Some Reflections on the Fighting Power of the Italian Army in North Africa,1940–1943

I. Fighting Power and Weapons

Weapons are often seen as a large part of the explanation of the alleged low level of Italian fighting power during the war. ⁴⁹ The following pages are not intended to systematically examine Italian weaponry; that would be a lengthy undertaking. Yet, the impression that the Italians were always in a state of technical inferiority needs to be revisited. ⁵⁰ Here again, Italian sources are indispensable.

The Italian soldier was equipped with the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle model 1891, in either a 6.5 mm calibre or an improved 7.35 mm. Although not as good as the British Lee-Enfield Mark 3 or Mark 4, the Carcano’s strengths and weaknesses did not significantly impact on fighting power. ⁵¹ Much more damaging was the lack of a sub-machine gun for the infantry units. The MAB 38 was already in production and available, and, according to Hoggs and Weeks, it was an excellent weapon. ⁵² The fact that it was never produced in larger quantities and distributed to the infantry is inexplicable. ⁵³ Instead, it was distributed to other formations, such as the Polizia dell’Africa Italiana (PAI), paratroopers, and carabinieri. ⁵⁴ Capable of a 500-round theoretical rate of fire, ⁵⁵ it would have considerably improved the firepower of the infantry sections and platoons, an important capacity in close combat. While other armies gradually provided their infantry with semi-automatic or automatic weapons during the course of the war, the Italian army did not.

Uneven quality characterized the infantry’s light and heavy machine guns, mortars, and hand grenades. The Breda 30 light machine gun did not meet expectations and, although not a bad weapon, was not a match for the British Bren. While the Fiat 35 heavy machine gun gave a reasonable performance, its counterpart, the Breda 37 (and 38), was a very good weapon appreciated by the troops, and it easily matched the British machine guns. ⁵⁶ Needless to say, none of them was a match for the German MG 34 or MG 42. The infantry used the 45 mm Brixia and the 81 mm mortars: the former was easy to use, light, and appreciated by the troops but not very powerful; the latter was a fine weapon, with a higher rate of fire per minute than the Brixia (18 or more shots compared to 8–10) and a range of 4000 metres. ⁵⁷ In 1940 the infantry had three types of hand grenades for offensive action with light explosive charges (usually between 150 and 200 grams) and not a single one for defensive action, a serious shortcoming, according to Rochat. ⁵⁸ Additionally, improvised anti-tank grenades and other devices were used by some units as early as the summer of 1940 in order to compensate for the shortage of anti-tank guns. ⁵⁹ They became standard infantry weapons until the end of the campaign, as the number of anti-tank guns was never sufficient. Their effectiveness against British armour largely depended upon circumstances and training: all men didn’t have ‘the courage, the determination, the sense of initiative’ to use these weapons in an effective way. ⁶⁰

In 1940 two guns, the 65/17 and the 47/32, were used to support the infantry and provide an anti-tank capacity. The 65/17 gun was a survivor of the Great War: more than 700 were still available in 1940. The weapon gave good results against enemy armour, especially when mounted on a vehicle. ⁶¹ The 47/32 gun was adopted in the second half of the 1930s and seen as among the best weapons in its category at the time. ⁶² It was a much lighter weapon than the 65/17 (265 kg against 570 kg), precise and easy to use. But it was not designed to be towed; as a result, sheer manpower was the most common way to move the gun on the very difficult terrain (sand or rocky ground) of North Africa. ⁶³ The weapon was used all through the war, despite its growing limited anti-tank capacity. By 1941, and even more so in 1942 with the arrival of American tanks, the 47/32 became less and less effective, forcing the Italian infantrymen to use the gun at very close range (often less than 500 metres) in order to destroy or to immobilize enemy tanks. When this was not possible, the support of divisional artillery became inevitable. ⁶⁴

Despite their sound professional preparation and good reputation earned in the previous war, Italian gunners were often handicapped in their ability to engage the enemy. ⁶⁵ In 1940 they found themselves in a situation of technical inferiority. Montanari notes that the army had a total of 7970 field guns available, but only 246 of them were built after 1930. ⁶⁶ For instance, the Austro-Hungarian 100/17 mod. 14 howitzer, a First World War gun, was in service for the entire North African campaign. It was a reliable weapon but it had a range of 9 km compared to the 12 km of the British 25-pounder. ⁶⁷ The 100/17 and the 75/27 guns, because of their antiquated wheels, did not withstand being towed over long distances, to the point where they had to be carried on trucks. ⁶⁸ An attempt to produce modern and powerful guns took place in the late 1930s and demonstrated that Italian industry could manufacture very good weapons; the 75/32 mod. 37 and the 90/53 mod. 39 guns were fine examples of this capacity. Unfortunately, owing largely to bureaucratic inefficiency, technical debates, and hesitations, these weapons were always produced in very small quantities. ⁶⁹ Additionally, when available, the few heavy modern guns were sparingly deployed: according to Ceva, only 26 of them ever reached the African theatre of operations. ⁷⁰ Thus, divisional and army corps artillery units relied, for the longest part of the campaign, on old guns, with shorter range and less powerful ammunition than the enemy. The results were mixed: for instance, in the first attempt to conquer Tobruk in April 1941, Italian gunners were not able to neutralize British batteries ‘simply because of the lack of appropriate guns’, ⁷¹ while the old 100/17 guns of Major Pardi played an important role in the defensive action at Halfaya Pass, during the unsuccessful British Operation Battleaxe. ⁷²

