German Wartime Anglophobic Propaganda in France,1914–1945

I. Introduction

While the role of Anglophobia in Franco-British relations has been studied on different occasions, historians have largely ignored the part played by the Germans in spreading anti-English propaganda in France during the first half of the twentieth century. ¹ The main study on Anglophobia in France, Anglophobie et politique, mainly left aside the German occupations of the country. ² The only work comparing the German press of occupation in France during the Franco-Prussian War and the two world wars, Andrea Laska’s Presse et propagande allemande en France occupée: Des moniteurs officiels (1870–1871) à la Gazette des Ardennes (1914–1918) et à la Pariser Zeitung (1940–1944), mentioned a campaign against Britain but failed to investigate its motivation or its reception by the French population. ³ In fact, Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac has so far been the only scholar to identify and analyse the role played by the Germans in spreading Anglophobia in France. In his article ‘L’opinion publique française, l’Angleterre et la guerre’, he argued that the 1939–40 German psychological warfare campaign of Anglophobia not only played an important part in demoralizing French troops and civilians but also triggered suspicion among allies. ⁴ Crémieux-Brilhac’s focus on the Second World War means that the German propaganda effort in France lacks perspective or context. A broad study on the role played by German military propaganda in exploiting anti-English sentiments in France during the world wars is needed to understand Germany’s determination to use Anglophobia as a central theme in both 1914–18 and 1939–45. These operations of psychological warfare not only raise important questions about the nature, goals, and reception of German propaganda attempts to foment Anglophobic sentiments in France but demonstrate the congruity of forms and themes between Germany’s First and Second World War campaigns. This study will investigate these questions but will also look at France’s attempts to negate German wartime Anglophobia.

The main regions affected by German psychological warfare will be at the centre of this article. During the first conflict, German propaganda was particularly active in the north-east of France, where communication between army institutions and enemy civilians was greatly facilitated by the occupation. ⁵ The Germans also used aerial leaflets and smuggled newspapers on a smaller scale to reach the rest of the country. While these methods were still widely employed during the phoney war, they were complemented by radio broadcasts – thus widening the audience to the whole country.

This study will first contextualize anti-English feelings at the beginning of the twentieth century. It will be noted that Anglophobia emerged in Germany at the end of the nineteenth century. The article will then move on to the goals of German Anglophobic propaganda in France during the world wars. The next section will evaluate the degree of emphasis placed on anti-English topics in each campaign of communication and highlight the themes used. Carrying on with the effectiveness and the actions of counter-propaganda, this article will conclude that the campaign of Anglophobia found on the German home front was recycled in the occupied territories of France during the First World War, a laboratory in which anti-English arguments reached a mature form. Anglophobia having been failed by primitive means of distribution in 1914–18, this article will demonstrate that its Nazi form became partially successful in Alsace-Lorraine during the phoney war before being adopted by the Vichy regime.

II. Goals

Before exploring the goals of German propaganda during the two world wars, it is worth examining Anglophobic feelings in France and Germany before 1914. France and England or Britain had been at war on multiple occasions since medieval times. If this historical dimension was responsible for a climate of mistrust, Anglophobia did not take its modern form until the nineteenth century. As Fabrice Serodes has argued, simple hostility progressively turned into conscious antagonism between rival powers. ⁶ Two reasons explain this transition: the role played by nationalism in instrumentalizing the past and the atmosphere of conflict surrounding colonial disputes. The Fashoda incident of 1898 was the most extreme example, almost causing war and triggering waves of Anglophobic reactions. ⁷ Yet despite such increased tensions, diplomatic relations improved before the First World War. Having almost fought each other six years before, the British and the French signed the Entente Cordiale on 8 April 1904. This agreement between powers did not put an end to Anglophobia in France but eased the situation.

