‘The Vanguard of Sacrifice’? Political Commissars in the Republican Popular Army during the Spanish Civil War,1936–1939

On 17 July 1936 a faction of the Spanish army rose up against the Second Republic, triggering a violent conflict that developed into the Spanish Civil War as groups loyal to the government rallied to its defence. In the days following the partially successful coup d’état, the two antagonistic camps scrambled to generate stopgap armed support.

The forces available to the Republic immediately after the uprising were a disjointed combination of party- and union-based volunteer militia, reinforced and at times led by members of the Spanish security and the armed forces. ¹ A considerable number of both of these remained loyal to the government, either through genuine political conviction or seeking self-protection during the disorder. ² However, in Republican-held territory, the regular pre-war conscript army disintegrated and government authority in many places collapsed. The prime minister, Santiago Casares Quiroga, immediately attempted to undermine the rebels’ manpower base by disbanding army units that joined the uprising. ³ But his decree principally and unwittingly affected loyalist sectors of the army, and many soldiers did not rejoin their units. Although some of these former soldiers joined the conflict as volunteer militiamen, the army effectively ceased to be a tool at the state’s disposal. ⁴

Republican Spain’s defence was therefore overtly political from the outset and was carried out by militant Spaniards prepared to fight in the Republic’s name – not only political republicans, but also socialists, anarchists, and communists who hoped to advance their own political agendas, including revolution. It was in this early period of the conflict that militia units began electing political delegates: trusted militants to act as intermediaries between militia forces, their political parties or unions, and the Republican government. A second driving force behind the appointment of political delegates was the need to watch over many professional officers in the government zone who were not considered fully loyal to the Republic. ⁵ However, once the loyalists began to organize their militia units into a regular army and introduced obligatory military service, the post of political delegate was formalized and the role of political commissar officially introduced in the structure of the emerging Republican Popular Army.

This article examines the system of political commissars in the Popular Army. It analyses the role of the political commissariat in the Republic’s war effort and explores the techniques the government used to encourage political engagement with the war, as well as maintain discipline and morale. It also investigates commissars’ relationship with their political and moral charges, the Popular Army’s foot soldiers, and with Republican command officers. Finally, it considers the political manoeuvring and proselytizing – particularly by the Communist Party of Spain, the Partido Comunista de España (PCE) – that occurred in the armed forces, despite the government’s attempt to minimize the rivalries between the different parties and unions fighting for the Republic. The role of Popular Army commissars and their interaction with combatants is therefore important for understanding an essential strand of the government’s politicized wartime mobilization. ⁶

A central question is the role of commissars in a politicized fighting force and the need for the commissariat. In his magisterial work on the Popular Army, Michael Alpert argues that the Republic had to manage ‘often unwilling conscripts, ignorant of what the war was about, whose ancestors had handed down anti-militarist sympathies, and forge a reasonably efficient army without reliance on external and traditional disciplinary methods’. ⁷ It also had to convince politicized volunteers that they should obey professional military officers, who in turn had to be persuaded that the new army was not a threat to their command authority. ⁸ Alpert adds that the role commissars played in the Republican Army was performed in different ways in other armies. The Nationalist Army, in contrast, relied on established military traditions and the chaplaincy to motivate its soldiers and maintain morale. ⁹ Julián Zugazagoitia, Republican wartime interior minister and later general secretary of the national defence ministry, even referred to the commissariat as the ‘new “chaplains”’ in his memoirs. ¹⁰ The commissariat as an institution was inspired by the Russian Red Army’s practices during the civil war of 1917–23, but a high-ranking officer in the Popular Army, Antonio Cordón, argued there were important differences between the two countries’ situations – principally that in Spain most combatants were inexperienced, unlike Russian citizens after three years’ fighting in the First World War. ¹¹ Another contemporary emphasized the earlier presence of commissars during the French Revolution. ¹²

The system of the commissariat itself reveals the delicate line that the Republic was forced to tread, in the nature of both the mobilization and the structure of the new and militarized army it created during the civil war. Because the Republic was fighting a rebellious conventional army, it had to distance itself from traditionally military practices that were wholly associated with the enemy and were distasteful to many of the government’s left-wing supporters. The challenge was to coerce combatants without being seen to do so, and without recourse to traditional power structures, as these had been undermined by the social revolution. It also meant that the organization of the new army had to make real concessions to political party and union militia, which formed the first line of defence for the government following the coup. ¹³ The result was the institutionalization of characteristics of the ad hoc and revolutionary militia columns, including the appointment of politico-military representatives as the Popular Army became more structured and its combatants regulated. ¹⁴ As one military historian commented: ‘The army disguised itself as a militia in order that it might be forgiven for not being so.’ ¹⁵ In many ways the commissariat compensated for aspects that a revolutionary army developing into a conventional army found difficult to enforce, such as discipline, which was considered to be a matter of convincing participants, rather than issuing orders to be obeyed blindly. ¹⁶ Moreover, Popular Army commissars played an eminently practical role, intended to compensate for the army’s lack of skilled junior officers and non-commissioned officers. ¹⁷

