Egyptian Soldiers in Ottoman Campaigns from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries

I. Introduction: Military Organization in Egypt

Early Ottoman military campaigns relentlessly focused on a westward advance. Turkish armies consolidated their hold on Anatolia, then conquered Istanbul and flooded into the Balkans. The sixteenth century’s long trend changed in nature during the reign of Sultan Selim I ‘Yavuz’ (1512–20). Eastern military-political realities encouraged him to contest domination of Arab lands as the disorganized Mamluk sultanate demonstrated it could not maintain its authority in Syria. Safavid Iran and even the Dulkadir emirate threatened Mamluk authority, and Selim I recognized this was a golden opportunity for Ottoman expansion.

Perceiving a threat from the Safavids, Selim I first advanced eastward in 1514. Following the defeat of an Iranian army at Chaldiran, he led his soldiers to equally decisive victories over Mamluk armies at Mercidabık (Marj Dābiq) in Syria and Ridaniye (Ridanieh) in Egypt. Cairo fell soon after, confirming Ottoman domination of the Fertile Crescent.

Recognizing the potential advantage of taking over the Mamluk system, Selim I established an administration for Egypt that was significantly different from that of the Balkans, Anatolia, or Syria. Standard Ottoman military/fiscal policy centred on the timar system, which provided agricultural revenues to provincial cavalrymen in exchange for military service. Egypt was unique in this regard as the existing Mamluk system was retained, and even allowed to expand. ¹ In addition, a significant janissary corps stayed in Egypt, along with a governor, fiscal agents, and a qadi (judge). Unlike the timar system, individual soldiers did not have direct control of specific estates. Instead yearly taxes, the salyāne (annual pay), were collected to provide salaries for Egypt’s soldiers and the military administration. ² Egypt became a salyāneli eyālet (a wage province). ³ Both janissaries and now Ottoman Mamluks were supported in this fashion. ⁴

Egypt’s peculiar military organization is partially explained by the Ottoman affinity for Mamluk warriors. Centuries of tradition saw Islamic states buy thousands of slaves from central Asia and the Caucasus every year, mostly to supplement local military assets. ⁵ The great majority of these slaves came from Turkic groups whose ethnicity allowed for easy amalgamation into the Ottoman military. It can be said that the Mamluk system created a potent military force, and these Turkish and Turkified warriors played significant roles in defeating outside invaders ranging from European Crusaders to the Mongols. ⁶

Mamluk is often translated as ‘slave soldier’ or ‘owned man’, but although they started off with such a status while training, Mamluks gained freedom and considerable privileges after graduating from military school. ⁷ This usually happened in their late teens, when they were free to marry and own property. ⁸ Another reason for Ottoman continuation of the Mamluk tradition was the large numbers of Turkish speakers traditionally taken into this system. The few non-Turk Mamluks learned Turkish and adopted Turkish names. As a result, Ottomans called Mamluks Etrāk (Turks), while designating the Mamluk state as Dawlat al-Turk or Dawlat al-Etrāk (Turkish state). ⁹

Mamluk candidates started training in their adolescence and completed their education in military schools called tibaq (singular tabaqa), and then later were inaugurated into a military and administrative career having gained their freedom through graduation. Before 1517, when it was annexed by the Ottoman Empire, Egypt’s graduation ceremonies were often attended by the Mamluk sultan. ¹⁰ In this system, promotion was based on success and talent. The most important factor in the creation of Mamluks as a class was their origins, almost always the Caucasus or central Asia, and their slave background. They were sometimes called ‘white slaves’ to differentiate them from African slaves, who were more likely to become eunuchs, labourers, or some form of support troops. ¹¹ In late Mamluk times blacks could become infantry musketeers, but rarely if ever Mamluks. ¹²