German public opinion followed a dissimilar pattern. Indeed, anti-English feelings steadily climbed from the end of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the First World War. According to Pauline Anderson, the Krüger telegram of 1896 and the subsequent deterioration of relations between Britain and Germany were instrumental in sparking the public’s imagination. ⁸ The naval arms race and the Boer War did nothing to ease the situation. At the turn of the century the German press regularly targeted British foreign policy, using the stereotypical English bourgeois ‘John Bull’ in caricatures. ⁹ If Anglophobia was more present, it would be wrong to assume that England had become public opinion’s main enemy before 1914. The threat that Russia posed to the eastern border of Germany raised more hostile feelings. In fact, Anglophobia would only become prominent in Germany after Britain’s declaration of war. ¹⁰

The initial months of the First World War trapped more than two and a half million French civilians behind enemy lines. ¹¹ Managing such a significant population was not an easy task, especially since German military doctrines of occupation relied on total order and absolute submission. ¹² To rule efficiently, the occupier designed various administrative institutions but also recognized the importance of intellectual stimulation. To that effect, the German army produced its own newspapers in French aimed at the civilian population in September 1914. These propaganda papers were supposed to ease the state of occupation, improve Germany’s image and increase economic collaboration. Yet they failed to convince. Lacking subtlety and obviously written by non-native French speakers, they instantly became an object of mockery among occupied civilians. ¹³ Rather than renouncing this effort, the Oberste Heeresleitung asked Abteilung IIIb to step in. In November 1914 this intelligence and propaganda unit launched a newspaper named La Gazette des Ardennes. It was a well-planned initiative managed by German supervisors and an editorial team composed of French and Alsatian journalists. ¹⁴ For the whole war this widely distributed newspaper (publication increased from 25,000 copies per issue in 1915 to 175,000 copies in 1917) would become the most prominent voice of Anglophobia in the occupied territories. Despite being banned, the Gazette des Ardennes also found its way into France through neutral countries or by post. ¹⁵

But why did the Germans use Anglophobia as the main strategy of communication in occupied France? There is no straightforward answer to this question because of the destruction of the Abteilung IIIb archives during the Second World War. There is no doubt that most Germans believed that Britain was responsible for the war and saw fit to use what they understood to be the truth to explain the conflict. As Matthew Stibbe has shown, civilians and soldiers were encouraged to accept this version by the press aimed at the home front and the army. In fact, German newspapers sustained a violent campaign of Anglophobia between August 1914 and November 1918. ¹⁶ However, German propagandists also saw Anglophobia as a way to facilitate the state of occupation. If French civilians living in the invaded territories were led to believe that Britain was responsible for the war and was the real enemy of France, they would have no moral justification to resist or avoid collaborating with the Germans. Jacques Ellul and Harold Lasswell, both respected propaganda theorists, would later confirm the effectiveness of such strategies. ¹⁷ But Anglophobia was also an excellent way to recycle old prejudices, an easier task than creating new ones. ¹⁸ As stated above, the Gazette des Ardennes was also read in the free part of France. There, anti-English arguments served a double purpose. They undermined the alliance, as in the occupied territories, but they also tried to improve Germany’s reputation. After all, the British had launched a vast international campaign of defamation against Germany at the beginning of the war. ¹⁹ The degree of emphasis placed on anti-English themes in the Gazette des Ardennes was more than significant. From November 1914 to April 1915, the newspaper published no fewer than 124 Anglophobic articles – 3 and a half per issue. This average, including hate and atrocity propaganda topics but excluding neutral narrations of battles and victories against the British, continued steadily until November 1918. ²⁰

This article will later argue that German propaganda was successful in the occupied territories but failed to have long-term effects in unoccupied France. The victory of 1918 did a lot to improve Britain’s image in France. The situation was different in Germany, where Anglophobia outlived the conflict. The occupation of the Rhineland and the rise of the Nazi Party did not help. During the thirties, Nazi propaganda used anti-Semitism and anti-capitalism to criticize Britain, but also praised its appetite for power. ²¹

