Abstract
The author gives a description of the arms, armour, infantry, and servants of the Iranian military tradition of West Asia.
I. Introduction
In a previous article the view was proposed and substantiated that sees warfare in this period as a continuum, without essential military innovations. In this view of history the changes that took place were connected to the contraction and expansion of two military traditions, the Turanian tradition of the pastoral nomads of Inner Asia and the Iranian tradition of the sedentary populations under their influence. This allows us to see the warfare of the Middle East as a functional military system, instead of as eternally dysfunctional in the face of constant military innovation. It also opens up the possibility of using the vast amount of sources from this period to reconstruct this military system. A subsequent article described the tactics applied by the typical warrior of the Middle East during the period under discussion, the armoured horse archer. 1 This article will describe his equipment, his infantry, and his servants.
II. Arms and Armour
In two previous articles we saw that the armoured horse archer fought with both missile weapons and close-combat weapons and that both he and his warhorse were armoured. In the sources all this equipment is explicitly required for mobilization or military review and described both in parades and in battle narratives. Of course, the army did not solely consist of heavily armed armoured horse archers. As will be shown in the next two sections of this article, in the Iranian tradition the professional infantry often refrained from wearing their armour, while a huge contingent of support personnel served the soldiers practically without any arms or armour at all. Leaving those ‘unarmed’ in the rear while sending the ‘armed’ to the front is a recurring theme in the sources. However, the ‘common’ soldier, the armoured horse archer, could only function in battle with his full equipment, some of which might be his personal property. The wealthy officers and guards were expected to turn up with their own arms, armour, horses, pack animals, and servants, but even the most destitute among the soldiers seem to have brought some essential equipment of their own to the muster-master, such as a horse, a bow, and a sword. As the muster-master reviewed the troops, his clerks carefully noted the equipment each soldier had brought at his own expense, so that he would be compensated and the deficiency would be supplied from the government arsenal and stables. 2
Whether they describe Levantine cavalry of Roman origin (sixth–seventh century) or of Turkish origin (twelfth–thirteenth century), the sources are remarkably consistent when it comes to listing the equipment of an armoured horse archer. Every horseman was required to carry both bow and lance. He invariably could draw a sword. He protected himself with some kind of metal shirt, a helmet, and armour for arms and legs. His horse was usually barded. Dagger and mace or battleaxe are also mentioned, and occasionally even a sling or a javelin. A small, round shield was often used, and underneath the helmet a separate armoured hood or coif could be worn. The lasso could also be employed as a weapon, to capture an opponent. 3
Most of this equipment can be seen on a statue of a late Sasanian mounted ‘knight’ in armour in Taq-i Bustan (Iran), dated around the sixth century, the beginning of the period under discussion. This armoured horse archer is shown from his right side, so we can see his quiver, suspended on his thigh. Just visible behind the crupper of his horse is the upper part of a sheath for an unstrung bow, which the horseman would suspend from his left side. Above his right shoulder he is wielding a long lance. He is wearing a wasp-waisted shirt of small, interlinking rings – mail armour – reaching almost to his knees. On his head he wears a heavily decorated domed helmet and from its rim a curtain of mail is suspended, covering the rest of his head save for his eyes. On his chest we can see the strap that keeps the round buckler on his left shoulder in position. Because of the poor condition of parts of the sculpture, it is no longer possible to discern any details of armour for the arms or legs save for the mail shirtsleeves on his upper arms. However, the head, neck, chest, and front legs of his horse are protected by a type of armour constructed from small, overlapping plates, connected by lacing – lamellar armour – and covered with decorative tassels. 4
As we saw previously, the most important weapon of an armoured horse archer was his bow (Persian kāmān, Arabic qaws, Greek toxon), a composite reflex bow. 5 The tension in this bow causes it to curve in the opposite direction after the bowstring is removed. In a painstaking and time-consuming manufacturing process, horn is glued to the inside of a wooden core and sinew to the outside. When the finished bow is strung, the horn on the inside is compressed while the elastic sinew on the outside is stretched. The long, almost straight bow-ends are attached to the bow at an angle, to act as a kind of levers when the bow is drawn. This lever action only comes into play during the second half of the draw, so to the archer it seems as if he has to use less force as he starts to aim. In the period under discussion the arrow was positioned against the centre of the bow, above the grip. The upper limb of the bow was therefore longer than the lower limb. The transition from bow end to limb of the composite reflex bow was rather abrupt, giving the weapon an angular, double Ω appearance, the ‘straight eared’ reflex bow. In the centuries around the beginning of the Common Era, this bow had replaced the ancient ‘Cupid’ reflex bow. In the eleventh century a double S-shaped bow – with a fluid transition from limb to bow end – supplanted the straight-eared type in the Middle East, the ‘recurved eared’ reflex bow. 6
In the period under discussion the bow was either kept unstrung in a slender sheath that could be closed with a cap (Persian kāmāndan; Arabic miqwas; Greek hēmithēkion, ‘half a bag’), or stored strung in a P-shaped case (Persian nīm-ling, ‘half a leg’, as it only covered the lower limb of the bow; Arabic qaraba; Greek thēkion platon, ‘broad bag’). 7 These holders were suspended on the left side of the horseman, from a separate waist-belt for archery equipment. Initially the ‘open’ bow case is only rarely shown, as from the Balkans to the Korean peninsula it was considered hunting equipment. A horse archer in armour carried his unstrung bow in a sheath and threw his strung bow over his head or left shoulder when reaching for his lance. However, the later recurved-eared composite reflex bow, in use in the second half of the period under discussion, was no longer stored in a sheath. Perhaps, like most West and South Asian composite bows from the early modern period, it so strongly curved in the opposite direction after being unstrung that the bow ends touched each other. As a holder containing such unstrung bows would have been circular and rather cumbersome, this would have left the case for the strung bow as the most practical storage solution, causing the sheath for the unstrung bow to be displaced as a piece of military equipment. 8
Around the beginning of the Common Era, horse archers in the Middle East had started to carry a quiver on their right side (Persian tīrkash, Arabic kinānat, Greek gōrytos).
9
In the period under discussion, two types of quiver were in use, one storing the arrows with their heads down and the other storing them with their heads up. The first model, the tubular candle quiver, had been characteristic for Sasanian Persian horse archers since the third century
A quiver contained between 20 and 40 (usually 30) arrows of various shapes and sizes. Most arrows were designed to be discharged from a long distance, with light, barrelled shafts – thick in the middle, tapering towards the head and the fletching – and relatively small, sharp heads. Such light flight arrows could quickly be discharged in the rapid fire technique or panjīkan. In order to penetrate armour at close range with the powerful technique or nīkan, the archer employed a heavy arrow, with a thick, stiff, parallel-sided shaft and a bodkin head of conical, pyramid, bullet, or chisel shape. For the sharpshooter’s technique or bārīkan, longer arrows were needed that allowed for a longer draw to propel the arrow with more force. These long, bobtailed arrows – tapering towards the fletching – were combined with heavy bodkin heads. To shoot game, or horses and humans without armour, the horse archer used arrows with flat, leaf- or spatula-shaped broadheads that would cause large wounds and severe bleeding. 13
The lance was the second most important weapon of the armoured horse archer – Persian neza, Arabic rumḥ, Greek kontarion (Latin contus, in turn deriving from Greek kontos, ‘barge-pole’). 14 In the last centuries before the beginning of the Common Era, a fairly long lance had become characteristic for Asian cavalry equipment. Its lance head was acorn, diamond, or dagger shaped, so as to allow not only thrusting but also hitting and slicing. This fencing style of lance play often caused the lances to shatter or lose their lance heads as they clashed against each other. A carrying strap allowed the archer to suspend the lance from his shoulder, clenching the shaft between right leg and saddle. Although the lance was wielded with both hands by most Asian horse archers, the Middle Eastern horse archer could also wield it with one hand, as seen on the relief at Taq-i Bustan. This suggests that, though apparently twice as long as its user, this lance must have been a light and manoeuvrable weapon. The ‘single handed’ technique reflects the influence of the ancient Mediterranean cavalry traditions prevailing in the western provinces of the (former) Roman Empire and the Muslim oecumene. As these lancers from Europe and the Maghreb often carried a large shield in their left hand, they only had one arm available to wield the lance. 15
In a popular cliché, after exhausting their quivers and shattering their lances, the horse archers would draw their swords – Persian shamsher, Arabic sayf, Greek spathion (Latin spatha). 16 In the beginning of the period under discussion, the horsemen of the Middle East fought with long, straight, and usually double-edged swords. Straight single-edged swords had been widely used in China since antiquity, and in the sixth century a curved single-edged long-sword – the sabre – had already made its appearance in southern Siberia. In the ninth century this weapon had become the typical sidearm of Inner Asian warriors. The Khorasani soldiers of the Abbasid Caliphs seem to have been the first to introduce the sabre to the Middle East. Firdausi often refers to the swords of the Iranians as ‘Indian’, probably to discern their double-edged swords from the single-edged sabres of the Turanians. The horse archer usually carried his sword in the ‘Bulgarian’ style, suspended diagonally on his left thigh from a sword-belt girded tightly around the waist. However, variants of the ancient sword-belt with scabbard-slide suspension remained in use well into the eighth century. In addition, the Arabs seem to have introduced the shoulder belt, which had traditionally been used around the Mediterranean and in South Asia. 17