For many observers the issue of armoured fighting vehicles was the most serious weakness of the Italian army during the North African campaign. ⁷³ In 1940 the only tanks available in the inventory were the light CV33-35 (also named L/33, L/35) and the medium M 11/39. ⁷⁴ In Libya at this time Italian forces had only 324 L tanks and 15 armoured fighting vehicles available. ⁷⁵ The limitations of the L 3 became obvious quite rapidly, and after the first encounters with British forces in June and July 1940, all the M 11/39s were sent to Libya. ⁷⁶ The M 11/39 was equipped with a 37 mm gun mounted in the hull, and lacked a radio set. Its limitations soon became obvious and it was decided in December 1940 to stop its production. In October 1940 the first new M 13/40 had arrived in North Africa, and by then, the Italians had 454 tanks. The M 13/40 had the 47/32 mm anti-tank gun installed in a turret and four 8 mm machine guns. The first units produced were delivered without radios, and it was not before mid-1941 that all M 13/40s were equipped with the Marelli RF 1 radio set. ⁷⁷ Upgraded versions came in 1941 and 1942: the M 14/41 was equipped with a more powerful engine, while the M 15/42 was powered by a gas engine instead of diesel and had a new, more powerful 47/40 mm main gun. ⁷⁸

The M 13/40 and its upgraded versions, the M 14/41 and M 15/42, became the backbone of Italian armoured units until the end of the campaign. ⁷⁹ But its main weaknesses were never put right; the vehicle was not sufficiently protected and was underpowered. Its 47/32 mm gun was a decent weapon and it was able to engage British armour in 1941, ⁸⁰ but the improved 47/40 mm gun was mounted only on the M 15/42 version, of which no more than 220 units were produced between 1941 and 1943. ⁸¹ Its mechanical reliability was a different issue: it took time for the Italians to adapt the tank to the desert environment (oil/air filters, among other things), and to realize the need for tank carriers, recovery vehicles, and repair shops. According to Montanari, its most serious mechanical flaws were gradually fixed in 1941. ⁸²

Although scholars and experts have a poor opinion – often shared by Italian combatants – of the M 13 and its successors, British reports and comments on Italian tanks are interesting. ⁸³ During Operation Crusader in late November 1941, General Auchinleck commented that ‘there were numerous Italian tanks, which had shown themselves to be better than we had believed’. ⁸⁴ In January 1942 he added: ‘The Italian M 13 tanks, which, as a result of the experiences of the previous campaign, we had been inclined to dismiss as valueless, fought well and had an appreciable effect on the battle.’ ⁸⁵ In August 1942 British intelligence wrote that the M 13/40 ‘has been found mechanically to be very reliable’. ⁸⁶ These lines certainly convey an important reality, which is that the quality of a tank depends on its crew and its training, and Italian crews were responsible for much of the M 13’s effectiveness. However, the arrival in the spring of 1942 of the American M 3 Grant, equipped with a 75 mm gun in a sponson and a 37 mm in a turret, and later the M 4 Sherman, considerably reduced the chances of Italian crews.

The need for a more powerful armoured fighting vehicle became pressing. From early 1942 until May 1943 the Italian army finally deployed a new armoured vehicle in North Africa: the 75/18 self-propelled gun (semovente). Far from flawless, the semovente was nonetheless an improvement. ⁸⁷ First developed in 1940, the vehicle was built on the M 13/40 chassis but without a turret. ⁸⁸ The M 40 75/18 had three main assets: a low silhouette, a radio set, and a powerful 75 mm gun. When used in conjunction with the M 13 or M 14, it provided additional and mobile firepower that lessened the vulnerability of the tanks. In early 1942 a group of semoventi was integrated in the 132nd artillery regiment of the Ariete and took part, with successes, in the operations that culminated in early July. ⁸⁹ As in the case of the medium tanks, upgraded versions with better armour and weaponry were also developed. Regrettably for the Italian combatants, delayed initial production and low outputs (60 M 40 75/18s produced in 1941, 162 M 41 78/15s in 1942) severely hindered the possibilities of the new weapon. ⁹⁰

Among all the shortcomings of the Italian army, one of the most incomprehensible was the lack of a modern armoured reconnaissance car in 1940, a weakness rapidly noticed by the Germans. ⁹¹ Despite years of Italian presence in Libya, the importance of exploration and long-range reconnaissance was undervalued. Pre-war hesitations produced the usual delays, and prototypes came only in 1939. As a result, while the British started incursions into Libyan territory right after 10 June 1940, the Italians lacked the means to do so. ⁹² Mass production of the Autoblindo 40 started only in February 1941, and it was October 1941 before the first vehicles entered service in Africa. ⁹³ At the end of May 1942 no more than 93 AB 40s and AB 41s reached the theatre of operations: they were sent in priority to the motorized units of the XX Corps and deployed in reconnaissance groups. As was the case with the semovente, the AB series was not without flaws – Caccia Dominioni remarked that the turret was especially vulnerable to enemy AP shells ⁹⁴ – but overall it was a good vehicle capable of providing the army with a much-needed intelligence-gathering capability. ⁹⁵ The AB 41 20 mm gun was capable of destroying light armoured vehicles, and its autonomy, 400 km without jerricans, was satisfactory. ⁹⁶ Among all the patrol cars used in North Africa by all the belligerents, it was certainly one of the best. ⁹⁷

