Abstract
The paper offers new explanations on the causes of the Mapuches’ success in resisting the invasion of their land in the time of Pedro de Valdivia. It is has been accepted the Spaniards were unable to subdue the Mapuches on account of their low level of social organization. Because of such a widespread view, other factors have been neglected. The Spaniards undertook the conquest while knowing almost nothing about the natives and their country. Far from being inexperienced in warfare, the Mapuches were well organized in wartime. Their success was heavily based on their prowess in using the forest environment to fight against the Spaniards.
In 1540 Spanish armies seemed to be invincible. In Europe, as a demonstration of his power, Emperor Charles the Fifth entered Paris on 1 January 1540, at the head of his imperial army on the way to Flanders. A few days later, at the far end of South America, on 20 January 1540, conquistador Pedro de Valdivia left Cuzco to conquer Chile. Despite the limited strength of his troops, about 150 Spanish soldiers and a thousand Peruvian Indians, Pedro de Valdivia had no misgivings about the success of his enterprise. In less than fifty years the Spaniards had overthrown powerful native Empires such as the Aztecs’ and the Incas’. In addition Pedro de Valdivia was an experienced officer. 1 He was a veteran of Flanders and Italy. He participated in the battle of Pavia (1525) where the king of France was taken prisoner. Later he won fame in Peru by fighting on Francisco Pizarro’s side. Owing both to the past successes of the Spanish armies in Europe and the Americas and to his military background, Pedro de Valdivia and his men could not imagine failing to conquer Chile.
It was, however, on this fringe of the Americas that the Spaniards were defeated by the natives. Their tough campaigns against the Mapuches were unsuccessful. Because of the continuous uprisings of the Mapuches, the inspired missionary Diego de Rosales termed Chile as the Indian Flanders. At the beginning of the seventeenth century the Spaniards had no option but to change the war of conquest into a defensive war and, above all, to recognize the autonomy of the Mapuches’ territory (Treaty of Quillin, 1641). Of course the Mapuches were not the only native people who resisted the conquest of their lands. On the margins of their empire the Spaniards had to face strong resistance. 2 They progressed in territories inhabited by mobile Amerindian groups who were living in inhospitable ecological environments (deserts, deep forests, swamps). For instance, the Chiriguanos in the dry Gran Chaco, the Chichimecs in the Mexican deserts, or the Amazonian Guarani groups were the cause of long-lasting struggles against the invaders. In the Chichimec case, nearly half a century (1550–90) was needed for the Spaniards to defeat the natives. Nevertheless, despite the natives’ resoluteness, the Spaniards often could contain such resistances thanks to military expeditions and the creation of Roman Catholic missions, which played an important part in the control of the conquered peoples. But in Chile the Spaniards were unable to subjugate the Mapuches during the entire colonial period (1540 to 1810). Classical studies on Spanish conquests in South America give few clues to explain the Mapuche case, in which the usual positions between Spaniards and natives are inverted. Most of the works on military conflicts between the southern Amerindians and the Spaniards are centred on Spanish successes. In broad outline, the analysis often rests on binary oppositions: on the one side, power and force; on the other side, helplessness and submission. That is why the natives’ knowledge of warfare has occupied a marginal position in colonial studies of the Americas. Apart from a few pioneer works, such as those of Georges Raudzens and Ross Hassig, it is probably because the Amerindians often lost their confrontations against the Spaniards that analysing indigenous war-making has not been regarded as being of much interest. 3
However, recent works on the North American frontiers have thrown new light on conflicts between natives and conquerors, and involve thorough studies which are useful for re-examining the Mapuche case. Concerning the North American south-west, Charlotte Gradie, Susan Deeds, and Maria Wade explore the early uprisings of the hunter-gatherer tribes of Nueva Vizcaya and the Texas Edwards Plateau. 4 On the North American south-east, two books which complement each other, by Steven Oatis and William Ramsey respectively, concern the Yamasee frontier and the conflicts with the Mississippian groups. 5 For their part, Clay Mathers, Jeffrey Mitchem, and Charles Haecker edited in 2013 a comparative synthesis on the sixteenth-century Spanish expeditions towards the American south-west and south-east frontiers, including military aspects. 6 While challenging Frederick Turner’s view on the frontier, 7 these new Indian historians or ethnohistorians provide a global understanding of conflicts which are regarded as part of a complex process of exchange, trade, violence, mutual changes, and living together in disputed territories. It is not possible to sum up in a few lines these rich contributions. Nonetheless, several points as regards the natives’ war-making can be highlighted briefly. As shown by the uprisings of the Guales (1597) and Tepehuanes (1616–17), the natives of the North American south-east and south-west were able to mobilize large contingents of warriors. Although inter-tribal wars were common among the natives, they could form alliances to repel the Spaniards, as occurred with the Guales and Yamasee tribes in the early seventeenth century. To attack the Spaniards they developed different tactics which were not limited to sporadic raids, like the Pueblo communities in New Mexico. 8 Moreover, the Mississippian tribes used to build defences which consisted of log palisades, sometimes surrounded by buffer zones. 9 Thus, like other native peoples of the world, the Maoris of New Zealand, the Australian Aborigines, or the Tuaregs in Africa, for instance, the American hunter-gatherers or pre-agriculturists could design a type of warfare more sophisticated than generally thought. 10 To what extent was it also the case with the Mapuches?
The aim of the paper is to find out the real reasons for the Mapuches’ success in resisting the Spaniards at the very beginning of the struggle. In order to analyse the original Mapuches’ war-making before later changes due to the prolonged contact with the Spaniards, the paper focuses on the first decade or so of the confrontation, corresponding to Pedro de Valdivia’s era, 1540–53. (see Figure 1). The thesis usually accepted among scholars to explain the Spaniards’ defeat comes from Alvaro Jara’s work, which greatly influenced subsequent studies. According to Jara, the Spaniards could not win against the Mapuches because of the low level of social organization of the natives. 11 Actually, the Mapuches had no pyramidal social structure which could be regarded as similar to that of the Incas. They had neither king nor emperor who could be easily deposed. Nevertheless, this is not enough to fully understand why the Mapuches could face the invaders. In order to get a more convincing explanation, it is necessary to have a global view on the beginning of the conflict between the Spaniards and the natives. How did Pedro de Valdivia and his men undertake the conquest of the Mapuches’ territory? What did they know about the natives and their country? Were the Mapuches inexperienced in warfare, as Jara claimed? Moreover, Jara and most other scholars paid no attention to the ecological environment where the war was taking place. Southern Chile was covered with thick forests over endless miles. 12 It is not difficult to guess this had consequences for the course of the war. How did the Mapuches make the forest their best ally in this asymmetric conflict? 13
Valdivia’s conquest and the Mapuches’ resistance in early colonial Chile.
I
The way wars begin often has great bearing on their outcome. What was the military situation in Chile when the Spaniards arrived? Was it a corner of the earth with neither conflict nor war between native peoples? In fact, before the Spaniards, the Incas had tried to conquer Chile. Their expansion towards the south started in the early fifteenth century. The main stages of it, however, occurred during the reigns of Tupac Yupanqui (1471–93) and Huayna Capac (1493–1527).
