The Fourth Northern Division and the Joint-IRA Offensive,April–July 1922

I

The ratification of the Anglo-Irish Treaty on 7 January 1922 provided the immediate context for the joint-IRA offensive. The agreement brought an end to the IRA’s two-and-a-half-year fight against Britain for Irish independence, but its terms were divisive. Not only did it compromise on the demand for a sovereign Irish republic, instead offering dominion status within the British Commonwealth, it also accepted the partition of Ireland as legislated in December 1920. ⁶ When the Treaty was ratified by Dáil Éireann, the republican provisional government assembly, it precipitated a split within the movement. Of particular concern was the schism within the IRA. Within days, angry demands surfaced among its divisional commandants for an army convention where the organization could make its own decision on the Treaty. ⁷ Amid this growing crisis leading figures within the IRA’s predominantly pro-Treaty general headquarters (GHQ) sought to placate disaffected officers through various assurances concerning the most unpopular aspects of the settlement. Central to these efforts was Michael Collins, the IRA’s director of intelligence throughout the war of independence and a signatory of the Treaty, who was rapidly emerging as the dominant political and military figure within the pro-Treaty faction. Collins had left his position at GHQ once the Treaty was ratified, but continued to exert his considerable influence in an effort to win over his dubious comrades. Indeed, as Peter Hart has observed, he used ‘every appeal he could think of to bring men to his side’. ⁸

For those IRA units stranded under British rule in the fledgling state of Northern Ireland, partition was the issue that undoubtedly provoked the greatest discontent with the Treaty. In an effort to retain their loyalty to GHQ, Collins demonstrated his commitment to further fighting in the region with the creation of the Ulster Council. This secretive body was tasked with coordinating IRA activity in Northern Ireland and along the border. It was composed of the divisional commandants of those units operating in Ulster, namely the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Northern Divisions, the First Midland Division, and the Third Western Division (Figure 1). The IRA’s new chief of staff, Eoin O’Duffy, a pro-Treatyite and a close associate of Collins, was also a member. ⁹

OPEN IN VIEWER

Figure 1.

IRA divisional areas in Ulster, March 1921 – August 1922. Reproduced with permission from Dr Robert Lynch, The Northern IRA and the Early Years of Partition, 1920–1922 (Dublin, 2006).

Frank Aiken, commandant of the Fourth Northern Division, was appointed as chairman of this body, a position described by one contemporary as holding ‘no authority whatever’ but which did carry ‘a certain amount of prestige’. ¹⁰ Aiken was the most accomplished IRA commander in Northern Ireland, and was well regarded by the staff at GHQ. In 1918 he had distinguished himself as an organizer in south Armagh, and had earned the position of vice commandant of the Newry Brigade. ¹¹ He eventually took full control of this unit in 1920 when his predecessor was imprisoned. ¹² Aiken subsequently earned a reputation as an effective leader. Prior to the truce his unit was one of the few in six-county Ulster to engage in significant offensive operations. Between January 1920 and July 1921 it carried out approximately 22 attacks on the authorities, primarily in the Newry and south Armagh area, killing 9 and wounding 15. It was also responsible for killing at least 3 civilians in June and July 1921, as well as numerous low-level operations including arson attacks, the blocking of roads, and the enforcement of the Belfast boycott. ¹³ Although this operational record compared poorly with that of IRA units in revolutionary hotspots such as Cork, Longford, and Dublin city, in Ulster, where the organization was weaker, it represented a considerable achievement. ¹⁴ It also earned Aiken the attention of influential figures at GHQ. In March 1921, when the Newry Brigade was reorganized as the Fourth Northern Division, it was alleged that his appointment as divisional commandant was due to Collins’s patronage. ¹⁵

Collins also proved instrumental in Aiken’s appointment as chairman of the Ulster Council. ¹⁶ Indeed, as Robert Lynch has suggested, the creation of the body can be viewed as an early attempt to gain at least the nominal loyalty of Aiken. ¹⁷ His attitude would prove crucial in determining his division’s stance on the Treaty, but his own position on the settlement was somewhat ambiguous. He certainly opposed its terms, with regards to both its acceptance of partition and its compromise on Irish sovereignty. Nevertheless, he was reluctant to condemn it outright. Writing after the civil war, he even went so far as to state ‘I might have voted for the treaty if I had have been a member [of Dáil Éireann].’ ¹⁸ Aiken’s doubts were allayed somewhat by Collins’s rhetoric regarding an ‘Irish interpretation’ of the Treaty and his assurances of a ‘republican constitution’ for the new Irish Free State. ¹⁹ It was Collins’s commitment to continued military action in Northern Ireland, however, that proved more crucial in securing his continued loyalty. It also had the added benefit of ensuring his support for GHQ during clashes with anti-Treaty officers. This was most evident in his consistent opposition to anti-Treatyite demands for an army convention between January and March 1922 and in his view that any such assembly should be postponed until the publication of the new constitution. ²⁰

