US Fleet Submarines in the Atlantic during the Second World War: A Case Study of Relative Failure

I

The submarines of Squadron 50 were initially assigned to assist with Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of Vichy-controlled French North Africa which has been described as ‘one of the great turning-points in the Second World War’. ⁷ The date of the invasion was set for Sunday, 8 November 1942, under the overall command of Lieutenant General Dwight Eisenhower. A three-pronged attack was formulated to strike at Casablanca from the Atlantic, while Oran and Algiers were struck from the Mediterranean. The invasion forces at Oran and Algiers (designated the centre and eastern naval task forces) included both American and British personnel, and sailed from the United Kingdom between 22 and 26 October.

The landings at Casablanca were an entirely American operation, and an invasion force of over 100 ships sailed directly from the United States. This Western Naval Task Force (Task Force 34) under Rear Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt was to land about 35,000 troops and 250 tanks under Major-General Patton at three points on the Atlantic coast of French Morocco. The main attack (centre group) was on Fedala near Casablanca, while flanking attacks were made at Port Lyautey (northern group) and at Safi (southern group). ⁸

The role of Squadron 50 submarines was to support the Western Task Force off Casablanca and the port of Dakar. The decision to include submarines with the armada appeared to have been made late in the planning stage, since a list of US naval vessels to be involved in Torch sent on 4 September included no submarines. ⁹ Nevertheless, the submarines were the first American vessels of Operation Torch to leave from the United States, departing from Montauk Point on 19–20 October 1942. ¹⁰ Once on station, four submarines acted to reconnoitre and assist the attacking groups to find their destinations off French Morocco, while a fifth submarine was dispatched to keep watch on the port of Dakar in case Vichy French naval units sortied. The submarines had already been at sea for several days before the first transports weighed anchor from the US on the afternoon of 23 October 1942. ¹¹

In part the submarines were intended to bolster battle-fleet strength, still depleted by the attack on Pearl Harbor. ¹² No doubt one of the submarines’ roles was also to scout against a possible ambush of the Allied merchant ships by U-boats. From the Allied point of view, the main threat to the expedition was from enemy submarines as it crossed the Atlantic. At the time neither the British nor the American navy was able to break the U-boat Enigma code, which meant that there was little evidence of enemy dispositions and that the risks of the ocean passage were increased. ¹³

As it transpired, the Allies had been fortunate to avoid enemy submarines. A pack of 10 German submarines had been drawn away from the Operation Torch ships by an unfortunate convoy (Sierra Leone 125) which lost 13 ships. ¹⁴ It was not until after the landings had taken place that over 20 U-boats in the North Atlantic with sufficient fuel were ordered to the waters off Morocco. Despite heavy anti-submarine activity, the U-boats still scored some successes. On 11 November the U-173 sank a US Navy transport and damaged two other ships. The following day the U-130 sank three American transport ships of the Western Task Force. ¹⁵ In one of war’s many twists of fate a survivor from the Hugh L. Scott, Pete Narowanksi, later became a crewman on the famous submarine USS Tang, and was one of only nine men to escape the Tang in October 1944 after it was sunk by a circular run of one of its own torpedoes. ¹⁶

Churchill described the assault phase of Operation Torch ‘a brilliant success’. ¹⁷ The participation of the American submarines in Operation Torch, however, can at best be described as a mixed success. The Squadron 50 submarines were to perform multiple functions in the operation, including reconnaissance, providing navigational reference points, and patrolling against Vichy French naval resistance. Having arrived off the coast of north-west Africa ahead of the main American contingent, the submarines were initially to make reconnaissance patrols of the landing sites in preparation for the Allied occupation. The USS Shad, which had departed American waters early on the morning of 19 October for French Morocco, entered its patrol area off Mehedia Light at Port Lyautey near midnight on 4 November. On the afternoon of 6 November the submarine took motion pictures from about 2 miles off the coast of Mehedia harbour, the break-water, and possible landing beaches. ¹⁸ The reconnaissance gathered included information on the surf, currents, visibility, minefields, and navigational aids. ¹⁹ The Shad’s commander, Edgar John MacGregor III, however, believed that a more thorough briefing on the assault plans should have been given in order to carry out the reconnaissance effectively. ²⁰

The USS Herring patrolled off Casablanca, and the skipper compared the illuminated city to ‘the center of Times Square’ after they surfaced on the night of 5 November. ²¹ Meanwhile the USS Gunnel photographed proposed beachheads and conducted general reconnaissance off Casablanca and Fedala. The USS Blackfish, under John Frederick Davidson, was tasked with operating off Dakar, while the USS Barb patrolled off Safi some 140 miles south of Casablanca.

The skipper of USS Barb, John R. Waterman, concluded in his patrol report that while the use of submarines in landing operations had ‘infinite possibilities’, reconnaissance just prior to the assault had not been successful, in part because of communications difficulties. ²² On the morning of the invasion a scout boat under the command of Ensign John T. Bell from the transport Harris had orders to obtain a written report on the Barb’s beach reconnaissance because the submarine’s signals could not be seen. Its beach reconnaissance, completed just before the attack, was of little value. ²³ The US submarines’ reliance on photographic images taken through their periscopes created the problem of transferring film to the landing forces in time to be of assistance. ²⁴ Heavy reconnaissance was also being carried out by aircraft, which probably provided more immediate and useful information than did the submarines. ²⁵

In addition to carrying out reconnaissance, the USS Barb was also charged with a ‘special mission’. The submarine transported a contingent of five Army scouts from the 47th Infantry who were to take station by the bell buoy off the Safi breakwater and use radio and blinkers to guide in the assault destroyers Bernadou and Cole in order to seize the harbour. Shortly after 10.30 p.m. on 7 November, the scouts, under Lieutenant Willard G. Duckworth, disembarked from the Barb in a rubber boat. Unfortunately, the scouts were twice as far from shore as anticipated, and after paddling 7 miles over six hours the men only arrived off the breakwater as the invasion began. They had to abandon their rubber boat and take shelter from a hail of machine-gun bullets from sentries. ²⁶ The scout boat under John T. Bell alluded to above managed to take a position near the jetty and superseded the Barb’s signals in guiding the Bernadou and Cole to the harbour.