14
The Incas’ conquest of Chile had been more difficult that is generally thought. In order to maintain the precarious Pax Incaica, no fewer than 50,000 warriors occupied northern Chile at the end of the fifteenth century.
15
When Pedro de Valdivia came from Peru, the Incas had annexed most of the Atacama Desert and part of the Central Valley. Further south the Incas attempted to take control of the Mapuches’ territory. But the forested country of the Mapuches remained mostly unreachable for them. Because of the resistance of the natives, the Children of the Sun could not go beyond the Maule River.
16
They stopped the conquest there and converted northern Chile into an agricultural colony, according to Inca Garcilaso de la Vega:
The Inca ordered them not to go further in conquering new lands but take care in cultivating and benefiting from what they won … Because of that order the Incas of Chile stopped their conquest, strengthened their frontier, and put limits and landmarks on their territory, which on the southern part of their empire was bounded by the Maule River.
17
In 1540 the Incas’ border of the Kollasuyu was far from being stable. According to Vivar’s chronicle, Quilicanta was the main military Inca chieftain (curaca) of the area. 18 He was in conflict with Michimalonko and Tanjalonko, the two Mapuche chieftains of the Aconcagua Valley. 19 It was not a simple dispute between touchy neighbours on the limits of their lands, as we can deduce from Vivar’s chronicle: ‘Those chieftains [the Inca ones] were at war with the cacique Michimalongo before we came into the area … and the war between them was quite tough when the general [Pedro de Valdivia] arrived in this land with the Christians.’ 20 A short time before the Spaniards’ arrival, north of the River Mapocho in the Coquimbo Valley the Incas exterminated 5,000 native Indians because they did not want to collaborate in digging ditches for irrigation. As Vivar said, it was probably an excuse to depopulate the area and get new lands for Inca settlers. 21 Thus, the Spaniards did not arrive in a pacified place where the Indians were living peacefully. 22 They did not invent the frontier but came into a disputed one between Incas and Mapuches.
Nevertheless, the arrival of the Spaniards changed the situation. The Incas of the area thought the Spaniards would be helpful in reducing the continuous threat the Mapuches represented in the Central Valley of Chile. Because of the early alliance between Incas and Spaniards, the Mapuches thought of both as foreign enemies. Or rather, the natives thought that Incas and Spaniards were the same enemy, as written by Pedro de Valdivia: ‘They called us Incas and our horses hueque incas, which means sheep of the Incas.’ 23 The assimilation between Spaniards and Incas in Mapuches’ minds was also fed by a noticeable continuity in the occupation of the territory by both invaders. Once he arrived in the Mapocho Valley, Pedro de Valdivia founded, on 24 February 1541, Santiago de Nuevo Extremo, on the southern bank of the river. The site was not free of any occupation, being the location of an Inca garrison led by cacique Huelén-Huala. 24 At the end of January 1541 Quilicanta allowed Pedro de Valdivia and his men to settle there.
Pedro Valdivia did not choose at random this particular place to build Santiago. As Captain Marmolejo explained, it was the best site he could find in the Mapocho Valley. 25 The main advantage of the spot was its geographical situation. It was located in a strategic knot, just at the limit between Michimalonko’s and Tanjalonko’s territories, the two enemies of the Incas and the Spaniards in the area. It was also on the Inca Road, which was a vital umbilical cord with Peru to get reinforcements and supplies. The future Santiago was an excellent military site. It was behind two arms of the Mapocho River and protected by marshy lands to the west and the south. On the east the hill of Huelén (Santa Lucía) gave a sweeping view of the whole surrounding country. It was an asset to observe the Indians’ movements and give the alarm in case of Mapuche onslaughts. In addition, the Spaniards had at hand much wood and timber in the nearby forests, which was essential to build the new city. 26
The Mapuches knew that Incas and Spaniards were not the same men. Michimalonko’s troops had already fought against those bearded people when Adelantado Diego de Almagro came into the Central Valley through the Aconcagua to discover Chile and returned to Peru (1535–8). Contrary to the widespread view that the natives regarded the Spaniards as gods or supernatural creatures, the Mapuches were soon certain they were ‘men of flesh and blood’, as Lobera stated. 27 They understood the Spaniards represented the same threat as the Incas. But what the Mapuches could not know was the significance of the name given by Pedro de Valdivia to the new place, Santiago de Nuevo Extremo, whereas it contained a clear message for all Spaniards of the time. During the Reconquista against the Moors in Medieval Spain, the apostle Santiago (St James) was the protector of the Christian fighters. When the soldiers were in trouble, the apostle was said to appear and help the Christians. In their beliefs, partly inherited from the Middle Ages, the conquistadores thought Santiago followed them in the Americas. For instance, as Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda asserted, thanks to the apostle, Cortés and his men succeeded in defeating the Indians of the region of Tabasco in Mexico. 28
According to Marmolejo, this was the reason why Pedro de Valdivia named the first city of Chile Santiago de Nuevo Extremo: ‘As I said, he gave it the name of Santiago as defender and patron saint of Spain in case of war against the Indians he was supposed to be confronted with every day.’ 29 The apostle appeared to act as he was supposed to do. While Michimalonko’s troops threatened Santiago a few times after its foundation, a mysterious knight riding a white horse appeared and terrified the Indians. He could not be anyone else than the ‘glorious Santiago’, as Lobera said. 30 The added words ‘Nuevo Extremo’ are also an evident reference to the Reconquista, as is the designation of Chile as the ‘Nueva Extremadura’. The terms ‘Extremo’ and ‘Extremadura’ were not merely an evocation of Pedro de Valdivia’s birthplace, as is often asserted. They come from the Latin expression extrema dorii (the borders of the Duero): in medieval times this designated the territories to be conquered from the Moors beyond the Duero River. 31 Thus, by using those terms, the goal of the Spaniards in Chile was unambiguous. They wanted to convert the defensive border of the Incas into a new front of conquest towards the south. Santiago de Nuevo Extremo was thought to be the starting point of the military enterprise.
II
Once they had defeated the powerful Aztec and Inca empires, the Spaniards could not guess the Mapuches would be able to stop them in the conquest of South America. The idea seemed to be unbelievable to most sixteenth-century Spaniards, as Marmolejo said in the introduction to his chronicle of Chile:
Many people will remain speechless when they know that at the far end of the world, naked and barbarian people, without any weapon, are so warlike, shrewd and bold in the defence of their homeland as the ones of this province.
32
As on the margins of many empires all over the world and down through the centuries (Roman, Chinese, or Russian, for instance), in the conquerors’ minds the territory of the Mapuches belonged to the category of ‘barbarian’ frontiers and conquest appeared to be easy. 33 Obviously, the Spaniards underestimated the difficulty of the task, despite the Incas’ previous defeat. In the following words of his introduction, Marmolejo lamented the impossibility for the Spaniards to subjugate the natives. The disappointment was all the greater as in those times Spain had one of the best armies in the world. Pedro de Valdivia and his men had weapons of steel and firearms unknown to the Mapuches, and they had horses which gave them a serious advantage. As Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda asserted, the Spaniards’ efficiency was based mostly on the cavalry: ‘the major hope and greatest possibilities to conquer the New World lie in horses’. 34 Thus, the striking paradox between a theoretical military superiority and the powerlessness of the conquistadores in defeating the Mapuches needs to be clarified.