The War Commissariat, the Comisariado General de Guerra, was formally founded on 15 October 1936, three months into the conflict, and under the premiership of socialist Francisco Largo Caballero. The government decree recognized the ‘politico-social nature of the armed forces’ and referred to the need to exercise a ‘constant influence over the masses of combatants’ with the objective of ‘never losing the notion of the spirit that must rouse every last combatant in the fight for freedom’. ¹⁸ Largo appointed the socialist foreign minister, Julio Álvarez del Vayo, as commissar general, as well as four deputy commissars working under him. ¹⁹ The timing of the order matched a militarization decree that officially formed the Republican Popular Army and marked the government’s decision to organize militia columns into a more conventional fighting force. ²⁰

As a result the political commissariat permeated the Popular Army, and throughout the remainder of the conflict commissars were appointed to ‘armed units of all types and roles’, as the original decree established. Indeed, the war ministry was authorized to appoint as many commissars to the Republican armed forces as it saw fit. ²¹ Commissars were not expected to act as command officers, and the role was designed to maintain political links between soldiers and their officers, as well as with the Republican government. ²² Every company had its political commissar, as well as each larger unit. For example, Santiago Álvarez, who wrote a memoir about his experience, was communist Enrique Líster’s 11th Division commissar until January 1938, and was confirmed in his post as V Army Corps’s commissar in December of the same year. ²³ All parties and political unions in the Republican camp had a presence in the commissariat – including, for example, the left-wing Catalan independentist Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya – although moderate republican parties were barely represented.

The selection process to become a political commissar was challenging, and aspirants had to have a demonstrable history of militancy. By April 1938, for example, candidates were required to have spent at least six months serving in the front line and had to prove, via a certificate, that they had been members of a left-wing union or party since before the uprising of 17 July 1936. Their candidacy also had to be supported by both the brigade commander and the unit’s highest-ranking commissar. ²⁴ Commissars for rearguard units could not belong to any of the mobilized reserve classes, as a means to ensure that applications were not used to avoid front-line service. ²⁵ Commissars were typically skilled tradesmen who had received at least basic level schooling and were able to read and write. ²⁶

The commissars’ central role was to organize the Popular Army’s political instruction, which was considered essential for combatants’ morale. A leaflet published on calling up the 1931 reserve class informed the new recruits that the commissars were in ‘constant touch with their soldier comrades, and at all times evaluating their fair needs, resolving their doubts and reaffirming their combative spirit’. ²⁷ Santiago Álvarez later wrote that a commissar’s role was to ‘orient, stimulate, guide and, as a last recourse, convince [their political charges] with their behaviour’. ²⁸ Moreover, Popular Army commissars were held directly responsible for the morale of the soldiers they were tasked to inspire and were blamed when their political preparation was deemed faulty. ²⁹

For this ambitious assignment, commissars relied primarily on two vehicles to reach combatants – political speeches and trench publications. ³⁰ The two modes were intricately linked, however, because commissars were responsible for selecting material for the press and often the final edition. The 31st Mixed Brigade commissars’ bulletin of February 1937, for example, called for a faster production of the articles that ‘are to make up our [the brigade’s] newspaper’. The order added that articles ‘must be signed and endorsed by the commissar of each respective battalion, who must take special care to examine the themes covered by these articles’. ³¹ The commissariat monitored units’ publications and held the commissar-editor accountable for material considered unsuitable. There is evidence that not all contributions by soldiers were published: one commissar, for example, refused an article for publication in his trench newspaper because he considered it ‘inappropriate’ and ‘unoriginal’. ³²