It was in providing weather information critical to the success of the landings that the American submarines most contributed to the operation. ²⁷ Whereas the landings at Algiers and Oran on the Mediterranean could be carried out with relative certainty about sea conditions, weather on the Atlantic coast, and in particular the ocean swell on the beaches, could potentially make the landings impossible. As late as the afternoon before the scheduled invasion, one of the submarines off Casablanca provided pessimistic reports on the weather conditions, but reports the following morning indicated beach conditions had moderated and the invasion proceeded as planned. ²⁸

Once the actual landing assaults began, the submarines were to send signals to the approaching US fleet to guide it to the correct beachheads and landing sites. British submarines were used in a similar capacity for the Mediterranean landings. ²⁹ The USS Shad was assigned as the beacon submarine for the Northern Attack Group, which under Admiral Kelly was to land about 9,000 soldiers near Mehedia at the mouth of the Wadi Sebou and occupy Port Lyautey and its airport. The USS Barb served as beacon submar-ine for the Southern Attack Group, charged with landing some 6,500 troops at Safi. ³⁰ The Center Attack Group had two beacon submarines: USS Gunnel under John Sidney McCain, Jr, and the USS Herring under Raymond W. Johnson. The Center Attack Group under Captain Emmett was to land about 19,000 soldiers on the beaches at Fedala, a small town about 15 miles from Casablanca. Squadron Commander Norman Ives, who was stationed on board the Northampton-class heavy cruiser USS Augusta, felt the operation demonstrated the value of using infrared light beacons. ³¹ In the case of the Gunnel, however, the tactical commander was unable to see the submarine from his ship Leonard Wood. ³²

The operation underlined the dangers to submarines in areas with large numbers of Allied ships and aircraft. While on station during the invasion, at 4.50 a.m., two shells exploded off the Barb’s stern. The crew were initially unsure if they were fired on by the enemy or Allied forces. An hour later crew on the Barb’s bridge saw tracers being fired at them, this time definitely from their own ships. The Barb dived for safety. ³³ Shortly after 6 a.m., with landing operations under way, the destroyer USS Eberle made two ‘very close approaches’ on the USS Shad that were broken off only after the submarine used smoke signals and sound transmissions to identify itself. The Shad’s commander believed more thorough plans should have been made for withdrawing from the area once heavy anti-submarine patrols began, and recommended that in future operations submarines be given a surface escort. ³⁴ Operating off Fedala, the USS Gunnel was also attacked by friendly forces and the crew discovered they had not been supplied with the latest recognition signals. About 7.30 a.m. on 8 November, the Gunnel was strafed by an aircraft identified as an Army P-40. Shortly after noon the Gunnel was bombed by another Army plane, with the explosion close enough to knock paint off the submarine’s bulkhead and disable its diesel engines. ³⁵

While the submarines had been ordered not to take any offensive action until after they had carried out their beacon role in the landings, once the invasion troops were ashore they were to intercept any enemy ships that moved towards the Allied force. ³⁶ Shortly after 6 a.m., after being fired on by friendly ships, the Barb started for its patrol station south-west of Mogador with instructions to intercept any French naval reinforcements from Dakar. The Gunnel also headed south to help intercept any French warships that attempted to leave Dakar, while the Shad travelled to its patrol area between Cape Sim and Madeira. ³⁷

The submarines had little success in engaging enemy shipping, with the USS Herring making the only confirmed sinking. By 4 a.m. on 8 November the Herring had permission to destroy any vessels departing Casablanca. The Herring identified the French freighter Ville de Havre and fired two torpedoes at 10.52 a.m. One of the torpedoes hit the ship, and the freighter was subsequently torpedoed again with a shot from the Herring’s stern tubes. The 5,750 ton vessel slowly sank. ³⁸

The only other US submarine to make an attack was the Blackfish. Shortly before noon on 9 November, stationed 5 miles north of Point Alamadies, the Blackfish crew spotted four vessels. An hour later the submarine fired torpedoes at two Italian freighters, claiming a hit on one of the ships estimated to be 7,110 tons. A short time later the Blackfish was depth-charged by the two escorts which accompanied the freighters. ³⁹ The Blackfish experienced another close call in the early hours of 13 November when it narrowly avoided a collision with three unidentified vessels. ⁴⁰ From 14 November the submarines began to head for their new base at Rosneath, on the west coast of Scotland. The Shad made a rendezvous with Barb and Herring on 23 November and the submarines moored at Rosneath on the 25th, followed by the Blackfish on the 27th. ⁴¹

II

American participation in the construction of a base at Rosneath began well before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Following meetings in Washington, DC, in early 1941, it was agreed that American engineers would build bases in Britain financed by the Lend-Lease agreement. Captain Louis E. Denfeld of the US Navy was sent to Britain in March 1941 to scout locations for possible bases, and Rosneath was one of two sites selected for a naval base. It was designated Base Two, and from July 1941 American construction engineers, along with masses of materials and equipment, began arriving, and by March 1942 a new wharf was in use.

Initially the base was used by the Royal Navy to support Atlantic convoy operations. During the lead-up to Operation Torch the United States temporarily assumed control of the base, and amphibious assault training took place there from August 1942. Once Operation Torch was completed, control of the base returned to the Royal Navy, although the US Navy continued to hold some areas, including docking for the submarine tender USS Beaver and the Squadron 50 submarines. There was also a submarine degaussing range in Stroul Bay, and the Royal Navy operated a floating dry-dock which could accommodate submarines. ⁴²

Compared with the amenities provided for submariners on leave in Hawaii, as well as Fremantle and Brisbane in Australia, the provisions for leave at Rosneath were spartan. Following the Herring crew’s first period of liberty there, Lieutenant Commander Raymond W. Johnson described the recreational facilities as ‘limited’, with the submar-ine commanders the only officers provided with suitable quarters ashore. In addition to restricted opportunities for recreation, Johnson noted that the men on leave faced a depressing climate. ⁴³ In responding to these criticisms, Norman Ives sarcastically wrote that ‘The squadron commander is unable to improve climatic conditions,’ and ventured his opinion that the weather at Rosneath was better than in Alaska. ⁴⁴ In a more positive vein, Ives noted that arrangements were made to requisition a hotel, the Buchanan Arms, near Loch Lomond for the use of men returning from patrols. An officers’ club and crew recreation hall were also opened. With such improvements Ives asserted that ‘Facilities for recuperation are equal to if not better than those provided for the crews of British submarines,’ a view concurred with by the British commander of submarines, Admiral Claud B. Barry. ⁴⁵ Following the Herring crew’s next period of leave at Rosneath, and with Johnson temporarily replaced as skipper by Lieutenant Commander John Corbus, comments on the amenities were more generous. Corbus noted that the rest camp at the Buchanan Arms was used and appreciated by all the officers and many of the enlisted men. ⁴⁶ Presumably amenities of another kind were also operating, since on the Herring’s next patrol four cases of venereal disease were diagnosed after departure from port. ⁴⁷