Egypt’s pre-Ottoman military traditions established martial classes that continued after 1517. The old Mamluk system included memālik-i sultāniyya, who were the slaves of the Sultan, and jünd al-halqa ¹³ and awlād al-nās ¹⁴ (both military divisions in the Mamluk state with fiefs), and the slaves of emirs who were maintained by the sultans were looked after in return for iqtāʿ (the assigning of lands to a functionary for his maintenance). ¹⁵ Jündî ¹⁶ numbered 24,000 during the reign of Berkuk. Auxiliary units led by Turkmen and Kurdish beys, in addition to the ejnād al-Arap (Arabic military corps in the Mamluk state) taken from Arabian ʿurban (tribes), supplemented the regulars. ¹⁷ During the final days of the Mamluk sultanate, Tomanbey fielded 20,000 soldiers at Ridaniye, a combination of jündî, Arabians, Zengids, and Circassians. ¹⁸ During the reign of Bayezid II, Ibn Kemal states there were jündî and Circassians among the Egyptian soldiers, noting that the Turkmen did not get along with the Circassians. ¹⁹ The latter, according to Mustafa Nuri Pasha, had numerous conflicts with Arabian soldiers. ²⁰

After conquering Egypt, Selim I left 3000 soldiers to maintain his authority. ²¹ Evliya Çelebi recorded Köse Kansu Bey taking these 3000 soldiers to support the siege of Candia. ²² Mustafa Nuri Pasha provided different numbers, citing 500 janissaries and 5000 mounted troops being assigned to Governor Hayır Bey for the security of Egypt after the conquest. ²³ Until 1525 these imperial troops formed the key units of the Egyptian army. Hayır Bey considerably changed the organization of his military structure in 1525. The governor was granted greater authority by the Sultan, and included Mamluks and their emirs in addition to the forces from Istanbul. Various kāshifs (a kind of sheriff under the Mamluks in Egypt) were also assigned to the emirs in Egypt. Thus, besides regaining military authority in Egypt, Mamluks also obtained direct wages via the Ottoman regime. This combination of Egyptian and Ottoman forces created a new military dynamic in post-1525 Egypt.

This new dynamic evolved into a new force under the direction of Makbul İbrahim Pasha. ²⁴ Some of the previous Ottoman garrison troops had become ill-disciplined and were recalled to Istanbul. In their place, a new contingent of janissaries was sent to secure Kalʿa al-Djebel (Djebel Castle) and Cairo. ²⁵ Makbul Ibrahim Pasha merged them with local levies to create six distinct units: kumliyya (volunteers), cavalry musketeers/riflemen, Circassians (Mamluks), janissaries, azebs (infantrymen), and jawishes (ranking military officers of the palace establishment). In addition to these units, the following also existed: muteferriqa (the governors’ own Mamluks). ²⁶ Kuloğlu (son of a kul/slave; member of a class of military recruit) and karındaşoğlu (brother of a kul/slave; member of a class of military recruit) units joined the army to serve in the second half of the sixteenth century. After fighting in Yemen and Abyssinia, they returned to Egypt and joined the waged garrison units. ²⁷ All were under command of the beglerbegi (provincial governor) and individual units were directed by captains and agas (various high-ranking officers).

The new Egyptian army contained Ottoman units and local soldiers. As the empire faced repeated challenges in the late sixteenth century, Mamluk emirs and their sons and servant entourage also joined the military. This marked the start of a long-term trend where Mamluks began to regain local authority. Inter-service rivalry between garrison units exacerbated this problem. After the second half of the sixteenth century, neither governor nor qadi interfered with financial affairs relating to soldiers’ wages. Furthermore, new units and military factions such as the Qāsımiyye and Fiqariyye of the late seventeenth century fuelled opportunity for military corruption. ²⁸

In numbers the Egyptian army increased to over 9300 in the last quarter of the sixteenth century. ²⁹ This almost reached 10,000 in the first years of Suleiman the Magnificent. ³⁰ Between 1664 and 1797 the seven ojaqs (regiments) ³¹ increased from 13,000 to 18,000. ³² This increase was an empire-wide phenomenon. ³³

Apart from land forces, a naval unit was also headquartered in Alexandria. Prior to the conquest, this same harbour sheltered a Mamluk squadron. After 1517 Cafer Bey brought Ottoman vessels to amalgamate with surviving Mamluk ships. ³⁴ This new force provided both warship and transport services.