Reports show that commissars exhorted their charges on a regular basis. One unit recorded that ‘political delegates constantly deliver speeches to the soldiers of this battalion’. ³³ For example, a report from the Army of Extremadura’s commissariat from 17 April 1938 made reference to 12 different speeches delivered to various battalions on just one day. ³⁴ Commissars’ speeches covered a broad range of topics and a flavour of these is available from their titles, although transcribed speeches were unfortunately not located in the course of this study. They included themes such as ‘The incompatibility of the Spanish and German character’, ‘Morale and discipline of our troops’, and ‘Why will fascism never take root in Spain?’ ³⁵ A report from the Army of Extremadura commissariat from June 1938 demonstrates that many speeches were political, such as ‘What are we fighting for?’, ‘The government’s 13 points’, ³⁶ ‘The collapse of the Fascist rearguard’, and ‘The country’s reconstruction after the war’. Others, however, covered more practical issues, for example: ‘Weapons cleaning’, ‘Unity and respect for the command’, and ‘Discipline’. ³⁷

The press, however, is another matter, and historians have access to the content of copious amounts of Popular Army trench newspapers. The main reason for this is the industriousness of unit commissars in publishing high-quality, multi-page, and professionally laid-out publications. An artillery supply unit in Albacete reported in November 1938 that it had a ‘large group of writers, artists and spontaneous contributors’, which made the job of creating newspapers ‘pleasant and profitable [in the moral sense; newspapers were distributed free of charge to soldiers]’. ³⁸ Even relatively small units, such as battalions with between 500 and 800 men, had their own publications with photos, illustrations, and articles that were distinctive and closely targeted to their combatants. In addition, most mixed brigades (about 3,000–4,000 men), divisions (about 10,000 men), and army corps (about 20,000 men) had their own publications too. A commissar who served with an armoured unit south of Madrid as from September 1938 later wrote that it published 11 newspapers for about 11,000 combatants. These, he remembered, were published on ‘a truck mounted with a press’ often stationed at the ‘front or sector in which the armoured forces played an active part’. ³⁹

Popular Army publications are therefore especially useful sources with which to gauge the Republic’s language of mobilization and its attempt to raise its soldiers’ morale. For this purpose, publications combined propagandistic material, including messages on patriotism and discipline, with light-hearted sections designed to engage combatants. The humour, intended to ‘stimulate and entertain during rest periods’, ⁴⁰ was used alongside practical messages regarding, for example, hygiene and weapons maintenance. ⁴¹ The commissars of the 31st Mixed Brigade published the unit’s first newspaper in March 1937 to greet the first contingent of conscript soldiers reinforcing the brigade. In the first edition the commissars described the publication, which was ‘written alternating rifle and pen’, as: ‘Just another militiaman, the best, the most humane, the one that carries within him all the spirit of self-denial and sacrifice that has characterized the 31st Mixed Brigade from its birth.’ ⁴² From other reports it is clear that commissars led politically motivated discussions of the press ⁴³ and evaluated the effect of different written material on their charges. ⁴⁴

Commissars also played a central role in combatants’ day-to-day routines, particularly those that could affect the fighting spirit and readiness of Republican soldiers. They organized classes and were responsible for maintaining soldiers’ centres, known as casas del combatiente. For example, the daily responsibilities of commissars with the 31st Mixed Brigade in February 1937 included tasks such as the ‘daily edition of a commissars’ information bulletin, running the libraries and the Casa del Combatiente’. ⁴⁵ By November 1938 a casa del combatiente in Albacete belonging to a rearguard motorized supply unit had a library of ‘almost 300 volumes’ covering a range of topics, such as literature, mechanics, and history. The centre also had games, such as ‘chess, dominoes and Parcheesi, as well as a radio and a piano’. ⁴⁶ One centre even had a bar, and the profits were used to pay for the paper and ink used to produce mural newspapers. ⁴⁷

Unit commissars also organized cultural evenings for their soldiers with music and poetry recitals, one of which received ‘rapturous applause’ from the audience in Valencia in March 1937, according to the commissar. ⁴⁸ As one report from December 1938 noted, the objective was to ‘stimulate the soldiers’ love of culture’ and emphasize the ‘difference between an educated and an uneducated soldier’. ⁴⁹ Soldiers’ entertainment was also heavily politicized, and Álvarez del Vayo wrote that a common character in the Republic’s ‘Front-Line Guignol’ was Nationalist General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, the governor of Seville, who also conducted propaganda radio broadcasts. He was represented mockingly by the Republicans with a ‘bottle of sherry in one hand, a microphone in the other, and his speech betraying a weakness for any and every kind of liquid save water’. ⁵⁰ Humour was openly encouraged, and the third commissar general, Bibiano Fernández Osorio, who belonged to the moderate Republican party Izquierda Republicana, wrote, ‘Seriousness does not preclude irony or comicalness: ridiculing a jumped-up fascist character in a funny way can be much more efficient for our purposes than a grandiloquent speech.’ ⁵¹