By the third century
The second sword sometimes mentioned as a horseman’s equipment refers to his dagger (Persian dashna, Arabic khanjar, Greek akinakēs). The dagger was usually carried on the abdomen, its scabbard attached to the sword-belt near the buckle. If he did not wear armour a horseman could also hide the dagger in his voluminous boots, but in the sources its discovery would often lead to accusations of treason. Most daggers were single-edged weapons, the hilt set at an angle to the blade, so they should more accurately be referred to as knives. While most were carving knives tapering into a sharp point, others seem to have widened towards the point so as to be used for cleaving. However, the more ancient true daggers – straight double-edged stabbing weapons – seem to have remained in use during the entire period under discussion. The horse archers used their knives and daggers when the long cavalry sword was deemed too unwieldy, for instance when they collided and grappled with each other, or when they dismounted in order to finish off a fallen opponent or to fight as infantry. 19
Maces, battleaxes, and war hammers had been in use in the Middle East since prehistory. These various percussion weapons could crush weapons, shields, and helmets; they could wound a body underneath flexible armour without needing to penetrate the metal; and they were also thrown as short-range missiles. A ribbed, winged, or spiked mace (Persian gurz, Arabic ʿamud, Greek saliba) seems to have been the most popular. The battleaxe – Persian tabarzīn, Arabic nāchakh, Greek tzikouris (Latin securis) – was a light, tomahawk-like weapon with a rather narrow, almost straight blade with a pointed pick or small hammerhead behind it. The war hammer looked like a small hockey stick, with an elegantly curving zoomorphic hammerhead like the head of a bull (Persian gurza’i gāv-paikar) or feline. Percussion weapons were often carried on the stirrup-strap, their heads close to the right knee, but the less cumbersome types could also be put under the sword-belt. While some handles were made of wood, the more expensive weapons were forged to metal rods or tubes. 20
These heavily armed horsemen could entirely cover themselves and their mounts with armour. During the period under discussion, Middle Eastern armour remained remarkably uniform in shape and construction well into the Mongol period, when new styles appeared from North-East Asia, Central Asia, and South Asia. From the third century
Initially the tunic armour appears to have been fabricated from a wide range of constructions, and this impression is borne out by the archaeological evidence. However, afterwards many of these various types of constructions became relatively rare or even disappeared altogether, while two types of armour became the dominant constructions in the Middle East for the fabrication of hauberks during the entire period under discussion. These were intertwined rings – the mail hauberk, Persian zereh, Arabic dir, Greek lorikion (Latin lorica) 23 – and laced plates (the lamellar hauberk, Persian jaushan, Arabic sābighah, Greek zaba). 24
The hauberks could be partly or entirely covered and/or lined with a permanent layer of padded cloth (Persian kazhāghand, ‘stuffed with raw silk’; Arabic sudra; Greek epilorikion, ‘over the hauberk’). Mail and lamellar armour are self-supporting constructions, so the cloth did not keep the rings or plates together, but it softened the blows of enemy missiles and close-combat weapons. The cloth cover prevented the metal from becoming cold, wet, and rusty through precipitation, from heating up through absorption of solar radiation, and from rattling against other pieces of equipment. Crucially, it prevented the bowstring from catching on the rings or lamellae of the hauberk, so often only the torso was covered. The cloth lining relieved the pressure from the armour on the body, especially the shoulders, protected neck and clothing from abrasion, and it could prevent the steel from reaching the body once the iron construction had been penetrated. Mail armour in particular would be covered with cloth, and for decorative effect sumptuous, colourful brocade was used. 25
The mail and lamellar hauberks were light suits of armour. Instead of lining his armour, a soldier could wear it over a garment of thick cloth (Persian khaftān, Greek peristēthidion, Arabic ghilāla), but every cavalry hauberk, whether of mail, lamellar, or some other construction, had to conform to the same formal (tunic armour) and functional (protection and comfort) requirements, because each was supposed to be worn on its own. Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, the armourers in the employ of the armoured horse archers were unfamiliar with the peculiar functional hierarchy between soft armour, mail armour, and plates, typical of the heavy, layered armour of thirteenth- and fourteenth-century medieval Europe. In the Middle East, rulers, commanders, and epic heroes often donned two separate metal armours on top of each other, but only the latter successfully employed such ponderous armour in combat. For ordinary mortals, using this heavy protection for a more strenuous activity than just sitting on a throne, rug, mule, or elephant usually proved fatal, or almost fatal. Wearing two armours on top of each other is noted in the sources exactly because it was something notable, not because it was commonplace. 26
Of course, the armourers were aware of the different properties of the two types of construction. In the Middle East the parts of a lamellar hauberk protecting the neck and shoulders were usually made of the more flexible mail construction (Persian girībān, Arabic taʿālīq as-suft, Greek strongylos and mēlon respectively). 27 Collars and shoulder-pieces – and skirts – of mail attached to cuirasses of large or small plates first appeared in the beginning of the Common Era, and in the fifteenth century, when a new armour construction appeared – today often referred to as plated mail, plates connected not by lacing but by rings – the ancient tradition of making the parts protecting the neck and shoulders from mail armour was continued. 28
The horse archer protected his head with a simple, domed metal skullcap – Persian khūdh, Arabic baida, Greek kassis (Latin cassis) – sometimes with cut-outs for the eyes and occasionally a nose-plate. 29 Many surviving helmets from the late Sasanian period are covered with embossed silver or copper alloy, the latter probably the ‘golden helmets’ mentioned in the sources. After the sixth century the use of the ancient cheek-plate was discontinued. Instead, a short curtain of mail or lamellar armour (Persian chashmak-i khūdh, Arabic dabirah, Greek pterugion) was suspended from the rim of the skullcap to cover the rest of the head and the back of the neck and occasionally (as on the statue in Taq-i Bustan) the face. Like the hauberk, this neck-guard (and sometimes the skullcap too) could be covered with cloth. Among the infantry the flexible, shoulder-length mail coif – Persian sirash, Arabic mighfar, Greek skaplion (Latin for shoulders, scapulae) – was a popular alternative to the helmet, often even their only piece of armour, but a horse archer usually wore his coif underneath a helmet as an extra piece of protection, closing the seam between the collar of the hauberk and the neck-guard of the helmet. 30 It either left the entire face exposed, or entirely covered it save for the eyes. Often a small knob or spike on top of the mail coif suggests the presence of a small, round plate on the top of the skull, similar to the later Ottoman plated mail missiourka. Perhaps the protuberance was designed to fit into the lining of a helmet worn on top of the coif. 31
The limbs were protected by armlets – Persian bāzūband, Arabic sāʿid, Greek cheiromanikion (Latin manica) – and leg guards (Persian rān, thigh; Arabic sāq, leg, and saʿidayn, shin guard; Greek gonyklarion, knee guard, and periknēmis, shin guard). 32 Since antiquity, these arm and leg guards were often made of narrow, overlapping metal hoops attached to supporting leather strips, the light and flexible precursor of their well-known descendant, the heavy segmented sleeve of the Roman gladiator. 33
A round buckler – Persian sipar, Arabic turs (Greek thureos), Greek skoutarion (Latin scutum) – could be hung on the left shoulder by a carrying strap. Partly made of metal, this shield was used to deflect the blow of a close-combat weapon or to give cover against an armour-piercing projectile. By unslinging the shield, the horseman could clench it in his left fist, and while retreating he could suspend the shield on his back. 34
The horsemen could cover their armour with a short-sleeved surcoat (Persian pīrāhan, Arabic barūd, Greek noberonikion). Its function was comparable to that of the permanent cloth cover of the kazhāghand, but the dull-coloured surcoat also served as camouflage, hiding the armour from view by preventing sunlight from reflecting from its metal surface. Even the spectacular tiger- or leopard-skin surcoats of epic heroes (Persian babr-bayān) would have offered excellent camouflage. One could also easily hide the wasp-waisted tunic armour underneath the long and loose-fitting riding coat. In the sources, wearing armour underneath one’s clothes either shows treacherous intent or serves as a precaution against such intent. 35
The horse of the Taq-i Bustan statue is partly covered in armour – Persian bargostuwān and sarī and Greek stētistērion and prometopidion (the trapper and the defence for the head respectively), Arabic tijfāf. 36 Usually, horse armour seems to have been made of cloth, felt, or flexible leather, so-called soft armour. It seems the more exclusive metallic barding was always of lamellar construction, though lamellar barding could also be made of strips of hardened hide, a lighter material. The soft armour was covered with colourfully patterned cloth, while all barding, whether constructed from soft armour or from lamellar armour, could be decorated with small tassels. The barding shown on the Taq-i Bustan statue, reaching almost to the fetlocks, covers only the front half of the horse, and the sources suggest that this was the usual fashion of Middle Eastern horse armour at the time. 37 The first indications that horse armour had expanded to protect the crupper and rear legs as well appear in Firdausi’s Shahnama. 38 This later, all-enveloping trapper was then brought to Europe by returning crusaders. After the Mongol invasion, much shorter styles of horse armour from North-East Asia appeared, made from lamellar armour.