Such a short examination of the available Italian weapons in North Africa cannot lead to a simple conclusion. Nevertheless, two proposals are possible, the first relating to the quality of Italian weaponry and the second relating to quantity. First, as of June 1940, the Italian infantry had one major weakness: the number of anti-tank weapons was not sufficient and the armoured units, equipped with the L 3 and M 11/39, were outclassed by British vehicles. Moreover, the absence of a real armoured patrol car was undeniably a weakness. Although it was sometimes outgunned by the enemy, the artillery’s reliance on vintage guns did not paralyse the capacity of gunners to engage combat. However, the situation deteriorated in late 1941 and in a more drastic way in 1942, as the very limited capacity of the industry to produce upgraded equipment or brand-new models became obvious. For instance, the qualitative jumps of British armour, first from cruiser and ‘I’ tanks to the American Grant, then to the Sherman, were something the Italians never experienced. ⁹⁸ In the case of tanks, Italian inferiority grew drastically. In the case of anti-tank weapons, the infantry started the war with the 47/32 gun; in Tunisia in early 1943 it was still the main gun available. For a time, improvisation helped the Italians to compensate for the lack of appropriate weapons: they mounted a number of guns of different calibres on vehicles – for instance the 100/17 on Lancia 3 RO lorries or the 65/17 on British Morris pick-ups – in order to increase mobility and firepower. ⁹⁹ Such expedients gave appreciable results, but they had limits. In sum, no other armies in North Africa experienced such a technical stagnation.

Second, the inability of Comando Supremo and the industry to provide the combatants with large stocks amplified the qualitative gap. Sometimes material abundance can compensate for technical inferiority; as we have seen, the lack of standard 47 mm anti-tank guns forced the Italians to rely on close-combat anti-tank tactics. At the same time, the industry was capable of manufacturing an excellent weapon, the dual purpose 90/53 gun, but unable to mass-produce it. The same pattern applied to the semovente, the autoblindo, and the 75/46 anti-aircraft gun: it seems that in the case of the Italian weapons, quality and quantity didn’t coincide. As a result, the combatants in North Africa were often short of weapons (and equipment), a shortage aggravated by Mussolini’s diversion of resources to senseless campaigns against Greece and – especially – the USSR, where more than 16,000 motor vehicles and thousands of motorcycles equipped the Italian 8th Army. ¹⁰⁰

To an extent, the capacity of the Italians to keep up fighting for almost three years with such equipment was remarkable. As the campaign unfolded, degradation of Italian equipment placed the combatants in a state of increasing technical inferiority. ¹⁰¹ Considering that Italian divisions had generally fewer men and less equipment than German and British units, it meant, in general, less firepower. According to Montanari, an Italian AS 42 infantry division had roughly 7000 men, 146 light machine guns, 18 81 mm mortars, and 142 trucks, compared with the 17,300 men, 819 light machine guns, 56 81 mm mortars, and 1999 trucks of a British 1941-type infantry division. ¹⁰² When Rommel decided in July 1942 to ‘corset’ German and Italian units, the lower firepower of the latter was one of the reasons that forced him to do so. ¹⁰³ As underlined before by Siegfried Westphal, it is doubtful that German or British combatants could have done better with the same weapons and equipment.

II. Fighting Power and Training

The North African campaign demonstrated that most Italian combatants entered the war in June 1940 poorly trained. ¹⁰⁴ It took some time for the British to realize that fact: ‘It is not true that the Italians lacked courage, William “Strafer” Gott told Anthony Eden, but they were simply not properly trained for the realities of desert warfare.’ ¹⁰⁵ Pre-war training was inadequate and insufficient; ¹⁰⁶ moreover, despite official regulations, low levels of physical and technical preparations continued to characterize the initial training system until the armistice. ¹⁰⁷ If some Italian units, such as the Folgore, the Monte Cervino, or the Savoia divisions, had very good levels of training and preparation, the overall quality of the training remained poor. ¹⁰⁸ The Italian military leadership in Rome acknowledged these shortcomings but failed to remedy them. The personal qualities of some officers helped to improve the situation. Unfortunately, adaptations and improvisations had their limits.