II. The Egyptian Army in the Ottoman Campaigns

The most important duties for Egyptian soldiers were protecting their homeland and fighting the Sultan’s enemies in campaigns. In the latter case Egyptian commanders focused on securing supplies of food, horse fodder, and ammunition. Frontier governors were charged with establishing supply centres. Commanders were continuously warned that no individual should be overlooked for recruitment, even fugitives or those in hiding. All were expected to enlist or to face punishment. In this regard, differences were seen between the provinces, such as Egypt, which had the salyāne system, and the more typical timar system. In the latter, the beglerbegi and sanjakbeg (the top subordinate of a beglerbegi) and officers of the provincial cavalry were responsible for mustering troops for campaigns. In the salyāneli (salaried) provinces, in addition to the beglerbegi and sanjakbegs, ojaq agas and local leaders were also responsible for mustering troops and supplies. In this regard, when Egyptian soldiers were needed, they were ordered to join the campaigns under the direction of their commanders; Bedouin were under their shaykhs. While the needs of soldiers in timarli units were met by alaybegs (officers of provincial cavalry responsible for mustering troops for campaigns), soldiers in salyāneli units were provided with their ulufe (pay). ³⁵

The empire needed many soldiers from the sixteenth century onwards, and was eager to utilize Egyptian resources. This made the Egyptian garrison a valuable asset. These soldiers were a significant factor owing to their excellent training. ³⁶ Superb horsemen who could fire bows or firearms while mounted, they were also deadly in hand-to-hand combat. ³⁷ With this in mind, the empire called for an Egyptian contingent to support the conquest of Rhodes. In this campaign, Egyptian troops performed well and were soon considered vital for imperial success, and were utilized continuously in campaigns until the second half of the eighteenth century. ³⁸ Imperial decrees made the reliance on the Egyptian army clear, regularly expressing confidence in the determination and enthusiasm of Egyptian soldiers. ³⁹

When the Diwan-ı Humāyun (imperial council) decided on war, it issued a decree containing the reasons for recruiting soldiers to the Egyptian beys and asked them quickly ‘to make the soldiers get ready for a specific campaign’. ⁴⁰ In these decrees Egyptian noblemen, senior officials, and agas were mentioned. ⁴¹ Upon receiving a decree, the beglerbegi immediately called the members of his provincial council, the sanjakbeg, and the seven ojaq ikhtiyars (senior officers), ⁴² and had the decree read in front of them. If a campaign leader had already been appointed, he was also called and presented with the campaign hilʿat (robes of honour), while local notables were assigned to gather supplies. ⁴³

As well as outlining all the procedures clearly, the decrees sent from the central government quoted the number of soldiers needed. While the number of the Egyptian soldiers joining a campaign was initially 500, ⁴⁴ this number increased to 2000 in the course of time. By the late seventeenth century, 3000 men were required for warfare. The ojaq commanders were told to choose these soldiers from talented, brave, and healthy ones. ⁴⁵ Their leaders were expected to be strong enough to discipline the soldiers. ⁴⁶ All these points, the soldiers’ obedience to their commanders, and the fact of their being under the control of the military commander-in-chief were explained in the decrees. ⁴⁷ The state also appointed an agent from the central government for the transportation of the Egyptian soldiers and for the safe transportation and provision of all ammunition. ⁴⁸ Thus, the troops’ annual pay was given to their agas, and their ammunition and other necessities were also provided until they returned to Egypt. Before Newroz, the new year, the agent used to gather Egyptian soldiers with their ammunition at the harbour at Alexandria, and the available ships were boarded. If imperial transportation was insufficient, the agent could take advantage of native and even foreign shipping. ⁴⁹