The Spaniards knew very little about the land and the people they wanted to subdue. Marmolejo qualified the Mapuche area as ‘such an unknown land’. 35 As for Lobera, he stressed the lack of information they had about the people: ‘on the natives, we don’t know the origin, neither where they came from nor the way they took to come to those kingdoms, and we are speculating about that without getting at the truth’. 36 It was a major weakness to launch the conquest of southern Chile while knowing almost nothing about the land and the natives. The Spaniards did not perceive it clearly at the beginning of the war, and the Mapuches’ territory appeared full of promise. When they arrived in the Mapocho Valley, they were enthusiastic about leaving the Atacama Desert, where they had experienced too much thirst and starvation, to the point of eating dogs they caught on the way: ‘And when the sun rose, they were happy to find another dog and two pumpkins which they cooked in water without salt in order not to be thirsty.’ 37 Vivar celebrated as a deliverance the fact that they came at last to the land where ‘it often rains’. 38 Pedro de Valdivia did not have enough words to describe the many qualities of the country. After explaining the delightful aspects of the climate and enumerating all the resources of the region (food, water, firewood, timber, gold mines, and so on), he concluded ‘the land was nothing but a divine creation in order to have everything at hand’. 39
Nevertheless, the forest environment of southern Chile soon became less favourable than expected by the Spaniards. As Najera claimed, the whole territory of the Mapuches was a real fortress. Indeed its wildness converted the progress of the conquerors into a risky and tough adventure, as shown in the following extract taken from Lobera’s chronicle:
After crossing the river with a lot of difficulties, they continued ahead, opening tracks in the mountainous woodland with axes and machetes they had, doing that at the cost of their blood, hurting themselves at every step with the prickly bushes and thorns, and going through large swamps and rivers with not a piece of ground that was not a quagmire full of heavy mud. And the roots of the trees were so entangled that the horses remained crippled; and some of them caught their hoofs in the network of roots, and in that way we lost many of them.
40
Far from being unusual, the situation described appeared repeatedly in Spanish chronicles. Because of the abundant rainfall of the area, the Mapuches’ territory was covered with rainforests over endless miles. The thick undergrowth vegetation of the forests often made them impenetrable, particularly when invaded by Chilean bamboos. 41 There were also a lot of thorn bushes and urticating plants which injured the soldiers. It was difficult to make their way through the forests not only for men but also for horses. They often broke their legs when their hoofs became trapped in the tree roots. 42 Nonetheless, the Spaniards had to cross many rivers coming down from the Andes in rapid streams such as the Maule and Biobio rivers. 43 Many men and horses disappeared when crossing rivers. 44 The horses were often unable to escape from the sticky mud of the marshes, while others fell down from precipices. 45 If the cavalry in Chile was effective on open land, the situation was, however, different in the wild forests. Every chronicler refers to the laborious task of driving horses through forests. In addition, the wet climate of the country often eliminated the Spaniards’ firearms advantage, because it made gunpowder useless. 46 The natives knew that and took advantage of it by attacking after downpours. 47 Consequently, the barbarian frontier of the Spaniards was first of all that of a wild and impenetrable environment. The southern Chilean forests were like a green hell in which they were quite vulnerable.
The wildness of the area could only be inhabited by savage people, in the Spaniards’ minds. 48 As the Incas had done before, at the beginning of the conquest they called the Mapuches pormocaes or pomaucaes. Those designations came from the expression purum aucca, what meant in Quechua ‘unconquered enemies’, according to Holguín’s Quechua dictionary. 49 The term purum is mostly associated with the idea of uncivilized or barbarian people. 50 The translation given by Vivar expresses this representation of otherness: ‘Seeing their way of life, the Incas called them pomaucaes, which meant savage wolves.’ 51 The Spaniards shared the same view of the natives. Pedro de Valdivia compared the Mapuches not to wolves but brave bulls. 52 By using images which evoke animals of the forest, the Spaniards clearly made a link between the woodland environment and the natives they supposed to be uncivilized people. That is why, at the very beginning of the conquest, Vivar asserted: ‘as they are people without order and reason, they had no experience in war’. 53
III
The Mapuches were not as ignorant of warfare as the Spaniards supposed them to be. After many decades fighting against the Incas, the Mapuches had gained a solid experience. 54 Pedro de Valdivia was implicitly to recognize it after several unsuccessful campaigns: ‘I promise on my faith that for thirteen years I served Your Majesty and I fought against a lot of nations, I have never seen such a stubborn people in fighting as those Indians were against us.’ 55 Nevertheless, the Spaniards were not the Incas. How did the acquired experience make the Mapuches able to face the new invaders?
From the arrival of the Spaniards the Mapuches were immediately able to mobilize their warriors and prepare coordinated actions. On 11 September 1541 Michimalonko’s troops set out to burn Santiago. For, contrary to the thesis of Jara, who considers that Pedro de Valdivia could not win against the natives because of their low level of social hierarchy, the Mapuches were well organized when they were at war. 56 In fact the social organization of the natives had a dualistic form, depending on peace or war. In times of peace, they used to live in scattered clans (rehues). They did not have any principal leader who might be regarded as king. Their social hierarchy was reduced to its simplest expression, for each clan had its own chieftain (ulmen). Everyday life was regulated by customary rules (admapu), which could be somewhat different from one clan to another. 57
But in times of war against external enemies (weichan), a centralized power emerged promptly, as occurred when the Spaniards tried to settle their territory.
58
As soon as the conquistadores laid the first stone of Santiago, all the Mapuche clans united to repel the invaders. As Vivar said:
They made a general call for unity, put their people under orders and held large banquets and [ritual] drunken parties as they are used to doing. And it is then when they make their agreements and decide for war, which is what they agreed to do in one of their gatherings … they ordered to be put to death all the Christians that were on earth saying they were few.
59
The kind of native meeting referred to by Vivar was headed by a gentoqui. He was a central figure in the preparations for war against external enemies. 60 Under his authority a main military leader was elected and recognized by all the clans for the duration of the war. He was chosen among the proudest warriors. The gentoqui sent to the elected leader an axe with a black stone (toquicura). It symbolized the fact that he was the repository of the general military command. That is why such a military leader was simply called toqui, which comes from the verb toquilin, to command. The Mapuches had other specialized toquis who headed a single kind of fighters. For instance, Najera mentions the existence of pilquitoqui. 61 The term is composed of pilqui, meaning ‘arrow’, and toqui, ‘leader’. The pilquitoqui was thus the chieftain of the Mapuche archers, but he was himself under the orders of the main toqui.