On 3 September 1939 France and the United Kingdom declared war on Germany. The following eight months would see no major offensive on the Western Front, a period known as the phoney war or the drôle de guerre. There was little violence but German propaganda aimed at French soldiers and civilians was in full swing, using radio broadcasts and launching more than 90 million leaflets. German psychological warfare was produced by various military and civilian units competing against each other: the Reichsministerium für Volkserklärung und Propaganda (the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda), the Auswärtiges Amt (the German Foreign Office) and the Propagandakompanien (propaganda companies inside the German army). ²² For the next eight months, Anglophobia would feature prominently in German psychological warfare.

The reasons for the German use of anti-English feelings in France in 1939–40 were different from those of the First World War. Propagandists wanted the French population to question the alliance with the British. Putting the citizens at odds with the government was a way to paralyse the system. The German army counted on the ensuing indecision to finish the war against Poland without having to fight on two fronts at the same time. ²³ Promoting pacifism and questioning Britain’s morality was also a way to demoralize French soldiers serving on the border. Putting it simply, the Germans counted on Anglophobic propaganda to weaken their adversaries and gain time. The importance that the Germans placed on this strategy becomes obvious when looking at the statistics: 56.5% of the leaflets and 80% of the radio programmes (Radio Stuttgart and Radio Humanité) aimed at France transmitted anti-English feelings. ²⁴

III. The Nature of German Anglophobic Propaganda

Before turning to the content, this article must briefly mention the ways propaganda arrived in France. During the First World War a ban on all neutral and Allied newspapers ensured that there was no alternative to the Gazette des Ardennes. This embargo forced French civilians desiring to know the latest news about the war to read German propaganda. ²⁵ Abteilung IIIb also wanted to distribute psychological warfare in the free part of France but faced problems of dissemination. The Allies were using aeroplanes to distribute leaflets in the occupied territories but the Germans saw this convenient solution as a breach of the Hague Convention. In fact, they even court-martialled British aviators who dropped propaganda leaflets in October 1917. ²⁶ There were only two plausible alternatives: unmanned balloons carrying La Gazette des Ardennes and German agents posting forbidden newspapers to France from neutral countries. Both solutions were used successfully. ²⁷ The interwar period brought new perspectives in terms of distribution. Aeroplanes continued their rapid technological evolution, while aerial propaganda was legalized at the Hague meeting of 1922 on aerial warfare. ²⁸ Unsurprisingly, the Germans used aviation to distribute propaganda deep inside France in 1939–40. But the most significant step for the globalization of propaganda was without doubt the popularization of radio. ²⁹ This invention, which brought propaganda directly to people’s homes, was used extensively by the Germans during the phoney war. ³⁰

Despite having different reasons to promote anti-English feelings in France, the Nazis copied the work of Abteilung IIIb almost entirely. Their motivation to do so was simple: they thought highly of the work done in the previous conflict. ³¹ What were the themes used to exploit Anglophobia? In 1914–18 the Germans largely built their campaign of Anglophobia on the idea that Britain was a greedy empire built on unrestricted capitalism. This short extract of the Gazette des Ardennes, printed in an article titled ‘Business Is Business’ in January 1915, was typical: ‘We have proved in a previous issue that British diplomats serve their economy. … The biggest warmongers in England do not love their country. They just work to protect their interests.’ ³² In its first issue (November 1914), the Gazette des Ardennes presented the war as a result of Britain’s maritime superiority and colonial appetite. The navy would soon serve as the most potent symbol of uncontrolled military power serving economic domination. Mentioned on a daily basis, the Royal Navy was also caricatured as a sea monster terrorizing the oceans and neutral nations, a giant octopus wrapping the globe or a giant spider building a net around the world. ³³

During the phoney war, the Germans based their propaganda on the exact same theme. For example, a booklet titled Pour anéantir le Hitlérisme (‘To annihilate Hitlerism’) showed a British octopus holding the globe in its tentacles. The words of Victor Hugo were also reproduced:

Your nation is a provocation to all the other countries. What a sublime occupation! You drain the world in such a fantastic way. One day, there will be two signs on earth: one will say ‘humans’, the other ‘English’. ³⁴

Another caricature of April 1940 saw Churchill crushing with his pound-decorated chariot a group of men of different ethnicities in the name of ‘political and economic servitude’. ³⁵ In both wars, German propagandists aimed the concept of a social struggle against British imperialism at French socialists and communists. In this propaganda narrative, Germany defended modest people around the world against John Bull’s appetite. ³⁶ The Germans knew that the French left had a conflictual relationship with the government and was divided on the issue of war. In 1914–18, prominent members of the radical party, such as the ex-finance minister Joseph Caillaux, were opposed to the conflict and advocated for a negotiated peace. ³⁷ The situation was even more difficult in 1939 as the government faced attacks not only from the socialists but also from the communists, eager to defend the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact. In fact, the French Communist Party went as far as to distribute leaflets encouraging French and German workers to fight together against international capitalism. ³⁸

If the Germans tried to destabilize the left, they did not forget the right. As mentioned before, the nationalistic interpretation of history had shaped a modern form of Anglophobia in France during the nineteenth century. The Germans knew that this violent past was a convenient argument to denounce an irresponsible alliance with the hereditary enemy. To reach nationalist circles, they manipulated beloved national figures. ³⁹ During the First World War, German propaganda published carefully selected extracts from the Memorial of Saint-Helena to engage with the Napoleonic myth. The Germans also used the martyrdom of Joan of Arc to denounce English cruelty and hypocrisy – two personality traits commonly used by Anglophobic propaganda. ⁴⁰ In 1939–40, Joan of Arc and Napoleon occupied an even more prominent position in German propaganda. Radio broadcasts and leaflets warned against the perfidy of the hereditary enemy. ⁴¹

There were other ways of using Anglophobia than drawing upon political allegiances. The Germans knew that the Allies disagreed on the conduct of war. During the battle of Verdun, the French counted on a British offensive to relieve their front but were disappointed to see their ally delay the attack. When the battle of the Somme finally happened in July 1916, the French felt bitterly let down by the British performance. ⁴² The Gazette des Ardennes rushed on the matter in an attempt to demonstrate that the French were paying the price for trusting the British. In 1939–40 French soldiers and civilians suspected their ally of delaying their deployment on the Western Front. ⁴³ Once again, German propaganda exploited this fear and even used the First World War as a historical warning: ‘480,000 English soldiers fell in 1914–1918; 1,425,000 French soldiers fell in 1914–1918’. ⁴⁴ The Germans obviously fudged these statistics and focused purely on ‘English’ soldiers while defining ‘French’ as including colonial troops. In fact, the United Kingdom lost about 800,000 men and the British Empire lost more than a million soldiers in total. According to German psychological warfare, the British were not only inefficient as soldiers but also caused trouble in France. The Gazette des Ardennes argued that British soldiers had a higher salary, which they used to seduce French women:

English soldiers are very well paid, incomparably better than French soldiers. … English soldiers have replaced all foreign wastrels [noceurs] and the Parisians who live to party. They thank their generals for giving them enough money to pay Venus. ⁴⁵

The same clichés resurfaced during the phoney war: ‘Much better paid and fed than the poilu [French soldier], the English, who behave like lords, stubbornly stay somewhere in France, not too close to the front line.’ ⁴⁶ Sexual references, just like the above-mentioned article of the Gazette des Ardennes, were also extremely common in 1939–40. The ‘Tommies’ sought out married French women, especially those who had a husband in the army. The Germans dropped large quantities of leaflets titled ‘Where Did the Tommies Stay?’ between December 1939 and April 1940. ⁴⁷ It showed a French soldier alone in the ruins while a British soldier flirted with his wife in the background. There were variations of the picture representing a British soldier in bed with a French soldier’s wife. ⁴⁸