All the campaign expenses of the mounted soldiers were met by the Egyptian treasury. ⁵⁰ When the horsemen went to the eastern front, they sailed to Iskenderun or Trabzon harbour and from here they went to the front overland. If the front included northern parts of Iran such as Azerbaijan or Kars, troops disembarked at Trabzon. When the frontier extended to southern parts of Iran, such as Baghdad, units were transported by sea to Iskenderun. If the fighting was in the Balkans or central Europe, the Egyptians sailed to Gallipoli harbour, and then marched to Edirne. ⁵¹ Once they were ashore, rolls were checked and missing names registered. ⁵² Sometimes, after completing a specific task, troops could return home with the permission of their commander. Ordinarily campaign duty was limited to three years. Soldiers returning to Egypt after a three-year term were awarded with teraqqi (an increase in their wages). Later on, as Egyptian troops became less useful owing to poor discipline and training, they were sometimes sent home early. ⁵³ Such problems occurred during the campaigns of 1730 and 1732. These Egyptians were regarded as a heavy burden on the state as they even plundered state granaries. Once the Egyptian beglerbegi informed the central government of this with a petition, ⁵⁴ in the decree that was sent to the rulers of Egypt in 1764, it was stated that the empire would forgo a contingent of Egyptian troops and accept cash contributions instead. ⁵⁵ However, this new practice was not long-lived as Egyptian soldiers were soon called to the Russian and Crimean campaigns. ⁵⁶

Ottoman military efforts had intensified during the seventeenth century. As a result, Egyptian expeditionary forces were often sent to more than one frontier. For example, Egyptian soldiers fought on numerous fronts in 1615 including in Iran, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Tripoli. ⁵⁷ These men could serve as far apart as Mecca and Kamianets-Podilskyi in 1671. ⁵⁸ Volunteers drawn from the Circassians, janissaries, muteferriqa, and sergeants were assigned to the Baghdad campaign in 1636. ⁵⁹ A significant contribution was made by Egyptians during the long siege of Candia on Crete (1648–69). They guarded Suda harbour in 1645 while an additional 2000 men disembarked from 28 ships at Chania harbour with their ammunition and supplies for direct participation in the siege. ⁶⁰ Although disrupted by a storm, the Egyptians re-formed and brought their artillery to bombard the defenders. ⁶¹ Eyewitness Evliya Çelebi noted 3000 energetic Egyptian soldiers who were involved in several assaults that captured enemy earthworks. ⁶²

Egyptians played an influential role in the suppression of unrest. In particular, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, Egyptian soldiers were employed in the suppression of Jelālī revolts. ⁶³ Furthermore, towards the end of the seventeenth century the state’s need for soldiers increased and Egyptians were regularly employed in multi-front operations. Deploying from Alexandria, Egyptian troops served in Belgrade and Temeşvar in 1697. ⁶⁴

In the first half of the eighteenth century the Ottomans organized four campaigns to the east, west, and north. Egyptians fought in each of these. One contingent fought against the Russians in the Prut campaign (1711), then went to fight in the Morea between 1714 and 1716. They also fought against the Iranians intermittently from 1723 to 1746. Smaller units were sent north and west between 1736 and 1739.

Imperial decrees called for the recruitment of soldiers before the Prut campaign. These decrees specifically mentioned Egypt, but called on the governor only to recruit 3000 Turkish speakers from the seven traditional ojaqs. ⁶⁵ These warned that no excuses would be accepted concerning lack of ships or equipment, and that the expeditionary force must make it to Edirne. ⁶⁶

Grand Mirahor ⁶⁷ Haji Ali Aga was assigned to preparations for the campaign, and arrived in Egypt on 2 January 1711. ⁶⁸ Preparations started as soon as the Sultan’s orders were read to the governor. Ali came from Istanbul to work with local elites. He expected to amass the volunteers and their supplies in two months. Egyptian revenues would cover the costs. ⁶⁹ Recruitment and transportation had to be arranged. Friction arose during the gathering of provisions and transport ships. The latter presented the greatest problem: only five of the necessary eight galleons were available. Efforts to hire merchant vessels failed, and in the end only the five government transports could be utilized. ⁷⁰

