Spanish-German Military Collaboration during the Spanish Non-Belligerency: German Advice for the Defence of the Canary Islands in November 1942

I. German Interest in the Defence of the Canary Islands

The Spanish declaration of neutrality in September 1939 concealed an intention to enter the war on the Axis side. The idea was already present in preliminary plans for naval construction in June 1938, when a more favourable colonial redistribution was expected at the expense of France and the United Kingdom. ⁹ German victories in May and June 1940 translated the belligerent temptation of the Franco regime into a non-belligerency statement, interpreted as pre-belligerency. ¹⁰ The Spanish offer to participate in the war on the side of the Third Reich was initially rejected because it was considered unnecessary. Meanwhile, negotiations undertaken in the autumn of 1940 did not lead to immediate belligerency, because the Spanish government did not obtain written guarantees for its territorial claims in Africa. Therefore, Franco signed the protocol to enter the war on the Axis side without setting any date, which remained postponed until the Third Reich lost interest in Spanish belligerency. ¹¹

However, the Spanish position in the conflict seriously worried the United Kingdom because of the belief that the first Spanish military action would be an attack on Gibraltar, the loss or disablement of which would require another British naval base to protect shipping in the Atlantic. In fact, the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Joint Planning Staff (JPS) had considered the issue since May 1940, directing particular attention to the Canary Islands, whose utilization by the enemy would also have serious consequences on British strategy. Initially, the United Kingdom preferred to secure the Portuguese Atlantic islands, which were less defended and less exposed to a German air counter-attack. However, the best option to harbour battleships and battlecruisers was the Port of La Luz in Gran Canaria, where the British could also use the airfield of Gando. Consequently, this goal became increasingly important, especially in the spring and summer of 1941, and thus the study of occupying the Canary Islands continued until the autumn of 1943, when the defeat of Italy definitively eliminated Spanish belligerency. ¹²

Therefore, it is not surprising that Franco, former general commander of the Canary Islands, as well as the Spanish government feared an occupation attempt on the archipelago and consequently strengthened its defence during those years. The vulnerability of the islands was not a new problem, yet it was during the Second World War that the biggest defensive effort in their history was conducted. The reorganization of the Spanish army in September 1939 resulted in the creation of new garrison units on the Canary Islands, units which were reinforced by the middle of 1940 at the time of the declaration of non-belligerency. At that time, the installation of coastal artillery and the implementation of existing measures on the Balearic Islands had commenced. These measures included the organization of a joint command for land, air, and naval forces, the creation of a naval command for the archipelago, and a partial mobilization that increased the garrison from 5,400 soldiers in September 1939 to 24,000 in the autumn of 1940. ¹³

Spanish concern regarding the islands was shared by the Third Reich, although for different reasons. The ports of La Luz and Santa Cruz de Tenerife formed part of the large supply area of Spain/Portugal, which was directed by the German naval attaché in Madrid and whose main objective was to supply provisions and fuel to German naval forces, expanding their range to the South Atlantic. Activity in the ports was conducted by taking advantage of the breach of the obligations of the Spanish government as a neutral power, and, therefore, it required neither the occupation of the country nor its belligerency. However, the French defeat made the German colonial project in Africa more realistic. In this case, a series of naval bases in north-west Africa would be necessary to protect the sea lanes to the new colonies. One of these bases was to be located on one of the Canary Islands, the assignment of which from the Spanish government in exchange for French Morocco was expected by Adolf Hitler without difficulty. ¹⁴ Shortly thereafter, on 27 July 1940, Admiral Kurt Fricke, from the Naval War Command (Seekriegsleitung, Skl), addressed the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Auswärtiges Amt, AA), specifying which bases were needed to defend the future colonial empire. Among them, Fricke requested the Port of Santa Cruz de Tenerife or the Port of La Luz from Spain in exchange for the assistance Spain received during the Civil War, French Morocco, and the German contribution to an attack of Gibraltar. ¹⁵

The postponement of the attack against the USSR and British resistance against the German air and submarine offensive made the option of a peripheral strategy more attractive to the High Command of the Navy (Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, OKM). This strategy included the conquest of Gibraltar and Suez, which would expel the UK from the Mediterranean. Admiral Erich Raeder, commander-in-chief of the German navy, considered the conquests of Gibraltar and Suez an alternative to the invasion of the USSR, but Hitler saw them as a prelude to achieve his main objective in Eastern Europe. ¹⁶ In contrast, the Anglo-American agreement, through which the USA would obtain a number of British bases in the Atlantic in exchange for approximately 50 old American destroyers, made Hitler fear that either of these powers could occupy the Spanish and Portuguese islands in the Atlantic. Consequently, during September and October 1940 the High Command of the Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, OKW) and the Skl studied the occupation of the Canary Islands. ¹⁷