Between February and April 1922 the Ulster Council was responsible for a series of IRA operations in Northern Ireland, all of which had the sanction of the pro-Treaty triumvirate of Collins, O’Duffy and Richard Mulcahy, minister for defence in the newly created provisional government of southern Ireland. In February it planned and implemented a series of kidnapping raids in Tyrone and Fermanagh as retaliation for the arrest of a group of IRA officers in Northern Ireland. Forty-two unionists, a mixture of civilians and members of the Ulster Special Constabulary (USC), were abducted and held prisoner in Monaghan. In March the council was also responsible for a series of barracks attacks and offensive operations along the border. ²¹ This escalating IRA activity came to an abrupt halt with the announcement of the second Craig–Collins pact on 30 March 1922. This was the second agreement within three months negotiated between the Northern Ireland government and the provisional government in an attempt to improve relations and alleviate the plight of the beleaguered northern nationalist minority. An earlier pact, agreed in January 1922, had quickly collapsed when it was realized that the British government had given each party very different impressions about the operation of a future boundary commission. ²² Under the terms of the Treaty, this commission would make a final decision on the position of the new Irish border. The expectation amongst pro-Treaty republicans was that the Free State would make large territorial gains through this arrangement, leaving Northern Ireland an unviable entity and hastening the unification of Ireland. Northern unionists, however, opposed even the slightest change to the border. ²³ The Ulster Council’s kidnapping raids dramatically marked the collapse of the arrangement in early February. ²⁴

The second Craig–Collins pact was no more successful than its predecessor. By late April neither administration had made any significant progress in fulfilling the terms of the agreement. These had included the recruitment of nationalists to the USC, Northern Ireland’s loyalist paramilitary police force, and the intervention of both administrations to ensure the safe return of individuals expelled from their homes and jobs during recent violence in Northern Ireland. ²⁵ Just as the collapse of the first Craig–Collins pact precipitated renewed IRA activity in Northern Ireland, the failure of the second agreement provided motivation for further republican attacks. Throughout April, IRA violence had declined so as not to be blamed for the collapse of the pact. ²⁶ With this obstacle now removed, plans began for a new offensive in Northern Ireland that proved unprecedented in their scale and ambition.

II

On 26 March 1922 an army convention was finally held in Dublin and the IRA officially split over the terms of the Treaty. Pro-Treaty units remained loyal to GHQ and were absorbed into the rapidly developing national army (henceforth referred to as provisional government forces). Anti-Treaty units rejected the authority of GHQ and aligned to a newly elected army executive. Florence O’Donoghue, a Cork IRA officer, later recalled that even before the convention pro- and anti-Treaty officers were cooperating in support of further action in the north amid various meetings aimed at averting a split. The convention did not affect this emerging joint-IRA policy, but in the aftermath of the split efforts seem to have intensified as negotiations aimed at reunification commenced. ²⁷ It was during this period that the plans for a large-scale offensive appear to have first emerged in the hope that a common cause in Ulster might avert civil war in the south. The offensive was, however, more than just a cynical manoeuvre aimed at stifling civil war. Northern opinion was well represented within both IRA factions. The majority of the organization’s divisions in Ulster, including Aiken’s Fourth Northern Division, had remained loyal to the pro-Treaty GHQ after the convention. A number of prominent northern officers had joined the anti-Treaty faction. ²⁸ Pro-Treaty leaders such as Collins, O’Duffy, and Mulcahy also displayed a sincere concern for the plight of northern nationalists. ²⁹ There was, therefore, a genuine interest (more emotional than practical) in confronting the issue of partition and pursuing further military action in the north.

The decision to undertake an offensive in Northern Ireland was formally announced to northern officers at a meeting of the Ulster Council at Clones on 21 April 1922. ³⁰ Events within the Fourth Northern Division in the preceding weeks suggest that the renewal of hostilities was eagerly anticipated. The division had moved its headquarters and the majority of its active units into north Louth and into the safety of Free State territory. Camps were established along the border at Dungooley, Ravensdale, and Bridge-a-crin, in Louth, and Castleblaney and Castleshane, in Monaghan. ³¹ On 13 April the division also took control of the former British military barracks at Dundalk, establishing the site as its headquarters. ³² The decision to move south of the border was motivated primarily by security concerns, but it also had a strategic logic. John Grant, captain of the Mullaghbawn Company, later explained that the new camps provided ‘a base for sending men into Northern Ireland to protect our civil population or to attack the British forces there’. ³³ The division had not necessarily foreseen the announcement of a large-scale offensive, but it clearly expected further fighting and had taken steps to improve its position.