The convoy left Alexandria for Gallipoli, where draught animals and carts were paid for directly by the soldiers, out of their allotted akçes (small silver coins). This time the Egyptians seemed late in almost all their movements. They lingered near Gallipoli for nearly two weeks, until new orders reminded them of their duties elsewhere. ⁷¹ Finally, after this command the Egyptian soldiers moved to join the army in Wallachia. They returned home at the end of the Prut campaign, only to be called back to the Balkans to fight the Venetians in the Morea. ⁷²

Previously, Egyptian troops had been expected to arrive trained and fully equipped for combat. Both cavalry and infantry were employed, all registered and given mevacibs. ⁷³ Often Egyptian infantry served at sea, joining the Ottoman fleet, while cavaliers were reserved for land combat. By the start of the 1700s the cost of transporting and feeding cavalry horses was so high that Ottoman requests often reduced the number of mounted troops, and took more foot soldiers instead. ⁷⁴

Ottoman policy always placed an official in charge of raising the Egyptian contingent. The agent was assigned by the central government for the recruitment of soldiers and the completion of commands stated in the decree. The selection and provision of soldiers were made under the control of this official. After the necessary equipment, sustenance, and money were prepared, the soldiers were ready to set out. A century earlier, troops would have been dispatched by ships sent from Istanbul. The large galleons needed were less common in the 1700s, and Egyptian commanders often looked for civilian vessels to fulfil this role. Since there were not adequate ships in Egypt, some ships were hired out of Istanbul. ⁷⁵ If there still were insufficient ships, then an empire-wide search for hirable vessels took place. ⁷⁶

During the Morean campaign much of the Egyptian transport needs came from merchant subcontractors. ⁷⁷ These expenses were met by the Egyptian treasury. ⁷⁸ Despite glitches in the transport and supply sectors, Banjamin Brue, who saw the soldiers’ regular movements both during their landing and on campaign, stated that the Egyptian soldiers marching in front of the grand vizier were tidier than the Ottoman troops. ⁷⁹ After the infantrymen entered the Morea from the Isthmus of Corinth, they were put under the command of the Diyarbakır beglerbegi Mustafa Pasha and assigned to the Morea Kasteli (Rio, near Antirrio) siege. ⁸⁰ The cavaliers assigned to the navy were left on Istendil (Tinos) island, which was conquered in 1715. ⁸¹ During the Austrian campaign, which can be considered as a continuation of the Morean campaign, the Egyptian soldiers were taken from their posts in the Morea and distributed to different regions and assigned to Hungarian territories. It is also noted that the Egyptian soldiers were positioned along the Sava River, a key point for the strengthening of the Belgrade region in 1717. While the Egyptian soldiers were on the Sava River with other protective troops in this region, they withstood attacks from the Austrian army. ⁸² Following the peace treaty in 1718, the Egyptians returned home.

In the first half of the eighteenth century, another event the Egyptian soldiers joined was the eastern campaign. These campaigns started in 1723 and lasted intermittently until 1746. The eastern campaigns against Iran were composed of three phases. The first phase began in 1723 and ended with the Hamedan Treaty in 1727. The second campaign planned against Iran in 1730 was interrupted by riots in that year, but commenced a year later. This second phase carried on intermittently and came to an end with the Istanbul Treaty in 1736. During this temporary peace in the east, a new campaign was launched to the west. This campaign started in 1736 and ended with the Belgrade Treaty in 1739, after which the Ottomans redirected forces to the east to solve the Iranian problems. ⁸³

The typical Egyptian contingent was composed of 3000 soldiers. ⁸⁴ The Egyptian soldiers sent to the eastern campaign moved from Trabzon harbour to their destinations. This situation was repeated when the eastern campaigns became frequent. Because the campaign frontier was in the north of Iran, Trabzon was preferred as a point of dispatch. If there were frontiers closer to Iraq or Arabia, Iskenderun and Payas harbours were also utilized. Furthermore, the position and importance of the Egyptian soldiers in these campaigns was seen in the decrees sent to the governors of Trabzon. These decrees present significant information concerning the condition of the Egyptian soldiers when they joined the main army.