The quality of supplies available at Rosneath afforded another bone of contention, at least in the early stages. After the USS Shad made its first patrol out of Rosneath, the war patrol report complained of ‘a noticeable decrease in the variety and quality of food’. ⁴⁸ More than any other fighting force, the US submarine service was known for its superior food, and a decline in quality represented a serious threat to morale. Again, Ives responded with some positive actions that included obtaining substantial quantities of eggs from Ireland and ordering other special foods from the United States. ⁴⁹ Following the Shad’s next patrol, it was reported that for the first time on patrol large quantities of fresh frozen meat were not lost through spoilage. ⁵⁰ Nevertheless, the comparatively limited selection of food remained a matter of at least sporadic complaint. ⁵¹

A more formidable challenge to the operational efficiency of the submarines was posed by mechanical problems, and along with supplies this put further strain on sub-marine crews. The USS Beaver (AS-5) was delegated the task of serving as tender for Squadron 50, and under Commander M.N. Little departed for Rosneath in late October 1942. The ship had been converted to a submarine tender at Mare Island Navy Yard in 1918, and in 1940 underwent modernization before joining the Atlantic fleet. ⁵² At least initially, it seems that the tender personnel lacked efficiency in servicing fleet sub-marines. Following the USS Shad’s first patrol in the Bay of Biscay, half of the crew was required to assist the tender crew in carrying out a refit of the submarine in a reasonable time. ⁵³ By the time the Shad had completed its third Atlantic war patrol, however, it was reported that work by the tender was ‘of uniform excellence’ and that the spare parts problem had ‘considerably improved’. ⁵⁴

The most serious mechanical issue was the defective main diesel engines installed in the Squadron 50 fleet boats Gurnard and Gunnel. Even before Operation Torch, the USS Gurnard had engine problems that required it going directly to the base in Scotland without participating in the North African invasion. The submarine had been fitted with Hooven-Owens-Rentschler (HOR) engines which earned an unenviable bad reputation throughout the submarine service. Although the USS Gunnel did participate in Operation Torch, the crew had to deal with a succession of engine failures following the landings. In a post-war interview the Gunnel’s skipper, John McCain, described the submarine’s HOR engines as a ‘dud’. ⁵⁵ On 16 November the number one main engine failed, and over the next few days the submarine’s other main engines failed as well, with their gear teeth sheared or distorted. Off the coast of Spain and almost 1,000 miles from its base, the Gunnel had only a small auxiliary Winton ‘dinky’ engine left for surface travel and could only make a top speed of 5 knots. A British escort provided companionship for the submarine to Falmouth, England, where it arrived on the morning of 26 November. On 3 December 1942 the Gunnel set off for Rosneath, and arrived four days later. ⁵⁶

The engine failures had not been the only mechanical problem suffered by the Gunnel. Lieutenant Commander McCain complained that excessive leaking of the outboard exhaust valves limited the ‘military effectiveness’ of the submarine, an opinion concurred with by Norman Ives. ⁵⁷ Another structural problem, one shared with the Gurnard, was the penetration of salt water spray into the engine rooms through the main engine intakes. The Gunnel stayed at Rosneath only long enough to have its engines repaired sufficiently to return to Portsmouth, New Hampshire, for a major overhaul before assignment to the Pacific. ⁵⁸

Having already missed out on Operation Torch because of engine problems, the Gurnard continued to suffer a series of mechanical problems on its first patrol from Rosneath. Skipper Charles Herbert Andrews later characterized the HOR engines as ‘lemons’ plagued by chipped gear teeth, vibration, and lubrication problems. ⁵⁹ Within a week of departing port, the number two engine was expected to fail. An exhaust valve broke off the auxiliary engine, a sheer pin failed on the number three engine, and problems developed with the main drive electrical equipment. An electrical fire in the manoeuvring room was narrowly averted, and both engine rooms had water leaking in through the induction piping. A problem since the Gurnard’s commissioning, the incursion of seawater further aggravated the HOR engines’ deficiencies by encrusting exposed moveable controls with salt. ⁶⁰ The patrol lasted less than two weeks. In his endorsement of the patrol report, Norman Ives noted that the engine casualties were similar to those of the Gunnel, and ‘strongly recommended that no submarine powered with this type of H.O.R. engine be sent on distant patrol until the defect is definitely eliminated or engine replacement effected’. ⁶¹ Before departing Rosneath for New London on 25 January 1943, the Gurnard was repaired with parts shipped from America, but despite this the crew experienced further mechanical problems on the journey back to the US. The scavenger blowers and gears of the HOR main engines were considered unreliable beyond 300 hours of engine operation. There were also continued problems with salt water and spray entering the engine rooms via the engine induction piping. ⁶²

The Gunnel and Gurnard were replaced in April 1943 by the USS Haddo and USS Hake; the latter submarines made a combined total of only five patrols in the Atlantic, including their transits to and from Rosneath. Unfortunately they also had HOR engines which suffered from by now familiar deficiencies. Under the command of John Cozine Broach, the Hake departed New London on 7 April 1943 for Rosneath; one of the crewmen on board died after a brief illness, but otherwise the patrol passed without incident. After arrival at Rosneath the Hake underwent a refit, and departed for its second war patrol on 15 May 1943. The same day the Hake suffered an engine failure and returned to port. After undergoing repairs and trials, the Hake set off again on 27 May, but during the patrol was ordered back to New London. ⁶³ Once back in the United States the submarine was sent to Mare Island, where its HORs were replaced by General Motors 16-278A engines. ⁶⁴