There was only one topic distinguishing German Anglophobia in France during the First and the Second World War: anti-Semitism. Used on leaflets and during radio programmes, anti-Semitism was supposed to reinforce anti-capitalist arguments. ⁴⁹ German propagandists talked about the judéo-britannique or the judéo-démocratique state and caricatured bankers and businessmen according to the well-known Nazi visual clichés. ⁵⁰

IV. Effects

French intelligence officers systematically interviewed repatriated civilians from the occupied territories, leaving behind a significant number of documents on the effects of propaganda and life in general in the invaded part of the country during the First World War. There is no doubt that the occupation traumatized many civilians living in the north-east of France. Famished and isolated, they were an ideal target for German propaganda. ⁵¹ As a result of Anglophobic psychological warfare, many occupied French believed that the British were too weak to win the war. Seeing no other possible outcome, parts of the invaded population even wished for a prompt German victory to put the ordeal of occupation to an end. ⁵² Although German Anglophobic propaganda was instrumental in destroying the credibility of the British army, there is no evidence to suggest that psychological warfare triggered feelings of hate. ⁵³ It must be highlighted that German propaganda did not manage to convince all layers of French society. Those animated by patriotic feelings saw in anti-English articles an invitation to adopt an Anglophile attitude. Philippe Stéphani, who experienced the occupation, testified after the war:

All books written against England during the last centuries are reproduced in La Gazette des Ardennes. There is not an issue without a reference to Joan of Arc or Napoleon. All of that is for nothing as each occupied citizen knows that he will owe the survival of his nation to England. And then … if the Hun hates England, it is a good reason for us to love her. ⁵⁴

German propaganda was considered so influential in the occupied territories that the French government took action. At the beginning of 1915 the war minister created an aerial propaganda unit (Service de la propagande aérienne) serving inside the Etat-major de l’armée under the direct supervision of the government. Its main mission was to ‘fight the demoralizing influence of the Gazette des Ardennes’ in the invaded regions of France with the help of an aerial newspaper called La Voix du Pays. ⁵⁵ French propagandists designing the paper identified Anglophobia as a priority. They systematically promoted cordial relations with their main ally by advertising the British war effort. The British, who also monitored morale in the occupied territories using interviews of refugees, knew that they had much to gain from this initiative. ⁵⁶ They offered the assistance of the Royal Flying Corps to distribute the Voix du Pays in the densely populated sector of Lille–Roubaix–Tourcoing. ⁵⁷ The British thought that German propaganda would create durable resentment against them in Belgium and France. This concern became acute after the failure of the battle of the Somme, when the enemy called this offensive a German victory. ⁵⁸ The British encouraged the French to increase the amount of Anglophile articles in the Voix du Pays. Politely turned down, they created their own newspaper in April 1917. ⁵⁹ Le Courrier de l’Air became the official voice emphasizing the role of the British army in the occupied territories. ⁶⁰ It lasted until November 1918 and was revived during the Second World War. ⁶¹

Front-line French soldiers also had regular access to German propaganda but rarely discussed it. ⁶² Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau demonstrated that soldiers were sceptical of their English colleagues and believed that victory was solely in their hands. ⁶³ Yet there is no evidence to prove that this state of mind was influenced by German newspapers and leaflets. German Anglophobia’s effects on the French home front are better documented. As mentioned, the Gazette des Ardennes penetrated the front line through neutral countries or by unmanned balloons. There is little evidence suggesting that the newspaper influenced the perception of Britain. Despite the lack of impact, German Anglophobia had consequences in France. The government and the army took the threat of propaganda very seriously. An officer of the Deuxième Bureau de l’Etat-Major, a French intelligence unit, summarized the state of mind:

At the Deuxième Bureau, we have seen how the German Headquarters tried to turn the French soldier against his English brother in arms. Germany will win the war the day the Franco-English alliance is broken. The stakes are huge. For this reason, the Germans try again and again. They attempt to make the British look revolting, not only to our soldiers but also to our population. ⁶⁴

This climate of suspicion, becoming worse as the war went on, eventually triggered repressive measures. On 5 June 1915 the war minister banned La Gazette des Ardennes to protect the French public from enemy influence. Despite the embargo, the German newspaper systematically reached the most influential editorial teams of the French written press. The French government used censorship to stop Anglophobia and other subversive topics but also turned to more radical measures when necessary. ⁶⁵ French intelligence believed that the Germans were secretly bribing editorial teams. The anarchist Le Bonnet Rouge was particularly suspected of being financed by Abteilung IIIb. ⁶⁶ There is still no consensus on whether the newspaper was collaborating or not, but it is clear that the campaign of Anglophobia published by the anarchist paper was reminiscent of German propaganda:

We are suspicious of Panbritannism and its potential consequences. When a powerful nation, with various and opposed interests all around the world, decides to defend her interests … it is not without triggering serious conflicts with other countries and encouraging this despicable mentality named ‘imperialism’. ⁶⁷

The French authorities arrested Emil-Joseph Duval, editor of Le Bonnet Rouge, at the Swiss border in May 1917. He was carrying a cheque signed by a German banker at the time of the arrest, a fact that convinced the government to act. The newspaper was shut down on the grounds of national safety and its team imprisoned for treason. The Deuxième Bureau clearly identified Anglophobia as one of the main threats posed by Le Bonnet Rouge to France. ⁶⁸ Duval was sentenced to death and executed on 17 July 1918. His collaborator Miguel Almereyda was also arrested for treason but was found dead in his cell on 20 August 1917. ⁶⁹ This article will go on to show that the government feared German propaganda so much that it launched an important campaign of counter-propaganda targeting Anglophobia, among other topics. ⁷⁰

The German campaign of Anglophobia of the First World War had no long-term effects in France. Victory not only proved that Britain was a reliable ally but also imposed a widely accepted narrative blaming the Germans for the war. This is not to say that Anglophobia disappeared during the twenties and thirties. Indeed, the Action Française and other far-right groups used anti-English feelings to reinforce nationalism, while the communists denounced Britain for its foreign policies. ⁷¹ Anglophobia was also acute in Alsace and Lorraine, where autonomists had strong sympathies for Germany. Many men from these regions who had fought in the imperial German army resented the British for having contributed to the victory of France.

Unsurprisingly, it is in Alsace and Lorraine that the French government recorded the most severe incidents of Anglophobia during the phoney war. The prefect of the Bas-Rhin department identified German propaganda as a problem and confirmed that ‘the population has no warm feelings for England’. ⁷² This view was confirmed two months later when the Alsatian prefects reported to the army and the government that German Anglophobic radio broadcasts were having a negative impact. They believed that sending British troops to the region might reverse the morale situation:

The Moselle area already has its Tommies. Recently, the Lorraine front received the first contingent. … Sending English soldiers to Alsace would fight the negative effects of German radio propaganda against Great Britain, which is so effective in our eastern provinces. ⁷³

The authorities kept a file reporting typical examples of Anglophobia in the eastern part of the country, whether it was a soldier stating that Daladier was paid by the British or a civilian saying that ‘we have not seen any Tommy except for the Duke of Windsor’. ⁷⁴ German propaganda even became a source of inspiration for a member of parliament, Joseph Rossé, who organized an anti-British campaign in the Catholic press of Alsace and Lorraine. He was finally arrested by the Sécurité Intérieure de la France in October 1939. ⁷⁵ Repression was not the only way to fight German propaganda. The French government encouraged local representatives to promote their ally. Mayors used the arrival of the British to organize celebrations and events. ⁷⁶ For example, the mayor of Metz underlined the role played by British troops in the Moselle area in December 1939. ⁷⁷