Despite the division’s enthusiastic preparations for renewed fighting, however, Aiken’s initial response to the announcement was cautious. During the meeting GHQ representatives offered him overall command of the offensive but he refused. He explained his reasons to a comrade later the same evening: ‘if I became general officer commanding these divisions – responsible for the whole northern campaign they would be able to blame me for failure’. He was particularly concerned that GHQ might make him a scapegoat ‘if they failed in their commitments in their supplies to us’. ³⁴ Less than two weeks earlier Aiken had clashed with GHQ regarding his division’s occupation of Dundalk Barracks, and the incident appears to have aroused suspicions regarding the pro-Treaty leadership’s agenda.

Dundalk Barracks was the only military base in the Fourth Northern Division’s command area that was to be vacated by the British under the terms of the Treaty. From early March, Aiken had pressed GHQ for firm information on the anticipated British evacuation. ³⁵ When the time came, however, the division was not informed. GHQ instead arranged that the barracks would be handed over to the assistant chief of staff and garrisoned with provisional government troops from Dublin. This decision was motivated by the pro-Treaty leadership’s distrust of the neutral stance adopted by Aiken and his division after the IRA split in March. Officially, the division remained under the authority of GHQ and the provisional government department of defence. The only exception was the staff of the First Brigade, based in north Louth, which along with two of its three battalions had rejected GHQ’s authority and aligned with the anti-Treaty IRA executive. GHQ was suspicious of the Fourth Northern Division’s neutrality, viewing it as an indication that it could not be relied upon in any future confrontation with the anti-Treaty IRA. This was reinforced by Aiken’s determination to maintain good relations with the rogue First Brigade in Dundalk and his stated intention to withdraw his division’s allegiance to GHQ if ‘asked to do something which is dishonourable’, the implication being if he was ordered to attack anti-Treaty forces. ³⁶

GHQ’s attempt to occupy the barracks was viewed as a betrayal by the Fourth Northern Division staff. Having learned of the impending evacuation through local rumours, Aiken confronted Mulcahy. Although Mulcahy was defiant at first, making clear that the government did not trust the division’s neutrality, he agreed [to] a compromise that would allow it to occupy the barracks on behalf of the provisional government. The episode had, however, severely dented Aiken’s faith in the pro-Treaty leadership and he later expressed his fears that Collins could be ‘arming and fixing the Free State army for a trial of strength’. ³⁷

Although Aiken refused the command of the offensive, he did accept responsibility for an important preparatory task: smuggling arms and equipment to IRA units across the border. At the Clones meeting GHQ representatives had accepted requests from northern divisional commandants for the material required to undertake the offensive. A two-week period was allocated for its delivery, and it was agreed that the operations would commence on 2 May. All consignments destined for the Second, Third, and Fourth Northern Divisions were first sent to Dundalk Barracks. From there they were smuggled across the border by road, concealed in converted oil tankers, and by boat to prearranged locations on the coast. ³⁸ Most of this material was provided directly by GHQ, which at this time was receiving a steady supply of arms and equipment from the British government for the new national army.

It is often claimed that to disguise the provisional government’s complicity in supplying IRA units in Northern Ireland these new arms were first swapped with older IRA weapons in the possession of anti-Treaty units in the south. The anti-Treaty rifles were then sent to IRA units in the north. ³⁹ This ‘swap’ arrangement is one of the few commonly known aspects of the joint-IRA offensive, but its significance has been overstated. Padraig Quinn, quartermaster of the Fourth Northern Division, later recalled that GHQ was initially the sole supplier for northern units. It was only when the gunrunning was well under way that it was realized that the arms supplied could be traced back to GHQ through their serial numbers. Supplies to northern units were suddenly suspended. As Quinn recalled, ‘there was no downright refusal of arms, it was just put off which meant postponing or deferring our operation’. ⁴⁰ Amid this uncertainty, Aiken and Quinn approached the anti-Treaty IRA leader, Liam Lynch. After various discussions between Aiken, Mulcahy, and Lynch the ‘swap’ arrangement was brokered. The actual quantity of arms involved was small, however, a ‘token transfer’ of around 100 rifles. Although much more material was apparently exchanged between pro- and anti-Treaty units, little of it appears to have made its way through Dundalk to units across the border. As a result GHQ continued to supply most of the material required for the offensive itself, provided that northern units filed off the serial numbers to prevent their identification. ⁴¹ Although the precise quantities of arms supplied to northern units by GHQ is difficult to determine, Quinn suggested that each division had requested 500 rifles, 250–300 revolvers, and large quantities of ammunition. Aiken’s testimony indicated that similar quantities were actually delivered, and he estimated that the Fourth Northern Division’s consignment consisted of 400 rifles, 500 revolvers, and a few Thompson sub-machine guns. ⁴²