In October 1937 over 40,000 men regularly attended classes in the Army of the Centre alone. ⁵² One senior commissar, Santiago Álvarez, estimated that 75,000 soldiers learned to read in the Popular Army throughout 1937. ⁵³ The emphasis on emancipatory education was a fundamental departure from the pre-civil war army, which held literacy in low regard even if it was not completely absent from its programme. ⁵⁴ Popular Army commissars constantly exhorted their charges to learn to read and write, and to educate themselves culturally and politically. The milicianos de la cultura, an organization of militarized teachers, assisted them in this task. ⁵⁵ ¡Presente!, the newspaper of the 31st Mixed Brigade, published the following encouragement:

Our army, the people’s army, has to be the most accessible, the most popular and the biggest university, because our army is Peace, it is Progress and it is Culture. It has to reach those comrades from the countryside who are culturally classified as illiterate … and who must not be embarrassed about finding themselves in this condition. ⁵⁶

Other newspapers published soldiers’ letters of thanks to the commissars who had assisted them in learning to write, ⁵⁷ and the 31st Mixed Brigade’s commissars reported in March 1937 that prizes instituted to motivate soldier-students were ‘paraded triumphantly throughout the village’ where they were stationed. ⁵⁸

The Republic’s desire to dissect Popular Army soldiers’ state of morale led to commissars producing lengthy and often highly detailed reports. A summary of a meeting of the 31st Mixed Brigade’s commissars held on 10 March 1937, for example, ran to 15 typewritten pages that referenced topics such as rations and clothing, as well as provision for sport and the quality of different munitions. ⁵⁹ Commissars also conscientiously reported the distribution of everyday comforts, such as supplies of tobacco and soap, which is an indication of their importance to Popular Army soldiers. ⁶⁰ Soap was essential to combat parasites such as lice that plagued soldiers, particularly in the summer months. Tobacco was a comfort as an appetite suppressant and a stress reliever, and very few men in the army did not smoke. One report from December 1937 referred to the almost daily distribution of these products, and that it made the soldiers ‘very happy’. ⁶¹ Often it was recorded under the category referring to ‘Political Work’ instead of under the ‘Day’s Summary’. ⁶²

Soldiers’ hygiene was a particular concern for commissars. At a Republican mobilization centre ⁶³ a commissar urged his charges not to urinate and defecate indoors. In an article published in the centre’s newspaper he wrote that the behaviour was outrageous, and added that, were he to describe it, the ‘blushing censor would cross out the adjectives with his pencil. Suffice it for me to say that there is a huge gulf between a pig and a hero.’ ⁶⁴ Another edition of the newspaper carried a pull-out quote that stated: ‘It is humiliating and sad to have to remind a soldier that he should wash.’ ⁶⁵ Commissars were also instructed to monitor their charges and attempt to limit their exposure to venereal disease, which was widespread on the Republican side of the lines and a major cause of casualties. ⁶⁶

In addition to its soldiers’ education, the Popular Army prioritized its commissars’ training, and published considerable didactic material to this end. This included lengthy booklets with titles such as ‘The commissars’ ABC’ and ‘Instructions to company delegates with respect to their mission in periods of combat’, ⁶⁷ designed to serve as an ‘element of guidance’ to unit commissars. ⁶⁸ The themes covered in these publications ranged widely and included detailed practical advice on, for example, how to prepare soldiers for an impending offensive – ‘use stirring phrases to highlight the importance of the combat that is about to take place’ ⁶⁹ – as well as the best way to execute a mural newspaper in a manner that was ‘attractive, [and would become] a real locus of excitement and curiosity’. ⁷⁰ The commissariat’s emphasis on this training underscores the level of guidance considered necessary for the Republic’s political commissars and the need to define their role within the new model of an armed force.

Most of the sources concerning the commissariat come from the organization itself, so it can be difficult to judge the success of its political campaigns and the relationship between commissars and Popular Army soldiers. There are, however, some indications of whether commissars were the ‘friends, teachers, living and direct examples of generosity, sacrifice and outright heroism’ that they were expected to be. ⁷¹ One veteran, Lluís Montagut, wrote a memoir of his time in the Popular Army that included high praise for one of his commissars, even during the difficult defence of Catalonia at the end of the war. Montagut was an older conscript – in his early thirties – branded only fit for auxiliary services, and far from a Republican propaganda mouthpiece. Yet he described his unit commissar as a ‘sharp boy, ardent and full of contagious conviction’ who delivered ‘brilliant speeches, sincerely vibrant, which inculcated in us a sense of duty’. ⁷²