A study of the French front press sheds light on the factors influencing military morale during the phoney war. This examination demonstrates that French soldiers commonly read German propaganda and listened to radio broadcasts. If these regimental newspapers insistently mocked enemy psychological warfare, they betrayed the penetration of Anglophobia nonetheless. ⁷⁸ Hidden behind the facade of humour, anti-English articles and cartoons denounced the lack of professionalism and the debauchery of the British army. ⁷⁹ The difference in pay between French and British soldiers was also a recurrent subject in front-line newspapers. ⁸⁰ In fact, it seems clear that German psychological warfare did not trigger radical changes but rather solidified prevailing stereotypes. According to Jacques Ellul, worsening the mood on the front line was already a success. ⁸¹ The French army tried to answer German propaganda by using the press and the radio, as usual. The main message was one of solidarity and unbreakable links. The French also did their best to prove that the soldiers of the two countries were treated equally. Officers inserted articles in the front-line press to answer the enemy. For example, an army newspaper named L’Hirondelle published an imaginary dialogue between a French infantryman and German propaganda: ‘you really go over the top when you say that we cannot get along, that everything that happened is the responsibility of England. Say Adolf, do you think we are imbeciles [couillons]?’ ⁸²

On a national level, German propaganda did not have the same success as in Alsace-Lorraine and on the front line. Reports from the prefects and the main centralized psychological warfare department, the Commissariat général à l’information, confirmed that anti-British feelings were confined to the regions bordering Germany. ⁸³ Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac came to the same conclusion, stating that Anglophobia remained a minority view, politically and geographically confined. ⁸⁴ Why did German propaganda fail on the home front? When the Second World War began, the French had prepared for psychological warfare. The Commissariat général à l’information, coordinated by the government, identified priority topics capable of influencing civilian morale and defined strategies of communication on a national level. Anglophobia was one of those priorities. Jean Giraudoux, the head of the Commissariat, worked hard to promote the entente cordiale. He organized several events, such as the Franco-British artistic week, to highlight the benefits of the Franco-British alliance. ⁸⁵ Radio stations aired Anglophile speeches by Daladier, Reynaud, and Giraudoux. The audiovisual appeal of cinema was also mobilized for the war of communication. Gaumont-Pathé, the first film company in the world, covered the Franco-British week and the commemoration of 11 November 1939. ⁸⁶ The British also used films on their home front to encourage Francophile feelings. ⁸⁷ In fact, Franco-British propaganda was much stronger during the phoney war than during the previous conflict, as both countries defined common objectives in an attempt to improve efficiency. ⁸⁸ This professionalization of psychological warfare was not a surprise; most French propagandists working on the Voix du Pays during the First World War had been recalled in 1939–40. ⁸⁹

V. Vichy and the Legacy of German Propaganda

The German offensive of May 1940 was a turning point for Anglophobia in France. New men, such as Pétain and Weygand, found their way to the head of the government and the army. Like many other high-ranking officers who had served during the First World War, they looked at the British with suspicion. The Free French and de Gaulle also had conflictual relations with their allies. However, prominent Vichy personalities, such as Admiral Darlan or the sous-secrétaire d’état à la présidence du conseil Baudoin, notoriously mistrusted their ally. ⁹⁰ Unsurprisingly, official propaganda was ordered to steer in the opposite direction. The instrumentalization of the Dunkirk retreat convinced the public that the British were responsible for the failure of the French army. Anti-British propaganda became prominent everywhere in France, including in the occupied region (and of course Alsace-Lorraine) and in the zone libre. The German Propaganda Abteilung of Paris directly encouraged Anglophobia in the north and provided arguments to Vichy propagandists in the south. ⁹¹

During the whole occupation, Anglophobia was used twice more than other topics such as anti-Semitism, anti-Freemasonry, and anti-communism. ⁹² The daily press from Paris, including right and far-right newspapers such as Gringoire and Je Suis Partout, made anti-English feelings their main strategy. Books trying to explain the catastrophic defeat also blamed the British. Radio presenters such as Jean-Hérold Paquis and Philippe Henriot used Anglophobia on a daily basis, and even cinema was mobilized to stir the feelings of the French population. ⁹³ Whether propagated by the Germans or by the Vichy regime, Anglophobia often used two major events: the attack on Mers-el-Kébir and the battle of Dakar.