The level of combat preparation of the troops stationed in Libya in June 1940 was low. The pre-war mood was characterized by caution and wishful thinking. The prospect of a two-front war in Libya led to a defensive strategy for which the Italian and Libyan units were considered ready. Additionally, the Italian commanders believed that an eventual campaign would remain a sort of large-scale colonial operation. ¹⁰⁹ In 1939 and 1940 the commanders-in-chief in Libya, Marshal Italo Balbo and, after his death on 28 June 1940, Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, were mainly preoccupied with getting their order of battle to the war establishment and asking Rome for more material. ¹¹⁰ Actually, neither they nor Marshal Badoglio, the chief of the Italian General Staff, had any professional competency to prepare the Italian forces for armoured warfare in the desert. ¹¹¹ In September 1939 a report judged the situation to be satisfactory, although it added that the overall quality of the order of battle could be raised by ‘better leadership, intense training and measures to improve morale and discipline’. ¹¹² As a result, the 236,000 men of the 5th and 10th armies were not specifically trained for mobile operations with armoured vehicles, anti-tank combat, and reconnaissance. ¹¹³ Most divisions lacked transportation and had to walk in most circumstances. Worse, preparation for the use of lorry-borne infantry units against the British didn’t take place, and improvisation eventually replaced real training. ¹¹⁴ As only 1477 guns of all types were available for operations, many units were under-equipped, especially with anti-tank guns. ¹¹⁵ In early June 1940 the intention to transfer the Centauro armoured division from Albania to North Africa aborted for ‘lack of time’. ¹¹⁶ The few armoured forces equipped with the L 3 had no specific training, according to Ceva and Curami. ¹¹⁷ When the first M 11/39 tanks reached Libya, the crews had a very ‘poor knowledge’ of how to use them. ¹¹⁸

Subsequently, the training of units in North Africa was mainly determined by the possibilities and limits of ‘on-the-spot’ training (in the rear areas or close to the front line) and the operational tempo. In many ways the experience acquired on the battlefield became the foundations of new official training regulations and memorandums issued in Rome, but despite Comando Supremo’s understanding of the situation and the efforts made by other departments in Rome, the training of units in Italy remained insufficient. ¹¹⁹ The case of the Trieste motorized division was one example. In the spring of 1941, while located in the Naples region and waiting to be transferred to North Africa, the division did only ‘one series of training activities’ before its departure. ¹²⁰ It meant that the officers and soldiers would have to do much of their combat preparation once they arrived in Libya in late August and early September – needless to say, not under the most favourable conditions. It should be noted that the Trieste was the Italian division that suffered the most during Operation Crusader: from 15 November until 28 December 1941 the division lost 8609 of its 10,809 men. ¹²¹ One might conclude that the division was not ready for such an ordeal.

The lack of preparation for anti-tank actions and the inadequate tactics of armoured formations appeared to be the critical deficiencies of Italian units. The importance of the tanks on the battlefield was finally recognized by a new regulation issued by the army chief of staff in late July 1941. ¹²² However, the obstacles to improvement were serious: in the case of the Ariete, the division had no previous fighting experience, and the men still had to use the same light and medium tanks; in the case of the infantry units, anti-tank tactics depended mostly on the 47/32 gun. While the men of the Ariete arrived in Africa well motivated, this was not the case with the infantry divisions (Brescia, Bologna, Pavia, Savona, and the remnants of Sabratha) already present in North Africa. The defeat inflicted by British forces during Operation Compass created a sense of inferiority that eroded the infantry morale. Initiated in the spring of 1941, a process of reorganization, authorized by Rome but inspired by operational experiences, took place. Indeed, the defeat of the 10th Army and the arrival of the Germans forced the Italian commanders in North Africa to constantly adapt orders of battle and divisional strengths to new operational circumstances. Training requirements and methods were also reviewed and implemented in all active divisions. Despite the lack of equipment and qualified instructors, the result was relatively good. Far away from the military bureaucracy in Rome, the organizational evolutions and training innovations that took place in North Africa were produced by necessity, and as British sources noted, it seemed that a sort of ‘genius for improvisation’ was also at work. ¹²³

As men and units were still sent to Africa with incomplete or inadequate combat preparation, expedients had to be found. In 1941, training centres (centri di istruzione) for all arms and services were established in Libya: in Barce for infantry and sappers units, in El-Abiar for the artillery, and in Fara Mara, Derna, and Ain El-Gazala for tank crews. ¹²⁴ Other schools were put in place to train all types of specialists (radio operators, drivers, mechanics, etc.). The objective was simple: to prepare the complementi (replacements) for integration into the units and to facilitate the reconstitution of battle-weary units. Moreover, the centres gave the newcomers time to acclimatize to the conditions of desert warfare. As very few scholars have examined these centri di istruzione and their evolution in 1941 and 1942, we know very little about them. In the case of the comando del centro d’istruzione carristi in A. S. (North African tank training centre command) at Villagio Corradini near Homs, its personnel in March 1942 consisted of 30 officers, 50 non-commissioned officers, and 340 men. These specialists were to train ‘hundreds’ of pilots, gunners, machine-gunners, radio operators, and drivers recently arrived from Italy. ¹²⁵

It is difficult to figure out to what extent the centro carristi improved the fighting power of the tank crews and how many men went through the facility, but performances increased. During Operation Compass, technical shortcomings (absence of radio sets) and poor tactics explained the destruction of the Maletti group (9 December 1940) and of the Italian tanks at Beda Fomm (7 February 1941), although two weeks earlier, near Mechili, the Babini brigade showed ‘a capacity to react and a sense of initiative’ in the encounter. ¹²⁶ At this time of the North African campaign, Italian crews knew little about the enemy weaponry and tactics, a reality that was gradually altered during the course of operations in 1941 and 1942. In February 1942 after-action reports on the use of tanks and armoured patrol cars showed that the Italians learned a lot about their enemy and its tactics. ¹²⁷ For instance, knowing that British tanks fired at a range of 1500 metres, and contrary to regulations, in full movement, made a big difference for Italian crews; the enemy fire was less effective than expected, and it allowed Italian tanks to fire at less than 1000 metres from the target, hence making the best use of the limited 47 mm gun of the M 13. In such a context it is probable that the centro carristi became not only a training facility but also a school for the transmission of practical knowledge.