An unlikely source of praise for Republican commissars came from their opponents, the Nationalist Army. In May 1937 the Nationalist V Army Corps recognized the work of the enemy in the field of politicized messages:

[We know] of the great work that the Red Political Commissars undertake with their combatants, with the never-ending propaganda of their ideals; and they do it because they owe all that they are to propaganda, they know its immense value and it is fair to say that in propaganda they surpass us. ⁷³

Less flattering praise was that the Nationalists were more likely to execute captured commissars than other types of soldier, and many avoided wearing their distinctive chocolate-coloured uniform for this reason, and because it made them a more visible target for enemy sharpshooters. ⁷⁴ From lists of commissar casualties from the end of the war, however, many must have been taking an active role in the front-line fighting. ⁷⁵

Commissars emphasized the differences between the Popular Army and the pre-war Spanish army. They stressed that the troops were not ‘bourgeois soldiers, “cannon fodder” who fight for a material aim of domination or expansion’. ⁷⁶ Commissars’ reports also indicate a change in relationship with command officers, and document cases where commissars prevailed over officers. For example, in September 1937 an officer was accused by his unit’s commissar of using ‘violent methods that characterize the army risen up against Republican legality’. The ‘lamentable deed’ of the accused captain, which was unfortunately not detailed in the report, was emphasized for the ‘repulsion and recrimination’ of his actions, which the commissar described as intolerable. ⁷⁷ One particularly honest commissar from the 51st Mixed Brigade may have summed up soldiers’ reactions to the organization when he wrote in April 1937: ‘The work of a commissar can be considered good when there is sufficient tobacco. Otherwise, it is bad.’ ⁷⁸

Not all commissars, however, were viewed in the same positive light. From some commissars’ reports it is clear that many took the opportunity to deliver haranguing speeches to their charges at every possible opportunity. Commissars’ messages may also have become weakened through constant repetition. An indication of the sheer number of speeches is that, in November 1937, an average unit’s commissar delivered 174 speeches, almost six per day, and completed 19 mural newspapers. ⁷⁹ One commissar wrote in February 1938 that he took advantage of the time saved by a speedy march back to camp to squeeze in an extra speech to his charges. ⁸⁰ Soldiers may have resented commissars’ constant lecturing. The commissars of the 31st Mixed Brigade were explicitly instructed by the commissariat at the start of 1938 to ‘end their interminable and improvised speeches … for once and for all’. ⁸¹ In June 1938 the commissars’ newspaper of the Army of the Centre chided: ‘Propaganda is for the soldiers, not so that commissars can archive it and proudly exhibit their collections.’ ⁸² The government even had to prohibit commissars from delivering speeches before executions. ⁸³ Indeed, some commissars’ speeches were so far removed from the day-to-day experience of the soldiers that they prompted both laughter and protests when they were delivered – one was entitled ‘Ulysses and war’. ⁸⁴ Álvarez del Vayo himself indirectly hinted at this antagonism in 1937, when he proclaimed in guidelines for political commissars that ‘soldiers will love their commissars for their organizational and educational work, even if they do not show it’. ⁸⁵ Zugazagoitia’s conclusions on commissars were less veiled:

As a control over [professional military] officers and as the public conscience on constant guard, [commissars] were unpleasant and, because they were ignorant of the role they were intended to play, they were also inept; as protectors of the troops they were demagogic. ⁸⁶

The commissariat was also at times critical of its commissars. One commissar, on his appointment in February 1937 to the post of political delegate for a sapper unit based in Valencia, wrote that cultural issues had been ‘somewhat ignored, either because of neglect or lack of time’ by the previous commissar. ⁸⁷ Other reports were more worrying for the Republic. In an order distributed to all commissars in Extremadura province, in south-western Spain, the commissariat made it clear that some delegates were not in close enough contact with their charges:

It is necessary to understand that in times of combat, when the enemy strikes our lines, that is where a commissar should be: next to our combatants, directly witnessing the scale of the attack and tireless so that no cause for defeatism undermines the fighting spirit of our soldiers. It is not in their offices, or on the end of a telephone, or looking over a map that [the commissar] encourages mettle, motivates the troops and imbues them with a sense of confidence and security. It is down in the trenches, on the battlefield, where a true commissar undertakes his active and efficient role. ⁸⁸