The military hierarchy of the natives did not end there. In the different Mapuche districts, they had military chieftains called lonko, such as Michimalonko or Tanjalonko in the Aconcagua Valley. The lonko commanded local battalions (linco) which could be composed of thousands of soldiers. Furthermore, among the soldiers two categories of warriors were to be distinguished. The privates were called cona, whereas the non-commissioned officers were designated by the term cupilonko. As shown by Marmolejo, the cona had the hair cut under their ears and just above their eyes. 62 For their part, the cupilonko had their heads entirely shaved. 63 This was certainly easily spotted by other native soldiers when engaged in combat and enabled them to transmit their orders.
Thus, war led the clans to transcend their differences and to stick together against the invaders. During the war they all accepted they depended on a pyramidal military hierarchy, whereas in times of peace each group used to respect only the chieftain of its own clan. Some rituals and practices show that in Mapuche culture the art of warfare was ancient and always associated with the forest environment. For instance, the ritual of war meetings has often been described by scholars. But the different authors paid little attention to the meaning of the places where the election of the main toqui was held. Najera gives one of the rare descriptions of these sites:
they are forests which seem to be made or designed for such purposes, small in area and with very big and twisted trees, places which we commonly call drinking spots for they are specifically set aside for the Indians to drink in them, and as in a council or in a town hall, the chieftains and people gathered in such [ritual] drunken parties have their council to decide about matters concerning war governance, and about questions such as uprisings, peace, campaigns or other enterprises.
64
As we can deduce from the quotation, they were exclusively reserved for military issues. They were located in secret parts of the forest. 65 Only chieftains and valiant soldiers (conahuentu) were admitted to participate in war councils. To refer to such meeting sites the Mapuche used two terms of different significance: lepun and alihuen. By lepun they designated the materiality of the space. It was a circular area planted with old trees and without undergrowth vegetation as in wood pasture. 66 Beyond the material space of the lepun, the big and twisted trees mentioned by Najera had a deep meaning for the Mapuches. The term alihuen is generally translated as ‘big tree’. However, this is not the tree as it is regarded by Western eyes. 67 To understand the meaning of alihuen it is necessary to bear in mind that for the Mapuches every human being was personified by a tree of the forest. Alihuen was not merely a tree but a spiritual incarnation of a person or a major event he or she represented. 68 Glorious toquis, noticeable victories, and great decisions concerning war were symbolized by planted trees. Such plantations were ritualized. When they celebrated a war council, another native man, apart from the gentoqui, emerged from the others. He was called genboye (or genvoye), which means ‘lord of the canelo tree’. 69 He represented the highest spiritual man, for the canelo tree was the most important of Mapuche sacred trees. 70 On the lepun, the genboye came to war councils with a canelo tree and planted it into the ground to mark the event and the elected toqui. 71 Thus, as a living chronicle of war, each canelo tree planted by the genboye recalled each council celebrated and the decisions which were taken by the Mapuches. When the native council opted for war against invaders, they sent them an unequivocal message, as shown by Marmolejo: ‘when they know that strangers have entered their country and want to fight against them, they issue an order to put on the track branches of a tree the Spaniards call canelo with bloodstained arrows across them’. 72 The canelo tree was usually a symbol of peace between the Mapuches, as the olive tree was in the Mediterranean world, but of course not when thrown down on the tracks leading to their territory with bloodstained arrows on it. Once war was declared, for eight days the Mapuche warriors remained in the forest in order to train and be well drilled to fight against their enemies. 73 This step in the preparation for war was called kolullallin. According to Luis de Valdivia, the term kolu designates both the colour brown and the clay of that colour they put on their faces. Llallin refers to the fact of becoming a lot thinner. It was one of the expected results of the Mapuches’ training for war. 74
IV
The Mapuches regarded the forest environment not only as the place to prepare for war. As Vivar said, the natives avoided face-to-face confrontations on open land where, in the first encounters, they suffered great damage caused by the Spanish cavalry. 75 When they were in trouble, they would take refuge in the closest forests. 76 But it would be simplistic to reduce the part of the forest in Mapuche warfare to a protective environment. What did the Mapuches find in the forest they could not get in other theatres of war? How did they use the forested environment to organize the defence of their homeland?
Because of the duration of the campaigns, supplies were the lifeblood of war. When fighting, every Mapuche warrior brought as his only supply a small bag filled with flour (ulldpu). The Spaniards were amazed by the capacity of the Mapuches to engage for several weeks or months with so little provision. Of course they could not do so without any other sources of food. The forest environment provided them with countless nourishing resources unknown to Pedro de Valdivia and his men. The collection of wild berries, plants, roots, and tubers was an important part of their usual diet, and Mapuche troops could easily be fed. Many trees and bushes of the Chilean forests produce a lot of nuts or fruits. The most noticeable is the coniferous Araucaria araucana, called pehuen by the natives. 77 It is a typical tree of the Araucanía zone which gives large quantities of energy-giving nuts. Mapuche warriors could pick them up from the ground. They could also gather the berries of the boldo tree (Peumus boldus), peumo tree (Cryptocarya alba), maqui tree (Aristotelia chilensis), or palo amarillo bush (Berberis montana), to give a few examples. 78 Apart from trees and bushes, other plants provided them with edible resources such as different wild potatoes, creepers such as the copihue (Lapageria rosea) which bear tasty fruit, and rhizomes of ferns such as those of the big añpe (Lophosoria quadripinnata).
The Mapuches’ knowledge of the food resources of the forest was a real advantage over the Spaniards. The Mapuches knew that the question of supplies was the invaders’ Achilles heel. They wanted to push their advantage. As often as possible they launched raids and destroyed Spanish crops. 79 The natives also burned their own crops in the zone between the Mapocho and Maule rivers, and ordered their people not involved in war to take refuge south of the River Maule. 80 Thus, the Spaniards could not count on the Mapuche harvesting. Pedro de Valdivia tried to stop the Mapuches’ strategic withdrawal. He ordered General Francisco de Villagra to keep the natives from crossing the Maule, but certainly with no success. 81 A short time after the foundation of Concepción del Nuevo Extremo, in 1552 the natives used another strategy to ruin the Spaniards’ supplies. As lamented by Vivar, they succeeded in introducing large numbers of rats into the fortress thanks to holes they carved under the fortifications. In the traps the Spaniards laid in order to limit the plague they found some days 400 or 500 rats. 82 More commonly the Mapuches hid food in the forest such as maize or araucaria nuts. The conquistadores desperately looked for it, and to find some hidden food was celebrated as a great event. 83 No doubt the Mapuches wanted to wage a war of attrition in order to deprive the Spaniards of supplies, according to Vivar. 84
In addition, the natives had at hand many kinds of wood to make their weapons. It was another clear advantage, as stressed by Najera. 85 Although Spanish weapons were of a more advanced technology, Pedro de Valdivia and his men were not capable of making them. Their weapons came from specialized centres located in Spain, mainly in Guipúzcoa and Toledo. Mapuche weapons were simpler but also easier to reproduce ad infinitum. They had at their disposal a large range of woods with different properties suitable for each kind of weapon. For instance, the hardwoods of the boldo tree (Peumus boldus), espino tree (Acacia caven), and guayacán bush (Porlieria chilensis) were used to make spears and clubs. 86 Bows were made with the maqui tree (Aristotelia chilensis), whereas slim bamboos were used for arrows. 87 Sometimes the Mapuches coated the arrows with poison prepared from colliguaya (Colliguaja odorifera), a common euphorbiaceous shrub in the Araucanía zone. The poison comes from the latex contained in the roots. It was used by the natives for war but never for hunting on account of its high toxicity. 88 It could kill a man in only 24 hours, according to Lobera, who found in a native fortress large earthen vats filled with poisonous herbs. 89
Furthermore, the Mapuche had defence systems based on forest planning. As John M. Cooper noted, they used ‘trenches protected with torn branches, pitfalls and ditches with sharp stakes at the bottom’ and ‘log forts and palisades’. 90 For his part, Louis de Armond added further observations based on Najera’s chronicle concerning Mapuche tactics in felling trees over trails to make the Spaniards’ retreats more difficult. 91 The following research neglected the subject in the main.