On-the-spot training became the way for Italian units to overcome their technical shortcomings and improve their fighting power. The operational tempo was the main criterion determining if training was possible, as the examples of the Ariete and Pavia divisions illustrate. ¹²⁸ In late February and March 1941 the Ariete armoured division carried out a series of exercises dedicated to integrating the combined action of tanks, artillery, and infantrymen. ¹²⁹ Then the Ariete took part in the first Rommel offensive against the British forces. It was only in July that the division was able to rest and to reorganize. In August, training took place again with an emphasis on recent operational experiences and the professional qualities of the men. ¹³⁰

When the Corpo d’Armata di Manovra (CAM) became operational in September 1941, the Ariete was its spearhead, supported by the Trieste (which had just arrived in North Africa) and Trento motorized divisions. It was then only that Italian mobile formations started to develop a real mentalità carrista (an armoured warfare mentality). During this operational break the divisions had time to organize and train. Despite the solid performances of the Ariete (Bir el Gobi), the Trieste (Sidi Rezegh), and the Giovanni Fascisti (Bir el Gobi) and the vigorous actions of the reconnaissance group during the British offensive (Operation Crusader), deficiencies in terms of equipment (lack of motorization and poor radio equipment) reduced the overall effectiveness of the CAM. ¹³¹ In spite of this unsatisfactory result, Rommel made full use of the CAM in his January 1942 counteroffensive. This time, under the command of General Zingales, who succeeded General Gambara, the CAM, composed of the Ariete and Trieste divisions, supported the actions of the German armoured divisions. Rommel was pleased by the action of the Italian corps and delighted about the results of the counteroffensive. ¹³² Clearly, the combat experiences and training opportunities of 1941 were instrumental in transforming the Ariete and the Trieste into efficient mobile units. On 10 March 1942 the CAM became the XX Corpo d’Armata and was engaged in all the battles until the end of the third El Alamein. It is easier to recognize the quality of the unit – ‘the officers and men of the XX Motorized Corps were properly trained and well-motivated soldiers’ – than to understand the origins of its improvement. ¹³³

On-the-spot training also applied to infantry divisions. In the autumn of 1941, as Comando Supremo reaffirmed the importance of training and the rigorous selection of men for the potenziamento dell’Esercito (the strengthening of the army), ¹³⁴ the Pavia division went into a series of brief but intense training activities. ¹³⁵ For instance, the men of the 27th infantry regiment enhanced their fitness and their ability to move on the battlefield; training for anti-tank action with either the 65/17 gun or incendiary devices was also part of the programme. As the Pavia would be part of the expected assault on Tobruk, there was a desire to instil in the men the basic offensive tactics needed for such a specific operation. ¹³⁶ The Pavia training programme was interrupted by the British offensive on 18 November 1941. As part of the Italian XXI Corps, the Pavia fought well and hard and suffered seriously: at the end of December it had lost 2983 men out of its initial strength of 6383 of 15 November. ¹³⁷ Even Rommel recognized that the Pavia training programme had been successful. ¹³⁸ At the beginning of 1942 the Pavia and other infantry divisions were reorganized on the divisione fanteria AS 42 type, which was an effort to provide them with more firepower, especially by increasing the number of anti-tank weapons of all types. ¹³⁹ After the reconquest of western Cyrenaica in January and early February 1942, the Pavia started a training programme based on the new divisional establishment and focused on firing drills and outpost defensive tactics. ¹⁴⁰

Training of men and units focused on two main elements. First, efforts were made to improve infantry units’ firepower by teaching the proper use of weapons. Officers noted that many soldiers did not know how to shoot properly or to use hand grenades and mortars. Many of the replacements, including complement officers, had almost no knowledge of the use of some weapons. Hence, firing drills became, when possible, regular practices. Second, anti-tank training became a fundamental priority, as many Italian units had previously shown their incapacity to oppose tanks with methods and rigour. In the case of infantry units, it became a critical aspect of their fighting power. A field manual entitled ‘I mezzi corazzati nemici’ (Enemy armoured vehicles) was eventually issued by the Comando Superiore Africa Settentrionale (North African High Command) in October 1941. The manual presented the weaknesses of enemy vehicles and the multiple ways to engage them at short distances with infantry weapons. ¹⁴¹ With time and practice, infantrymen learned that the 20 mm Solothurn was only useful against light armoured vehicles. They used in the most efficient ways the 47 mm anti-tank gun: at close range (often under 500 metres) and against the vulnerable parts of the enemy vehicle. Improvisation also played its part: already by the summer on 1940, as noted and encouraged by Marshal Balbo, some soldiers engaged enemy armoured vehicles with improvised explosive devices, often incendiary bombs and grenades. ¹⁴² As discussed previously, a variety of improvised anti-tank grenades became generalized in Africa, despite their limited effectiveness.