This study was based on two premises: the peaceful transfer of one of the islands by Spain and the resistance of the Spanish garrison against a British attack. The first premise was ruled out in the negotiations held in September 1940 concerning the entry of Spain into the war. ¹⁸ The Spanish minister of foreign affairs, Ramón Serrano Suñer, travelled to Germany in November, after Franco and Hitler met in Hendaye, to finalize the details of Spanish belligerency. Hitler did not insist on the transfer of one of the islands, but he offered German forces to reinforce their defence. The offer was rejected by Serrano, who stated that the Spanish garrison had the necessary resources to counter a British attack. ¹⁹

The Spanish refusal to cede the island was reflected in Directive no. 18 of 12 November 1940 to conduct Operation Felix. The directive indicated the need to occupy the Portuguese archipelagos before conducting the attack on Gibraltar, the main objective of the operation. Regarding the Canary Islands, the directive stated only that the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine should examine beforehand the reinforcement of their defence. ²⁰ To direct this task, the German high command decided in December to send to the Spanish archipelago a German officer, Commander Fritz Krauss, with the Spanish government’s knowledge and support. This mission occurred after Franco confirmed his decision to postpone entry into the war with Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, chief of the Abwehr. Accordingly, on 11 December, Hitler’s Directive 19a ordered the postponement of Operation Felix and the cancellation of all the arrangements made for its execution, except reconnaissance missions, such as Krauss’s voyage. ²¹

Krauss visited the islands of Gran Canaria and Tenerife for a week, from 12 to 19 December, accompanied at all times by the military authorities of the archipelago. He presented the information he obtained in a 19-page report, in addition to 11 annexes and 4 maps which have not been preserved, in which the Spanish commanders’ willingness to defend the islands was emphasized. ²² However, Krauss also exposed the main difficulties they faced, such as the extent of Anglophilia among the population and the lack of modern military equipment. The lack of modern military equipment was evident in the army’s heavy weapons, especially in obsolete coastal artillery, as were the absence of strong naval forces and the precariousness of the air forces, which had been reduced to several dozen obsolete aeroplanes. Therefore, Krauss recommended delivery of the assistance that the Third Reich had planned for the reinforcement of the Canary Islands. ²³

According to the directive of Operation Felix, in November 1940 the German navy studied the shipment of four artillery batteries to Gran Canaria and Tenerife. However, in February 1941 the OKM ordered the cancellation of the preparations because of the indefinite postponement of Spanish belligerency. ²⁴ Several months later Germany began to change its position regarding the shipment of the guns, fearing that the United States would occupy the Iberian Atlantic archipelagos. By 22 May, Hitler agreed to the delivery of four artillery batteries to Spain to reinforce the Canary Islands’ defence. ²⁵ The guns were in the Port of La Luz by the end of August, but their installation required several months of work and German assistance, which can be verified through the diary of Commander Kurt Meyer Döhner, the German naval attaché in Spain. On 24 August 1941 Döhner’s diary announced the arrival of the Bötel construction team in Las Palmas, whereas on 7 November 1941 it mentioned their arrival in Tenerife. On 30 January 1942 the diary announced the departure of the Brinkmann construction team from Las Palmas. Spanish opposition to the German offer of an instruction detachment was also recorded on 31 October and 7 November 1941. ²⁶

The 4 batteries with a total of 12 guns were distributed between Gran Canaria and Tenerife. However, the assistance received brought more problems than help. First, when receiving the batteries, the Spanish army believed it was a ‘loan’ that did not require any financial compensation. However, in February 1944, the Third Reich demanded more than 5 million marks for the guns, which were finally compensated by the Spanish depots that the Army Ministry had completed in Germany for other operations. ²⁷ Second, the weapons received were obsolete and so worn that Carlos Martínez de Campos y Serrano, captain general of the Canary Islands from 1950 to 1953, considered them ‘completely useless’. ²⁸

Shortly before the arrival of the guns, two German officers, Captain Mirus and Lieutenant Colonel Grünewald, were on the islands to inspect their defensive state. Their visit was announced by the navy minister to the naval commander of the Canary Islands on 12 July 1941. Five days later the German officers received a note with the Spanish garrison’s main requests for military equipment. Thus, the officers’ stay in the archipelago should have occurred at that time; however, Mirus was still in Gran Canaria on 18 October, according to the German naval attaché’s diary. ²⁹ The report that was probably written by Mirus and Grünewald has not been preserved. However, it is possible that the data the officers collected was included in a report of August 1941, which argued that the capacity of the garrison to repel a landing attempt was limited or even non-existent, especially in the face of naval shelling of the port facilities. ³⁰ Nevertheless, the German high command could still be informed by the Abwehr agents on the islands, which occurred in February 1941. ³¹ Therefore, it was not necessary to send more officers to the Canary Islands, until the Spanish government requested one of them to verify its defensive state in the autumn of 1942.