The Barb, Shad, Blackfish, and Herring, fitted with Fairbanks-Morse or General Motors engines, had relatively little trouble but were far from free of equipment failures. Following the Blackfish’s fourth patrol, the patrol report claimed: ‘The excessive smoking and steaming of the main engines is a very serious military hazard and an immediate remedy is considered vital.’ ⁶⁵ The Blackfish also experienced problems with its gyro compass. ⁶⁶ On its fifth war patrol, the Blackfish continued to suffer from some of the effects of a depth char-ging it underwent on 19 February 1943. Although the submarine’s high-pressure air bank was supposedly repaired, its continued malfunction led to claims of ‘defective workmanship’. ⁶⁷ On its second war patrol the Herring found its deck lockers had been inadequately constructed and made ‘disturbing noises submerged’, while the SJ radar was also intermittently out of order. ⁶⁸ The Shad also found its SJ radar ‘unreliable’ on its first patrol. ⁶⁹ By its third patrol, however, the Shad described the SJ radar as ‘highly satisfactory’ and credited its use for a successful attack on 1 April (although as noted below the attack was far less successful than imagined). ⁷⁰ Other mechanical deficiencies experienced by the Shad included difficulty receiving messages in heavy seas and malfunctioning of the bow planes. ⁷¹

III

For British submarines the most productive theatre of operations was the Mediterranean. The US Navy’s fleet boats, however, were considered too large for patrolling the Mediterranean, where relatively calm and transparent waters, along with coastal shallows, made size a liability. ⁷² Even with smaller submarines, British losses in the Mediterranean were horrific, and vindicated the decision not to send American fleet boats there. During November–December 1942 alone, five Allied submarines were lost there. ⁷³ On the other hand, the deployment of the American reinforcements to different areas arguably strengthened the British strategy of dispersing enemy defences. ⁷⁴

In the six months before the American fleet boats were based at Rosneath, British submarine patrols in the Atlantic (including the waters off Norway, the North Sea, and Bay of Biscay) had claimed few enemy ships. In August 1942 the Saracen was credited with sinking U-335, and two steamers were sunk by the Sturgeon and Unshaken the same month. It was not until December that a British submarine claimed another success, and this resulted from a commando raid rather than torpedoes. On 12 December in Operation Frankton the Tuna disembarked at the mouth of the Gironde estuary a party of Royal Marine commandoes who paddled their canoes upstream and were able to damage four German ships with limpet mines. ⁷⁵

Initially patrols from Rosneath focused on the Bay of Biscay, where the US submar-ines were to monitor shipping lanes off the Spanish coast suspected of being used by blockade runners to aid the Germans. These operations were inspired largely by an increase in signals intelligence from late 1942, especially Japanese diplomatic decrypts. These, along with U-boat Enigma intelligence obtained from the beginning of 1943, afforded increased information on enemy blockade runners sailing between Europe and Japan. Since April 1941 German and Italian blockade runners had been used to ship raw materials from Japan to the Biscay ports and machinery back to Japan. Alerted by the Japanese diplomatic cypher, the Allies knew that increased blockade running between Europe and the Far East was planned for the 1942–3 winter. On 30 November 1942 a Sunderland flying boat spotted the Italian blockade runner Cortellazzo, which was subsequently sunk by British destroyers. On 15 December the tanker Germania, bound from Bordeaux for the Far East, was scuttled by its crew after being intercepted by the British destroyer Redoubt. ⁷⁶

By January 1943 expanded Allied air and naval operations, including the commando raid noted above, disrupted blockade running to and from the Bay of Biscay. An attempt to deploy the US submarines Barb, Shad, Blackfish, and Herring into a patrol line to intercept the blockade runner Rhakotis, however, failed because of communication delays. Again it was left to a British surface ship, HMS Scylla, to sink the Rhakotis after it was spotted by a Sunderland flying boat on 1 January 1943. When blockade runners resumed activities in March, Allied operations against them were hindered because intelligence failed to provide advance notice on their departures from Biscay ports. ⁷⁷ Alerted by decrypts to the departure of three blockade runners on 27 March, the Herring was directed to help intercept them, but the ships had already passed the Allied patrol line. ⁷⁸

The dominant tone of the reports written on the American patrols in the Bay of Biscay was one of frustration. Given Spain’s nominal neutrality there were strict protocols requiring that suspect ships be attacked only if positive identification could be made. For example, the Shad received instructions to note enemy ore-shipping routes in neutral waters but to ‘attack enemy vessels if definitely identified and repeat and not within territorial waters’. ⁷⁹ As summed up by Squadron Commander Norman Ives, ‘Positive identification was difficult for the commanding officers, as both identification data and intelligence of neutral movements were lacking or late.’ ⁸⁰

Following the Herring’s first venture into the Bay of Biscay, outspoken skipper Raymond Johnson lambasted the idea of conducting a patrol off neutral ports as hardly justifiable, and described the situation as ‘particularly unsatisfactory’ when Spanish neutrality had to be scrupulously respected. ⁸¹ The Herring crew also had to deal with the limited ‘sea room’ off neutral ports, and frequently had to manoeuvre to avoid fishing craft. ⁸² Johnson further criticized the length of the patrol, 58 days, as excessive, pointing out that patrols in the Bay of Biscay required almost exclusively submerged operations which put special strain on crews. ⁸³ The US skippers had been warned that they would be targeted by Allied bombers if they were caught on the surface. ⁸⁴ This was certainly no idle threat, given that on 11 November 1942 the British submarine Unbeaten had been sunk by an RAF Wellington aircraft in the Bay of Biscay. ⁸⁵ In his endorsement of the Herring’s report, Ives tried to put a positive gloss on the patrol by suggesting that the information gathered ‘will be of great value for future patrols in the Bay area’. He acknowledged, however, that the lack of intelligence on shipping and delays in passing this on presented ‘a weighty problem on commanding officers’. ⁸⁶ The situation had improved little by the time the Herring made its next patrol when, under a different skipper, the patrol report described the information provided on prospective movements by Spanish shipping as ‘of little value’. ⁸⁷

The USS Gurnard departed Rosneath on 28 November 1942 for its first war patrol in the Bay of Biscay, and at one stage received information on the probable departure of a German tanker from the Spanish port of El Ferrol. When the Gurnard patrolled off El Ferrol, however, the crew found that the number of trawlers made it difficult to operate undetected, and it was believed that at least some supposed fishing boats were engaged in anti-submarine patrols. ⁸⁸ The crew of the Shad drew a similar conclusion, and suspected that some fishing boats were acting as escorts for German ore ships. ⁸⁹ The Gurnard’s skipper, Charles Andrews, concluded in his patrol report that ‘Aside from providing excellent training and seasoning for officers and crew this patrol was uneventful. That no enemy ships were met is a disappointment to all on board.’ ⁹⁰ According to Andrews, the only ‘touch of color to a dull patrol’ was provided by dodging floating mines. ⁹¹ He was still more forthright when he later summed up the patrols in a post-war interview with historian Clay Blair, Jr:

We had a lousy set of circumstances to work on. We were forbidden to be on the surface in daylight. We were not to authorize the torpedoing of any ship that looked to be over 5,000 tons without first reporting it to the Admiralty and getting permission – identify it. Of course you could never do that. ⁹²

The Gurnard in fact never fired a torpedo.