The details surrounding the operational planning for the joint-IRA offensive are elusive. Indeed, it has proven extremely difficult to ascertain exactly what was envisioned. Having examined the statements provided to the Bureau of Military History by former members of the northern IRA, Robert Lynch has concluded that ‘on paper at least the offensive involved a virtual full-scale invasion of Northern Ireland’. ⁴³ Vague notions of such an attack had been circulating within the IRA from as early as spring 1921. Strategy documents produced by GHQ in March of that year had emphasized the growing importance of Ulster, describing the province as ‘a bridgehead that the English cannot afford to lose and must spend lavishly to defend’. ⁴⁴ A strategy document created for the newly formed Fourth Northern Division the following month also contained specific references to a ‘general offensive’ in Ulster. In such an attack, it stated, ‘the Fourth Northern Division is to be regarded as the spear point of the offensive for which the driving power would be supplied from the south’. ⁴⁵

The testimonies of Fourth Northern Division officers would suggest that the plans for the offensive drew heavily from these GHQ documents. The planned operations recalled by various officers indicated a large-scale conventional attack. John Cosgrove, captain of the Ballymacnab Company, later claimed that the Armagh Battalion was to attack the British garrison in Armagh city and then ‘move in the direction of Lough Neagh from where the 3^rd Brigade would launch an attack on the town of Portadown which we understood was a key point in the British defences’. ⁴⁶ In south Down there were plans for an attack on Newry, and Patrick Casey, vice commandant of the local brigade, spoke ambitiously of applying ‘a general scorched earth policy in the entire area’. ⁴⁷ Quinn recorded the most remarkable description of what was envisioned in the offensive, as northern units understood it. Included among unsorted and previously unpublished notes, his recollections provide the first detailed overview of the IRA’s plan of attack.

According to Quinn, the Second Northern Division, based in Tyrone and Derry, was ‘to occupy all posts in area attempting no mass movements of troops but more or less preparing the ground for occupancy by 1, 5, 4 [Northern] Divisions’. The Third Northern Division’s operations were divided up among its various component areas. In Antrim, ‘movement of troops [was] to be on a moderately large scale [with] attempts to be made to capture one or two key positions’. Belfast was ‘to be held up’, with republican troops occupying positions in sufficient strength so as to hold the city. Units in north Down, meanwhile, were ‘to devote attention to harassing and annoying concentrations of English forces’ at Newtownards and Ballykinlar. Various towns were to be ‘occupied’ and a junction effected with the Fourth Northern Division for an advance towards Belfast. As was also indicated by Cosgrove, the Fourth Northern Division was to launch an assault on Armagh Military Barracks and ‘advance on Portadown’. Banbridge was to be occupied and the advance continued towards Belfast with troops from Down. All Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) and USC ‘posts and personnel’ were to be wiped out in all areas and ‘all effectives in every division’ were to be mobilized for the attacks. ⁴⁸

Quinn’s notes also provide an indication of the role that was to be played by IRA units based in the Irish Free State. The First and Fifth Northern Divisions and the First Midland Division were represented on the Ulster Council, and it is generally believed that they were pledged to support the offensive. Indeed, there is little doubt that the First Northern Division was to participate, as anti-Treaty officers were sent to the area to provide experienced leadership for local units. ⁴⁹ Quinn recalled that this division was ‘to take all posts in [a] general sweep from Donegal concentrating on Derry [city]’. The intended role of the Fifth Northern and the First Midland Divisions is less clear. Quinn’s notes only make reference to the Fifth Northern Division, claiming that it was ‘to attempt to occupy all posts within [its divisional] area, paying special attention to Enniskillen’, and then to join up with the Fourth Northern Division above Armagh. Enniskillen was, however, part of the First Midland Division’s command area. It is possible that Quinn simply confused the divisions or, perhaps, failed to distinguish between them in describing their intended movements. There are other details missing from his account. In discussing the Fourth Northern Division’s operations, for example, he provided no indication of the planned activities in south Down, although he did make veiled references to an attack on Newry elsewhere. ⁵⁰ Regardless of these shortcomings, Quinn’s testimony provides a compelling insight into what was envisioned and highlights the central role of the Fourth Northern Division.

The plans for the offensive were impressive on paper, but it is extremely unlikely that they could have been successfully carried out. Generous estimates place the northern IRA’s membership in early 1922 at 8500 men. ⁵¹ More conservative estimates suggest a figure of 4000. ⁵² In either case, it is agreed that these figures only represented the organization’s membership ‘on paper’. The number of active members can generally be considered to have been significantly smaller than either total. ⁵³ The Northern Ireland government, on the other hand, had at its disposal around 27,563 USC constables (full-time, part-time, and emergency reservists). ⁵⁴ This force was further supplemented by the remnants of the RIC, the growing number of recruits for its successor, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), and approximately 5000 British troops. ⁵⁵ Even with the support of the First and Fifth Northern Divisions, and the First Midland Division, republican forces would have been vastly outnumbered.