Vivar’s chronicle gives valuable information on the Mapuches’ defences made of trees, particularly when describing Michimalonko’s refuge. It stood on the Aconcagua Valley north-east of Santiago. On arriving at the place, Pedro de Valdivia and his men were surprised to see in front of them a huge wall of vegetation made this way:
Carob trees are tall trees in the country, with large and thick thorns which are as large as half a nail of carpentry and strong and bulky. From those branches and trees, this chieftain [Michimalonko] had made such a stronghold which was ideally prepared both for attack and defence, mostly from people on horseback. It was so woven and thick that it seemed to be a fortress wall.
92
The native defence described by Vivar was a more complex structure than a common palisade made with logs. Actually, the description given corresponds to a hedge of very large dimensions like those of the defensive forests in medieval Europe (Wehrwald, Grenzwälder, haies forestières, plessis). 93 The thorny carob tree was well adapted to make a strong barrier. Such a natural defence was composed of several rows of old trees. Between them, flexible branches and young trees were bent and linked together or to older trees. The action of bending or twisting trees was called tomplin by the Mapuches. 94 Bent branches and trees continued to grow in those twisted positions. They soon became densely entangled, hence the aspect of being woven, as Vivar stressed. Eventually what remained was an impressive wall of vegetation, as seen by Pedro de Valdivia and his men. Michimalonko’s carob tree wall was several kilometres long, for, as Vivar specified, it began from a tall hill, spanned a valley, and ran on to very high pinnacle rocks on the other side. It completely closed the access from the lower part of the valley to Michimalonko’s refuge. Moreover, turrets were built all along the wall for the native archers. 95 In Tanjalonko’s territory Vivar described a defence of the same kind. It was located north-west of Santiago in a thick forest of old trees and made with ‘heavy and very well woven branches’. 96 It was designed as an arc from a river to a lake. It was impossible to build such defences made of trees so soon after the Spaniards’ arrival, contrary to Villalobos’s point of view. 97 In fact, they were a survival from the previous war against the Incas.
Confronted with such walls, the Spaniards had only two possibilities. The first was to skirt around the obstacle, which is what they did to attack Michimalonko’s fort. That involved trudging wearily for a long distance across the forested slopes of the nearby hills and arriving from a more elevated point than the wall itself. The second alternative was to cut a hole in it with machetes and make the soldiers go through one by one, as explained by Lobera.
98
This hard and perilous work had to be achieved under continuous volleys of native arrows. But after the barrier was crossed, the situation became even more critical. The Spaniards had no option but to win the combat. For, in the contrary case, the wall prevented them from any possibility of falling back quickly and allowed them little chance to escape alive, as shown in the following example:
they saw a squad of Spaniards get out from the [native] fort, running down the slope in a very disorderly way, and behind them a huge battalion of Indians coming after them and inflicting as many injuries as the defence of bushes and wild bamboo where the horses were entangled.
99
Unable to escape from the trap of the wall of vegetation, 44 Spaniards perished in the clash, mostly cavalrymen. Apart from the static defence of the walls, the Mapuches could quickly prepare barriers with bent or felled trees. 100 It was an essential part of their preparation for ambushes. The purpose of these trees over tracks was, above all, to lead the Spaniards towards the thickest parts of the forests by closing many trails and allowing them one path as the only option. 101 Later, when the Spaniards were far enough along it was easy to block the path with other bent or felled trees, and thus prevent their enemies’ retreat.
According to Lobera and Vivar, it is in an ambush of this kind that Pedro de Valdivia waged his last battle, in Tucapel. After several hours fighting against Lautaro’s troops, and having lost almost all his men, he tried to escape from the forested area where the combat was taking place. 102 But as every way out was closed by bent and felled trees, the Mapuches could easily take him prisoner. 103 They put him to death on 27 December 1553. A few months later, on 23 February 1554, General Francisco de Villagra narrowly missed being killed in similar circumstances in the battle of Mariguenu (Marihueñu). The Mapuches lured him into a trap. When retreating from a forested hill south of Concepción, all the return tracks were obstructed by barriers made of bent and felled trees. 104 Lautaro’s troops took advantage of the situation to attack the Spaniards at each of these barriers. As detailed by Vivar, there were heavy losses among the Spanish troops: 90 Spaniards were killed, as well as 3,000 Indian auxiliaries. In one of the attacks the natives managed to unseat and injure General Villagra. Unhorsed, he was in great danger. He was spared thanks to another cavalryman, who gave him his own horse to enable him to escape alive. 105 Thus, the bent and felled trees were a deciding factor in the success of the Mapuches’ ambushes. As a consequence of Valdivia’s death and Villagra’s defeat, all the forts of the area were abandoned for several years by the Spanish soldiers. The people of Concepción were shipped back to the starting point of the conquest, Santiago de Nuevo Extremo.
V
To conclude, Jara’s thesis is not enough to fully understand why the Spaniards failed to conquer the Mapuches’ territory. The analysis made above on the first decade or so of the war makes it possible to point out a new series of factors explaining the Mapuches’ success in preventing the Spaniards from conquering their land. What the Spaniards regarded as a new front of conquest was an old frontier for the natives. In 1540 the Mapuches had been fighting against the Incas for at least a century. Obviously, they were not at all inexperienced warriors but already had long military experience. The ceremonial of the war councils, the process of the main toqui’s election, and their prowess in landscaping defences from vegetation could not have been invented straight after the arrival of the Spaniards in Chile. They were rooted in ancient knowledge the Mapuches had acquired from their previous enduring war against the Incas, or perhaps even before. Pedro de Valdivia and his men could not count on the effect of surprise. On the contrary, the native defences were operational and the Mapuches were soon in battle array. They had been able to mobilize large numbers of warriors in order to lead coordinated attacks on the Spaniards since the foundation of Santiago.