Operating off the Spanish city of Vigo during its first patrol in the Bay of Biscay, the USS Barb sighted some 224 vessels. As in the case of the Herring, however, the submar-ine’s crew found the presence of trawlers and fishing craft made approaches on suspect ships difficult, and in the end they determined all of the ships investigated to be neutral. ⁹³ On its next war patrol the Barb made even more contacts, sighting 485 trawlers and fishing craft as well as 127 larger vessels. At least one trawler flying a Spanish flag was believed to be engaged in anti-submarine activities. The Barb’s patrol report clearly reflected the crew’s frustration: ‘The feeling of futility engendered by such numerous contacts which failed to develop into attacks was hard to overcome. The tendency was to become lax and the effect on morale was noticeable.’ ⁹⁴ The Blackfish’s first patrol in the Bay of Biscay similarly came up empty, with the submarine crew spotting no shipping which could be verified as a legitimate target. The report on the Blackfish’s next war patrol echoed by now familiar complaints about the difficulties of conducting operations off a neutral port. Hundreds of fishing boats in the area made it near impossible to avoid being spotted, while hazy conditions made it difficult to determine the nationality of vessels, even when large Spanish flags were painted on their sides. The skipper, John Davidson, felt certain that at least some ships using Spanish colours and markings were enemy ships bound for French ports. ⁹⁵

On the basis of this and other patrol reports, Norman Ives concurred that there were probably breaches of neutrality in the Bay of Biscay which included the misuse of Spanish markings, as well as the use of anti-submarine vessels and patrol planes within territorial waters. ⁹⁶ ‘Only a change in strategic policy can alter the delicacy of this situ-ation,’ Ives concluded. He recommended ‘stiffening of demands on neutrals to supply advance and accurate information on shipping’ and if not met that ‘a total blockade of Spanish ports be declared’. ⁹⁷ These recommendations were never implemented, although diplomatic action later succeeded in substantially reducing the shipment of iron ore from Bilbao to the Biscay ports. ⁹⁸

American submarines conducted a total of nine patrols in the Bay of Biscay, with attacks on enemy shipping being made during four of the patrols. On the Herring’s second patrol there, with John Corbus as commander, the submarine operated off El Ferrol and Cape Ortegal. In the early hours of 21 March 1943 the crew spotted a U-boat and fired torpedoes which they presumed sank the submarine. Norman Ives credited the Herring with the sinking of the U-boat for 530 tons. ⁹⁹ The British Admiralty Assessment Board, however, was prepared to concede no more than that the U-boat was ‘probably sunk’. ¹⁰⁰ This was the only attack made by the Herring, which led Corbus to sum up the patrol as ‘disappointing’. ¹⁰¹

The USS Blackfish made its only attack in the Bay of Biscay off Bilbao, Spain. In the early evening of 19 February 1943 the Blackfish approached two trawler-like vessels estimated to be 700 tons each. After recognizing German colours and mounted guns, the submarine’s crew fired two torpedoes at each of the ships, claiming a torpedo hit on one of them. German records later confirmed that the Blackfish sank the 1,432 ton German patrol boat Haltenbank (trawler no. 408) off the north coast of Spain and in fact it had made two torpedo hits on the craft. ¹⁰² The attack proved costly, however, since the Blackfish was immediately counter-attacked with depth charges and what sounded to the crew like bombs. The Blackfish sustained damage to the conning tower door frame, the main engine induction, and a sound head. After reporting its condition the submarine was instructed to return from patrol, and it moored at Falmouth, England, on the evening of 22 February 1943. ¹⁰³ From Falmouth the Blackfish went to the Royal Naval Dockyard at Devonport on 5 March, and once repairs were completed departed for Rosneath on 22 March. ¹⁰⁴ In light of the damage suffered by the Blackfish, Squadron Commander Ives questioned the judgement of attacking two anti-submarine vessels when they were not escorting a valuable target, writing in his endorsement that the skipper ‘does not show evidence of best judgment’ and that ‘he should take only well-considered risks’. ¹⁰⁵

The USS Shad proved the most active US submarine in making attacks, with assaults on four vessels during its first patrol in the Bay of Biscay. On 30 December 1942 the submarine received instructions to proceed to a patrol station off Bilbao. Shortly after midnight on 4 January 1943, the Shad spotted a vessel estimated at 400 to 600 tons towing a barge. The submarine surfaced for a gun action from a range of 400 to 800 yards. The barge was sunk with the deck gun but, as the submarine moved in to finish off the trawler towing it, the 3 inch deck gun jammed. It was still believed that the vessel might have sunk. ¹⁰⁶ Although skipper Edgar MacGregor criticized the 3 inch gun’s lack of ‘hitting power’, he considered the gun action to be a morale booster and ‘excellent experience as it taught many valuable lessons in regards to this sort of offensive action’. ¹⁰⁷ On 9 January the Shad spotted a steamship flying no colours and without running lights apparently on a course for Bordeaux. With the deck gun out of action, the Shad fired two torpedoes, but both passed under the target. On the Monday morning of 25 January the Shad fired four torpedoes at a ship identified as the German ore-transport steamer Nordfels leaving Bilbao harbour at about 9.30 a.m. The torpedoes apparently missed, and the ship returned to the harbour. ¹⁰⁸ Intelligence later revealed that the fourth torpedo had in fact hit the Nordfels in the vicinity of its screws and, although it failed to explode, broke off a couple of propeller blades and dented a few plates. The British consul in Bilbao summed up the damage as ‘very slight’, and expected the ship to be repaired within a few days. ¹⁰⁹

The Shad’s skipper considered that the attack on the Nordfels and the gun action, along with the presence of enemy planes searching for them, were ‘generally sufficient to alleviate the boredom of a long patrol during which nothing happens’. ¹¹⁰ Again, Norman Ives did not view these attacks uncritically and suggested that the Shad crew should have had more torpedoes ready to fire when they attacked the Nordfels. They were also criticized for wasting two torpedoes on a shallow-draft vessel in the 9 January attack. Still, the Shad received credit for sinking one towing trawler of 600 tons and one ore barge, and for damage to the 1,200 ton ore vessel Nordfels. The crew were commended for ‘showing a marked aggressive spirit throughout the patrol’. ¹¹¹