Another report of August 1938 from the Catalonia commissariat stated that ‘numerous commissars’ travelled to Barcelona without ‘any official reason whatsoever’, and referred to the ‘notorious abuse of the leave system by commissars’. The report concluded that political delegates were to ‘offer in this regard the suitable example of austerity that all commissars should adhere to’. ⁸⁹

A further reason that soldiers may have resented commissars is that they applied pressure for them to give up their salary and rations. The political argument was that: ‘He who has faith in victory, has no need to hoard money.’ As a 31st Mixed Brigade commissar told his charges in March 1937, ‘one of the most efficient ways in which we can help our government is to cede one third of our wages to the state’. ⁹⁰ Another commissar reported in February 1939 that he had asked soldiers to donate one quarter of their rations voluntarily to the civilian population. ⁹¹ At a time when shortages universally prevailed, this was a considerable and probably unwelcome sacrifice.

At other times commissars were excessively zealous in their duties. In October 1938, for example, the 97th Mixed Brigade’s commissar was disciplined for suggesting that the next time the Nationalists offered a truce in order to fraternize in no-man’s-land, the Republicans should allow them to leave the trenches and then shoot them as soon as they were in range. The commissariat responded that ‘any commissar who guides his inferiors in this way will in future lack the authority to impede … his subordinates committing reproachable acts’. ⁹² More disturbingly, there is evidence that commissars at times took justice into their own hands in a violent manner on the battlefield. An investigation conducted in November 1938 by the Popular Army concluded that men were illegally shot in the front line merely on the suspicion of imminent desertion. The report identified 65 men who had been executed ‘without standing trial’. ⁹³ This practice was considered widespread enough for General Vicente Rojo to issue the following stern order shortly afterwards. He reacted against

the imposition of the harshest sanctions (executions without trial) by some units at the front for reasons that do not justify such extreme measures. This evil [mal] must be avoided at all costs … avoiding all manner of loss of rights [desafueros] that do not benefit either Republican unity or the war [effort]. ⁹⁴

It is clear, however, that some Republican combatants were victims of summary justice at the hands of Popular Army commissars.

Furthermore, there is evidence that the political conflicts between different factions defending the Republic spread to the commissariat and contributed to undermining the Republican war effort. Both contemporaries and subsequent observers generally agree that the PCE was able to dominate the political commissariat, although there is disagreement about the causation.

Certainly communists were better represented among commissars in the Army of the Centre and may have accounted for 80 per cent of the force, ⁹⁵ as well as claiming to have a proportionately greater number of casualties at the front line. ⁹⁶ The communists were also aware that as a party they had much to gain from militarization and had been quick to offer their volunteer forces, the 5th Regiment of Popular Militias, as the basis of the first mixed brigades of the Popular Army. ⁹⁷ Álvarez del Vayo, the first commissar general, wrote in his memoirs that the Communist Party did come to dominate the commissariat, but that it was not deliberate policy on the part of the organism’s leadership. First, he argues that early commissars were granted their posts in a desperate attempt to halt the Nationalist advance on Madrid in the autumn of 1936, when the very survival of the Republic was on the line in the battlefield:

I appointed [the commissars] without paying any attention to their political affiliation, after studying their dossiers and in many cases talking with them. Their party or political affiliation made no difference to me. In the end it turned out that the communists were greater in number than the commissars who belonged to other parties. ⁹⁸

Secondly, Álvarez del Vayo wrote that the communists granted the commissariat greater importance than did other parties, who saw the formalized structure ‘at first as something rather exotic and unnecessary’. ⁹⁹ By appointing political heavyweights to the organization, the communists were better prepared to defend their sectarian interests. This argument is reinforced by Alpert, who argues that the anarchist CNT, in contrast, appointed a relatively young and inexperienced militant as the organization’s deputy commissar. ¹⁰⁰

The communist ascent in the commissariat, however, was contested by those who interpreted it as a campaign of political domination. ¹⁰¹ Largo’s government, for example, tried to ensure that the commissariat remained under the control of the ministry of war, rather than dominated by one political party. To this end, in April 1937 the prime minister issued an order against commissars’ appointments without official sanction from the government. ¹⁰² Moreover, under the premiership of Juan Negrín, Indalecio Prieto, the socialist defence minister, forbade commissars from directing propaganda at the enemy and set up a separate organism for this purpose in order to contain the influence of the commissariat. ¹⁰³ There is also evidence that the anarchists pushed for a system of proportional representation of the different political groups within the commissariat, which would have seen a considerable rise in socialist and anarchist political delegates. ¹⁰⁴ It is important to note, however, that while socialists and anarchists disliked what they saw as an overbearing communist influence in the commissariat, it was not the system itself with which they were in disagreement. ¹⁰⁵

