Abstract
The Cuban Missile Crisis has been almost uniformly acknowledged by historians as the most dangerous moment of the Cold War. It is also one of the most thoroughly documented episodes of the conflict. Yet, with the continued release of records from Russia, Cuba, and far beyond, it remains astonishingly fertile ground for historians. Recent, revisionist studies of the crisis have devoted attention to the decision-making process of senior figures in Washington and Moscow. Drawing on a vast range of sources, this collection of essays deserves praise for producing analyses which broaden our understanding of key historical debates, while highlighting hitherto neglected, under-researched themes and issues. It also succeeds in decentralizing the historiography by examining the role of third-party nations indirectly involved (but still intertwined) with the events of October 1962.
Len Scott assesses just how close the world came to a nuclear catastrophe, skilfully weaving together analysis of the political leaders’ dispositions, the unfolding of events at an operational level, and the risk of conflict extending to Europe. Although renowned as a crisis in which the role played by the executive was overwhelmingly decisive, there were misunderstandings lower down the policymaking hierarchy and ample opportunity for the conflict to escalate irretrievably. Scott’s engagement in counterfactual analysis is always pertinent and handled well, not the sloppy sort that sometimes blemishes historical studies. He concurs with the traditional argument of mutual restraint, believing that ‘the closer political leaders neared the brink, the more determined they were to draw back’ (p. 32). The most interesting part of the chapter concerns the risk of unintentional nuclear war emerging – through mistakes, misjudgement, and miscommunication at an operational level. The U-2 incident and the perilous showdown between the US and Soviet navies both illustrated how quickly the Cuban Missile Crisis might have spiralled regardless of Kennedy’s and Khrushchev’s best intentions. Scott reminds us that ‘here as in other episodes in October 1962, “crisis management” looks like a dangerous oxymoron’ (p. 35). Jack Kennedy put it more colloquially: ‘There’s always some sonofabitch who doesn’t get the word,’ he quipped, after learning of Chuck Maultsby’s blundering into Soviet airspace.
The crisis was one of the first major international episodes of the television age. Rosaleen Hughes and Jean Seaton’s chapter on the BBC’s reportage offers fascinating insights into the relationship between the British government and the media, and draws contrasts between the coverage of Cuba and the Suez fiasco of six years earlier, when friction had developed between the corporation and Eden’s Conservative government. The authors comment on the BBC’s ‘marked sense of even-handedness’ throughout the crisis (though it was always ‘President’ Kennedy and ‘Mr’ Khrushchev). Initial coverage had maintained an independent view, reflecting ‘a less than wholehearted endorsement of the US action’ and emphasizing British concerns about the legality of the blockade and the lack of American consultation with their allies (p. 51).
Important work by Michael Petersen casts fresh light on the efforts at US military intelligence reform prior to and during the crisis, particularly via the establishment of an integrated Defense Intelligence Agency, overseen by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. Petersen explains that the parochial culture of military leadership in the Pentagon meant that attempts at reform (such as eliminating redundancies, discouraging interservice rivalries, and combining resources) were met with great resistance. This had potentially fatal consequences. For as Petersen emphasizes, ‘the new agency’s influence over tactical and operational issues waned as the prospect of war increased’ (p. 128).
Meanwhile, Toshihiko Aono researches the complex relationship between the Cuban and Berlin issues during the crisis, and the secret attempts by the US and British governments to seek third-party mediation. The Kennedy administration sought to reduce the threat to Europe by attempting to arrange initiatives through the United Nations, aimed at mutual withdrawal of missile bases from Cuba and Turkey. For its part, the British government remained focused on persuading US policymakers to avoid premature military action in the Caribbean, thereby lessening the threat to vulnerable Berlin. Macmillan’s strategy was to introduce a UN inspection team in Cuba, end the blockade, and oblige the Americans and Soviets to negotiate. To provide incentive for Soviet cooperation, Britain would receive UN observers at the Thor IRBM bases on British soil, as a reciprocal ‘face-saving’ gesture (pp. 206–7). Kennedy, however, displayed little interest in Macmillan’s proposal, and it was Khrushchev’s letter to him on 26 October that would provide the breakthrough.
Other chapters contribute to the international flavour of the book. Laura Stanley and Leonardo Campus explore the political impact of the crisis in Australia and Italy respectively, while David Gioe provides an in-depth examination of Anglo-American coordination of the Oleg Penkovsky case. One surprise omission is a more detailed analysis of the role of the US Congress. The Cuban Missile Crisis occurred just weeks before a critical mid-term Congressional election, yet the role of legislative institutions receives light treatment, appearing only sporadically in the book. True, Congress was not yet the force it would become from the mid-1970s onwards, and did not have any direct role in the policy decisions. However, ‘war party’ hawks on Capitol Hill (notably Senator Richard Russell) constantly denounced Kennedy’s handling of the crisis as weak, and one of the President’s key objectives throughout the episode was to project a strong image and shore up his domestic support ahead of the elections. Nevertheless, this impressive, exhaustively researched collection of essays will serve as a highly valuable and original addition to the historiography of the Cuban Missile Crisis.