The Egyptian soldiers dispatched to Trabzon for the eastern campaign were transported by ships or galleons which either were rented or belonged to the state. As in the previous campaigns (for example, the Prut campaign in 1711 and the Morean campaign between 1714 and 1716), commands were also sent to the rulers of Egypt and the agent appointed by the central government. Soldiers went on campaign with the zabits (officer) of the seven ojaqs and with the aid of the agent and officials assigned during the first Iranian campaign. ⁸⁵ In 1724 fully equipped soldiers set out for Trabzon from Egypt. Commands were sent to the rulers of Trabzon for the immediate dispatch of Egyptian soldiers to the fronts. The person to whom these commands were addressed changed according to the preparations to be undertaken. For example, in a 1724 decree, the qadi of Trabzon, qadis of the states, mütesellim (agent), and ayan-ı vilayet (the chief man in a town or one of the notables) were mentioned. ⁸⁶ The rulers of Trabzon soon embarked on their preparations. Before the ships carrying the Egyptian soldiers arrived, the animals to carry their goods and the bakers were arranged for. ⁸⁷ Particular attention was paid to the supply of animals and it was emphasized that this issue was crucial for the immediate dispatch of soldiers. ⁸⁸ Furthermore, a different agent was assigned by the central government for the completion of preparations in Trabzon. If adequate animals could not be sourced, animals used for other purposes in Trabzon were asked for. ⁸⁹ The Egyptian soldiers coming by ship were taken to the harbours and mounted on the animals and later transported to Erzurum. After the treaty in 1727, the Egyptian soldiers were sent back.

The second Iranian campaign planned in 1730 was thwarted because of a riot, ⁹⁰ though 3000 soldiers were requested from Egypt. As in previous campaigns in Egypt, the soldiers, equipped under the control of the rulers and the agent, set out for Trabzon in galleons provided from Istanbul. ⁹¹ Decrees were sent to the governor of Trabzon for the necessary preparations before the soldiers arrived in Trabzon. This time a wider range of local officials had the task of supporting the Egyptian contingent. To make essential preparations, decrees were sent to the governor, qadi of Trabzon, qadis of the province, official in charge of the warehouse, deputy of the janissary aga, kethodas (lieutenant or steward of a high-ranking official), commanders of the janissaries, ayan-ı vilayet, and iş erleri (clever workmen). ⁹² The central government emphasized the need for compliance and threatened reprisal in the event of disobedience. Therefore, the rulers of Trabzon tried to supply the essential equipment and animals. In fact, everything was coordinated by the decrees sent by the central government. The person responsible for the supply of essential equipment and for the campaign preparations was clearly stated in the decrees. For example, the official responsible for the warehouse of Trabzon and the agent sent by the central government were assigned to the supply of vehicles for the dispatch of the Egyptian soldiers. ⁹³ These two officials were responsible for the supply of animals and vehicles, and these were procured from Erzurum. In the event that the supplies were not adequate, the vehicles used in various assignments in Trabzon were also employed. It was particularly emphasized that the vehicles should be provided from Erzurum. ⁹⁴ Since the geographic position of Trabzon was not suitable for the availability of carts, it was appropriate that the provision be made from Erzurum. Transportation congestion was not unheard of and had been typical in previous campaigns; Trabzon could not easily handle the needs of an army. With the diligent efforts of the agent and the official in charge of the warehouse, the animals and vehicles to carry the goods of the Egyptian soldiers were prepared at the harbour before the soldiers arrived. When they arrived, they moved around by procuring vehicles or animals which they paid for with their akçes. ⁹⁵ Even with the Ottoman desire to spend less on the infantry, the Egyptian contingent needed a plentiful supply of horses and fodder. There were 160 horses allocated for officers, muteferriqa, sergeants, volunteers, tufankjiyan (riflemen), Circassians, mustahfizan (janissaries), and azebs, another 600 horses for five ojaqs, and 1000 horses for two ojaqs consisting of azebs and janissaries. ⁹⁶