What is clear, though, is that political wrangling affected the commissariat. As early as June 1937 the situation was considered so detrimental that Prieto prohibited proselytizing within the army, and ordered a prohibition on recruiting soldiers to political parties and organizations. ¹⁰⁶ For example, in May 1938 a report from the commissariat stated that some commissars ‘do not yet know what their task is, despite the time in their posts’. The criticism was against the ‘politicking of this and that commissar general, and whether they belong to this or that political party’. The report also called for ‘vigorous norms to be drawn up [against this practice]’. ¹⁰⁷ General Rojo wrote after the war: ‘For many people, the commissariat was simply and straightforwardly an organism for political activity – from which they could recruit volunteers for their party – and not one for the popular cause and the work of the government.’ ¹⁰⁸ The irony was that the Popular Army wanted its soldiers to be politicized, to be motivated to undertake sacrifices for the governmental cause, but not if that politicization caused rifts that undermined the Republican camp. The tension this caused was difficult for the commissariat to manage, not least because commissars, including the leaders, were affiliated to a particular party or union, and so too were many of their soldiers. ¹⁰⁹ One attempted solution was to project the politicization as broadly and acceptably as possible, and often only to invoke the fascism that all could agree they opposed. As Álvarez del Vayo proclaimed in a 1937 speech delivered in Albacete, in central Spain:

Since we are fighting a political war, the primary duty of the commissar is the political guidance of the soldiers. But this does not mean the politics of a specific party. The term ‘political’ has a much broader meaning. Everything is political in its all-encompassing definition, and no human activity can escape being political … Today we uphold the politics of anti-fascism. ¹¹⁰

Nevertheless, soldiers of one political affiliation looked to join units that were unofficially known to be controlled by their organization and complained if their commissars emanated from a different one. ¹¹¹ Soldiers even used it as an excuse for desertion, in one case claiming that they were seeking to join an ‘exclusively confederal [i.e. anarchist] unit’. ¹¹² A sign that these divisions reached front-line soldiers is that the Popular Army press encouraged commissars to explain to their soldiers that shortages were common in wartime and that it did not mean that they were being undersupplied because of their political affiliation. ¹¹³

There was also rivalry between the political commissariat and the Popular Army’s command officers. This possibility was tacitly acknowledged in the original decree: ‘At no instance are [the commissars’ duties] in conflict with the absolute necessity to underscore the authority of the military command.’ ¹¹⁴ In a leaflet distributed to new recruits the commissars were described as ‘auxiliary to the command’, ¹¹⁵ and official instructions underlined this hierarchy. For example, in an order from December 1937 it was specifically stated that commissars were not accountable for ‘technical direction nor military command’, but were expected to ‘shape, clarify, and strengthen the political consciousness of both command and soldiers’. ¹¹⁶ The commissars’ role was to guarantee that ‘guidance in these matters reached … the parapets and the trenches’. ¹¹⁷

But in practice commissars had to tread a difficult line between the military leadership and the soldiers, the ‘principal element’ of ‘our army’. A commissar from the 31st Mixed Brigade reported in January 1938 that this task ‘leads us directly to be interested in everything; in their daily regime, their preoccupations, their needs and aspirations of all kinds etc., etc.’ ¹¹⁸ From the report it is apparent that the commissars’ functions did overlap with strictly military obligations. For example, the commissar described taking part in the ‘daily intervention in the military and political direction of the brigade’. This included ‘general training and fire-discipline of the soldiers’, as well as the ‘control of nocturnal sentries in their positions’. ¹¹⁹ Commissars with the 20th Mixed Brigade in Extremadura during 1938 were also expected to direct the construction of front-line fortifications. ¹²⁰ Zugazagoitia referred to this conflict when he wrote that the political commissariat was a ‘misguided Russian transplant to Spanish climes under which all military commanders stumble, even those that can best disguise it’. ¹²¹ In addition, Tomás Mora, the commissar-inspector of the Army of the East, maintained that many officers feared being branded fascists and were consequently often hesitant to object to their unit’s commissars. ¹²²

There is evidence of further strain between commissars and military officers that involved issues of professional ability and political independence. For example, in March 1937 a commissar of the 31st Mixed Brigade described his unit’s officers as ‘perfectly incapable’ to the extent that ‘even the troops are beginning to realize’. ¹²³ Another report from the head commissar of the Valencia military region, written in February 1939, referred to the military command as taking an ‘antiquated and absurd’ position on political issues within the army: the senior officers had refused to allow political parties and unions to hold political meetings, and only permitted administrative ones. ¹²⁴