Yet it is unclear if the offensive was actually intended to produce a military success, and the ultimate aim of the attack is obscure. Northern officers apparently believed that it was intended to bring down the northern government and smash partition, but this view was not shared by all of those involved. Mossey Donegan, an anti-Treaty officer sent to the First Northern Division to assist in the offensive, later claimed that it was to be ‘of nuisance value’ and that it was merely intended to produce a ‘political or diplomatic’ incident. ⁵⁶ This reflected the hopes of anti-Treaty leaders, in particular Liam Lynch, that vigorous IRA activity in the north

if supported by pro-Treaty leaders and pro-Treaty Army elements in the counties along the border, would be regarded by the British as a breach of the Treaty and would create a situation in which a re-united Army would again confront the common enemy. ⁵⁷

The pro-Treaty faction’s motives in supporting the offensive are more difficult to determine. Historians such as John Regan and Fearghal McGarry have suggested that pro-Treaty leaders may have had cynical motives in supporting the offensive. Collins and O’Duffy, it is argued, may have misled northern units as to the degree of support they would receive from the south in order to maintain their loyalty in the period leading up to the civil war. This does not necessarily mean that the offensive was a malicious ploy engineered by GHQ. As Regan has observed, there is evidence to indicate that the initiative for the attack came from within the Ulster Council. In these circumstances, he argues, ‘Collins had little choice but to go along with the plan and let the northerners burn themselves out.’ ⁵⁸ There is, however, also plentiful evidence to suggest that the decision to pursue a general offensive originated with pro-Treaty leaders. ⁵⁹ This was certainly Padraig Quinn’s understanding of events. He noted, ‘I understood from F. [Aiken] that Michael Collins was the inspiration for this general offensive.’ ⁶⁰ It is, of course, possible that the decision for a renewed offensive in Northern Ireland was that of GHQ, but that the Ulster Council was subsequently responsible for the overambitious scale of the proposed attack.

John McCoy, the Fourth Northern Division’s adjutant, believed that the support of pro-Treaty leaders was genuine at first, but that their enthusiasm cooled once the possible implications of the offensive became clear. He later recalled that ‘the pro-Treaty party seemed to suddenly realise that operations in the north might, and possibly would, cause a complete smash up of all the treaty plans with the British’. ⁶¹ This wavering in pro-Treaty support may help account for GHQ’s sudden reluctance to supply weapons to northern units once preparations had begun, as discussed above. It also supports Kevin O’Shiel’s belief that the offensive, and its ultimate collapse, resulted from Collins’s tendency ‘to reach quick decisions without consulting many’. ⁶² The pro-Treaty faction may not have set out with sinister intentions, but once the implications of the offensive became apparent they do appear to have misled northern units. This lends credence to Regan’s suggestion that Collins and O’Duffy did eventually manipulate the situation to produce a ‘tactical advantage’ as civil war approached. ⁶³

Confusion over the offensive’s ultimate objectives was further exacerbated by the fact that the planning and preparations involved three separate entities: the northern IRA, in the form of the Ulster Council; the pro-Treaty GHQ; and the anti-Treaty IRA executive. In explaining their respective duties, Lynch states that ‘while the pro-Treaty side would be largely responsible for supplying the arms and equipment, the anti-Treaty IRA would provide the leadership. It would be left to the Northern IRA to supply the majority of the actual manpower.’ ⁶⁴ Various contemporaries later claimed that Aiken, as chairman of the Ulster Council, held the overall command of the offensive. ⁶⁵ As has already been observed, however, he had refused this position when the offensive was announced in late April. He also refused a second offer in the week before the attacks began:

Mulcahy asked me if I would take command of all the divisions in the north for the purposes of carrying on whatever activities were agreed upon there. I asked if I took responsibility would I be given authority and a free hand. He said no and I did not accept. ⁶⁶

Command of the offensive ultimately fell to O’Duffy as chief of staff. All reports were forwarded to him, and the sequence of events once the attack commenced clearly suggests that he was responsible for its coordination. ⁶⁷

Although the offensive was scheduled to begin on 2 May, arms consignments destined for northern units were delayed, possibly as a result of GHQ’s previously noted unease regarding serial numbers. As a result, O’Duffy agreed to postpone the operations to allow extra time for preparation. The Second Northern Division, however, requested permission to commence its offensive as planned on 2 May. O’Duffy allowed this and, with the other divisions having postponed their operations, the Second Northern Division was quickly overwhelmed by the USC. Its campaign effectively collapsed before any other division had mobilized. ⁶⁸