II. Colonel Eichheim’s Mission to the Canary Islands in October 1942

From June to December 1941 two events sealed the Axis’ fate. The first was the German invasion of the USSR, which began on 22 June and had been planned as a blitzkrieg. Instead, the invasion turned into a war of attrition after Germany failed to conquer Moscow before winter. The second event was the USA’s entry into the war in December following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. ³² The demographic and economic potential of the two new belligerents tipped the balance of forces decisively against the Axis, but it was still necessary to apply all of their potential in battles in Stalingrad, Kursk, and Midway to influence the course of the war decisively. ³³ In fact, during the first half of 1942, the Axis advanced on all fronts. The U-boats were harassing Allied maritime traffic in the west Atlantic, the Deutsche Afrika Korps and their Italian allies were entering Egypt, the German army was advancing towards the Volga, and Japan achieved its greatest expansion in the Pacific, which was only stopped by the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. ³⁴

Despite this apparently favourable situation, the German high command was aware that Germany would have to confront the USA sooner or later, so it tried to ascertain where the USA would project its forces. On 13 March 1942 the importance of the Iberian archipelagos for the Allied military effort was stressed by the Naval War Command. ³⁵ However, the High Command of the Army (Oberkommando des Heeres, OKH) considered the Canary Islands better defended than the Portuguese archipelagos. ³⁶ The German concern was no longer on Operation Felix, which had been suspended in September 1941 until the conclusion of operations on the Russian front, which resulted in the final abandonment of the project. In its place a new defensive operation had begun to take form, Operation Isabella, whose objective was to repel an Allied landing on mainland Spain. ³⁷

The attrition on the Russian front forced the Wehrmacht to divert many of the units assigned to Isabella, which was finally abandoned. In its place a new operation, ‘Ilona’, appeared, but it had more limited objectives: the defence of the ports in northern Spain and the Pyrenees in case of an Allied invasion. ³⁸ In the meantime, the concern regarding an Anglo-American landing was growing. On 25 July the Skl believed it necessary to use the Luftwaffe and U-boats to defend the Canaries, which would become an air and naval base that would compensate for the possible fall of the Azores into enemy hands. ³⁹ On 20 September it was still believed that German aid could forestall the loss of the Spanish islands. ⁴⁰ A month later the fear that the Allies could use the Atlantic islands to support their military effort surfaced again. ⁴¹ However, despite these considerations, the Third Reich expected Spain to be capable of defending the Canary Islands. ⁴²

Spanish will to defend the archipelago seemed evident, although a more thorough understanding of Spanish domestic policy makes it doubtful that all the members of the government agreed. Franco supported himself by balancing forces that had fought against the Republic during the Civil War, of whom the monarchist generals and the Falange were most important. The generals preferred to maintain neutrality, a position financed generously by Britain through the banker Juan March. ⁴³ However, the Falangist ministers, headed by Ramón Serrano Suñer, wanted to enter the war on the Axis side. The rivalry between both groups was growing and reached its highest intensity in August 1942, when several Falangists threw two grenades into a meeting presided over by General José Enrique Varela, minister of the army. This attack and the subsequent reaction of Varela caused a serious crisis that led to a reorganization of the government. Varela and Serrano Suñer were substituted by two generals: the Germanophile Carlos Asensio Cabanillas and the neutralist Francisco Gómez-Jordana, ministers of the army and foreign affairs, respectively. ⁴⁴

Most historians agree that the replacement of Serrano Suñer by Gómez-Jordana was the result of a domestic political crisis, although as a consequence it turned Spanish foreign policy towards neutrality. ⁴⁵ This change is clearly perceptible in the reorganization carried out by the new foreign affairs minister, who chose his collaborators among the monarchist diplomatic staff instead of the Falangist politicians of Serrano’s era. ⁴⁶ Gómez-Jordana considered that the war was going to be long, and for that reason Spain should not intervene but improve its foreign affairs, especially with Portugal and the Allies. Franco was aware of this change, and the possibility had been raised that he chose Gómez-Jordana with the intention of changing the course of foreign policy, although Franco often took a contrary position to Jordana’s in foreign policy debates. ⁴⁷

Jordana’s neutralist stance was increasingly apparent, as evidenced by the protest lodged against Italy for violation of neutral airspace after Italy bombed Gibraltar, killing Spanish victims in the process. ⁴⁸ However, this event did not prevent his taking a benevolent attitude towards the docking of the damaged Italian submarine Giuliani at San Sebastian nor the liberation of an Italian commando, detained after conducting sabotage against Gibraltar. ⁴⁹ The change of Spanish foreign policy was so slow that, by the end of 1942, Spain had not yet found an equidistant position from both belligerents. The new foreign minister discussed with the Duke of Alba, Spanish ambassador in London, the difficulties of moving Spain towards neutrality, although he made it clear that in his view continued Spanish non-belligerency was no longer to be interpreted as pre-belligerency. The incidents caused by Spanish collaboration with the Axis continued until the greater Allied pressure in the middle of 1943 forced its progressive reduction. ⁵⁰ Examples of this collaboration are the spy network of the Abwehr in the Straits of Gibraltar until 1944, the existence of the Blue Division fighting the USSR alongside Axis troops in the east until its dissolution in October 1943 (it was later substituted by the Blue Legion until March 1944), and the wolfram exports to Germany until the middle of that year. ⁵¹