On 6 July 1940 the French stopped all diplomatic relations with Britain as an answer to the attack on the French fleet at the port of Mers-el-Kébir. This event promptly became the best example illustrating England’s perfidy. The failed battle of Dakar, in which a mixture of British and Free France forces bombed Vichy forces in the West African port, also fuelled propaganda. The first important Anglophobic campaign of psychological warfare took place in October 1940. Posters blamed the English for bombing French civilians and bringing misery. These German-made placards carried the slogans ‘C’est l’Anglais qui nous a fait ça’ (‘The English did that to us’) and ‘Femmes et enfants d’Europe accusent’ (‘Women and children of Europe accuse’). ⁹⁴ One of the illustrations showed the idealized French family, a soldier, a daughter, and the wife carrying a baby, left alone in the ruins of a city. In the background an English soldier smokes a pipe while observing the scene with satisfaction. This example was typical of Anglophobic propaganda during the period. So strong were the examples of Mers-el-Kébir and Dakar that they were still used in 1944. But there was also a major difference between German and Vichy Anglophobia. The French wanted to use anti-English feelings to damage the reputation of de Gaulle and his followers. They argued that the general had betrayed his country to serve the ‘English economy, the Jews, the Freemasons and the Bolsheviks’. ⁹⁵

German and Vichy propagandists also used the past to attack England. This strategy was nothing else but a revised version of what had been done during the First World War and the phoney war. For example, a leaflet called ‘Five Centuries of Cowardice’ listed historical dates such as 1431 (the death of Joan of Arc), May 1821 (the death of Napoleon, ‘tortured by Hudson Lowe’), 1857, 1901, and finally April 1944, with the words ‘The English aviators killed 800 French in Rouen, burned 3,000 houses, and made 10,000 people homeless.’ ⁹⁶ Similarly, far-right organizations instrumentalized the image of Joan of Arc and created a whole celebration on the day of her death. Pétain even gave a speech on 11 May 1940 in which he compared France during the Hundred Years War and the current conflict. ⁹⁷

But what about public opinion? The government asked the prefect to draw up reports on morale and on the efficiency of Anglophobia. With the exception of hardened collaborators, the French remained pro-English during the war and perceived the Germans as the enemy to beat to regain freedom. There was a loss of confidence in the British when they bombed France in 1944, but it was only temporary. Propaganda never managed to make the French hate the British. ⁹⁸

VI. Conclusion

This article has compared the content, the distribution, and the reception of German propaganda aimed at France during the two world wars. The Germans used Anglophobia and the historical Franco-British antagonism to demonstrate that France had been tricked into defending Britain’s unfair economic interests. This study has shown that Anglophobia aimed at France acquired its final form at the beginning of the First World War and varied little afterward. The Germans followed technological innovations, such as the radio, but stuck to the same narrative. If the Nazis introduced anti-Semitic arguments, those remained both uncommon and conditioned to the theme of economic domination.

The authors of this article have also argued that the campaigns of Anglophobia during the two world wars produced different outcomes. During the First World War the occupier managed to discredit the British in the occupied territories. The level of demoralization was so high that the French and British governments felt compelled to react in 1917–18. This Franco-British reaction had important consequences. In the short term, Allied propaganda managed to regain the confidence of the occupied population. In the long term, the French and the British learned to coordinate the production of psychological warfare. Their joint effort successfully fought German Anglophobia during the phoney war. With the exception of Alsace and Lorraine, German propaganda failed to leave a mark on civilians or the army.