On 5 May, O’Duffy presided over a meeting of the Ulster Council at Clones and agreed a new start-date for the offensive. ⁶⁹ The attacks were rescheduled for 19 May, and would be signalled by a daring raid on the Musgrave Street RIC Barracks in Belfast by the Third Northern Division. The raid was scheduled to take place in the early hours of 18 May, and O’Duffy assured Seamus Woods, the commandant of the Third Northern Division, that he would order out all other divisions the day after it was attempted. Two weeks later the raid took place as planned, but ultimately failed in its objective. Nevertheless, the Third Northern Division commenced its offensive operations the following day. Like the Second Northern Division, however, it found itself acting alone. All other divisions remained inactive, including the Fourth Northern Division. On 24 May the Third Northern Division made a desperate plea to O’Duffy to order out Aiken’s men immediately, in the hope that they could open a second front and relieve IRA units in Belfast and north Down. O’Duffy promised to do so, but there is no evidence that an order was issued, and the Fourth Northern Division remained inactive. ⁷⁰ Under intense pressure from the USC, the Third Northern Division abandoned its efforts and Woods reported that the events had demoralized his forces to the point that ‘the Military organisation is almost destroyed’. ⁷¹

III

The misconception that Aiken was in overall command of the joint-IRA offensive added a particular sense of treachery to the Fourth Northern Division’s inaction once the attacks began. It also carried the implication that the decision to withdraw from the attack was his alone. This was not necessarily so, but how can the division’s failure to commence its operations best be explained? First, it is important to understand the sequence of events within the division. The testimonies of Fourth Northern Division members ⁷² suggest that they were to begin their operations on 22 May, not 19 May as stated elsewhere. It is difficult to explain this inconsistency, but it is possible that the division’s operations were postponed because of confusion surrounding the Third Northern Division’s failed attempt to raid Musgrave Street Barracks. This operation was to signal the beginning of the offensive, and it was intended that the armoured cars captured in the raid would be brought to the Fourth Northern Division’s headquarters at Dundalk Barracks. Padraig Quinn recalled that the division was notified when the raid was to take place. Units in south Armagh and south Down were duly alerted and took up positions ‘to facilitate and cover the passage of the armoured cars through their commands’. When the armoured cars did not arrive these forces ‘were withdrawn having been on duty from midnight to 6–7 in the morning’. ⁷³ In the resulting confusion divisional officers may have believed that the offensive had again been postponed, and therefore did not commence their operations on 19 May as originally planned.

It is also possible that the operations were postponed earlier in the week as a result of Aiken’s absence from the division. On 16 May he had travelled to Dublin with a delegation of republicans from Newry and south Armagh to lobby leaders for unity amid negotiations for the Collins–de Valera pact, an electoral agreement aimed at preserving political unity in the upcoming southern elections. The negotiations had stalled and the delegation had decided to intervene to stress the importance of southern unity for continued action in the north. Aiken remained in Dublin in the days that followed, and recalled being present in Dáil Éireann when the pact was finally announced on 20 May. ⁷⁴

Aiken returned to his division on the eve of its planned operations, and, with units equipped and in position throughout Armagh and south Down, issued a cancellation order. Patrick Casey, vice commandant of the Newry and South Down Brigade, remembered being recalled to Dundalk:

I asked what the position was and he [Aiken] replied that our division was taking no part in the rising, but that there was no cancellation so far as the remainder of the northern counties was concerned. He gave as his reason that the Armagh Brigade was not fully equipped and for that reason he felt justified in withdrawing his Division from action. ⁷⁵

Some units did not receive the cancellation order until the following day. John Cosgrove remembered that it ‘arrived in Armagh about noon of that Monday and we received those orders later that evening’. ⁷⁶ Coincidentally, internment was introduced that same day in response to unrest elsewhere in Northern Ireland. With no IRA activity in Armagh and south Down, the USC’s raids went unchallenged and around 36 republicans were taken prisoner in the first few days. ⁷⁷

Casey clearly believed that Aiken’s decision to withdraw from the offensive was taken independently. He did not, however, believe that the decision was motivated by concerns regarding the Armagh Brigade’s equipment levels, and reflected, ‘I could never understand Aiken’s real motive in not fighting his division on this important occasion.’ ⁷⁸ Concerns over equipment levels certainly seem an unusual rationale for such a late decision, but Aiken’s worries were not unfounded. John Cosgrove, a member of the brigade, later recalled that his company was disappointed with the quantities of arms and equipment that it had received. ⁷⁹ Their sentiments were most likely a reflection of their understanding of what was envisioned in the offensive. As has already been observed, the brigade had an extremely ambitious plan of attack. Reservations regarding the quantities of arms received are further supported by the testimony of Seán McConville, who recalled that in the period leading up to the offensive the brigade’s Lurgan Battalion received only 60 rifles, a Thompson sub-machine gun, 60 grenades, and ‘some revolvers’. ⁸⁰ For a battalion with approximately 220 members (‘on paper’, at least) these quantities were wholly inadequate, given the operations that were intended. ⁸¹