The Mapuches’ onslaughts were not those of distressed people having bravery as their only asset but fighting in a disordered way. They were well organized when they were at war with external enemies. As seen above, their warfare was based on a substantial military hierarchy going from the private (cona) to the main military leader (toqui), whose authority was recognized by all native fighters in wartime. The native military hierarchy also included non-commissioned officers (cupilonko), district officers (lonko), and specialized officers such as the chieftain of the native archers (pilquitoqui). The military organization of the Mapuches did not spring from the war against the Spaniards, for it was already well established when the first combat took place. Thanks to their experience, the Mapuches were able to use a large range of tactics to repel the conquistadores. The war of attrition they conducted by reducing as much as they could the Spaniards’ ability to obtain supplies shows that the Mapuches were soon aware of their enemies’ weaknesses. It also demonstrates that the Mapuches could devise an elaborate strategy of war, like some native groups of the North American south-west and south-east (Tepehuán, Guale, or Pueblo tribes, for instance).
But the most determining factor lies in the forested nature of southern Chile and the ability of the natives to fight in this kind of environment. In fact the forest played a prominent part in the Mapuches’ war-making. It was not only where they found countless supplies or suitable wood for fashioning their weapons. The forest was the place where they used to train for war. Their forts were located in remote spots of the forest and protected from the invaders by defences made of vegetation similar to fortress walls. From the forest they launched large-scale raids on the Spanish forts, but in the main they avoided face-to-face confrontation on open land where they were much too vulnerable because of the cavalrymen. They were not, however, in as strong a position as when they ambushed the Spaniards in the forest by preventing their enemies’ retreat with bent and felled trees and attacking them on the blocked trails. Such a tactic was dreadfully effective. In a striking contrast, Pedro de Valdivia and his men were quite vulnerable in the forest. The asset they had with horses on open land was almost reduced to nothing. For them, the forest environment was an unknown world and they had to face a type of warfare they were not prepared for. Valdivia’s death in the thick forests surrounding the fort of Tucapel symbolized all the difficulties of the Spaniards in fighting in this wild environment. It also marked a major turning point in a war which remained impossible for the Spaniards to win.
Footnotes
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
1
M.J. Cordero, The Transformations of Araucania from Valdivia’s Letters to Vivar’s Chronicle (New York, Peter Lang, 2001), pp. 22–4.
2
D.J. Weber, Bárbaros: The Spaniards and their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment (Yale, YUP, 2005); J. Lockhart and S.B. Schwartz, Early Latin America: A History of Spanish America and Brazil (Cambridge, CUP, 2005), pp. 253–304; C. Lázaro Ávila, Las fronteras de América y los Flandes indianos (Madrid, CSIC, 1997).
3
G. Raudzens, ‘So Why Were the Aztecs Conquered, and What Were the Wider Implications? Testing Military Superiority as a Cause of Europe’s Pre-industrial Colonial Conquests’, War in History II (1995), pp. 87–104; G. Raudzens, ‘Why Did Amerindian Defenses Fail? Parallels in the European Invasion of Hispaniola, Virginia and Beyond’, War in History III (1996), pp. 331–52; R. Hassig, War and Society in Ancient Mesoamerica (Berkeley, UCP, 1992); R. Hassig, Aztec Warfare: Imperial Expansion and Political Control (Oklahoma, UOP, 1995); W. Stavig, The World of Tupac Amaru: Conflict, Community, and Identity in Colonial Peru (Lincoln, UNP, 1999); R.J. Chacon and R.G. Mendoza, eds, Latin American Indigenous Warfare and Ritual Violence (Tucson, UAP, 2007).
4
The main native communities were the Xixime, Tepehuán, Tarahumara, and Concho groups in Nueva Vizcaya, and the Coahuiltecan and Apache groups in the Texas Edwards Plateau. C.M. Gradie, The Tepehuan Revolt of 1616: Militarism, Evangelism and Colonialism in Seventeenth Century Nueva Vizcaya (Salt Lake City, UUP, 2000); S.M. Deeds, Defiance and Deference in Mexico’s Colonial North: Indians under Spanish Rule in Nueva Vizcaya (Austin, UTP, 2003); M.F. Wade, The Native Americans of the Texas Edwards Plateau, 1582–1799 (Austin, UTP, 2003); R.J. Chacon and R.G. Mendoza, eds, North American Indigenous Warfare and Ritual Violence (Tucson, UAP, 2007).
5
The Mississippian groups extended from the Mississippi Valley to South Carolina, including large parts of present-day Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. S.J. Oatis, A Colonial Complex: South Carolina’s Frontiers in the Era of the Yamasee War (1680–1730) (Lincoln, UNP, 2004); W.L. Ramsey, The Yamasee War: A Study of Culture, Economy, and Conflict in the Colonial South (Lincoln, UNP, 2008).
6
C. Mathers, J. Mitchem, and C. Haecker, eds, Native and Spanish New Worlds: Sixteenth-Century Entradas in the American Southwest and Southeast (Tucson, UAP, 2013).
7
F.J. Turner, The Frontier in American History (New York, Holt, 1920).
8
The natives employed tactics to combat Spanish cavalry, or minimize waterborne assaults and sieges. They also ambushed the Spaniards and trapped the horses: Mathers et al., Native and Spanish New Worlds, p. 220.
9
Oatis, Colonial Complex, p. 13; M.D. Fontana, ‘Of Walls and War: Fortification and Warfare in the Mississippian Southeast’, PhD thesis, Chicago, University of Illinois, 2007, pp. 54–5.
10
A.R. Vayda, Maori Warfare (Wellington, Reed, 1960); J. Connor, The Australian Frontier Wars, 1788–1838 (Sydney, UNSWP, 2005); R.J. Richard, Warfare in African History: New Approaches to African History (Cambridge, CUP, 2012); L.H. Keeley, War before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage (Oxford, OUP, 1996), p. 8; A. Gat, War in Human Civilization (Oxford, OUP, 2008), pp. 25–35; W.E. Lee, ed., Empires and Indigenes: Intercultural Alliance, Imperial Expansion and Warfare in the Early Modern World (New York, NYUP, 2011).
11
A. Jara, Guerre et société au Chili: Essai de sociologie coloniale (Paris, IHEAL, 1961), pp. 53–4.
12
P. Camus Gayán, Ambientes, bosques y gestión forestal en Chile (1541–2005) (Santiago de Chile, LOM, 2006), pp. 59–60; S. Villalobos, La vida fronteriza en Chile (Madrid, MAPFRE, 1992), pp. 241–2.
13
A.J.R. Mack, ‘Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict’, World Politics II (1975), pp. 175–200; I. Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (New York, CUP, 2005).
14
L. León Solís, ‘Expansión Inca y resistencia indígena en Chile, 1470–1536’, Chungará X (1983), pp. 95–115; J. Bengoa, La memoria olvidada: Historia de los pueblos indígenas de Chile (Santiago de Chile, Biblioteca del Bicentenario, 2004), p. 53.
15
Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, Comentarios reales que tratan de el origen de los Incas (Madrid, Nicolás Rodríguez, 1623), I, p. 247.
16
J.L. Rector, The History of Chile (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 30; T.D. Dillehay, Monuments, Empires, and Resistance: The Araucanian Polity and Ritual Narratives (Cambridge, CUP, 2007), pp. 100–1.