If the diplomatic sources confirmed the slowness of the foreign policy turn, the military preparations reflected with greater clarity the persistence of the Spanish alignment with the Axis. In June 1942 an operation to invade Vichy France had been prepared, not only to reinforce the border in favour of Spain, but also to ease the occupation of French Morocco. ⁵² This project was abandoned after Operation Torch and the German occupation of south-east France, but the Anglo-American landings in Morocco and Algeria still confirmed the Allies as a threat. In the ministers’ council on 8–10 November 1942 the new army minister pressed for entrance into the war on the Axis side. Although the mobilization ordered on 15 November was not explicitly directed against the Allies, the army deployment seemed more aimed at stopping an Anglo-American attack on southern Spain or Morocco than a German invasion across the Pyrenees. ⁵³ Regarding an invasion through the Pyrenees, at the end of 1943, the Spanish army studied the fortification of this area, perhaps because of the prospect of an Allied landing on the French Mediterranean coast, although the works did not begin until October 1944. ⁵⁴ At that time no German troops were on the other side of the Pyrenees, and the Spanish high command considered an Allied airborne attack in Galicia and the Pyrenees. ⁵⁵ The Spanish-German agreement in February 1943 for the acquisition of German armaments does not suggest that this rearmament was designed to counter Third Reich aggression. ⁵⁶

This understanding is consistent with the vision of the conflict in the confidential reports to Franco sent by Captain Luis Carrero Blanco, deputy secretary of the government presidency. One of these reports, dated 11 November 1942, barely three days after the Allied landings in north-west Africa, shows that the Spanish government still wanted to enter the war on the Axis side but was not prepared for it. Carrero believed that the loss of North Africa and the Mediterranean would make a Spanish intervention, whose greatest contribution would be to close the Straits of Gibraltar, useless. However, this result would not imply a total defeat for Germany. Carrero even considered that Spanish participation would make sense if the Third Reich reacted in Africa by repelling the Allies. ⁵⁷ The German sources also reflect the approach of Franco’s regime to the Axis at that time. On 20 November a German report stated that General Juan Vigón, the Spanish air minister, had agreed to the construction of two air stations in north-west Spain, whereas the foreign affairs minister requested aid to repel a possible Anglo-American attack. Six days later, during Gómez-Jordana’s visit to Portugal, Hitler committed himself to help Spain against an Allied attack. ⁵⁸

The fear of aggression was centred on the most vulnerable territories, among which were the Canary Islands, whose reinforcement had continued until the summer of 1942. However, the reinforcements had not solved the problem of a serious lack of personnel and materiel from which the Canary Islands garrison suffered. The German experience in coastal defence could improve the use of the scarce available resources. Since June 1940 Britain had conducted several raids in occupied Europe, but in May and August 1942 it conducted two amphibious operations of greater importance. The first one was ‘Ironclad’, the objective of which was the naval base of Diego Suárez in Madagascar, which was taken on 7 May by forces that had been trained to conquer the Port of La Luz of Gran Canaria. Probably this detail was not known by the Spanish high command, but it was evident that the conquest of the naval base was not just a simple raid. Operation Jubilee, the Anglo-Canadian operation against Dieppe, had also drawn the attention of the Spanish high command. This operation failed on 19 August.

After receiving the Spanish request for a German officer to evaluate the defence of the Canary Islands, the OKW ordered Colonel Siegfried Eichheim, appointed to the general staff of the chief engineer and fortifications officer in the OKH, to visit the archipelago to evaluate its defensive state, in light of recent German experiences in coastal defence, namely, the Allied failure in Dieppe. Eichheim remained in the Canary Islands from 27 October until 9 November 1942, spending five days in Tenerife, three in Gran Canaria, two in Fuerteventura, and half a day in Lanzarote. It was a longer stay than Commander Krauss’s visit, and unlike his predecessors he also went to the two easternmost islands, which could be taken by the enemy to make an attack on the main islands easier. It is possible that the planned stay was longer than that finally conducted, but the American landings in French Morocco forced Colonel Eichheim to return as soon as possible to avoid the risk of remaining isolated in the Canary Islands. In fact, shortly afterwards, the air transport between the archipelago and mainland Spain was suspended, which stranded Walter Sauermann, the German consul in Las Palmas. ⁵⁹ On 18 November, having returned to Germany, Eichheim wrote a 12-page report for the Abwehr to deliver to General Vigón, the Spanish air minister. ⁶⁰ In the Spanish military sources there is just a translation of this report, published recently, ⁶¹ but the plans for the defence of the islands at the beginning of 1943 show several observations which were probably a consequence of Eichheim’s visit.