Why did the horse archer use this extensive armour? In close combat it was often pierced with remarkable ease, so it must have been very light. The apparent ‘low quality’ of Roman armour from the early Byzantine period, compared with the much heavier armour used by their Frankish contemporaries, has been noted before. 39 However, this verdict is based on the implicit assumption that armour is used to protect against lance and sword, but these soldiers were archers. First and foremost, armour had to protect against arrows. It is important to make this distinction, because only after the appearance of firearms would missiles surpass the destructive force of a sword blow or lance thrust. The overwhelming majority of arrows battering a suit of armour were light projectiles, discharged in huge numbers from a long distance. By the time they reached their destination their velocity had been reduced almost to their own speed of fall, which made the arrows incapable of piercing light armour. 40 The intended effect was a rattling – in every sense of the word – hail of arrows that could wound any exposed part of man or beast. 41 As these arrows were merely shot in the general direction of the enemy from a galloping horse, but rained down in profusion, armour had to cover the soldier and his mount completely. However, because of the low penetrative capability of these light projectiles, his armour could also be light and flexible, hardly reducing the soldier’s freedom of movement that was so vital for his mobile, skirmishing style of combat. 42
III. Infantry
Unlike the numerous Hellenistic infantry, the infantry of the Middle East was subordinate to the cavalry. For most battles the sources fail to mention where the infantry was to be found in the battle array, or whether there was any infantry present at all. This omission hasn’t always been noted, perhaps because it was assumed the Asian infantry would have formed up in phalanx in the centre, as in the Hellenistic world. As a Hellenistic battle array often consisted of such an infantry phalanx protected by wings of cavalry, the Iranian triadic organization is sometimes attributed to Hellenistic influence, but the ancient Assyrians and Persians already divided their armies in three divisions. However, they did not form up their infantry in the centre and their cavalry on the wings, because, since antiquity, the place and function of the ‘Iranian’ infantry in the battle array had been more akin to the practice in later medieval European armies. Provided enough professional foot soldiers were available, each of the three divisions would consist of cavalry supported by infantry. As we shall see, the cavalry was not formed up on the flanks of the infantry, as is usual with a Hellenistic army. In the Iranian tradition the cavalry either fought in front of the infantry, or sheltered behind it (Figure 1). 43

Battle array of cavalry supported by infantry.
As we saw in the previous article the armies were drawn up in consecutive lines. To serve as a place of refuge in case the cavalry battle took a turn for the worse, a line of infantry in serried ranks could bring up the rear of the cavalry lines. However, when the commander had already noticed that the enemy had superior firepower, the infantry could be formed up in front of the cavalry, to protect the horses against enemy missiles. Cavalry in front of infantry was the offensive formation; cavalry behind infantry, the defensive formation. 44
When the first line of the battle order consisted of cavalry, the foot soldiers could still join the fighting. The skirmishing line of the attackers could be reinforced with skirmishers on foot. The foot skirmishers often hitched a ride to the zone of death mounted behind the attacking horsemen, to dismount as soon as they came within range of the enemy. The infantry then attacked like the cavalry, deploying as skirmishers in open order. Because of their powerful and well-aimed bowshot, foot soldiers were a welcome addition to a skirmishing line of horse archers. While skirmishing alongside the cavalry, a foot soldier, having left his armour behind, was often draped in no more than a loincloth or a pair of trousers. His light gear allowed him to keep up with the horses and to beat a hasty retreat when the enemy cavalry counter-attacked. When horsemen caught up with a soldier on foot, he defended himself with his sword, keeping a buckler above his head. 45
An important task of the infantry was to intercept a surprise attack. A horseman would only mount his warhorse when combat was expected. Until then, it was led unsaddled in order not to tire it, while its owner rode a pack animal. To prevent man and horse from suffering from hypothermia or hyperthermia, often their armour was carried along on pack animals, so before the cavalry was ready to do battle, both the horsemen and their horses first needed to be equipped and armoured, a time-consuming operation. When an army was ambushed, it was up to the infantry to hold the line until the cavalry was ready to join the fight. 46
However, the most important function of the infantry was to protect the cavalry against a hail of missiles. Fakhr Mudabbir (thirteenth century) and al-Tarsusi (twelfth century) compare the infantry line of the defensive formation to a wall. According to an eighth-century source quoted by al-Tabari, the foot soldiers protected the horses of their own cavalry while killing the horses of the enemy. The Strategikon (c. 600
Wearing their armour, the foot soldiers received the attack of the enemy cavalry. Often waiting for them on their knees to make themselves as small a target as possible, they pointed their lances at the approaching horses. To shoo them away, they could also rise up to advance. As long as the horsemen threatened their line, the foot soldiers were forced to stick close together, as their serried ranks and bristling lances formed an intimidating obstacle the horses did not dare to approach. The closed order of the infantry was a necessary evil: a necessity because it kept the enemy horsemen at bay, but an evil because the hail of arrows discharged by the horse archers would cause heavy casualties in such densely packed, stationary ranks. To compensate for the vulnerability of their closed order to a hail of missiles, the foot soldiers propped up a kind of fence of huge shields. These standing shields gave the soldiers cover against a hail of arrows, and as the fence suggested an impassable barrier to a horse, they also kept the enemy horsemen at bay. This allowed the foot soldiers to drop their lances and concentrate on discharging their projectiles. 48
When the enemy cavalry fell back, the foot soldiers were ordered to open their line. They gathered into separate columns, while their cavalry attackers passed through the intervals to pursue the enemy. 49 The foot soldiers then also divided themselves into attackers and defenders. Those in the first ranks hurried after their mounted attackers to support them as attackers on foot, while the last ranks stayed behind or followed them in a slow, careful, and ordered advance, carrying the huge shields in front of them as a moving shield-wall. As the infantry skirmishers were still in their armour, they were not allowed to venture too far from the columns of their comrades. 50 The skirmishing horsemen in front of the infantry were supported by their foot soldiers in two ways. Psychologically, the mass of their infantry bringing up the rear seemed like an obstacle to their horses, driving them towards the enemy and thereby making the attacks of the cavalry more aggressive. Physically, the foot skirmishers supported them with their firepower, and if the enemy still proved to be too strong, the mounted attackers could always retreat behind the protective bulwark of the infantry shield-wall in their rear. 51
When the enemy cavalry drove back the counter-attack, the skirmishing foot soldiers retreated to the shield-wall. Like the horsemen, foot soldiers had to retreat undismayed to reassure their defenders and intimidate their pursuers. They walked backwards or – like the horsemen – they turned their torsos and pointed their eyes and weapons at the enemy as they calmly made their way back to their defenders, taunting and challenging their pursuers. The defenders of the infantry admitted their attackers to their ranks. The returning mounted attackers retreated through the lanes between the infantry columns, upon which the latter closed their ranks and again formed up in line, protected by continuous rows of standing shields. 52
Armoured foot soldiers in closed order carrying close-combat weapons, missile weapons, and huge shields could not be deployed on the flanks, as they were unlikely to keep up with the fast manoeuvres performed by the flank-protection party and the outflanking party. If the flanks failed against the enemy and the army was surrounded, the infantry could be split up, with half being led to behind the cavalry to protect the battle array in the rear. 53
If the foot soldiers were ill-prepared, or had become weakened, dispersed, frightened, or confused, a charge towards them by the enemy cavalry could be enough to make them panic and flee, throwing down their large shields. Horsemen could then ride through the openings that would inevitably start to appear in the fleeing mob, hitting left and right on the heads of the fugitives with mace or battleaxe. A running horse could knock down the few lone foot soldiers that strayed into its path, something a small horse can learn to do with as much ease – or difficulty – as a modern large police horse. Other horsemen surrounded the fugitives and drove them in like sheep, shooting at them with their bows or stabbing them with their lances. The plight of those unfortunate foot soldiers was far more terrible than that of modern infantry defeated by cavalry. In a successful modern cavalry charge against infantry, a foot soldier would be free from molestation by a horseman armed with a sabre by simply throwing himself on the ground. Units ‘cut to pieces’ by a cavalry charge ceased to function as a unit, but few soldiers were actually harmed. The armoured horse archers, however, could always reach the fugitives with their arrows and long lances, so for the foot soldiers there was no escape. The infantry of a defeated army were often annihilated. 54