The departure of military troops from Trabzon to the eastern campaigns demonstrates the method of marching and gathering. Three ojaqs consisting of volunteers, riflemen, and Circassians first set off. They were followed by the muteferriqa and aga of the sergeants. Later, janissary and azeb ojaqs moved off, and finally the serasker (commander-in-chief). The troops moving systematically in this way did not cause congestion and reduced the difficulty in finding enough animals. The Egyptian soldiers who marched from Trabzon first camped with the troops of the Revan (Yerevan) serasker Vizier Ali Pasha (1731). ⁹⁷ The vizier ordered them to guard different places. However, the Egyptian soldiers were disorderly and undisciplined, as they were often throughout the first half of the eighteenth century. They were late arriving at the front line and failed to join the war against the enemy, who escaped to the Mosul region. ⁹⁸

When the second phase of the Iranian campaign ended, the Ottomans turned westward to deal with the Austrians. In this campaign between 1736 and 1739 the Sultan also wanted to employ Egyptian soldiers. However, this time the decrees pertaining to the gathering and dispatch of Egyptian soldiers were sent to the serasker in the eastern front instead of to Egypt. The Egyptian soldiers that were first under the command of Vizier Ali Pasha later entered into the service of the Iranian serasker Vizier Ahmet Pasha, and the essential commands for the dispatch of Egyptian soldiers to the north were sent to him. ⁹⁹ Thus, it was reported that Egyptian soldiers should be commissioned in the western campaign. Trabzon played a key role in the dispatch of Egyptian soldiers in this campaign as well. The soldiers reaching the eastern fronts also used Trabzon harbour to reach the north. Therefore, the decrees regarding the mission and dispatch of Egyptian soldiers were important. These decrees indicated how the Egyptian soldiers were to be dispatched and where they were to serve. There were three important points for the rulers of Trabzon. The first was the number of soldiers, the second was where they would serve, and the last was the supply of the vehicles essential for their dispatch. However, it is stated that while 3000 Egyptian soldiers were routinely called up in some decrees, ¹⁰⁰ the remnants from the eastern front were called up in other decrees and the commanders of these soldiers were from Egyptian beys and the zabits of the seven ojaqs. ¹⁰¹

It was indicated roughly where the Egyptian soldiers would serve in the campaign to the north but an exact zone was not specified. In fact, it was stated the soldiers would be sent directly to Kiliya wharf from Trabzon to go to Vizier Mehmet Pasha, serasker of Babadag. ¹⁰² But this final port of call was later changed. This time the Egyptian soldiers were assigned to the command of the sea captain of Crimea and Caffa with hatt-ı hümayun (the manuscript of the Sultan), since this is where the soldiers were primarily needed. ¹⁰³ After the number and the duty station of the Egyptian soldiers were known, the most important activity for the commanders of Trabzon was to provide the essential vehicles. To help with this were the officials sent from the central government and the local rulers. Thus, the head of the doorkeepers from the dergâh-ı âli (Sultan’s court), Mahmut Bey, was assigned to this duty and he also appointed the officials who were in charge of the warehouse and customs for the supply of vehicles. ¹⁰⁴ Since the campaign would be launched to the north, the ships had to be supplied as soon as possible. As a consequence of these efforts, nine Black Sea chaikas (wooden sailing boats) were provided. Six were from Trabzon and Athens; two were from Giresun and one was from Hopa. The cost of renting these ships was 2808 kuruş (foreign silver coins, at this time valued at about 120 akçes each), and this amount was paid by the warehouse and customs officials, sharing the cost equally. ¹⁰⁵ This method might have been applied because the Egyptian soldiers did not have enough money in the eastern campaign. After the supply of the ships, the Egyptian soldiers were soon sent to Crimea and served in several defensive missions under the command of the captain there. When the western campaign ended in 1739, the Egyptian soldiers returned to Egypt.