III. Eichheim’s Advice for the Defence of the Canary Islands

Eichheim’s report consists of three main sections. The first discusses the circumstances which had given rise to this mission, and then succinctly reviews in barely four pages the modern procedures of attack and defence of the coasts. The second and largest section contains seven pages devoted to recommendations on defensive measures in the archipelago, grouped into the following three main categories: tactics, organization, and fortification. The last section consists of a concluding observation. Eichheim recognized he could only obtain an impression of the land and the most important fortifications by visiting the most representative zones. He also indicated another difficulty when writing the report. Language was a problem because he could speak with the Spanish officers only through interpreters. This made the exchange of views difficult, despite the guided visit to the four islands.

For Eichheim, an attack on the coasts would adopt multiple forms, from sabotage and commando raids to large landings. The latter ones would be conducted by sea, air, or a combination of both, but their main goal would be the occupation of ports and airfields to be used as naval and air bases. In fact, the air landings could be directed to take airfields and objectives in the rear. The attacks would try to take advantage of surprise and would probably be done at night, although this would not exclude the possibility of prior preparation through air strikes and naval bombardment. The discharge of the landing force in boats would be beyond the reach of the coastal artillery, and it would be expected to take any port to make the unloading of transport ships faster. After this preparation would come a landing in two waves, with air and naval support: the first wave would comprise infantry, sappers, and some tanks, whereas the second wave would land the artillery and a greater number of tanks. The operation should last a very short time, making it possible to land a division in several hours.

In the defence of coasts, the most important objective would be the destruction of the enemy while it was weakest, approaching land. Nevertheless, the coastal artillery could not be used for this purpose because of its slowness and its targets being too small. It was also necessary to consider the possibility that the enemy could land in different locations, and four measures were considered essential to confront that situation. First, the important points for defence had to be prepared, so they could stand independently for several days. Second, moving away from the coast was necessary, as was protecting the organizations that did not serve the coastal defence directly, such as the troop barracks, supply depots, and so on. Third, mobile reserves should be organized to counter-attack. Fourth, blockade lines and explosives should be arranged at road junctions. In addition, the success of the defence depended largely on how quickly it got under way. In this sense, Eichheim recalled that the coastal defence in Dieppe was on the alert from the beginning of the attack. ⁶²

The explicit reference to ‘Jubilee’ suggests that the procedures of attack and defence responded mainly to the experience gained in the failed Anglo-Canadian landing. However, this does not mean that the lessons were always right or the Allies would do the same in future operations. In fact, German success was also due to serious mistakes in Allied planning, such as inflexibility, deficient intelligence concerning the German defences, the execution of a frontal assault lacking sufficient naval support, inadequate air cover, and relatively limited training for the assault force. The loss of the surprise factor seemed to condemn the operation to failure before execution, whereas the erroneous interpretation of these lessons led to another disaster at Omaha beach during the Allied landings in Normandy. ⁶³ However, when these lessons were correctly assimilated they permitted a break through the defences of Juno, Sword, and Gold Beach. Instead, the German high command failed to complete defensive preparations. It could not resolve in time the strategic dilemma of keeping armoured reserves for a counter-attack inland, to protect them from air attacks, or close to the beaches to immediately annihilate the enemy forces that had been able to land. ⁶⁴

However, in November 1942 Eichheim could not guess what was going to occur one and a half years later on the Normandy coast, so he revised the tactical measures applied in the Canary Islands from the experience of Dieppe. These defence measures are summarized as follows: the importance of reconnaissance, the defence nucleus (Schwerpunkt) arrangement, the need to guard the cliffs, fortification measures, preparations for destroying infrastructure, action to render ground unsuitable for airborne landings, and the lighting problem. The first two measures were obvious. Reconnaissance was important to detect the enemy as soon as possible, in the same way that the existence of a unique command for the land, air, and naval forces and sure and fast communications were essential. Regarding the latter measures, the telephone network was still being completed, and Eichheim recommended that it overlap with other means of communication. Another obvious recommendation was that the cliffs should be guarded by patrols because they could be climbed by commandos.

Some of these observations had not gone unnoticed by the Spanish garrison, although Eichheim’s insistence suggests that there still remained much to be done. The instruction of the captain general on 10 April 1941 assigned reconnaissance missions to the air and naval forces, whereas the advice to create a unique command had been issued on 9 July 1940. ⁶⁵ The importance of communications was present in the plan to defend Gran Canaria dated 26 April 1941, with instructions for the telephone, radiotelegraph, and optical networks. However, the plan of 20 January 1943 was more detailed, emphasizing that the phone network was to be used as much as possible and that the optical network doubled the radiotelegraph network. Finally, the less suitable landing zones of Gran Canaria had been considered to be passive in 1941, receiving only an infantry platoon, whereas in 1943, according to Eichheim’s recommendation, they had four platoons. ⁶⁶

The defence nucleus received greater importance in the German report for which Eichheim outlined two significant suggestions. First, it was necessary to reconsider the distribution of forces in the archipelago because the two major islands had equal garrisons, despite the fact that Gran Canaria had the most important port, La Luz, and its coast was more suitable for landings, particularly near Gando airfield. Second, the entire coastline could not be defended effectively, but from a military point of view it was necessary to concentrate the forces at the most important points, such as ports, airfields, heavy artillery batteries, road junctions, or supply depots. In that sense, he noted that the four insular capitals he had visited (Las Palmas, Santa Cruz of Tenerife, Arrecife, and Port Cabras) seemed less protected by infantry than remote places on the coast.