But although the backs of panicked foot soldiers were hard to resist, horsemen preferred fighting other horsemen and usually avoided a fight with infantry; they were especially reluctant to attack disciplined and well-prepared infantry. If such a confrontation could not be avoided, the armoured horse archers would attack and retreat in their usual way, shooting a hail of arrows. The champions rode up to the shield-wall, to puncture the standing shields at short range with an armour-piercing arrow or a javelin, to hit the foot soldiers with their lance or battleaxe, or to bully them. Their mobility and dispersed deployment made the horsemen a difficult target, while the attacks of the champions and the menace of the other horsemen forced the foot soldiers to maintain the closed order that offered such an excellent target. However, in this contest the horsemen were at a serious disadvantage, because an archer on foot can shoot with more power and accuracy than a mounted archer. Moreover, in a duel between a horseman and a determined foot soldier, the latter usually had the upper hand. In a military culture dominated by horsemen, there was little honour to be gained from defeating a foot soldier and much dishonour to be incurred by being defeated by one, so cavalry quickly retired when foot soldiers stood their ground. The Strategikon (c. 600), al-Tabari (ninth–tenth-century source), al-Harawi (twelfth century), and al-Ansari (fourteenth century) all refer to the conventional wisdom that infantry should deal with infantry, and cavalry with cavalry. 55
The only way for cavalry to defeat determined and well-prepared foot soldiers was to dismount and fight them on foot, but deploying the cavalry as infantry usually was a desperate defensive measure. As has been argued in previous articles, cavalry can only attack or flee; it cannot defend. 56 In the face of superior numbers of enemy cavalry and without the option of retreat – for instance because the soldiers were already committed to battle – a cavalry commander would order his men to dismount and form up as infantry in closed order. This was a very unpopular command, because if the dismounted horsemen did not succeed in repelling the enemy, at least until help arrived, they faced annihilation. As the horsemen rightly considered themselves an easy target standing close together without a horse on which to flee to safety, it was not uncommon for them to refuse to dismount. When an army was defeated and fled, a particularly conscientious and honourable commander would dismount his retinue and continue to fight on foot, to cover the retreat of his other soldiers. 57
If foot soldiers predominated in both armies, for instance in mountainous terrain, they could initiate battle. Infantry fought infantry rather like cavalry fought cavalry, discharging missiles at each other in extended order, while the most intrepid soldiers threw away their bows to duel in close combat. Unlike a mounted archer, a discharging archer on foot could not at the same time run hither and thither to evade enemy projectiles, so he had to make himself as small a target as possible by crouching, dropping on his knees or taking cover. This was probably the reason why thrown missiles such as stones, javelins and spears remained popular among the infantry, as their effectiveness improves by being discharged while running. When one of the infantry formations wavered, the other would bring forward its banners and slowly and purposefully, in serried ranks, march towards the enemy, with drawn daggers, maces, and axes. Just like the line formation of the cavalry defenders, the closed infantry formation was used as a psychological weapon, not as a combat formation. Infantry rarely used the lance against other infantry, because in the Iranian tradition the long lance – like the long-sword – was considered to be a weapon for or against cavalry, too cumbersome for combat between soldiers on foot. Therefore, a massed infantry advance did not result in something similar to a crash between two phalanxes of hoplites, lances shattering as they collided with heavy, bronze-covered shields and massive plate armour. Instead, it led to the sudden flight of the weaker contestant, as with a modern bayonet charge. The victorious infantry would drive the defeated infantry back upon their cavalry, if cavalry had been ensconced behind that infantry, and the cavalry of the victorious infantry could then exploit the confusion sown among the opposing cavalry by their fleeing foot soldiers. 58
However, in the Middle East the armoured horse archers were usually supported by a relatively small contingent of professional foot soldiers. In the Iranian tradition, foot soldiers were seen as horsemen wannabes. Just as a horseman aspired to be recognized as a champion, a foot soldier wanted to become a horseman, and he would readily promote himself when he captured a warhorse. 59 The author of the Strategikon and al-Jahiz (ninth century) prefer horsemen to foot soldiers, claiming that horsemen were better foot soldiers than foot soldiers would have been horsemen. 60 In status, in performance, and in numbers, the cavalry was the dominant arm. The infantries usually engaged only after the struggle between their respective cavalries had been decided and one of them had fled the field. Infantry rarely advanced across the battlefield as an independent tactical unit; they seem to have been attached to the cavalry as a supporting unit. 61
Like their horsemen, the professional foot soldiers of the Middle East usually were archers. They were ‘dragoons’, mounted infantry, travelling to the battlefield on pack animals, just like the horsemen. And just like the horsemen, they were equipped with both missile weapons and close-combat weapons. 62 However, cavalry equipment and infantry equipment were not identical. For instance, instead of the double ‘Bulgarian’ cavalry belts – a sword-belt and a belt for archery equipment – a single belt carried both the quiver and the scabbards for dagger and sword, the cumbersome bow sheath or bow case usually being dispensed with. 63
A piece of equipment typically associated with fighting on foot is the arrow guide (Persian nāwak, Arabic majra, Greek sōlenarion). It was a small tube or gutter that could be tied to the left hand or to the bow. The bowstring moved through a slot that ran along the length of the arrow guide. This turned a conventional bow into a kind of vertical crossbow, which allowed an archer to shoot short darts. These have a number of advantages over conventional arrows. The centre of gravity of a small, light dart with a relatively heavy point lies well forward, improving its balance and therefore its long-range performance. Under the force of a released bowstring, a short dart will not warp, wasting less energy and preventing the dart from wobbling and thereby glancing off a close range target. Furthermore, if the same amount of force is applied to a lighter projectile, it will cause it to move faster. As it was difficult to see such a small and fast projectile coming, it was near impossible to avoid it. In addition to using the arrow guide for powerful, accurate shooting, one could also simulate the firing of five arrows in rapid succession by inserting even smaller darts into the arrow guide on top of each other. Since a foot soldier had to drag his ammunition across the battlefield without the convenience of a tactical mount, short and light projectiles were obviously more practical than long and heavy projectiles. The sōlenarion is first mentioned in the Strategikon, so it was in use at least from 600 onwards. 64
Foot soldiers were much more inclined than horsemen to use the sling (Persian qalāsang, Arabic miqlā, Greek sphendobolon) and the javelin – Persian khisht, Arabic mizrāq, Greek bērrutta (Latin verutum). A heavier, more versatile weapon was the infantry spear, used for both stabbing and throwing – Persian zhopīn, Arabic harbah, Greek lankidion (Latin lancea). 65
For engaging cavalry, specialized weapons were used, such as various types of pole arms (Persian dās, Arabic ṣabarbarah, Greek dorydrepanon). In addition to the long cavalry lance, the infantry employed an even longer pike against horsemen, and in addition to the cavalry long-sword, an even longer two-hander. 66
Since the long cavalry sword was considered to be too cumbersome for combat among men on foot, foot soldiers often preferred a short-sword (Persian nīmcha, Arabic miʾṣab, Greek paramērion). The short-sword seems also to have been referred to as a khanjar and is shown in art as a double-edged poniard type or single-edged cutlass type of weapon. 67 In tenth-century eastern Iran a third type reappeared that had once been very popular in the Middle East and around the Mediterranean, the forward-curving sickle-sword. This new sickle-sword, the katāra, originated from South Asia, where such a weapon had never disappeared. Incidentally, a tenth-century mural from Nishapur of a mounted falconer, armed with both a sabre suspended from a sword-belt around his waist and what looks like a poniard attached to his stirrup-strap (Arabic rikābī) and carried between left leg and saddle blanket, suggests that the short-sword was now also used by horsemen. 68
Since a foot soldier had to tuck his mace in his belt – unlike a horseman, who would carry it on his saddle – he preferred a light, smooth, tubular- or round-headed mace, often made of fire-hardened wood instead of metal (Persian harbās, Greek ropalon, Arabic dabbūs). Their status being close to that of commoners, the infantry used weapons that were often modifications of or identical to the tools and implements of civilian life, such as a broad-axe (Persian tabar, Arabic faʾs, Greek axinē) or a T-shaped hammer (Persian musht, Arabic latt, Greek rabdion). By the second half of the period under discussion, more elaborate versions of the dabbūs, the tabar, and the latt had emancipated to become cavalry equipment. 69