The last campaign in the first half of the eighteenth century was organized to the east, Iran. It began in 1743 and ended in 1746. Trabzon harbour also played an active role in this campaign given that the northern front had gained in importance for the dispatch of soldiers. ¹⁰⁶ Records of the period, including those in the Ottoman Archives, contain no reference to Egyptian soldiers participating in the last Iranian campaign, so it can be safely assumed that they did not take part in it.

A final important point is the impact that the Egyptian soldiers made in the places they passed through en route to their assigned regions. The presence of 3000 soldiers in a residential district could cause problems. To help control this, the state arranged for the immediate supply of the vehicles necessary for the movement of soldiers which allowed their instant dispatch. As we see in the decrees sent by the central government, special officials were assigned to this duty. In fact, the state wanted the soldiers dispatched as soon as possible because of the urgent need for troops at the front, but this practice also eased the burden in the cities where the soldiers were accommodated. Although some measures were taken – for example, intensive efforts were exerted in the cities to obtain the supply of animals, vehicles, and ships – an affected region could not always respond quickly enough to the requirements of such a population of troops. If a city could not supply sufficient animals and so on, another city could be included in the effort. Such practices entailed significant organizational capacity. On the other hand, as these large crowds of soldiers made purchases with their own akçes in the cities they visited, they also contributed to the local economy. All that silver could also induce inflation, or even scarcity, as happened in 1731, when Egyptians with akçes in their pockets bought up most of Trabzon’s food and fodder. The city, with a population of no more than 42,000, was hard pressed to efficiently meet the needs of 3000 soldiers. ¹⁰⁷ With all the pack animals and supply carts taken into consideration, the consequence was a very congested city. These were serious challenges that were never completely solved. There simply were not enough supplies, and the roads out of the town were not always able to handle the traffic. That the Trabzon area was not suitable for growing crops made scarcity inevitable. The rulers of the city claimed that when the soldiers arrived a drastic famine was experienced and the bakeries were unable to meet demand. ¹⁰⁸ Disorder and banditry were the result. The rulers attempted to ameliorate the situation: 2000 bushels of flour stored in warehouses were sold to the bakeries overseen by a previous governor and the official in charge of the warehouse. Thus, bread and peksimet (a kind of bread which remains edible for a long time and was eaten during the war and periods of famine) were made and the scarcity was overcome. There was also a lack of barley, a vital animal feed. The governor took an interest in this also, and 2150 bushels of barley stored in the warehouses under his personal control and for the Şirin Hatun Foundation ¹⁰⁹ were sold off to the soldiers to overcome the problem. ¹¹⁰

III. Conclusion

Selim I’s conquest of Egypt dramatically increased the size of his empire. The Ottomans left 3000 soldiers behind after the conquest for the protection of their interests. In addition, local Mamluk units were retained for military purposes. Composed mainly of Turkish-speaking Circassians, these combined with the original Ottoman garrison to form seven corps of infantry and cavalry. This Egyptian garrison, taken from local elites, supported Ottoman military campaigns and maintained imperial authority against domestic rebels. The Sultan could call on upwards of 3000 men for campaigns outside Egypt throughout the seventeenth century. Although these soldiers showed considerable elan during early campaigns, they became corrupt and undisciplined during the eighteenth century.

The transition from well-prepared troops who arrived in their own ships, and had sufficient funding, to those poorly prepared and often absent from the battlefield forces was evident by the Morean campaign in the first half of the eighteenth century. Their ineffectiveness was so marked in 1764 that Istanbul no longer wanted Egyptian troops, even though a few participated in the Russo-Turkish War. Training, supply, and financial issues help explain why. These are not glamorous matters but it is clear that failure to solve them greatly reduced the efficiency of Egypt’s contribution to the Ottoman Army.