Aiken may have been justified in his concerns regarding the Armagh Brigade’s equipment levels, but his reservations might also be considered a manifestation of a more general unease regarding his division’s preparedness for the offensive. He later recalled his efforts to obtain an additional 500 rifles from GHQ for use in the attack. ⁸² This is telling, as it suggests his reservations regarding equipment levels were not confined to one particular brigade. His judgement may also have been affected by events elsewhere. The fate of the Second Northern Division in the preceding two weeks could not have escaped his attention. Reports of the Third Northern Division’s operations in the days before may also have influenced his decision. As Lynch has observed, having commenced its operations on 19 May, this division’s offensive lasted only one week, ‘with virtually all the violence confined to the first two days’. ⁸³ In this first 48 hours, three barracks attacks had failed. The burning of property and various shootings in Belfast had proven a greater success, but hardly lived up to expectations of what had originally been envisioned. In this context the cancellation order may have resulted from an understandable loss of nerve. To push ahead with the planned operations, with the Second Northern Division effectively defeated and the Third Northern Division in serious difficulty, would have been futile and would have needlessly weakened, if not destroyed, the Fourth Northern Division. This, perhaps, may explain Aiken’s late orders for a cancellation.

There is an alternative explanation for the cancellation order. John McCoy, the division’s adjutant, later indicated that it had originated with GHQ:

Orders to the effect came to us with only sufficient time to enable the operations to be called off. In some other areas, notably Tyrone, Derry and Belfast, Co. Antrim and East Down the cancellation did not reach the men in time and the operations commenced. ⁸⁴

This is certainly plausible. GHQ was responsible for the coordination of the offensive. Communication links with Dundalk were strong as a result of the railway line. Indeed, it is possible that Aiken received the order while he was in Dublin that weekend and issued it upon his return. There is also nothing in Casey’s testimony to rule out this possibility. Nevertheless, McCoy’s testimony does contradict Casey’s in one important respect. Whereas Casey believed that the cancellation order did not apply to other divisions, McCoy suggested otherwise. Both testimonies are problematic in this regard, however, as the Second and Third Northern Divisions had already commenced their operations ahead of the Fourth Northern Division’s start date of 22 May.

If the order did originate with GHQ, why was it issued? A Department of Defence memo later claimed that a decision was taken ‘that there would be no fighting on the border or around it – which decision meant [sic] that there were no “offensive” operations carried out by the 1st Northern, or 1st Midland or 5th Northern Divisions’. ⁸⁵ This reflected GHQ’s desire to hide its involvement in IRA activity in Northern Ireland. It also explains the inaction of the other units on the border. Logically, this decision should also have applied to the Fourth Northern Division and may account for the cancellation of its operations. The division was based in Free State territory and occupied a military base on behalf of the provisional government. Its participation in the offensive would have constituted fighting on or around the border and would have made clear the pro-Treaty leadership’s complicity in the violence. If the cancellation order did originate with GHQ, this was the most probable cause. Indeed, it is intriguing that the only two divisions that were allowed to proceed with their operations unhindered were those with command areas that were based entirely within Northern Ireland.

The theory that the cancellation order originated with GHQ is lent further credence by the fact that Aiken and his fellow officers apparently believed that an offensive was still in the offing up until the outbreak of civil war in southern Ireland. On 26 July, just two days before provisional government forces attacked anti-Treaty positions in Dublin, Aiken recalled having an argument with O’Duffy after pressing for more rifles for use in the offensive. ⁸⁶ Padraig Quinn also recalled approaching Mulcahy on 16 June, the day of the southern elections, to request more material for the attack. He alleged that Mulcahy ‘advised burning when he could not give me [the] requisite rifles. [He advised] burning Banbridge, Lawrencetown … as a matter of fact I was ordered to burn half of Newry.’ ⁸⁷ Such views were shared by members of the Second Northern Division who received promises of further support from O’Duffy, ‘with the intention of an invasion of the Six Counties in the late summer’. ⁸⁸ Indeed, those who remained loyal to GHQ after the outbreak of civil war continued to receive assurances of future military action in the north until as late as August 1922. Such incentives seem particularly disingenuous given the prevailing attitude of the provisional government that, as early as 3 June 1922, had indicated its commitment to purely peaceful forms of obstruction with regards to Northern Ireland. ⁸⁹

In spite of the continued expectation of a large-scale offensive in Northern Ireland, the Fourth Northern Division did resume operations in Armagh and south Down in late May 1922. The division became embroiled in two prolonged skirmishes on the border with members of the USC and the British military. On both occasions the fighting was brought to an end through negotiation. ⁹⁰ In response to internment, Aiken ordered the kidnapping of various prominent unionists and USC constables in Armagh and south Down in late May and early June. A number of individuals were abducted and others were seized opportunistically while travelling through north Louth. Newry’s resident magistrate, Mr Justice Woulfe Flanagan, was killed by his would-be abductors when he put up a struggle. ⁹¹ In all, approximately ten hostages were taken and held at Dundalk Barracks amid demands for the release of IRA prisoners. ⁹² Guerrilla operations also resumed in south Armagh, and well-equipped Fourth Northern Division columns made various attempts to ambush USC patrols in the region, with little success. More disturbingly, on 17 June, the division was responsible for a shocking reprisal attack outside Newry. Six Protestant civilians were killed and a number of homes burned in the attack, which was carried out in response to the killing of two republicans near Camlough and a sexual assault against a Sinn Féin councillor’s pregnant wife. It was believed that members of the USC committed both incidents. ⁹³