In the Iranian tradition, armour was not very popular among the foot soldiers, as it hindered them from keeping up with the cavalry. 70 Moreover, unlike a man on a horse, a pedestrian is a relatively small target that can more easily be protected against arrows by a shield or some other cover. Infantry armour was therefore lighter and less extensive than cavalry armour. So as not to obstruct jumping and running, infantry mail and lamellar hauberks usually were ‘half-armours’, reaching no further down than the waist by omitting the ‘skirt’ of the tunic armour. Instead, a short flap at the front sometimes protected the abdomen. The sleeves could also be sacrificed, which resulted in a kind of flak jacket. To further reduce weight, the lamellar hauberks of the infantry were often made of strips of hardened hide. Another light (and cheap) alternative to metal armour was soft armour. During the period under discussion, it seems the Middle East witnessed the supplanting of soft armour made of felt (Persian namad, Arabic libd, Greek pilos) by a quilted cotton jerkin – Persian sāwīs, Arabic qarqal, Greek bambakion (Persian paṃba, cotton). While its medieval European descendant the aketon (Arabic qutn, cotton), was often used as a separate padding underneath metal armour, the quilted jerkin of the Middle East was worn as an independent suit of armour, with its own lining or undergarment. Infantry helmets would sometimes lack the protective screen suspended from the rim of the skullcap, but the foot soldiers seem to have preferred coifs to helmets, in fact to any other forms of armour. Armour for the limbs was not nearly as common as among the cavalry. 71
The various local types of standing shields were deployed on the ground and, if necessary, kept upright by a prop. They can be compared to the pavise used by medieval European infantry, but its Asian counterpart was larger and of lighter construction. The standing shield could also be carried by hand like an ordinary shield, but it was rarely used for close combat, as it was both too cumbersome and too flimsy to effectively ward off blows and thrusts. It was only carried in anger when the infantry formations slowly advanced in closed order under enemy fire. As soon as the foot soldiers attacked, they left the standing shields behind, so, unlike the ordinary shields and bucklers, the standing shields should be seen as a kind of portable palisade, not as the personal equipment of individual soldiers. Like the horsemen, foot soldiers would often use a buckler in a duel. These parrying shields could be partly made of metal, but the standing shield was always of a light construction, wicker, reeds glued together with tar, or sheets of leather or quilted cloth stretched over a light wooden frame. 72
The small, solid buckler and the large, light standing shield owed their popularity to the fact that they did not obstruct the use of the bow. Variously shaped medium sized shield types were also known. Strong enough to deflect a sword blow or lance thrust and large enough to offer a crouching foot soldier a reasonable measure of protection against a hail of missiles, they combined the functions of standing shield and buckler. As its users could only return fire by throwing javelins or spears, this type of shield is especially connected with the military traditions from the western parts of the Roman and Muslim world, where a warrior fought with spear and shield. However, the Romans had also sent Berbers, Germans and Slavs to the Levant, from the eighth century onwards the Mediterranean tradition of spear and shield expanded further into the Middle East, and finally, from the tenth century onwards, the Daylami foot soldiers from north-west Iran brought their spears and oval shields even as far east as Central and South Asia. 73
IV. Servants
The infantry in the Iranian tradition appears in two very distinct guises: one, a limited number of skilled, intrepid, and well-armed skirmishers; the other, a huge mob of inexperienced, vacillating, and virtually unarmed commoners. By the fourth century
So the Middle East knew two kinds of foot soldiers, professional infantry and a civilian levy. Although numerous, the tactical value of the levy was rather limited, but they were indispensable to the proper functioning of the army, as they performed all the menial chores the soldiers would not do. During a siege they served as sappers; during battle, as water carriers and stretcher-bearers; when the army was on the move, as porters, shepherds, and drivers; and when the army halted, they would dig the trenches and pitch the tents. They also included various kinds of craftsmen, such as masons and bricklayers to repair or erect fortifications, carpenters to build artillery, bowers and blacksmiths to repair the arms and armour of the soldiers, and tailors, cobblers, and saddle-makers to repair their other equipment. 77
Civilians could provide a kind of emergency levy if there were insufficient numbers of professional soldiers available, but they would also on occasion be inserted into a regular, front-line battle array of professional soldiers. Since professional foot soldiers were often few and far between, their ranks were swelled with the most able-bodied part of the levy, to make the infantry formations appear stronger. As the professional infantry in the first ranks swarmed towards the enemy to fight as skirmishers, the levy stayed behind or followed slowly in closed order, carrying the huge shields in front of them. Using the levy in battle was fraught with danger. As untrained civilians, they were not very obedient, experienced, or disciplined, and their enthusiasm could suddenly turn to panic. Because of their large numbers, their flight could easily sweep the professional soldiers along and unravel the entire battle array. 78
Prior to the battle of Dara (530
Unlike these ragged foot servants, the mounted servants or pages (Persian chākir, Arabic ghulām, Greek pais) were registered on the army lists and received proper equipment and pay. Though mounted on horses, they do not seem to have been protected by armour or to have carried close-combat weapons, but the Strategikon refers to them as soldiers, since the pages were attendants of an entirely different calibre. Some stood directly behind the lines, supplying returning skirmishers with fresh horses, water, or ammunition. When a horseman’s bow had snapped, his lance been shattered, or his sword had been broken, the pages provided him with new weapons. Behind the lines it must have been buzzing with feverish activity – bellowing camels and braying asses and mules burdened with ammunition, water, and equipment; spare horses whinnying impatiently; the mounted servants and the servants on foot scampering about, looking after these animals and their masters, and carrying the wounded soldiers back to camp. 80
Other mounted servants followed the attackers up to the zone of death between the battle lines. It was their designated task to bring to safety any armoured horse archer who had been wounded or unhorsed. The Strategikon enjoins them to carry water flasks and their saddles should have an additional stirrup, to enable an unhorsed soldier to mount behind them. These ‘medical orderlies’ also brought back prisoners, caught riderless horses, stripped dead or wounded enemy soldiers, collected spent arrows for reuse, and salvaged any other lost equipment lying around. The pages were allowed to bring this booty to their own units, so that the armoured horse archers would not be tempted to leave their comrades to get it themselves. 81
The young court attendants surrounding a ruler were also called ‘pages’ and other names suggesting a menial status, but this was only their status in relation to their ruler, as they were in fact the sons of the aristocracy. To ensure the loyalty of their fathers, the ruler always kept these young princes close to his person as hostages, and in war they served as his personal elite bodyguard of armoured horse archers. 82
The Strategikon mentions two other types of soldiers with a serving capacity, the ‘recruits’ and the ‘weapon bearers’ (Persian jazān and nau rasida jawānān, Greek neōteroi and armatoi). They too were armoured horse archers, just like the soldiers they accompanied, but of lower status. The recruits were, of course, the newly admitted young soldiers in a regular unit. The ‘weapon bearers’ or ‘young warriors’ seem to have been guard recruits, ordinary soldiers attached to an elite unit. The recruits and the guard recruits performed the same tactical functions as the other armoured horse archers of their unit, but, until promoted, they were liable to do chores from which the veterans and the guards were exempted, for instance foraging. 83 All army personnel, whether professional infantry, civilian levy, mounted servants, or recruits, were there to support the characteristic warrior of the Iranian tradition, the armoured horse archer.
Footnotes
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
1
E. Alofs, ‘Studies on Mounted Warfare in Asia I: Continuity and Change in Middle Eastern Warfare, c.
2
E. Gamillscheg, trans., and G.T. Dennis, ed., Das Strategikon des Maurikios (Vienna, 1981), 1.2 (subsequently Strategikon); T. Nöldeke, Tabari: Geschichte der Perser und Araber zur Zeit der Sasaniden (Leiden, 1973), 156, 164, 248–9; A.G. Warner and E. Warner, trans., The Shahnama of Firdausi (London, 1905–25), 2.344, 3.168, 175, 4.11, 63, 153, 5.47, 276, 6.227, 276, 350, 8.103 (subsequently Shahnama); B. de Meynard and P. de Courteille, trans., Les prairies d’or, rev. C. Pellat (Paris, 1962–97), 1283 (subsequently Masudi); D. Ayalon, ‘Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army II’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies XV (1953), 464.
3
Strategikon 1.1.12–16, 2.10–12, 36–9; H.B. Dewing, trans., Procopius: History of the Wars I–V (London, 1914–28), 1.1.12–16 (subsequently Procopius); J.D. Frendo, transl., Agathias: The Histories (Berlin and New York, 1975), 2.8.1 (subsequently Agathias); Nöldeke, Tabari, 248–9; Shahnama 7.230–3; R.C. Smail, Crusading Warfare, 1097–1193, 2nd edn (Cambridge, 1995), 77. Cf. E. Yar-Shater, ed., The History of al-Tabari (New York, 1985–2007), 2.1278 (subsequently Tabari); D.S. Richards, trans., The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athir from the Crusading Period from Al-Kāmil fiʾl-taʾrīkh 1–3 (Aldershot and Burlington, 2008), 2.378, 398 (subsequently Athir); Li Guo, Early Mamluk Syrian Historiography: Al-Yūnīnī’s Dhayl Mirʾāt al-zaman (Leiden, 1998), 134.