All these measures gave results and provided Italian units, especially the reputedly weak infantry divisions, with renewed fighting power in defensive actions. On 22 July 1942 the combined defensive action of the units of the 61st regiment of the Trento and the 200th German infantry successfully repulsed Australian units in their attempt to capture Tel el Makh Khad ridge. ¹⁴³ Rommel himself praised the men of the 3rd battalion of the 61st regiment of the Trento for their performance. ¹⁴⁴ Indeed, there were many instances (in the three battles of El Alamein) where Italian infantry first-line outposts were ‘bypassed’, especially at night-time, by British forces in the course of an offensive; but often larger posts and boxes were not captured, and hence constituted a tactical quagmire for enemy forces. ¹⁴⁵

Clearly, on-the-spot training in North Africa became a necessary expedient in 1941 and 1942, and primary sources attest that Italian generals and senior officers took the issue very seriously. ¹⁴⁶ Military setbacks confirmed that all units were not perfectly prepared: as part of the XXI Corps deployed on the northern sector of the El Alamein front, two battalions and three artillery groups of the Sabratha infantry division were overpowered by the Australians in the battle for Tel El Eisa on 10 July 1942. ¹⁴⁷ Destroyed at Beda Fomm in February 1941, the division, which was reorganized in the same year and engaged in Rommel’s spring offensive of 1942, came under ‘the biggest artillery bombardment of the desert war so far’, but nevertheless put up a fight against the Australians. ¹⁴⁸ Even the experienced men of the Ariete armoured division had bad moments. After midnight of 3 July 1942, the under-strength division (8th Bersaglieri had no more than a couple of hundred men, 132nd tank regiment had only eight efficient M 13s, and the 132nd artillery regiment had just over 40 guns) moved south of Ruseiwat ridge towards a position called ‘Deep Well’, reached around 04.00. ¹⁴⁹ Quite rapidly the men of the Ariete understood ‘how bad was the choice of this position’, ¹⁵⁰ and the division came rapidly under the fire of the Weir column and of other units of the 2nd New Zealand division. At 10.00 the battle was over and the Ariete had lost 531 men, 36 guns, and 55 trucks. ¹⁵¹ Although parts of the division were able to retreat, and were sent to the rear to reorganize, the impact of the defeat was felt through the entire XX Corps. ¹⁵²

It is in this context that after the end of the ‘first battle’ of El Alamein in late July 1942, General De Stefanis, commandant of the XX Corps, reminded his divisions’ commanders that, despite losses and battle exhaustion, the importance of training properly the replacements remained an ‘importantissima attività’ (a highly important task). ¹⁵³ The presence of seasoned veterans was, without a doubt, a decisive element contributing to the preparation of the newly arrived men. The number of junior officers and non-commissioned officers capable of training depended on the availability of weapons and ammunition, as well as the operational tempo and losses. The campaign took its toll: by 30 September 1942 the Italians lost in North Africa a total of 32,299 men (7881 killed, 11,192 injured, 13,226 missing). ¹⁵⁴ The defeat in the third battle of El Alamein brought the Italian units to a point of rupture: an additional 971 dead, 933 wounded, and 15,552 captured. ¹⁵⁵ Montanari notes that these numbers increased in the days following the retreat: 9000 Germans and Italians were dead, 15,000 wounded, and 35,000 taken prisoner; the British victory did not come cheap, as they lost some 13,560 men. ¹⁵⁶

For all Italian arms (armoured, motorized, infantry, and artillery units) deployed in Libya after El Alamein and later in Tunisia, maintaining fighting power became, more than ever, a challenge. As most seasoned veterans were out of combat and experienced units had been destroyed or partly destroyed, the arrival of inexperienced men and new units made things more complicated. ¹⁵⁷ Even in the late stages of the campaign in early 1943, General Messe used the training centres to upgrade the combat preparation of replacements. ¹⁵⁸ Moreover, testimonies of combatants confirmed that training had always been the key for operational effectiveness. ¹⁵⁹

III. Fighting Power and Battlefield Contingencies

The capacity of the Italian combatants to engage the enemy and to sustain combat was related to their ability to use the weapons available properly and with a maximum of effectiveness. However, two other elements, the role of surprise and the German presence in North Africa – the products of circumstances, not inevitability – affected their fighting power.