17
‘El Inca les embio a mandar que no conquistasen mas nuevas tierras, sino que atendiesen con mucho cuidado cultivar y beneficiar las que avían ganado … Con este mandato cesaron los Incas de Chile sus conquistas, fortalecieron sus fronteras, pusieron sus términos y mojones que a la parte del Sur fue el último término de su Imperio el Río Maulli’: Garcilaso de la Vega, Comentarios reales, I, p. 248.
18
J. Vivar, Crónica de los reinos de Chile (Madrid, Dastin, 2001), pp. 95, 111; Mariño de Lobera, Crónica del reino de Chile, Colección de historiadores de Chile y documentos relativos a la historia nacional (Santiago de Chile, Ferrocarril, 1865), IV, p. 58.
19
Vivar, Crónica de los reinos, pp. 93–4.
20
‘Estos caciques hacían la guerra al cacique Michimalongo antes que nosotros entrásemos en la tierra … la cual tenían muy trabada cuando el general allegó con los cristianos a estas tierras’: ibid., p. 95.
21
Ibid., p. 85.
22
L. León Solís, Lonkos, Curakas and Zupais: The Collapse and Re-making of Tribal Society in Central Chile (1536–1560) (London, ILAS, 1992).
23
‘Llámannos a nosotros ingas, y a nuestros caballos hueque ingas, que quiere decir ovejas de ingas’: J. Toribio Medina, ed., Cartas de Pedro de Valdivia (Seville, M. Carmona, 1929), p. 205.
24
B. Vicuña Mackenna, Historia crítica y social de la cuidad de Santiago desde su fundación hasta nuestros días (1541–1868) (Valparaíso, Mercurio, 1869), pp. 22–3.
25
A. Góngora Marmolejo, Historia de Chile, desde su descubrimiento hasta el año 1575, Colección de historiadores de Chile y documentos relativos a la historia nacional (Santiago de Chile, Ferrocarril, 1862), II, p. 6.
26
Lobera, Crónica del reino, p. 49.
27
Ibid., p. 39.
28
J. Ginés de Sepúlveda, Historia del Nuevo Mundo (Madrid, Alianza, 1996), p. 107.
29
Marmolejo, Historia de Chile, p. 7.
30
Lobera, Crónica del reino, p. 59; Vivar, Crónica de los reinos, p. 237.
31
V. Clément, De la marche-frontière au pays-des-pays: Forêts, sociétés paysannes et territoires en Vieille-Castille (XIe–XXe siècle) (Madrid, Casa de Velázquez, 2002), p. 136.
32
‘Muchos se holgarán de saber que en el cabo del mundo, jente desnuda y bárbara, sin armas sea tan belicosa, ardidosa y arriscada por la defensión de su tierra, como es la de esta provincia’: Marmolejo, Historia de Chile, p. xii.
33
J.C. Romer, ed., Face aux barbares: Marches et confins d’empires de la Grande muraille de Chine au Rideau de fer (Paris, Tallandier, 2004); P. Sénac, La frontière et les hommes, VIIIe-XIIe siècle: le peuplement musulman au nord de l’Ebre et les débuts de la reconquête aragonaise (Paris, Maisonneuve et Larose, 2000), p. 354.
34
Sepúlveda, Historia del Nuevo Mundo, p. 131.
35
Marmolejo, Historia de Chile, p. xii.
36
‘De cuyos naturales ni sabemos el oríjen, ni de qué parte, o por qué vía hayan aportado a estos reinos; y andamos conjeturando acerca desto, sin atinar con el rastro de la verdad’: Lobera, Crónica del reino, p. 14.
37
‘Y venido el día hallaron otro perro y dos zapallos, que no se contentaron poco, y cociéndolo en agua y no le echaron sal, porque sed no les diese pena’: Vivar, Crónica de los reinos, pp. 83–4.
38
Ibid., p. 85.
39
‘Parece la crió Dios a posta para poderlo tener todo a la mano’: Medina, Cartas de Valdivia, pp. 42–3; Cordero, Transformations of Araucania, p. 86.
40
‘Habiendo pasado el río con hartas dificultades dieron traza en ir abriendo sendas en la montaña con hachas, y machetes, que llevaban, haciendo esto a costa de su sangre lastimándose a cada paso en los espinos y matorrales: y pasando grandes pantanos y arroyos de agua sin haber pedazo de tierra, que no fuese lodazal de mucha pesadumbre. Y estaban tan enredadas las raíces de los árboles unas con otra, que se mancaban los caballos; y aun algunos dellos dejaban los vasos encajados en los lazos de las raíces perdiendo de esta manera muchos’: Lobera, Crónica del reino, p. 229.
41
Marmolejo, Historia de Chile, p. 175.
42
Ibid., p. 82.
43
Lobera, Crónica del reino, p. 137.
44
A. González de Najera, Desengaño y reparo de la guerra del reino de Chile (Santiago de Chile, Ercilla, 1889), p. 204
45
Marmolejo, Historia de Chile, pp. 48, 153.
46
H.L. Peterson, Arms and Armor in Colonial America, 1526–1783 (New York, Dover, 2000), p. 69.
47
Najera, Desengaño y reparo, p. 93.
48
J. Pinto, ‘Integración y desintegración de un espacio fronterizo: La Araucanía y las Pampas 1500–1990’, in J. Pinto, ed., Araucanía y Pampas: Un mundo fronterizo en América del Sur (Temuco, Ediciones de la Frontera, 1996), pp. 15–16.
49
D. González Holguín, Vocabulario de la lengua general de todo el Perú llamada lengua Qquichua o del Inga (Lima, Francisco del Canto, 1608), p. 296.
50
For example, the expression purum runa poques is translated into Spanish by Holguín as ‘barbarian, savage people, with neither law nor King’: ibid., p. 295.
51
‘Visto los ingas su manera de vivir los llamaron pomaucaes, que quiere decir lobos monteses’: Vivar, Crónica de los reinos, p. 229.
52
Medina, Cartas de Valdivia, p. 137. Cordero, Transformations of Araucania, p. 92.
53
‘Como es gente sin orden y sin razón, carecían de experiencia en la guerra’: Vivar, Crónica de los reinos, pp. 109–10.
54
M. Restall and K. Lane, Latin America in Colonial Times (Cambridge, CUP, 2011), I, p. 121.
55
‘Prometo mi fe, que ha treinta años que sirvo a V.M. y he peleado contra muchas naciones, y nunca tal tesón de gente he visto jamás en el pelear, como estos indios tuvieron contra nosotros’: Medina, Cartas de Valdivia, p. 202.
56
Jara, Guerre et société, p. 54.
57
R. Latcham, La organización social y las creencias religiosas de los antiguos araucanos (Santiago de Chile, Cervantes, 1924), p. 153.
58
For conflicts between different Mapuche clans, they did not use the term weichan but tautulun.
59
‘Hicieron llamamiento general y ordenaron a sus gentes e hicieron grandes banquetes y borracheras, porque lo tienen por uso. Y en ella hacen sus acuerdos y dan orden a la guerra que juntos allí en aquella junta acordaron … dieron orden en como matarían a todos los cristianos que había en la tierra, diciendo que eran pocos’: Vivar, Crónica de los reinos, p. 110. On the quick mobilization of the natives: Lobera, Crónica del reino, p. 46.
