A witness in the landscape: The bombing of the Forêt domaniale des Andaines and the Normandy Campaign,NW France,1944

Abstract

An archaeological survey of well-preserved Second World War German supply depots and bomb craters from Allied air raids in the Forêt domaniale des Andaines, Normandy, has prompted an evaluation of the effectiveness of Allied intelligence gathering and tactical bombing of the German logistics network in advance of, and during the Normandy Campaign of June–August 1944. In conjunction with analysis of primary German and Allied archive sources, published historical accounts and aerial photographs, we demonstrate that Allied intelligence knew of the importance of the forest as a major fuel depot and attacked it with at least 46 missions over the period 13 June–4 August. However, landscape evidence demonstrates that only one of three fuel depot sites in the forest was successfully identified and partially destroyed by bombing. Allied intelligence efforts also failed to gather sufficient evidence to target one of the largest Seventh Army munitions depots in Normandy. Supply depots in the forest thus remained operational until late in the campaign and will have supported the German Mortain counter-offensive of 7–14 August. The limited success of Allied bombing in the Forêt domaniale des Andaines testifies to the difficulties in striking well-dispersed and camouflaged woodland facilities and supports the argument that the success of air power against German logistics efforts lay primarily in the degradation of the regional communications infrastructure and the Wehrmacht’s vehicle fleet rather than the destruction of supply dumps.

Keywords

Second World War Normandy logistics supply depots tactical bombing

Introduction

The contribution of air power to the Allied success in the D-Day invasion and subsequent Normandy Campaign in June–August 1944 was the focus of much contemporary and immediate post-war military analysis, and has continued to attract historical debate ever since. With the establishment of air superiority over beachheads and hinterland the strategic and – especially – the tactical arms of Allied air forces were able to exercise a decisive role in degrading the combat power of German ground forces. While some aspects of the aerial campaign have been subject to revision, notably with respect to the effectiveness of bomb and rocket strikes on armoured vehicles,¹ it is generally accepted that attacks on vehicle columns and the French transport infrastructure, especially bridges and the railway network,² were significant in disrupting German efforts to both reinforce and supply combat units.³

Allied air forces were also tasked with attacking the network of German supply depots and dumps in the region and yet this aspect of the aerial campaign has received comparatively little attention. While some studies have acknowledged the destruction or damage to at least some of these facilities,⁴ there has been little detailed analysis of this aspect of the Allied air campaign, and this despite the evidence that at particular points in the battle for Normandy, for example in the early phases of the Mortain counter-offensive of 7–13 August, German ground forces were at least adequately sustained from nearby supply dumps.⁵ This suggests that the role of the supply depot network in supporting German operations, at least at certain times and places, is worthy of further analysis. The opportunity to do so is now emerging from the recognition that Normandy’s forest environments – the preferred location for German supply depots – have the potential to host not only the remarkably well-preserved archaeological landscapes of such depots, but also the bomb craters of raids intended to destroy them.⁶

In this paper we build on work by the authors⁷ that has presented the first detailed description of the location, size and configuration of major Seventh Army supply facilities in the Forêt domaniale des Andaines (hereafter FDA), lower Normandy.⁸ Located some 85 km south of the Normandy coastline assaulted on D-Day, depots in the FDA were a source of fuel, munitions and foodstuffs for German forces throughout much of the Normandy Campaign and were also the focus of intensive and repeated air attacks by the US Ninth Army Air Force (Ninth AF). Here we present the first multi-disciplinary synthesis of the landscape record of supply depots and bomb craters, primary German and Allied archive sources and published historical accounts with the aims of (i) evaluating the effectiveness of Allied intelligence gathering and analysis with regard to one of the largest supply facilities in central Normandy, (ii) evaluating the degree to which supply depots in the FDA were accurately identified, located and targeted for air attack, (iii) documenting the history of air raids in the forest and the nearby supply depot and railhead at Domfront and (iv) assessing the landscape record of air raids in the FDA. Finally, we locate the logistics facilities in the FDA within the wider geographical and operational context of the German supply network in Normandy and contribute to the evaluation of Allied air attacks on logistics targets in support of the Normandy Campaign.

The German Army logistics network in Normandy

In early June 1944 overall responsibility for military logistics in France rested with the Chief of Staff of OB West (General der Infanterie G. Blumentritt) with command and control of supplies being coordinated by the Quartermaster, Oberst Otto Eckstein.⁹ Located along the northwest coast of France and the Low Countries, Army Group B defended the anticipated Allied invasion with the Seventh Army in Brittany and Normandy (Figure 1) and the 15^th Army extending between Normandy and the Netherlands. Both Armies relied on the services of Eckstein at OB West for commissary and military supplies and maintained a network of railheads and fixed supply depots (Lagers), many of the latter being located in forests for purposes of concealment from Allied aerial reconnaissance. The D-Day landings on 6 June 1944 and the subsequent Overlord campaign would be largely contested in the area initially held by the Seventh Army and it is this region of Normandy that forms the focus of this paper.

Figure 1.