4
Cf. R. Ghirshman, Parthes et Sassanides (Paris, 1962), pl. 235.
5
F. Steingass, A comprehensive Persian-English dictionary including the Arabic words and phrases to be met with in Persian literature, being Johnson and Richardson’s Persian, Arabic and English Dictionary revised, enlarged and entirely reconstructed (Beirut, 1970), 1047 (subsequently Steingass); H. Kennedy, The Armies of the Caliphs: Military and Society in the Early Islamic State (London and New York, 2001), 177; Strategikon 1.2.12.
6
N.A. Faris and R. Potter Elmer, trans. and ed., Arab Archery: An Arabic Manuscript of about AD 1500, ‘A Book on the Excellence of the Bow & Arrow’, and the Description Thereof (New Jersey, 1945), 14; J.D. Latham and W.F. Paterson, Saracen Archery: An English Version and Exposition of a Mameluke Work on Archery (London, 1970), 6–8 (subsequently Taybugha); W.F. Paterson, ‘The Archers of Islam’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient IX (1966), 73, 78–9; M.M. Khorasani, Arms and Armour from Iran: The Bronze Age to the End of the Qajar Period (Tübingen, 2006), 297–305.
7
Steingass 963, 1047, 1296, 1446; Strategikon 1.1.14–15, 2.16; C.E. Bosworth and M. Ashtiany, trans., The History of Beyhaqi (The History of Sultan Masʿud of Ghazna, 1030–1041, by Abuʾl-Fazl Beyhaqi (Cambridge, MA, and London, 2011), 1.403 (subsequently Beyhaqi); Khorasani, Arms and Armour, 314–15.
8
Strategikon 1.2.13–15; Procopius 2.21.8, cf. C. Willemen and C. Kozyreff, Trésors d’art de la Chine (Brussels, 1982), pl. 69, fig. 171; J.H. Sanders, trans., Tamerlane or Timur the Great Amir (London, 1936), 137.
9
Steingass 296, 341, 1052.
10
Kennedy, Armies of the Caliphs, 177; A. Boudot-Lamotte, Contribution a l’étude de l’archerie musulmane (Damascus, 1968), 102 n. 1; Steingass 364, 991.
11
G. Clauson, An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish (Oxford, 1972), 586–7; Steingass 663; Boudot-Lamotte, Contribution a l’étude, 102 n. 1; Kennedy, Armies of the Caliphs, 177. D.T. Rice, The Great Palace of the Byzantine Emperors (London, 1947), pl. 39. Cf. D. Nicolle, Attila and the Nomad Hordes (London, 1990), 13, ‘box-type’; B. Dwyer, ‘The Closed Quiver’ Journal of the Society of Archer-Antiquaries XLI (1998) [updated 2001:
]; H. Riesch, ‘Mongolische Pfeilköcher des Mittelalters’, Waffen- und Kostümkunde LII/2 (2010), 113–48, ‘trapezoid quiver’.
12
Steingass 296, 341, 347–8, 350, 356, 364, 379, 747–8, 750, 756; Khorasani, Arms and Armour, 313–14. Contra: Riesch, ‘Mongolische Pfeilköcher’, 132; J.M. Smith, ‘Mongol Society and Military in the Middle East: Antecedents and Adaptations’, in Y. Lev, ed., War and Society in the Eastern Mediterranean, 7th–15th Centuries (Leiden, 1997), 261, 264. Beyhaqi 1.403.
13
Strategikon 1.2.17; Nöldeke, Tabari, 249; M. Gold, trans., The Tārikh-e Sistān (Rome, 1976), 213 (subsequently Tārikh-e Sistān); G.T. Scanlon, trans., A Muslim Manual of War (Cairo, 1961), 80. Arrowheads: E. McEwen, ‘Persian Archery Texts: Chapter Eleven of Fakhr-i Mudabbir’s Adab al- Harb (Early Thirteenth Century)’, Islamic Quarterly 18 (1974), 92–3 (subsequently Fakhr); Faris and Elmer, Arab Archery, 107–9. Taybugha 24–6; Steingass 218, 224, 231; M. Junkelmann, Die Reiter Roms III (Mainz on the Rhein, 1992), 168; Khorasani, Arms and Armour, 308–13; personal communication by B. Dwyer.
14
Steingass 1442; Strategikon 1.1.10, 16, 2.18, 31, 55, 11.1.45, 2.24, 26, 3.10; Beyhaqi 1.210; D. Nicolle, Islamische Waffen (Graz, 1981), 11, 12; B. Lewis, ed. and trans., Islam: From the Prophet Muhammad to the Capture of Constantinople, I: Politics and War (New York, 1974), 216 (subsequently Jahiz (1974)).
15
Strategikon 3.5.32; Khorasani, Arms and Armour, 246–8.
16
Steingass 342–3, or tegh, 760; Strategikon 1.2.20, 11.1.15, 2.24, 3.10; Kennedy, Armies of the Caliphs, 173; Nicolle, Islamische Waffen, 3, 71; Khorasani, Arms and Armour, 84–97.
17
Shahnama 2.114, 152, 3.128, 345; Tabari 2.787. Cf. C.T. Harley-Walker, ‘Yahiz of Basrah or al-Fath ibn Khaqan on the Exploits of the Turks and the Army of the Caliphate in General’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1915), 646 (subsequently Jahiz (1915)); Steingass 343, 961; Khorasani, Arms and Armour, 130–3. Shoulder belt: Tabari 3.1253; Shahnama 2.152; D. Nicolle, The Armies of Islam (London, 1982), 13. Scabbard slide: cf. Alofs, ‘Studies on Mounted Warfare in Asia I’, 432. Indian sword: Shahnama 2.152, 3.43, 217, 6.42, 8.126, 152, 417.
18
L. Mercier, La chasse et les sports chez les Arabes (Paris, 1927), 215; H. Rabie, ‘The Training of the Mamluk Faris’, in V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp, ed., War, Technology and Society in the Middle East (London, 1975), 161–2. Cf. P.O. Harper, Silver Vessels of the Sasanian Period (New York, 1981), pl. 23. H. Seitz, Blankwaffen (Munich, 1981), 152, on the history of the Italian grip in Europe; C. Ardant du Picq, Études sur le combat, new edn (Paris, 2004), 161–2, condemns the fencing of the European cavalry and approves of the native horsemen from the colonies using their swords to strike, not to parry; J. Keegan The Face of Battle (London, 1976), 149.
19
Procopius 8.29.23; P. Schreiner, trans., ‘Theophylaktos Simokates, Geschichte’, Bibliothek der griechischen Literatur (Stuttgart, 1985), 2.18.23 (subsequently Theophylaktos); Steingass 476, 527, 584; Jahiz (1915) 646; Athir 3.207; Nicolle, Islamische Waffen, 6–8; D. Nicolle, Saladin and the Saracens (London, 1986), 33; G. Azarpay, Sogdian Painting: The Pictorial Epic in Oriental Art (Berkeley, 1981), pl. 17, 29–30; C. Cahen, ‘Un traité d’armurerie composé pour Saladin’, Bulletin d’Etudes Orientales XII (1947–8), 161 (subsequently Murda); Khorasani, Arms and Armour, 219.
20
Procopius 2.21.7; R. Grosse, Römische Militärgeschichte: Von Gallienus bis zum Beginn der byzantinischen Themenverfassung (Berlin, 1920), 336; A. Dain, L’‘Extrait Tactique’ tiré de Léon VI le Sage (Paris, 1942), 38 n. 7; Beyhaqi 1.210; Steingass 279, 1073, 1082; Nicolle, Islamische Waffen, 8–11, pl. 2; Nicolle, Saladin and the Saracens, 10 K, L, M; Azarpay, Sogdian Painting, pl. 7–9; Murda 162; Khorasani, Arms and Armour, 251–66; Athir 2.27, 146.
21
J.C.N. Coulston, ‘Later Roman Armour, 3rd–6th Centuries AD’, Journal of Roman Military Equipment Studies I (1990), 142–6.
22
‘Roman’ armour: Shahnama 3.42, 63, 77, 326. ‘Tibetan’ armour: Tabari 3.1520. Skirt hauberk: Shahnama 2.114, 3.128, 345.
23
Strategikon 11.1.15; Steingass 616; Kennedy, Armies of the Caliphs, 108; Nicolle, Islamische Waffen, 17–18.
24
Kennedy, Armies of the Caliphs, 108; Steingass 378, 640, 1016, 1027; Nicolle, Islamische Waffen, 19–20, 71; Khorasani, Arms and Armour, 279–81; P. Schreiner, ‘Les pays du Nord et Byzance’, Actes du colloque d’Upsal, 1979 (Upsala, 1981), 222. Contra: Nicolle, Islamische Waffen, 19. Zaba/zabatos: Strategikon 1.2.10, 7B.15.15, 11.2.24/10.1.20, 12B.23.16, respectively. Cf. Agathias 2.8.4. Cf. Ghirshman, Parthes et Sassanides, pl. 235.