60
Dillehay, Monuments, Empires and Resistance, p. 117.
61
Najera, Desengaño y reparo, p. 98.
62
Marmolejo, Historia de Chile, p. 2.
63
L. Valdivia, Arte y gramática general de la lengua que corre en todo el Reino de Chile, con un vocabulario y confesionario (Seville, López de Haro, 1684), p. 95; Najera, Desengaño y reparo, p. 39.
64
‘Son unos bosques que parecen hechos o criados para tal efecto, de poco circuito y de altísimos y diformes árboles, lugares a que comúnmente llaman los nuestros bebederos, por ser dedicados particularmente para beber los indios en ello, donde como en consistorio o palacios de ayuntamientos, los caciques y taneapis en tales borracheras tienen sus consejos y determinaciones en las cosas del gobierno de la guerra, como es para tratar rebeliones, paces, jornadas o otras empresas’: Najera, Desengaño y reparo, pp. 43–4. The word taneapis used by the author is wrongly spelt. The correct form is tantani (‘people gathered’ or ‘to gather’). Holguín, Vocabulario de la lengua, p. 338.
65
D. Rosales, Historia general del reyno de Chile: Flandes Indiano (Valparaíso, Mercurio, 1877), I, p. 113.
66
Dillehay, Monuments, Empires and Resistance, p. 291.
67
To designate the tree as a forest resource, the Mapuches used the word mamll.
68
For instance, the Mapuches used to plant trees close to their homes for a birth or a wedding. The natives called them ‘tree of life’ or ‘tree of health’ (mongalihuen). Latcham, La organización social, p. 324.
69
Valdivia, Arte y gramática, p. 100. The Latin name of the canelo tree is Drimys winteri, after John Winter described it in 1578. He commanded the Elizabeth on Sir Francis Drake’s first voyage (1577–8). E.W. Mösbach, Botánica indígena de Chile (Santiago de Chile, Andrés Bello, 1999), pp. 78–9; A.E. Hoffmann, Flora silvestre de Chile: Zona Araucana (Santiago de Chile, Fundación Claudio Gay, 1982), pp. 56–7.
70
G. Boccara, Guerre et ethnogenèse mapuche dans le Chili colonial: L’invention du soi (Paris, L’Harmattan, 1998), pp. 79–80.
71
Valdivia, Arte y gramática, p. 100.
72
‘Tiene por orden cuando quieren pelear y saben que extraños entran en su tierra, ponelles en el camino ramos de un árbol que los españoles llaman canela, y en ellos atravesadas flechas untadas con sangre’: Marmolejo, Historia de Chile, p. 2.
73
J. Toribio Medina, Los aboríjenes de Chile (Santiago de Chile, Gutenberg, 1882), pp. 124–5.
74
On the terms kolu and llallin, see Valdivia, Arte y gramática, pp. 93, 110. Rosales used the expression collullanllin, but it is badly translated by the author as ‘to get a lot thinner as ants’. Rosales mistook kolu for kollella (‘ant’). Rosales, Historia general, I, p. 115.
75
Vivar, Crónica de los reinos, p. 71.
76
Ibid., p. 134.
77
Lobera, Crónica del reino, p. 266; V. Clément, ‘Peuple de la forêt, peuple de la frontière: Identité des indiens Pehuenches dans l’ancienne marche araucane (Chili,
78
Medina, Los aboríjenes de Chile, p. 198.
79
Vivar, Crónica de los reinos, p. 139.
80
Ibid., pp. 162–3; Medina, Cartas de Valdivia, p. 35.
81
Medina, Cartas de Valdivia, p. 37.
82
Vivar, Crónica de los reinos, pp. 258–9.
83
Najera, Desengaño y reparo, pp. 87–8.
84
Vivar, Crónica de los reinos, p. 122; Najera, Desengaño y reparo, p. 87.
85
Najera, Desengaño y reparo, p. 169
86
Medina, Los aboríjenes de Chile, p. 133; R. Latcham, La capacidad guerrera de los Araucanos, sus armas y métodos militares (Santiago, Universitaria, 1915), p. 40.
87
Rosales, Historia general, I, p. 224.
88
J. Vellard, ‘Les curares: leur préparation par les indiens sud-américains’, Journal de la Société des Américanistes XLIV (1955), p. 69.
89
Lobera, Crónica del reino, pp. 364, 373.
90
J. Montgomery Cooper, ‘The Araucarians’, in J. H. Steward, ed., Handbook of South American Indians (Washington, US Government Printing Office, 1946), II, p. 730.
91
L. Armond, ‘Frontier Warfare in Chile’, Pacific Historical Review XXIII (1954), pp. 127, 131.
92
‘Los algarrobos son árboles grandes en esta tierra y de grandes y gruesas púas, son tan largas como clavos de medio tillado y recias y muy espesas. De estas ramas y árboles tenía este cacique hecho un fuerte tan fuerte que era tan aparejado para ofender como para defender, principalmente a gente de a caballo. Estaba tan tejido y tan gruesa que parecía muralla’: Vivar, Crónica de los reinos, p. 99.
93
W. Kuhn, ‘Der Löwenberger Hag und die Besiedlung der Schlesien Grenzwälder’, in Beiträge zur schlesischen Siedlungsgeschichte (Munich, Delp, 1971), pp. 32–62; C. Higounet, ‘Les grandes haies forestières de l’Europe médiévale’, Actes du Congrès de la Société des historiens médiévistes (Lille, 1979), pp. 213–17; J.J. Dubois and J.P. Renard, ‘Forêts et frontières: Quelques réflexions pour une étude causale et évolutive’, Espace, Populations, Sociétés I (1984), pp. 25–42.
94
Valdivia, Arte y gramática, p. 134.
95
Vivar, Crónica de los reinos, p. 100.
96
Ibid., p. 104.
97
S. Villalobos, Historia del pueblo chileno (Santiago de Chile, Universitaria, 2000), IV, pp. 69–70.
98
Lobera, Crónica del reino, p. 271.
99
‘Vieron salir del fuerte una cuadrilla de españoles corriendo con gran tropel por la cuesta abajo, y un opulento ejército de Indios que venían tras ellos haciéndoles no menos daño que la maleza de las matas y cañeral donde se embarbascaban los caballos’: Lobera, Crónica del reino, p. 316. In medieval Spain the expression ‘maleza de las matas’, used by Lobera, designated a defensive wall of vegetation. V. Clément, ‘La frontera y el bosque en el Medievo: nuevos planteamientos para una problemática antigua’, Actas del Congreso La Frontera Oriental Nazarí como sujeto histórico (S. XIII–XVI) (Almería, Instituto de Estudios Almerienses, Diputación de Almería, 1997), p. 335.
100
Lobera, Crónica del reino, p. 315.
101
Ibid., p. 230.
102
Lobera, Crónica del reino, p. 154.
103
Vivar, Crónica de los reinos, p. 276.
104
Ibid., pp. 283–4; D. Barros Arana, Historia general de Chile (Santiago de Chile, Universitaria, 1884; reprint, 2000), II, p. 21.
105
Ibid., p. 285.