The first contingency, surprise, played a fundamental role against the Italians in the first eight months of the campaign. Right after 10 June 1940, British forces initiated operations against the Italians in Libya, infiltrating rear areas along the border. Although Marshal Balbo maintained that his soldiers responded with vigour, they stayed on the defensive, incapable of regaining the initiative. ¹⁶⁰ Later, in early September, Marshal Graziani’s limited advance into Egyptian territory was followed by a reluctance to systematically initiate intelligence-gathering operations. For two months the Italian 10th Army did very little to actively prepare for further operations, and although Matruh (approximately 110 km east of Sidi El Barrani) was officially Graziani’s next objective, he took all the dilatory measures to avoid action. On 15 October 1940, in a long letter to Badoglio, chief of the Italian General Staff in Rome, he explained how air reconnaissance flights reported that British forces were deeply entrenched in defensive positions. ¹⁶¹ Later in October and in November, Graziani and his intelligence service (Ufficio I) neglected to take into consideration multiple reports from the central office of the SIM (Servizio Informazioni Militare) that were indicating the strong possibilities of a British offensive. ¹⁶² The rest is history: Operation Compass, superbly prepared, started on 9 December 1940, and took the Italians totally by surprise. The first days had been critical for the Italians; the loss of Sidi El Barrani and the collapse of their defensive system created a negative mindset, one of inescapable defeat and the myth of the invincibility of the British tanks, especially the ‘Matilda’. In three days 38,000 Italians were captured. ¹⁶³ At Beda Fomm in early February 1941, while the remnants of the 10th Army were retreating from Cyrenaica, surprise in conjunction with poor armoured tactics and disorganization played again in favour of the British forces. But after the winter of 1941, surprise ceased to be a decisive factor negatively influencing Italian fighting power: experience and training helped the Italian combatants to overcome tactical surprise, as in the first days of Operation Crusader. ¹⁶⁴ In the second half of 1941 and 1942, many Italian units developed an unprecedented reconnaissance capability. For instance, the Nizza Cavalleria reconnaissance group of the Ariete and the reconnaissance group of the Trieste became very active during Operation Crusader and, in the case of the latter, well known for its actions in the first El Alamein. ¹⁶⁵ Moreover, the collaboration between the German and Italian military intelligence services and effective air reconnaissance played a role. ¹⁶⁶ Although its influence on Italian fighting power was not direct, the interception by the SIM of the cables sent by Colonel Fellers, the American military attaché in Cairo, to Washington gave Rommel an appreciable amount of information that was highly valuable in the operational cycle that lasted from January to June 1942, and especially in his decision to chase the retreating Eighth Army after the fall of Tobruk. ¹⁶⁷

The second contingency was the impact of the German presence in North Africa. British intelligence noted that the improvement of Italian units was ‘due almost certainly to increasing German influence both in organisation and tactics’. ¹⁶⁸ General Auchinleck assumed that ‘there was little doubt that the presence of German troops had stiffened Italian morale, particularly that of their armoured troops’. ¹⁶⁹ Although these assumptions seemed correct, it is difficult to prove them, as primary and secondary sources have little to offer. That German troops helped the Italians to recover from their defeat and to rebuild their self-esteem as combatants is highly probable. ¹⁷⁰ More evident was the impact of the energetic and uncompromising leadership of Rommel: in early March 1941 he assessed the potential of Italian units in a very critical way, especially in the case of the Ariete armoured division, noting the absence of a reconnaissance capability. ¹⁷¹ As unpleasant as it sounded for General Gariboldi (the commander-in-chief and Rommel’s superior at that time), this nevertheless bore fruit, as many Italian division commanders established an effective relationship with Rommel and German officers. ¹⁷² Three weeks later the Ariete and the Brescia divisions were involved alongside German units and under Rommel’s command in the first Axis offensive of 1941. The success of the operation acted as a profound morale boost for Italian troops. Despite all their shortcomings in terms of training and equipment, the two divisions showed that the desire to fight was restored and that Italian pride demanded revenge.

The German influence manifested itself in a more practical way. By the spring and summer of 1941, Germans already began to share information with their ally. Cappellano and Pignato affirm that this cooperation took different, valuable forms for the Italians, especially for training. ¹⁷³ They now had access to German after-combat reports, analysis on enemy weapons and tactics, British field manuals and other documents, and prisoner interrogations. ¹⁷⁴ For instance, we find in the Italian army archives a British document (captured by the Germans and translated into Italian) on the action and tactics of the 22nd armoured brigade, which was involved in Operation Crusader, or one of the XIII Corps on night-time operations that was intended for the 1st armoured division and the 4th Indian division. ¹⁷⁵ This information proved to be invaluable to the Italians for adopting new training drills and tactics, especially for anti-tank combat. As a result, Italian units had more confidence in their weapons. The surprise and panic created by the Matilda did not survive long.

A final aspect of the ally influence on Italian fighting power is the wide use of gruppi tattici (tactical groups). For Cappellano and Pignato, the systematic use of tactical groups learned from the Germans was the main innovation of the war at the tactical level. ¹⁷⁶ A tactical group was an ad hoc combination of different types of units, usually a mix of infantry, artillery, and engineers, supported by patrol cars, tanks, and anti-tank units. Italian units’ field records offer ample evidence of the use of tactical groups, which made the cooperation with German units easier. British sources also acknowledged the practice, ‘which has manifested itself in a bewildering number of “ad hoc” formations, designed to meet particular circumstances and bearing little relation to theoretical establishment’. ¹⁷⁷ As early as April 1941 a British document underlined that Italians had a disposition for adaptation: ‘The flexibility of organization, for which the Italian army is notable, facilitates any necessary improvisations.’ ¹⁷⁸