Some historians have viewed this wave of violence as a late attempt by the Fourth Northern Division to commence a ‘limited offensive’ or ‘to open a second front for Belfast’. ⁹⁴ Rather than forming part of a grand IRA scheme, however, these activities were notable for their reactionary nature. The skirmishes on the border were not planned attacks. The first skirmish had, for example, erupted spontaneously when a group of USC constables ransacked a public house situated on the Free State side of the border. ⁹⁵ The kidnappings were carried out as a response to internment, and the reprisal attacks at Altnaveigh were a reaction to USC violence in south Armagh. The resumption of guerrilla operations can also be viewed as a response to the activities of the authorities at this time.

So far as the Fourth Northern Division was concerned, an offensive was still to come. It was not until the outbreak of civil war in southern Ireland that hopes of fighting in Northern Ireland were truly dashed. The division cancelled all operations and adhered to the neutral position it had adopted after the IRA split in March 1922. In spite of this, and despite Aiken’s desperate attempts to act as intermediary between pro- and anti-Treaty leaders in the opening weeks of the conflict, the division was viewed as a hostile force by GHQ. Provisional government forces seized Dundalk Barracks on 15 July, the morning after a tense, but apparently encouraging, meeting between Mulcahy and a delegation of Fourth Northern Division officers in Dublin. ⁹⁶ Aiken was arrested, but did not remain a prisoner for long. After an audacious rescue engineered by his remaining free officers, he resumed command of his division and entered the civil war on the side of the anti-Treaty IRA, drawing on the considerable quantities of arms and equipment supplied to his division for use in the offensive. The Fourth Northern Division’s command area in Louth subsequently became one of the most violent regions in the conflict outside the anti-Treaty IRA’s strongholds in Munster. ⁹⁷ Whatever the motives of the pro-Treaty faction in supporting the offensive, it had ultimately created a dangerous enemy.

IV

An exploration of the Fourth Northern Division’s role in the joint-IRA offensive provides a wealth of new detail regarding the episode and a fresh perspective on the key issues that surround it. It offers an intriguing view of what was planned and how it was prepared, as well as an indication of the flaws and weaknesses that ensured its failure. It was an elusive and contradictory venture from the outset, and its aims were vague, perhaps deliberately so. The various entities involved had their own conceptions of what it was intended to achieve, as well as their own agendas, the most uncertain of which was that of the pro-Treaty faction. It is difficult to say with any certainty if the involvement of leaders such as Collins and O’Duffy was intentionally callous. Even if their support was genuine at first, however, they did ultimately mislead northern units and this proved beneficial for GHQ in maintaining the loyalty of commandants such as Aiken in the period leading up to the civil war.

A more thorough examination of the Fourth Northern Division’s involvement in this offensive also provides some explanation as to why it remained inactive once the fighting began. Aiken certainly issued a last-minute order cancelling his division’s participation, but the origin of that order remains unclear. The mistaken belief that Aiken was in overall command of the offensive inevitably led some contemporaries to assume that the decision was his alone. Although there are various reasons why he may have issued such an order on his own initiative, it is also plausible that it originated with GHQ. O’Duffy, as chief of staff, was almost certainly responsible for the coordination of the offensive. Furthermore, GHQ appears to have cancelled the operations of those other IRA divisions that straddled the border for reasons that must also have applied to the Fourth Northern Division. Although it is tempting to speculate further, the scenarios outlined here are the only possibilities that are supported by the limited evidence available. The degree of Aiken’s culpability must, therefore, remain unclear.

Perhaps most importantly, a better understanding of the Fourth Northern Division’s role in the offensive provides a fresh perspective on the episode as a whole. In later years former northern IRA members may have looked upon the scheme as a lost opportunity to smash partition, in Patrick Casey’s words ‘the ultimate fight for the complete liberation of Ireland’. ⁹⁸ As the Fourth Northern Division’s experience serves to illustrate, however, this was not so. In reality it was a poorly conceived and hopelessly unrealistic plot that was hastily thrown together in a desperate attempt to maintain IRA unity, and which southern factions were quick to discard once the civil war had begun. Northern officers were, perhaps, too slow in realizing this, and too late in recognizing that, in the aftermath of the Treaty, partition was an issue of limited importance for republican leaders in the south.