The Shad revisited the Bay of Biscay on its next patrol and there must have been a sense of déjà vu when on 16 March the submarine received a dispatch indicating that the Nordfels, after being repaired, had departed Bilbao. ¹¹² Although the Shad did not encounter the Nordfels, on this patrol decrypts from the U-boat Enigma key (Shark) directly contributed to an attack. On 30 March, Shark decrypts revealed that an incoming blockade runner had made a rendezvous with a U-boat and that four German destroyers had departed to meet the ship. The following day the Italian ship Pietro Orseolo coming from Japan was spotted from the air. ¹¹³ With the help of an aircraft from the No. 19 Group of RAF Coastal Command, the Shad made contact with a convoy of four destroyers and the Pietro Orseolo near the French coast in the early hours of 1 April 1943. The Shad’s crew fired eight torpedoes into the convoy. Although the night was dark and overcast, they believed that their torpedo salvo wiped out most of the convoy, and the patrol report dramatically described how ‘smoke from explosions rose like curtains two to three hundred feet into the air’. ¹¹⁴ According to the report, ‘Two destroyers were seen to be blown out of the water,’ while it was believed another destroyer and the merchant ship were also sunk. ¹¹⁵

In his endorsement of the patrol, Norman Ives enthused that ‘It is extremely gratifying that after so many comparatively fruitless patrols in the Bay area an opportunity to inflict major damage on the enemy presented itself.’ He compared the attack to the work being done by submarines in the Pacific and praised the potential of the fleet-type submarine with its surface speed, radar, torpedo data computer, and sound equipment. He credited the Shad with sinking two destroyers and a freighter of 8,000 to 10,000 tons. ¹¹⁶ Later assessment of the attack, however, showed that these claims were greatly inflated. Both photographic reconnaissance and intelligence reports by covert agents indicated that the blockade runner Pietro Orseolo, carrying a cargo of rubber, arrived at Bordeaux on 2 April with damage from two torpedo hits. All four of the Narvik-class destroyers were intact, although there was some evidence to suggest that one of the destroyers had been hit by a torpedo which failed to explode. ¹¹⁷ Even so, Admiral Harold R. Stark, the commander of US naval forces in Europe, praised the attacks as ‘a well conducted aggressive action with a fine display of offensive spirit and cool courage’. ¹¹⁸

IV

The Pietro Orseolo proved not only the first blockade runner to reach Europe from the Far East since November 1942, but also the last until the attempt to sail blockade runners from Japan was resumed in November 1943. ¹¹⁹ In the meantime, from April 1943 the patrol areas of Squadron 50 submarines shifted north. The British Admiralty believed that a force of German warships, including the battleship Scharnhorst, battleship Tirpitz, and heavy cruiser Lützow, recently moved from Narvik to Altenfjord in northern Norway might attempt a breakout into the Atlantic. With British submarines concentrated in the Mediterranean, the American submarines were drafted to reinforce a patrol line in case the German ships sortied. The patrol line for intercepting the German ships initially extended from the Lofoten Islands to Spitzbergen and later moved west to cover the Denmark Strait between Iceland and Greenland. By mid-May a breakout of the German ships appeared less likely and the patrol line was discontinued. ¹²⁰

At the same time, the American patrols were intended as anti-U-boat operations. With the loss of over 1,000 merchant ships to German submarines during 1942, a meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill at Casablanca in January 1943 determined that the defeat of U-boats was a top priority in Allied planning. ¹²¹ In early 1943 an estimated 100 U-boats operated in the mid-Atlantic beyond the reach of Allied air patrols. ¹²² Decrypts of German communications from late March 1943 revealed not only the increasing number of U-boats in the North Atlantic, but also the declining efficacy of German tactics. ¹²³ The US patrols off Norway, off Iceland, off the north of Ireland, and in the mid-Atlantic, however, proved even less productive than those in the Bay of Biscay and further challenged the morale of crews. As with the Biscay patrols, the experience of US submari-ners largely replicated that of their British predecessors who had sighted few targets, spent lengthy periods submerged to avoid enemy aircraft, and battled extreme weather conditions. ¹²⁴ Between January 1942 and March 1943 British submarines had made only two attacks on U-boats in the Atlantic, one of which was successful. ¹²⁵

By April 1943 Allied escort carriers and convoy support groups were bringing German submarines to heel. That month the British submarine Tuna also claimed U-644, after signal intelligence indicated a U-boat patrol line being formed to intercept shipping to Russia. There would be, however, only one other successful British submarine action against a U-boat in the North Atlantic for the remainder of the year. Although signal intelligence indicated the routes taken by U-boats, the British boats made few contacts. ¹²⁶ The American submarines made an even less tangible contribution to the anti-U-boat campaign.

The USS Haddo conducted its first patrol of the war travelling from New London to Rosneath in April 1943 through areas believed to be U-boat routes, but made no contacts. ¹²⁷ On its first patrol from Rosneath, the Haddo was assigned a patrol area in the mid-Atlantic just outside the zone covered by aircraft. From the experience of their own submarines, the British Admiralty was sceptical of this strategy, but the Americans believed the greater endurance and range of their fleet boats might give them an additional edge. ¹²⁸ The Haddo crew made one sighting of a U-boat but they were unable to close for an attack. ¹²⁹ The Haddo’s skipper summed up the patrol as ‘discouraging’. ¹³⁰ This in fact proved to be the only definite sighting of a U-boat made by any of the Squadron 50 submarines in northern latitudes.