The first advice was not taken up because the garrison of Gran Canaria did not experience a great increase after the orders in April 1941 and the reorganization at the end of that year. On 3 February 1943 Tenerife had 9 infantry battalions and 4 infantry battalions to be mobilized, 12 coastal artillery batteries, 4 field batteries, and 1 anti-aircraft battery. ⁶⁷ According to the order of January 1943, the garrison of Gran Canaria was similar: 9 infantry battalions and 4 infantry battalions to be mobilized, 15 coastal artillery batteries, 4 field batteries and 1 anti-aircraft battery. The only significant difference between both islands was the deployment of 22 fixed guns on the coasts of Gran Canaria to counter landings, which had not been mentioned in the order of February 1943 for Tenerife, although there were 18 fixed guns on that island. ⁶⁸ Among the factors that could have prevented the implementation of this advice was the fact that Tenerife was the other provincial capital of the Canary Islands, and possessed important maritime and air infrastructures and, especially, the Canary Islands general headquarters.

Eichheim’s recommendation to increase infantry forces to defend the insular capitals did not seem to succeed either. In the case of Gran Canaria, there was only one infantry battalion deployed for the city of Las Palmas and the Port of La Luz in 1943, the same as in 1941, with the only difference that there was one infantry battalion to be mobilized. Perhaps the Spanish command deduced opportunely that, after the Dieppe fiasco, the possibility of a direct assault against the city and the port was small, so the enemy would try to land in places less defended, just as the Allies did subsequently in North Africa, Italy, and France.

In contrast, a clear reorganization of the defence of Gran Canaria in 1943 can be seen, with four large differences undertaken since the plan of April 1941. First, the five existing defensive sectors were grouped into four, with 13 subsectors. Second, the sectors and the subsectors were not limited to the coast, but they extended inland. Third, the line planned in 1941 to reduce the battle front had been transformed into seven transversal lines two years later to contain the enemy advance towards the insular capital. Finally, the second position in 1941, intended to stop the enemy advance inland, does not appear in the plan of 1943. It is possible that this reorganization was related to Eichheim’s advice to concentrate forces around the most important objectives because it meant a clear enlargement of the passive zone, the displacement of the guard zone towards the east, and a considerable reduction of the resistance zone where defensive forces were concentrated.

Eichheim paid greater attention to organizing the defence of all major points, such as military bases, to resist attacks by enemy infantry and tanks. Moreover, he believed it was imperative that a land front for the defence of Las Palmas be established. In this city there were some infantry weapons installed on docks and piers, but the other ports had neither barbed wire fences nor barriers to prevent access to the port by enemy ships. Artificial barriers did not exist, except some barbed wire fences, so Eichheim recommended using barbed wire and the ravines as anti-tank obstacles. He also proposed deploying the few existing anti-aircraft weapons so they could be used against ground targets, given the lack of enough rapid-fire weapons. Finally, and because of the limited active anti-aircraft defence, Eichheim insisted on improving passive defence by building refuges for the garrison.

In the 1943 plan is Eichheim’s advice that defence of the islands beyond stopping the enemy at the beaches should be contemplated, unlike the principle behind the 1941 plan for the Canaries’ defence. The transversal lines considered in 1943 could constitute the land front for the defence of the capital suggested by Eichheim. Orders were given in 1943 for the deployment of barbed wire and mines, but it is not clear to what extent this occurred. The employment of anti-aircraft weapons against land objectives had already been arranged in 1941 and this idea was repeated in 1943. However, the defence of the Port of La Luz did not experience significant improvements: on 2 November 1945 the submarine defences of the naval base of the Canary Islands, whose first mobilization exercise occurred in June 1947, ⁶⁹ had not yet been organized. No more weapons for the close defence of the most important points were shipped, despite the shortcomings noted by the captain general in March 1942.

The tactical measures proposed by Eichheim concluded with some recommendations for destroying the main military and economic objectives on the islands and for disabling places suitable for air landings, as well as measures to solve the lighting problem. Firstly, it was necessary to prepare in peacetime the personnel and the explosives to quickly destroy militarily and economically prominent objectives, such as coastal artillery or the unloading facilities at the ports. Secondly, the Spanish garrison had to prepare stones, trenches, and other obstacles to prevent the landing of planes and gliders, especially at Fuerteventura, where there were extensive areas suitable for these operations. And thirdly, because of the lack of searchlights, especially on the coast, Eichheim suggested the use of tracer ammunition.