25
Tabari 3.1558, 1830; Steingass (109), 663, 1027; A.S. Melikian-Chirvani, ‘The Westward Journey of the Kazhagand’, Journal of the Arms and Armor Society XI (1983–5), 8–35; J.F. Haldon, trans., ‘Constantine Porphyrogenitus: Three Treatises on Imperial Military Expeditions’, Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae XXVIII (Vienna, 1990), 749–50, 837–8; Tārikh-e Sistān 310–11.
26
Two armours; commanders: Fakhr 252; Tabari 1.2286, 2.1154, 3.554, 1558; Rustam and his son: Shahnama 2.159, 162, 3.184, 186, 251; Caliph and his son: Tabari 2.1799, 3.588. Heavy armour for commanders: Procopius 8.11.48; Shahnama 5.47; P.K. Hitti and F.C. Murgotten, The Origins of the Islamic State: Al-Baladhuri, I–II, Studies in History, Economics and Public Law (New York, 1916–24), 304 (subsequently Baladhuri); Tabari 2.495, 1107, 2014, 3.233, 1777; Nicolle, Islamische Waffen, 19. Cf. Strategikon 11.1.15. Undergarment: Steingass 469, 891; Dennis, Three Military Treatises, 16.60.
27
Strategikon 1.2.20; Taybugha 26; Nicolle, Islamische Waffen, 21; Steingass 1015, 1036, 1086.
28
A.V. Simonenko, ‘Bewaffnung und Kriegswesen der Sarmaten und späten Skythen in nördlichen Schwartzmeergebiet’, Eurasia Antiqua VII (2001), 272–3 and pl. 48; Ghirshman, Parthes et Sassanides, pl. 63c; G. Cameron Stone, A Glossary of the Construction, Decoration and Use of Arms and Armor in All Countries and All Times (New York, 1934), pl. 50.2, 3, 51, 53, 56.1, 57.2, 3. Plated mail: Steingass 195, 329; Nicolle, Islamische Waffen, 50.
29
Strategikon 1.2.12; Steingass 10, 19, 482; Nicolle, Islamische Waffen, 23–4.
30
Strategikon 1.2.10; Steingass 716, 1281; Kennedy, Armies of the Caliphs, 170–1; Nicolle, Islamische Waffen, 25; Fakhr 87. Face-covering helmet: Beyhaqi 1.280, 2.117.
31
Strategikon 1.2.10, 10.1.20; Nicolle, Islamische Waffen, 25, 69. Plate on top: R.M. Foote, ‘Frescoes and Carved Ivory from the Abbasid Homestead at Humeia’, Journal of Roman Archaeology XII (1999), fig. 5–7; Nicolle, Islamische Waffen, 59.
32
Steingass 145, 641; Strategikon 1.2.23; Nicolle, Islamische Waffen, 21, 71. Cf. Alofs, ‘Studies on Mounted Warfare in Asia I’, 434. Jahiz (1915) 646.
33
Steingass 201, 564, 642; Strategikon 12B.16.32; Tabari 2.587; Nicolle, Islamische Waffen, 22, 71; Khorasani, Arms and Armour, 278. Cf. Tabari 2.1690; Steingass 428. Ancient segmented armour: O. Gamber, Waffe und Rüstung Eurasiens: Frühzeit und Antike (Brunswick, 1978), pl. 312, 351, 381; Ghirshman, Parthes et Sassanides, pl. 63c, 165–6, 195, 219–20. Early modern segmented armour: Cameron Stone, Glossary of the Construction, pl. 53, 73.
34
Strategikon 1.2.22; Steingass 651; Nicolle, Islamische Waffen, 27–8, 69, 72; Smail, Crusading Warfare, 78.
35
Surcoat: Shahnama 3.184, 5.222; Steingass 115, 154, 180, 264–5; D. Nicolle, The Armies of Islam, 7th–11th Centuries (London, 1982), 25; Strategikon 1.2.50; Tabari 3.1960. Cf. Alofs, ‘Studies on Mounted Warfare in Asia II’, 20. Clothing over armour, treason: Shahnama 8.247; Tabari 2.615, 630. Expecting treason: Tabari 2.787; Athir 2.10, 243.
36
Barding: Strategikon 1.2.36–7; Tabari 2.36, 328, 1100, 1153, 1406, 1517; Shahnama 1.227, 3.60, 189, 244, 6.347, 8.102, 298, 303, 9.11; Ansari 128–9; Steingass 178, 283, 680; Kennedy, Armies of the Caliphs, 105; Nicolle, Islamische Waffen, 31–2, 72.
37
Ghirshman, Parthes et Sassanides, 235; C. Mango, R. Scott, and G. Greatrex, ‘The Chronicle of Theophanes Confessor’, Byzantine and Near Eastern History, AD 284–813 (Oxford, 1997), 318 (subsequently Theophanes); Baladhuri 315; Tabari 1.2193, 2.495.
38
Shahnama 3.62.
39
Cf. W. Rose, ‘Römisch-Germanische Panzerhemde’, Zeitschrift für historischen Waffenkunde II (1906), 1–55.
40
Procopius 1.18.33. Cf. Paterson, ‘Archers of Islam’, 83–4.
41
Strategikon 11.1.15–17; Procopius 1.18.31–35. Agathias 3.22.2, 24.9, 25.1; H. Darke, trans., The Book of Government or Rules for Kings (Siyar al-Muluk / Siyasat-nama) (London, 1960), 10.18; Tabari 19.355; N. Fries, Das Heereswesen der Araber zur Zeit der Omaijaden nach Tabari (Tübingen, 1921), 52.
42
W.H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power (Chicago, 1982), 18–19; Tabari 2.1016: fast armoured horses.
43
Kennedy, Armies of the Caliphs, 113. Three divisions: F. Thureau-Dangin, trans., Une relation de la huitième campagne de Sargon (714 av. J.-C.) (Paris, 1912), 130; A. D. Godley, transl., Herodotus Historiae I–IX (London, 1921), 7.82, 86, 121; M. Bizos, trans., Xenophon Cyropaedia (Paris, 1972–8), 6.3.21, 7.1.3, 5–7; E. Iliff Robson, trans., Xenofon Anabasis (Cambridge, MA, 1969), 1.7.1, cf. 2.4.2–5, 3.10.42–3, 11.1.22–4.
44
Lines of cavalry and infantry: Tabari 2.1524. Cavalry in front infantry: Strategikon 12A.4, 5.3–10, 7.42–52, 68–77; Procopius 5.29.37–8, 8.32.16–19; Tabari 1.2330–1, 3.1970. Cavalry behind infantry: Strategikon 12A.7.1–60; Shahnama 3.127, 4.23–4, 158; Murda 148, 162; J. Sourdel-Thomine, ‘Les conseils de Sayh al-Harawi a un prince Ayyubide’, Bulletin d’Etudes Orientales XVII (1961–2), 233 (subsequently Harawi); Ansari 104, 107. Cf. Alofs, ‘Studies on Mounted Warfare in Asia II’, 13.
45
Procopius 6.1.2. Sword and buckler: Procopius 8.29.22–4; Tabari 2.663; Shahnama 8.294; P.K. Hitti, trans., An Arab-Syrian Gentleman and Warrior in the Period of the Crusades: Memoirs of Usamah ibn-Munqidh (London, 1929; new edn, 1989), 87–8 (subsequently Usamah). Foot soldiers hitching a ride: Tabari 3.17.
46
Strategikon 9.1.9–12; Theophylaktos 6.9.15; Tabari 3.831; R.N. Frye, trans., The History of Bukhara: Translated from a Persian Abridgement of the Arabic Original by Narshakhī (Cambridge, MA, 1954), 89; Ansari 107. Cf. Usamah 127–8.
47
Strategikon 12A.7.1–2; Tabari 1.2330–1, 2.1524, 3.1970. Tarsusi 148, 162.
48
Infantry in front cavalry: Tarsusi 148, 162; Shahnama 3.127, 4.23–4, 158; Harawi 20; Tabari 3.831, 1970; Beyhaqi 1.123–4, 2.258. Kneeling infantry: Tabari 2.959, 3.831; Ansari 107. Persian standing shields: Procopius 5.22.20; Tabari 3.1552, 1693; Beyhaqi 2.125, 258.
49
Strategikon 12.A.7.23–29; Tarsusi 148–9, 162.
50
Strategikon 12.A.7.29–36: four or five bowshots.
51
Strategikon 12.A.7.33–5; Tabari 3.1213. Cf. P. Sidnell, Warhorse (London, 2006), 61.