In fact, even before the first Axis counteroffensive of late March 1941, it became clear that Rommel liked to use tactical groups (or other ad hoc formations such as the Italian ‘columns’) for specific tasks. ¹⁷⁹ Montanari pointed out that the German training system and equipment facilitated the creation and employment of this kind of unit, while deficient Italian training and inadequate equipment forced the men to improvise in critical operational situations. ¹⁸⁰ Nevertheless, the use of tactical groups was a positive element in terms of fighting power for at least two reasons. First, it exposed many Italian units to German tactical and operational know-how, a proximity that certainly stimulated a spirit of emulation. Second, as many Italian divisions were never fully trained or equipped, only the most capable and efficient regiments or battalions (or even companies) were chosen to be part of a tactical group. Hence, under the leadership of highly competent officers such as Major Santamaria, Lieutenant Colonel Fabris, and Colonel Montemurro – who distinguished themselves commanding ‘columns’ and tactical groups – the Italian combatants gradually earned the respect of their German counterparts. For instance, Colonel Montemurro and the men of his ‘column’ played a decisive role in the recapture of Mechili in early April 1941; for his action, he was awarded the Iron Cross 2nd Class by Rommel, the first Italian to receive such an honour in North Africa. ¹⁸¹

IV. Fighting Power, Italian-Style?

The Italian army fought for almost three years – its longest campaign of the Second World War – in North Africa. Ultimately 26 of its divisions were destroyed ¹⁸² and more than 12,000 men were killed. ¹⁸³ After the first eight months of the campaign (June 1940 to early February 1941), the 10th Army was almost completely crushed in a succession of British attacks. Commenting on the consequences of the initial setbacks at Sidi El Barrani, Rommel was right: ‘The British successes were obviously having an almost paralysing effect on the Italians. They withdrew to their strongholds at Bardia and Tobruk and waited to see what the enemy would do next.’ ¹⁸⁴ The fortress of Bardia and its 45,000 men surrendered on 5 January 1941, and Tobruk and its 22,000 men fell on 23 January. ¹⁸⁵ The fall of both garrisons was not the result of superb British preparation creating total surprise; it was simply the sign of Italian resignation, undeniably the two best examples of Italian low fighting power – and low morale – of the entire North African campaign.

Nevertheless, the Italian army survived and became, within its limits, an effective fighting force, with some of its units more effective than others. Its contribution to Axis military successes was not negligible, although ‘rarely recognized’. ¹⁸⁶ As we saw previously, already in March 1941 the Ariete armoured division and the Brescia infantry division, totalling 16,000 of the 25,000 men under Rommel’s command, were successfully involved in the reconquest of Cyrenaica. ¹⁸⁷ In all major encounters of 1941, 1942, and 1943, most Italian soldiers fought well against the British forces. Italian losses, especially men killed in action, were often at the same levels with German losses. ¹⁸⁸ When there was no other alternative – as was the case at Bardia and Halfaya Pass in early January 1942 – many Italian soldiers became, like their German counterparts, prisoners of war. The remnants of the Folgore division – 200 officers and 3000 men – gave up on 6 November 1942 not because they lacked fighting power, but because fighting was no longer an option. ¹⁸⁹ Commenting on the Italians, Rommel admitted:

The duties of comradeship, for me particularly as their Commander-in-Chief, compel me to state unequivocally that the defeats which the Italian formations suffered at El Alamein in early July were not the fault of the Italian soldier … There is no doubt that the achievement of every Italian unit, especially of the motorized forces, far surpassed anything that the Italian Army had done for a hundred years. Many Italian generals and officers won our admiration both as men and soldiers. ¹⁹⁰

After the defeat at El Alamein, the retreat in Libya forced the Italian commanders to recreate an effective order of battle with the Pistoia, La Spezia, and Trieste infantry and the Giovani Fascisti armoured (sic) divisions. ¹⁹¹ These divisions were made up of survivors of El Alamein (Trieste and Giovani Fascisti) and units that had been kept in the rear area (the Pistoia arrived in North Africa in the summer, the La Spezia in November). The abandonment of Tripolitana and the battle for Tunisia did not mean the end of the Italian commitment: at the end of December 1942, more than 30,000 Italian infantrymen were in the line. ¹⁹² But at this time the war in North Africa was lost, and by an irony of history, in Tunis in May 1943, more Germans went into captivity than Italians. ¹⁹³

Even though a history of the Italian army performance in the North African campaign has not been written yet, one thing is undeniable: for the Italian troops, the learning curve was sharp. If some units were less badly prepared than others, most had to adjust in order to become efficient on the battlefield. Specialized formations, such as the armoured Ariete and the motorized Trieste divisions, had to train and adapt in order to survive the operational tempo imposed by the Germans. The Folgore airborne division arrived in Africa only after the capture of Tobruk in the summer of 1942; highly motivated and superbly trained, the men had to learn how to fight as simple infantrymen in a desert environment. The transformation of some infantry divisions, such as the Pavia, so poorly equipped and motorized, was noteworthy. For almost three years the men fought roughly with the same equipment, as very few new weapon systems ever reached Africa. ‘Italian style’ fighting power was then peculiar: men who were originally poorly trained for desert warfare learned to use with a maximum of effectiveness weapons that were becoming more and more obsolete. All this took place primarily because so many infantrymen, tank crews, artillerymen, and engineers gained the capacity to adjust in order to remedy their initial professional shortcomings. ¹⁹⁴ While the enemy counted on vast amounts of weapons and gradual technological superiority, Italian combatants’ only hope was to learn, adapt, and improvise.