The first tactical measure mentioned by Eichheim was present in the captain general’s plan of 10 April 1941, by which it was ordered that each military governor prepare destruction plans ‘in the unlikely event’ that the enemy managed to land and to advance inland. The military governor of Gran Canaria did so in his order of the 26th of that month, which foresaw the destruction of docks (except in the main port), water supply facilities, and roads, although Eichheim’s observations suggest that the plans for destruction had not been developed. In fact, in the plan of 1943, the military governor ordered the sapper chief to study, along with the sector chiefs, the changes to be conducted in the destruction plan in force. The second tactical measure was conducted later, because the study of making the aerodromes inoperable began in the summer of 1943 and the subsequent accumulation of stone piles could be developed only very slowly. ⁷⁰ Regarding the third measure, the use of tracer projectiles, it is not mentioned in the plans of 1941 or 1943 for Gran Canaria.

Concerning organizational measures, the report emphasized the need for an alarm system that could activate the defences quickly and which could be improved with alarm and mobilization exercises, simulation games, and manoeuvres. The report also indicated that measures against sabotage should be considered. In that regard the captain general had requested Madrid’s authorization to expel suspicious people, and prevent them from soon returning to the islands. Finally, Eichheim verified that the captain general wanted to import peninsular troops because he did not trust conscripts from the Canaries. It is possible that the Spanish officers could have been even more explicit, as there was some mistrust towards the inhabitants caused by widespread Anglophilia in the Canary Islands, particularly when a British attack seemed possible. This problem was considered by the general staff of the army in the reorganization of the archipelago garrison in October 1941, when it ordered that some of the troops involved were to come from the Spanish mainland. Therefore, at the end of September 1942, approximately a third of the 34,000 troops on the islands were peninsular or North African. ⁷¹

In addition, Eichheim paid special attention to fortifications. One of his recommendations was to take advantage of cave construction, which was cheaper and better suited to the terrain than concrete construction. Another recommendation referred to the fortification of command posts, artillery batteries, and other military targets to strengthen their resistance to protect against aerial bombs of 500 kg. Eichheim also noted the desirability of preparing obstacles, such as mines, trenches, walls, and stones, against combat vehicles. The rocky nature of the islands did not pass unnoticed to the German officer, who considered it very favourable for camouflage, which had already been properly applied to coastal artillery but not to infantry positions. Moreover, it had not been improved with decoys.

Among the fortification measures, Eichheim discussed building principles. Bunkers and machine-gun nests were usually visible when they should have been better blended with the ground, and the walls should have been reinforced with stone. The constructions endowed with loopholes were appropriate for opening fire against the enemy flanks, but not for frontal fire, for which it was better to use open positions to fire in any direction. With regard to size, the German officer preferred to build many small refuges and positions instead of large fortifications. Moreover, the positions installed in galleries should not be excessively large. The entrances to the nests should be protected and situated with the back to the front. It was vital that the soldiers could leave the shelters quickly to avoid capture by the enemy. Finally, Eichheim also proposed the lining of concrete ceilings with metal beams and plates.

These fortification measures were considered in the plan of January 1943, in light of the limited resources available. One evident decision was the abandonment of many machine-gun nests – more than 400 had been built throughout the archipelago – except those that were better blended with the ground. As the German report recommended, these constructions were relatively small, and many of them were prepared to use two machine guns or automatic rifles, and usually located for flank fire. There is no explicit evidence of the construction of decoys, but the plan of January 1943 stated that only the best blended would be utilized, ‘leaving the other nests as false targets to disorient the enemy’. It also included the construction of more open infantry positions, as combat positions for machine-gun or rifle sections. In fact, open infantry positions were present in the plans of 1941 as ‘resistance islets’, and an Anglo-Canadian report of 24 December 1942 even included the drawing of one of them. ⁷² The difference introduced by the plan of 1943 is that it considered them as the main fighting positions for the infantry, instead of the majority of the abandoned machine-gun nests.

Finally, the German officer indicated the difficult situation in Gran Canaria and Fuerteventura for water and food supply, although it was recognized that plans had been made to spread the depots and move them inland, making them less vulnerable. Regarding food supply, it is possible that the creation of the Economic Command by the captain general helped ease the situation, although it could not bring an end to the dependence on foreign imports, because in 1942 the archipelago was forced to import more grain than it could produce. ⁷³ As for water, perhaps Eichheim confused Gran Canaria with Lanzarote, because after the increase of their garrisons the shortage was especially serious on this last island as well as in Fuerteventura. The solution comprised regular water shipments by A2 and A4 navy tanks. ⁷⁴ However, the JPS was also conscious of this problem, so in one of the drafts of ‘Pilgrim’ – the operation to occupy the archipelago – it had been planned to interrupt this supply to force the surrender of the garrisons. ⁷⁵