52
Strategikon 12.A.2.1–20, 7.42–49; Procopius 3.32.18; Agathias 1.15.1; Tarsusi 149; Ansari 104; Kennedy, Armies of the Caliphs, 113. Panic infantry: Procopius 5.29.37–8, 8.32.16–19. Cf. Alofs, ‘Studies on Mounted Warfare in Asia II’, 22, 26.
53
Strategikon 12A.7.61–7.
54
Procopius 1.14.52. Cf. Junkelmann, Die Reiter Roms, 117, pl. 133, 134. Infantry destroyed: Tārikh-e Sistān 306; Athir 2.46, 3.225.
55
Procopius 6.11.4–8. Infantry–infantry, cavalry–cavalry: Strategikon 8.2.46–8; Tabari 2.1005, 1101, 3.816, 823; Harawi 233; Ansari 112. Cf. Keegan, Face of Battle, 155–9; Ardant du Picq, Études sur le combat, 159; Alofs, ‘Studies on Mounted Warfare in Asia II’, 23.
56
Alofs, ‘Studies on Mounted Warfare in Asia I’, 436, and ‘Studies on Mounted Warfare in Asia II’, 14.
57
Strategikon 8.2.251–4, 12A.7.83–8; Procopius 1.18.41–8, 8.8.30–1, 31.5, 35.19; Theophylaktos 1.12.4, 2.4.2; Tabari 2.49, 58, 560, 1536–8, 1707, 3.17, 40, 1911, 1969; Shahnama 3.180, 259. Cf. Kennedy, Armies of the Caliphs, 25; Jahiz (1915) 672. Dismounting commander: Tabari 2.1940, 3.854.
58
Strategikon 12A.7.1–22; Jahiz (1915) 651; Beyhaqi 2.118; Ansari 104, 106. Contra: Kennedy, Armies of the Caliphs, 23, 105.
59
Procopius 5.28.21; Tārikh-e Sistān 162–3.
60
Strategikon 8.2.251–4; Jahiz (1915) 672.
61
Strategikon 12B.23.28–32. Cf. Usamah 130–1.
62
Dragoons: Procopius 8.13.4, 14.6–8; Theophylaktos 2.8; Tabari 3.852, 2261; Beyhaqi 293; Tārikh-e Sistān 258. Heavily armed infantry: Nicolle, Islamische Waffen, 14–15; Murda 161; Khorasani, Arms and Armour, 250; Procopius 8.29.13–28; G.T. Dennis, trans., Three Military Treatises (Washington, 1985), 27.17–20, 36.3–8, 14–20; A. Christensen, L’Iran sous les Sassanides, new edn (Osnabrück, 1971), 132, 209; Tabari 1.1550, 2.1241; Agathias 3.17.7; Nicolle, Islamische Waffen, 10, 13–14.
63
Strategikon 12B.1.8, 4.2–3. Cf. Alofs, ‘Studies on Mounted Warfare in Asia I’, 432.
64
Strategikon 12B.5.4–5; Tarsusi 129–30; Fakhr 81, 86, 91; Tabari 3.1626, 1982, 2004, 2054; Steingass 1382; D. Nishamura, ‘Crossbows, Arrow-Guides and the Solenarion’, Byzantion LVIII (1988), 422–31.
65
Sling: Steingass 197, 461, 255, 275–7, 936–8, 1040; Strategikon 12B.4.4; Beyhaqi 1.201, 284–5; Ansari 127; Kennedy, Armies of the Caliphs, 113. Javelin and spear: Strategikon 9.2.22, 11.4.44, 74, 12A.7.58, B.2.3, 3.4, 5.6, 20.9–10, 86, 89; Procopius 5.29.42; Grosse, Römische Militärgeschichte, 332–3; Beyhaqi 1.210; C.E. Bosworth, trans., The Ornament of Histories: A History of the Eastern Islamic Lands, AD 650–1041, The Original Text of Abū Saʿīd ʿAbd al-Ḥayy Gardīzī (London, 2011), 105; Nicolle, Islamische Waffen, 14–15; Steingass 415, 461, 628, 637, 1222, 1521; Khorasani, Arms and Armour, 250.
66
Shahnama 4.197; Nicolle, Islamische Waffen, 12–14; Steingass 254, 269, 497, 521; Jahiz (1915) 652, 671; Jahiz (1974) 216; Agathias 5.22.4. Cf. Steingass 757, 903, 1222, 1521.
67
Strategikon 12B.4.2–3; Grosse, Römische Militärgeschichte, 331–2; Dennis, Three Military Treatises, 27.19; Steingass 1359, 1445; Nicolle, Islamische Waffen, 8, 36; Nicolle, Saladin and the Saracens, 33.
68
Steingass 1014; Nicolle, Islamische Waffen, 38, 72, pls. 5, 23; Nicolle, Saladin and the Saracens, 10 B and C; Murda 161–2; Khorasani, Arms and Armour, 212–18. Cf. Seitz, Blankwaffen, 191.
69
Strategikon 12.B6.5, 20.11; Nicolle, Islamische Waffen, 9, 11; Steingass 279, 503, 821, 1117, 1119, 1243; Murda 161–2; Tabari 2.1923.
70
Baladhuri 279; Jahiz (1915) 652.
71
Felt: Steingass 1116, 1425; Dennis, Three Military Treatises, 16.54–9. Cotton: Steingass 256, 645, 978; C. Blair, European Armour circa 1066 to circa 1700 (London, 1958), 33–4; Nicolle, Islamische Waffen, 16–17, 45, 71; Dennis, Three Military Treatises, 16.59-61.
72
Procopius 5.22.20; Tabari 2.37, 3.5, 1552, 3.1693; Tarsusi 137; Steingass 1417; Nicolle, Islamische Waffen, 30; Khorasani, Arms and Armour, 270 n. 11.
73
Nicolle, Islamische Waffen, 27–8, 30–1; Nicolle, Armies of Islam, 18; Beyhaqi 1.223, 377, 379, 2.196, 218.
74
The Roman topos: W. Seyfarth, trans., Historia Romana (Römische Geschichte) (Darmstadt, 1970–1), 23.6.83, 24.8.1; Procopius 1.14.25–7; Theophylaktos 2.8. Arab terms of abuse: Tabari 1.2107, 2116–17, 2.1608, 3.66, 3.1021, 1463, 1725, 1473, 1528; S. Elbeheiry, Les institutions de l’Egypte au temps des Ayyubides (Paris, 1971), 156–60.
75
Tabari 2.1187–8, 3.123, 709, 1199 (n. 165, C.E. Bosworth), 1623; Steingass 420, cf. 1095, 1261–2.
76
Strategikon 1.2.28–34, 62–74; Procopius 2.8.17, 28, 7.22.2–5, 20–1. 4.4.8; Agathias 2.19.6; Theophanes 377; Tabari 1.2426, 2.1256. Cf. M. Zakheri, Sasanid Soldiers in Early Muslim Society: The Origins of Ayyaran and Futuwwa (Wiesbaden, 1995), 54.
77
Dennis, Three Military Treatises, 14.27–32; Agathias 3.23.1, 24.6, 5.16.3–4; Beyhaqi 2.255; A. Cheddadi, Ibn Khaldun: Le livre des exemples (Muqaddima) (Paris, 2002), 595; Elbeheiry, Les institutions, 194–5.
78
Procopius 1.18.38–40; 5.28.1–18, 29.24–34; Agathias 2.8.2, 3.28.3.
79
Procopius 1.14.25–7; Strategikon 1.2.28–34, 10.1.18–22; Tabari 2.1535–6, 1543, 1547, 1598, 1923, 1941, 3.877, 885–6, 1212, 1586, 1592; Beyhaqi 2.81. Sling: Steingass 197, 255, 275–7, 936–8, 1040; Strategikon 12B.4.4; Ansari 127; Kennedy, Armies of the Caliphs, 113.
80
Strategikon 1.2.63–72, 3.40, 5.19, 6.21, 48, 3.6.7, 7A.13.15, B9.2, 9.5.103; Kennedy, Armies of the Caliphs, 199; Steingass 891, 893.
81
Strategikon 1.2.71, 2.9.1–30, 5.2.7–8; Procopius 2.3.23, 7.11.31; Boudot-Lamotte, Contribution a l’étude, 142. Wounded: Strategikon 8.216–19; G. Tantum, ‘Muslim Warfare: A Study of a Medieval Muslim Treatise on the Art of War’, in R. Elgood, ed., Islamic Arms and Armour (London, 1979), 199.
82
Theophanes 326, 414; Tabari 3.1258; Masudi 1284; C.E. Bosworth, ‘Ghaznavid Military Organization’, Der Islam XXXVI (1961), 46.
83
Strategikon 1.3.24, 2.6.46–48, 3.7.7, 7B.10.2–7; Zakheri, Sasanid Soldiers, 69. Cf. F. Mackler, trans., Histoire d’Heraclius, par l’évêque Sebêos (Paris, 1904), 49.
