshend apparently concluded during the 24th that he had no choice but to retire, and issued orders for the withdrawal of his division on the morning of 26 November. Sir John Nixon advised against a withdrawal, observing: ‘At the present moment the enemy does not apparently realize your state, and they themselves are apprehensive of being attacked by you.’ ⁶¹

Nixon was correct. Late in the evening of 24 November, Ottoman headquarters received a false report that Townshend was once again advancing. By this point, heavy casualties and the desertion of large numbers of rear-echelon troops had weakened the Ottoman force considerably. Moreover, Nurettin and his staff had struggled to respond to Townshend’s initiatives for more than 60 hours with limited information and even less sleep. Their reaction to his apparent renewal of the offensive was therefore less than sanguine. According to Amin: ‘The terror and confusion aroused at HQ with the rapidity and effect of a thunderbolt by this frightful news is quite impossible to describe or picture.’ ⁶² Nurettin and his staff were aware that the abandonment of the Ctesiphon position would be devastating to the morale of their force and would encourage unrest among the inhabitants of the region. As Amin explained: ‘to fall further back and take refuge in the Diala line might cause the disruption and mutiny of certain tribes and elements only too glad of any opportunity and would cause a terrible despondency in the minds of all’. ⁶³ In addition, the Ottoman staff had little confidence that they could hold the Diala line, which was much weaker than the Ctesiphon position. Nonetheless, despite the potentially catastrophic consequences of a retreat, Nurettin ordered an immediate retirement across the Diala.

The Ottoman commander eventually regained his composure. On the morning of the 25th, when subsequent reports revealed no movement by Townshend’s force, the Ottoman commander ordered the reoccupation of his original position. Townshend, however, never regained any semblance of the confidence that had animated him on the first morning of the battle. Assuming that the enemy advance indicated the arrival of substantial Ottoman reinforcements, Townshend expedited the retirement of his force, and 6 Division initiated a hasty withdrawal on the evening of 25 November, which continued until it returned to Kut-al-Amara in early December.

IV. Conclusion

Given the numerical superiority of Ottoman forces at Ctesiphon, it is tempting to conclude that Charles Townshend’s retirement to Kut-al-Amara was a foregone conclusion. Certainly this is what Townshend implied from 1916 onward, as he argued that he conducted the advance with a single division against his better judgement. In fact, from his return to Mesopotamia in August 1915 until the first day of the battle of Ctesiphon, Townshend believed that he could inflict a decisive defeat on an Ottoman force of equal or greater strength. Even as his force became increasingly vulnerable after the inconclusive battle of Kut-al-Amara, he remained confident that he could achieve victory at Ctesiphon using a series of carefully orchestrated frontal and flanking attacks that would overwhelm the enemy’s command system and force Nurettin to initiate a panicked withdrawal. Townshend’s plan, however, contained a flaw inherent in contemporary ‘effects-based operations’ in that it assumed that the enemy would react in a predictable manner to specific actions, despite the fact that these actions were executed in a chaotic environment and interpreted by the enemy through the crude filter of an imperfect intelligence-gathering apparatus. ⁶⁴ Townshend’s decision to command from the front exacerbated this problem. Driven by his belief in the necessity of a rapid victory due to the fragile morale of his force, as well as his experience at the battle of Kut-al-Amara, Townshend attempted to minimize delays in the transmission of orders by accompanying his columns into battle. Influenced by the events unfolding directly in front of him, Townshend expedited the pace of his operation, making it even more difficult for the enemy to detect, let alone respond to, the separate attacks of his three columns. In the process, he made costly decisions, such as directing Hoghton’s entire brigade to traverse the battlefield under enemy fire. Thus, by the end of 22 November, his force had suffered heavily, but failed to provoke Nurettin’s withdrawal.

Townshend might well have achieved greater success had he executed his plan more gradually, allowing each column to engage fully with the enemy before initiating the attack of the next. This would have allowed the Ottoman command system more opportunity to react to the attack in the way Townshend intended. Even if it did not induce the collapse of Nurettin’s army on the first day of the battle, it would probably have been less costly to 6 Indian Division, leaving Townshend more able to continue the offensive on subsequent days. The Ottoman numerical advantage was not decisive. The enemy was much stronger than Townshend expected, and as Edward Erickson has demonstrated, Nurettin was capable of mounting effective counter-attacks. That said, the Ottoman commander was certainly not convinced that he held a significant advantage. Ottoman intelligence, which was just as bad as Townshend’s, drastically overestimated British strength at 20,000 troops. ⁶⁵ Under the impression that he was outnumbered, Nurettin proved increasingly nervous throughout the battle, as demonstrated by his potentially disastrous retreat to the Diala on the night of 24/25 November. Given the shakiness of the Ottoman commander, it seems possible that had Townshend orchestrated his attack more effectively on 22 November 1915, he might very well have compelled Nurettin to abandon his last strong defensive position below Baghdad, undermining Ottoman control over the local population in the process.

To point out Charles Townshend’s mistakes is not to exonerate his superiors, who grossly underestimated the difficulties of capturing Baghdad with little more than a single division. Indeed, even if Townshend had won a quick victory on 22 November, occupying Baghdad for any significant period was beyond the capabilities of his force. Nonetheless, Townshend had an opportunity at Ctesiphon to defeat Nurettin and throw the Ottoman Army in Mesopotamia into disarray. Had he done so, 6 Indian Division might have reached Baghdad, loosening significantly the Ottomans’ hold on the region and compelling them to divert resources from elsewhere in an attempt to re-establish it. At the very least, a victory would have eliminated the perceived necessity of a rapid retirement, almost certainly sparing Townshend’s force the fate that ultimately befell it at Kut-al-Amara.

Beyond demonstrating the impact of Townshend’s conduct of operations at Ctesiphon, this paper points to the importance of examining the impact of command decisions on the Mesopotamia campaign in general. In contrast to the Western Front, where until recently historians have obsessed over command decisions while ignoring the limitations imposed by logistics and imperfect intelligence, the Mesopotamia campaign is seen largely as the inevitable result of poor logistics and faulty intelligence. ⁶⁶ While these factors certainly imposed constraints on British efforts in Mesopotamia, the case of Ctesiphon demonstrates that command decisions had an important impact on the outcome of the campaign and should not be overlooked