After dedicating most of a 12-page report to indicate aspects that could be corrected or improved, Eichheim finished his evaluation on the defensive state of the archipelago, qualifying the sense of his observations. He did not want to suggest that much of what had been done in the Canary Islands in previous years was wrong, but it had only to be reviewed and completed in light of recent experience. It was simply the same situation experienced in the German coastal defence after the lessons learned from the British landings in France and Norway, as well as the ones provided by the continually changing land fronts. The German officer concluded that this continuous updating had allowed the success in Dieppe. It is likely the Spanish military authorities, both in the general staff of the army and in the archipelago, shared this point of view. Not only had they requested a German officer, but some of his observations matched those made by the garrison, and other observations were incorporated into the defence reorganization undertaken in early 1943.

IV. Conclusions

Some of the German colonel’s advice was included in the 1941 plans for the defence of the islands, and some was not considered. However, in January and February 1943 a reorganization of the defence of the islands visited by Eichheim was conducted, which in large part was a response to his observations. This can be seen in the plan prepared for Gran Canaria in January 1943, specifically in the new division of the island into sectors and subsectors, the reinforcement of the guard of the passive zones, the greater attention granted to communications, the creation of transversal lines, the deployment of barbed wire fences and mines, the changes in the destruction plans, and the replacement of many machine-gun nests by ‘resistance islets’, with nests being abandoned as decoys.

The Spanish command of the archipelago did not have many illusions on the matter because they had complained several times of a considerable shortage of means that prevented them from enacting minimum defensive needs. In fact, there is no record of large weapons shipments to fill this gap after Eichheim’s visit. The uncompleted defence of the Canary Islands shows the real weakness of the Spanish armed forces, in contrast with the ambitious plans to conquer Gibraltar, Morocco, Portugal, and South France, which have been studied by Manuel Ros Agudo. ⁷⁶ Although the Spanish army had 750,000 men in arms at the end of 1942, ⁷⁷ the lack of means made it defenceless. As Gabriel Cardona said, ‘That big army existed, but it was a tired and barefoot giant, sitting on a junk pile.’ ⁷⁸

Thus, it does not seem that the reorganization of January 1943 managed to guarantee the defence against a landing, especially when the Allied intelligence services had very detailed knowledge of the archipelago’s defences. This is clear in the Anglo-Canadian report of December 1942, despite its inaccuracies regarding Gran Canaria and the corrections made in January 1943. In Allied military planning on the Canary Islands, there is no evidence of Eichheim’s mission, but important changes were noted in planning adaptations on Gran Canaria, such as the abandoning in April 1943 of the landing in Gando Bay to take the airfield, which suggests that, despite its limitations, the Spanish defensive effort had an influence on the Anglo-Canadian occupation plan. ⁷⁹

The sending of German officers to the Canary Islands to verify their defensive state shows that the risk of an Allied attack against the archipelago worried the Spanish high command and even the Germans. Consequently, these islands were not abandoned in the Spanish plans to enter the war on the Axis side, although they did not constitute a factor in avoiding the belligerent temptation in the summer and autumn of 1940. In fact, the German advice regarding the defence of the archipelago against an Allied attack shows the Franco regime’s alignment with the Third Reich. On the other hand, German concern about the Canary Islands exemplifies the limits of that alignment, because the Third Reich got neither Spanish belligerency nor the cession of one of the islands. This was not an exception in Spanish-German relations in these years. Although the Franco regime gave valuable aid to the Third Reich during the war, there were significant differences in some areas, for instance the payment of the Spanish war debt to Germany. ⁸⁰ In the end, Spanish territorial ambitions were counterbalanced by the failure of German guarantees to grant Franco his claims on Gibraltar, French Morocco, and so on, and by Allied economic pressure.

Finally, the visit of Colonel Eichheim, made between October and November 1942 at the request of the Spanish government, supposes continuity with the non-belligerency policy, just like other forms of collaboration with Germany, which were maintained until 1944 despite the slow turn of Spanish foreign policy towards neutrality initiated by Gómez-Jordana. The Spanish Blue Division remained in Russia, fighting until the autumn of 1943, when it was replaced by the Blue Legion until March 1944. Although the Americans instituted an oil embargo against Spain at the beginning of 1944, the Spanish continued to trade wolfram with Germany until August 1944, and dealt with contraband until September. Moreover, at the end of the war and during the post-war period, the Franco regime protected many German agents, preventing their capture by the Allies. ⁸¹ And last but not least, Gómez-Jordana gave information to the German ambassador about the risk of an Allied landing in north-west Africa in November 1942, a few days before the Torch D-day. ⁸² In conclusion, the turn of the Spanish foreign policy towards strict neutrality was very slow, despite Allied pressure to end Spanish collaboration with the Third Reich. Franco turned from reluctant belligerent in the autumn of 1940 to reluctant neutral until the end of the war.