For the USS Shad’s fourth war patrol, MacGregor was replaced as skipper by Roland Fremont Pryce. The Shad departed on 4 May 1943 to patrol an area off Iceland and Norway where, without a period of darkness, the submarine spent about 19 hours a day submerged. ¹³¹ During the 43-day patrol the Shad made no definite contacts with enemy submarines, and the patrol report concluded that the chance of such contacts was ‘remote’. ¹³² Even if a U-boat were encountered, some American skippers considered that their submarines would be at a disadvantage. Working in extended daylight hours, the skipper of the USS Barb pointed out that the large silhouette of the American fleet boats was much more easily spotted than the smaller low-silhouette U-boats. ¹³³

At least some submariners concluded that their best chance of sighting a U-boat was through cooperation with air reconnaissance. ¹³⁴ On the other hand, working with aircraft created the danger of being attacked by ‘friendly’ aviators. Although this might be averted by a total ban on bombing in areas where Allied submarines operated, this would have hamstrung aviators at a time when aircraft equipped with radar proved the most effective anti-submarine weapons in the Allied arsenal. ¹³⁵

In the absence of enemy ships, the main dangers faced by the Squadron 50 submarines were from the weather and sea conditions. In the Bay of Biscay the US submarines had periodically faced gale-force winds and problems of visibility. ¹³⁶ On its first patrol in the Bay of Biscay the USS Barb at times battled huge seas and driving gales with winds over 70 knots. The crew discovered that all of their binoculars flooded when used in heavy weather. ¹³⁷ In what proved the most atrocious winter of the war, conditions for those submariners on patrol in January 1943 appeared especially treacherous. ¹³⁸ On its second war patrol the Shad experienced ‘mountainous seas’ that dented the fairwater plating of its conning tower. ¹³⁹ The same month the Herring encountered gale-force winds and sea swells reaching 40 feet, conditions according to the patrol report ‘not particularly suited to an offensive submarine patrol’. ¹⁴⁰

Conditions generally deteriorated as the submarines moved north. When the USS Herring made a patrol in the North Atlantic, the patrol report emphasized the problems of visibility: ‘About half the time effective periscope observations against a target as small as a U-boat were limited to about 4000 yards.’ ¹⁴¹ The Blackfish departed for its fourth war patrol off the coast of Norway and north of Iceland on 5 April 1943, and within a couple of days rough seas resulted in the submarine ‘taking on considerable water in engine room and control room’. ¹⁴² Although the seas later calmed, snow squalls periodically reduced visibility to virtually zero. The formation of ice on the Blackfish presented another problem, resulting in broken radio antennae insulators and malfunction of the SJ radar. Most seriously, the formation of ice on the superstructure prevented proper flooding and venting, which prolonged the diving time and made the submarine more vulnerable to attack. This was a particular liability in areas of continual daylight and at times within 150 miles of enemy air bases. ¹⁴³ Norman Ives recommended that in high latitudes with long daylight hours the submarines should stay submerged as much as possible to counter the disadvantage of a large silhouette. ¹⁴⁴

V

By mid-1943 the US Navy determined that the Squadron 50 fleet boats could be better employed in the Pacific theatre and they were recalled to the United States. Ironically, as historian Clay Blair points out, the most significant contribution of Squadron 50 sub-marines to the Battle of the Atlantic proved to be unintentional. As the Haddo, Hake, and Herring left Scotland for the United States, Allied convoys in the Atlantic were warned of their impending presence using the Anglo-American Naval Cypher Number 3. The Germans also relayed this information to their U-boats using the Enigma code, revealing to Allied codebreakers that Cypher Number 3 had been compromised. The Allies subsequently switched naval codes, creating a huge setback for Germany. ¹⁴⁵

Norman Ives remained commanding officer of Base Two, which served as a training, supply, and maintenance base in preparations for the invasion of France. In November 1943 he was replaced at Rosneath by Commander E.S. Stoker, and he took over responsibility for training special navy construction battalions for clearing captured beaches and ports in France. He later became the US director of the port at Cherbourg, France, where he was killed in action on 2 August 1944 at the age of 47. ¹⁴⁶

Including the participation in Operation Torch, Squadron 50 boats made a total of 28 war patrols in the Atlantic theatre. These were the last US fleet submarines assigned to European waters. Rear Admiral Claud B. Barry, as the British admiral of submarines, wrote to Captain Ives that although targets were ‘disappointingly few’, Squadron 50’s ‘actual contribution has been very great and personal, far beyond numbers of ships sunk or damaged’. ¹⁴⁷ In other words, leaving aside Squadron 50’s small toll on enemy shipping, it represented a symbolic strengthening of the Anglo-American alliance. This was certainly the view of Charles Andrews, skipper of the USS Gurnard, who in a post-war interview characterized the submarines’ role as ‘a kind of token support’ for the Royal Navy. ¹⁴⁸

In his message to Ives, Admiral Barry further wrote that ‘It is pure bad luck that they [Squadron 50] have not achieved more successes, especially so in the case of USS Shad who carried out one of the most outstanding attacks that has come to my notice.’ ¹⁴⁹ The lack of success, however, was not due simply to ‘bad luck’. Given previous British ex-perience in the same patrol areas, where according to Arthur Hezlet fewer torpedoes were fired over eight months than an average week in the Mediterranean, the outcome appeared predictable. Surface warships and aircraft proved more effective weapons against blockade runners and U-boats in the Atlantic. As Hezlet points out, the greater mobility of air and surface forces compared with submarines gave them an advantage in responding to signal intelligence. ¹⁵⁰ They also posed a grave threat to submarines operating in the same areas. The Squadron 50 fleet boats further faced some of the same materiel problems as US submarines in the Pacific theatre. The most obvious limitation was the HOR engines installed in the Gunnel, Gurnard, Haddo, and Hake. John S. McCain, Jr, skipper of the Gunnel, claimed without too much exaggeration that volumes could be written ‘as regards the dubious trustworthiness of this make of engine’. ¹⁵¹ Eventually the dozen US submarines built with the engines had them replaced.

The Squadron 50 submarines also experienced some of the torpedo malfunctions so well documented in the Pacific campaign and which bedevilled the service until late 1943. Following the Shad’s 1 April 1943 attack on a convoy, for example, it was believed that some of the torpedoes exploded prematurely in the wakes of the target ships. ¹⁵² On at least two documented occasions, the USS Shad hit enemy ships with torpedoes that failed to explode. ¹⁵³

In light of the few enemy vessels sunk by the Squadron 50 submarines, it might be suggested that the main benefit of their Atlantic patrols, apart from strengthening the Anglo-American alliance, was that they afforded the personnel involved with valuable experience. The report on the Blackfish’s first patrol concluded: ‘Lack of activity during this patrol was disappointing but the value of training of the officers and crew was excellent.’ ¹⁵⁴ Similarly, following the Barb’s third war patrol in early 1943, the main outcome was described as the experience the crew gained in handling the submarine rather than attacks on enemy shipping. ¹⁵⁵