In addition, Republican Popular Army commissars were responsible for attempting to control desertions. This was particularly the case in the latter stages of the conflict, when the Republican war effort was collapsing, increasingly unsuitable men were conscripted en masse, and desertions turned into a flood, making the job of a political commissar more difficult. ¹²⁵ A pamphlet from the central zone’s commissariat published in May 1938 made commissars’ responsibility clear. It stated that the instructions were a ‘reminder of some aspects of [commissars’] work, which judging by [the number of desertions] has not been undertaken with sufficient intensity’. While the commissariat acknowledged that material conditions played a role in causing desertions – ‘A lack of attention to the small needs of the combatants (hot food, tobacco, clothing, shelter, hygiene, the post, distractions etc.)’ ¹²⁶ – the principal message was that they were considered political:

It is warned that this commissariat … will, in future, consider such desertions as demonstrable proof of the insufficiency of the political work of the commissars in the units of this zone – and said commissars will be held fully accountable. ¹²⁷

The commissariat’s leadership knew that the general mobilization of the population would entail the conscription of men not loyal to the Republic. Álvarez del Vayo made this explicit in a March 1937 circular to brigade-level commissars. He ordered commissars to undertake the ‘delicate task’ and place suspect individuals in positions where their ‘presence [was] not a threat’. ¹²⁸ In November 1937, for example, the commissars of the 31st Mixed Brigade were instructed to monitor the ‘fascist elements within the units’. ¹²⁹ Commissars stationed in Extremadura during 1938 set up ‘surveillance services’ consisting of ‘trustworthy’ soldiers instructed to watch over their colleagues. ¹³⁰

Unit commissars also disciplined those that ‘without negative intent and, by talking too much, spread their complaints, lack of discipline and discontent to others’. ¹³¹ The men of the 96th Mixed Brigade, for example, were ‘wary of their commissars’ because of their mission to root out potential deserters and defeatists. ¹³² Some surviving records are ambiguous as to whether the commissariat ordered bands of trusted soldiers positioned behind the Republic’s own lines in order to halt Nationalist assaults or whether, more sinisterly, these were designed to dissuade Popular Army soldiers from fleeing towards the rearguard. ¹³³ Commissars were also expected to enforce prohibitions on various activities perceived to undermine soldiers’ morale – such as fraternization with the enemy ¹³⁴ and sending letters to war godmothers ¹³⁵ – which were blamed for the spread of defeatism towards the end of the conflict.

Republican Popular Army commissars were, therefore, a central part of the Republic’s militarization and mobilizing campaigns. The system was born in an impromptu manner from the serious dislocation that the Republic faced when defending itself against a coup without the control of reliable armed forces. As ideologized militants from political parties and unions rallied to the Republic’s defence in the summer of 1936, it was consistent to institute political representatives in the battlefield. Once these were in place, however, parties and unions wanted to retain their influence in the armed forces as the Republic militarized. The most acceptable solution, which made it viable to continue to refer to a revolutionary people’s army, was to institutionalize the system of political commissars within the emerging Popular Army’s structure. Commissars were expected to enthuse their soldier charges with the political education to fight the war willingly, while at the same time ensure that a revolutionary army remained disciplined in the field. The most able commissars undertook this task successfully, and there is evidence that political delegates were able to motivate and educate soldiers, stressing the Republic’s laudable social goals and need for political unity to achieve them. Indeed, the simultaneous foundation of the Popular Army and the political commissariat in October 1936 was, in part, responsible for containing the frighteningly rapid Nationalist advance on Madrid in the autumn of that year. As the war progressed, commissars were also relied upon to stem the Republic’s growing problems with its soldiers’ defeatism and defections. The least able commissars, however, hindered the Republican war effort in the long run by perpetrating the political divides that hampered the Republic, creating tense relations with crucial command officers and abusing their privileged position within the army’s hierarchy.

Mobilization and militarization were significant challenges for the Republic, largely because of the initial loss of government control within many areas that remained loyal following the coup and the imperative need to distance the new Popular Army from the traditionalist and enemy Nationalist Army. In this light the commissariat was a principal component of the patchwork of imperfect and rapidly improvised solutions instituted to compensate for a radical change in social fabric and the way in which an organized armed force was conceived. Although the Republic ultimately lost the Spanish Civil War, its capacity to resist the Nationalist Army for three years under extremely dislocated circumstances is testament to the partial success of the government’s measures.