Just as Operation Torch had offered experience in amphibious landings that would later be employed at the Normandy landings in 1944, it could be argued that the training of personnel in the Atlantic primed them for successful careers in the Pacific. ¹⁵⁶ Most of the commanders and crews with Atlantic experience turned in creditable performances on their first patrols in the Pacific. The USS Shad departed Rosneath on 5 July 1943 for New London, with Edgar J. MacGregor III back in command after being relieved for one patrol. Although the original plan had been for the Shad to undergo a major overhaul, it was determined partly for the ‘morale benefit’ to immediately send the crew on their first Pacific patrol ‘after the many months waiting for this opportunity’. ¹⁵⁷ MacGregor, making his fifth patrol in command of the Shad, left Pearl Harbor on 28 September 1943 as part of a coordinated attack group with two other fleet boats. The Shad was credited with sinking two enemy transports weighing a combined 13,400 tons and damaging another four vessels totalling 24,869 tons, although post-war assessments whittled down the tally to sinking one ship. ¹⁵⁸

After making a total of four patrols in the Atlantic, the USS Barb set course for the submarine base at New London, where it arrived on 24 July 1943, and following a quick overhaul it left for service in the Pacific. ¹⁵⁹ On its first Pacific patrol the Barb was credited with sinking an 8,000 ton freighter and damaging another of 5,624 tons. ¹⁶⁰ The Herring under command of Raymond Johnson began its first patrol from Pearl Harbor on 15 November 1943 and was credited with sinking two transports, one freighter, and one escort vessel, a combined 30,027 tons, and damaging a 7,000 ton tanker. ¹⁶¹ Post-war assessment reduced the Herring’s claimed ships from four to two. The USS Hake skippered by John C. Broach received credit for sinking three ships (plus two small craft) on its first Pacific patrol. ¹⁶²

Despite these successes, there is some evidence that experience in the Atlantic could have a negative effect. The USS Haddo set sail from Rosneath for New London on 10 July 1943, and after a major overhaul at Mare Island, which included replacement of its HOR engines with Wintons, the submarine headed for Pearl Harbor under command of John Corbus. The Haddo departed on 14 December 1943 for its first Pacific war patrol, concentrating on the waters off Manila in the Philippines before arriving at Fremantle, Australia. Corbus was criticized for insufficient coverage of the patrol area and spending too many days submerged. In his endorsement of the patrol, Squadron Commander Captain John Meade Haines believed: ‘This was undoubtedly due in part to the Commanding Officer’s previous experience in the Bay of Biscay Areas where such practice was mandatory, as well as by his lack of familiarity with the methods employed in the Pacific.’ ¹⁶³ The patrol was deemed not successful for an award of the submarine combat insignia.

Having commanded the Blackfish for four patrols in the Atlantic, John F. Davidson made his first patrol in the South-West Pacific area, having left Brisbane on 19 October 1943. Although the Blackfish was credited with sinking one freighter and damaging another, Davidson’s superiors believed that it underperformed relative to its opportunities on the patrol. The submarine made contact with 14 enemy ships, but only twice did attacks develop and in both cases torpedoes were fired at extreme ranges. Again, the ‘inexperience of the commanding officer in this area’ was singled out as a reason for the relatively lacklustre results. ¹⁶⁴

As it turned out, two of the submarines making the most successful debuts in the Pacific theatre were those that made the fewest patrols in the Atlantic. The USS Gunnel had participated in Operation Torch, but engine failures then forced its return to New Hampshire for a major overhaul. Despite the continuing handicap of HOR engines on its first Pacific patrol, the officers and crew of the Gunnel under McCain were congratulated by Charles A. Lockwood, Jr, Commander of Submarines Pacific, for a ‘highly aggressive and successful war patrol’. ¹⁶⁵ After only 11 days on station in the East China Sea, the Gunnel was credited with sinking two freighters and one destroyer for a total of 15,607 tons before its engines began breaking down.

The highest praise for the first Pacific patrol of a former Squadron 50 submarine was reserved for the USS Gurnard under the command of Charles Andrews. The Gurnard made only two aborted Atlantic patrols before being forced to return to New London for work on its HOR engines. After the repair the Gurnard arrived at Pearl Harbor on 26 May 1943, the first of the former Squadron 50 submarines to report for duty in the Pacific. On its first Pacific patrol, the Gurnard was credited with sinking two freighters and a destroyer, a combined 15,583 tons, and damaging another four freighters and an aircraft carrier totalling 46,482 tons. Squadron Commander Wakeman B. Thorpe described the patrol as ‘epoch making’, while Charles Lockwood praised it as ‘outstanding in aggression, strategic planning, successful torpedo attacks and results’. ¹⁶⁶

Revealingly, in his endorsement of the patrol the division commander, Robert McCormick Peacher, described the Gurnard’s efforts as ‘one of the finest, most aggressive first patrols on record’. ¹⁶⁷ Not only did this disregard the Gurnard’s patrols in the Atlantic, the report itself was mislabelled with the result that the Gurnard confusingly has two second war patrol reports on record. Peacher made a similar slip in his endorsement of the Shad’s first Pacific patrol, congratulating the officers and men for ‘a very fine first patrol’ when the nucleus of the crew had made five previous patrols in the Atlantic. ¹⁶⁸ Even at this early stage, it seems contemporaries began to expunge the Atlantic patrols from the submarines’ records.

This is not to argue for an inverse correlation between the number of patrols made in the Atlantic and success in the Pacific. It is likely that performance in the Pacific had more to do with individual skills and initiative rather than simply previous experience in the Atlantic theatre. In command of the USS Gurnard, for example, Charles Andrews went on to sink 10 confirmed enemy ships, earning a ranking among the top 20 US skippers of the Second World War. ¹⁶⁹

Overall, these examples drive home the limiting factors that US submarines faced in the Atlantic compared with the Pacific. In contrast to the morale problems experienced by Squadron 50 submariners, by 1943 morale among submariners in the Pacific was high, and increased even more once the US Navy’s torpedo problems were overcome. In contrast to the frustrating rules of engagement prescribed for patrols in the Bay of Biscay, ‘unrestricted’ warfare in the Pacific afforded a plethora of potential targets. Contrary to the poor intelligence afforded the US submarines in the Atlantic, the flow of Ultra mater-ial from cryptographers in the Pacific ensured a high number of contacts with the enemy. In these circumstances, it is small wonder that the Atlantic patrols of America’s fleet submarines were soon forgotten.