Map of northwest France showing location of Seventh Army munitions, fuel and rations depots as of 5 June 1944 (NARA T312, 1571, 000607). Numbered sites are listed with code names.

Command and control of Seventh Army logistics rested with the Quartermaster’s Supply Officer (575 Brigade, Army Supply Command), based at Army HQ at Le Mans, overseeing a network of depots distributed throughout Brittany, Normandy and the occupied Channel Islands (Figure 1). Administration was exercised via three local Stützpunkts, respectively located at Loudeac and La Guerche-de-Bretagne (near Rennes) in Brittany, and in Normandy at Bagnoles-de-l’Orne (Figure 1; see Army Supply Command and Stützpunkt reporting channels, respectively).¹⁰ The commanding officer of the Bagnoles-de-l’Orne Stützpunkt was therefore responsible to the Army Quartermaster’s Supply Officer for the day-to-day administration of several Seventh Army supply depots in the Basse Normandy region (Figure 1).

The Bagnoles-de-l’Orne Stützpunkt lay close to a number of supply depots established in the FDA, a 55 km² area of mixed historic woodland in the Orne département, Basse-Normandie region, some 85 km south of the Normandy coastline (Figure 1). Relatively low intensity post-war management of the forest has permitted remarkably good preservation of archaeological features associated with supply depots (Figure 2) and this, combined with archive analysis, has recently facilitated the first full description of the geography and landscape context of a major Seventh Army logistics facility.¹¹

Figure2.

Photographs of surviving munitions (a) and fuel (b) bunkers in the FDA.

In addition to a large storage facility for food reserves (codenamed Lager Viktor¹²), the FDA hosted two major supply depots, respectively for fuel (Lager Berta) and munitions (Lager Martha)¹³ (Figure 3). The Lager Martha munitions depot was established in August 1943 in woodland to the north and east of Bagnoles-de-l’Orne (Figure 3) and was to have an eventual capacity of 3500 tons¹⁴; on 1 June 1944 the depot was recorded as holding 2008 tons of ordnance.¹⁵ The depot was itself supplied via the railway station at Bagnoles-de-l’Orne.¹⁶ Fuel reserves in the forest were hosted at Lager Berta which, while initially commissioned in April 1943¹⁷ as a single facility located 5 km northwest of Bagnoles-de-l’Orne, was by 22 May 1944 dispersed over three discrete sites in the west of the forest (hereafter termed Lager Berta I, II and III: Figure 3). By 1 June 1944, Lager Berta stocked 967 cubic metres of fuel and held the status of a Führer Reserve Heeres-Betriebstoff-Lager (Army Fuel Storage),¹⁸ but remained under the administration of the Bagnoles-de-l’Orne (Seventh Army) Stützpunkt. However, shortly after the partial destruction of Lager Berta I by an air raid on 13 June 1944 this site appears to have been closed and the remaining facilities at Berta III (and likely also Berta II) subsumed into the operation of Lager Beere (see below). Lager Beere was initially a smaller depot facility located near the railway yards at Domfront, 5 km west of the FDA (Figures 1 and 3),¹⁹ but much of this operation was relocated into the western part of the forest in late May 1944.

Figure 3.

Map of Bagnoles de l’Orne and the Forêt domaniale des Andaines showing the location and extent of logistics depots and the modern road and rail network.

The Seventh Army’s Quartermaster’s Supply Officer controlled a road transport fleet for moving supplies within and between depots and, when operationally necessary, for onward transfer to corps and divisional stockpiles.²⁰ Some elements of this fleet (Third Company, 595^th Transportation Unit and Fuel Tanker Column 676) were stationed at the Bagnoles-de-l’Orne Stützpunkt and on 31 May 1944 the motorised components of this allocation amounted to 64 trucks and 17 fuel tankers.²¹ Vehicles were sheltered in blast-protected and camouflaged parking facilities established at both the Berta and Martha depots, as well as on the northern margins of Bagnoles-de-l’Orne itself (Figure 3).

Allied intelligence, target identification and mission planning

Preparations for Operation Neptune (the D-Day landings) and the broader operational requirements of Operation Overlord imposed an additional set of requirements on Allied intelligence gathering activities that hitherto had been focused on strategic air targets and efforts to degrade the capabilities of Germany’s oil industry and air forces.²² Of particular importance to the forthcoming invasion was the identification and evaluation of targets intended to disrupt German efforts to reinforce and also supply their combat units in the Normandy area, especially those associated with railway networks but including also roads, bridges and waterways23 (the ‘Transportation Plan’²⁴). Other military targets for tactical air operations included the coastal defences in the landing zones, airfields and air defence infrastructure, communications infrastructure, military bases and columns and, of particular relevance here, the network of supply depots.

Central to the intelligence and targeting process was the development of Tactical Target Dossiers (TTD), produced by the Air Ministry Department, Air Intelligence 3(C)1²⁵ and compiled by the Theatre Intelligence Section (TIS).²⁶ TTDs for northern France were organised by geographical sectors corresponding to approximately 1 degree of longitude and 1 degree of latitude (c.71 km by 114 km) and named after major towns or cities. The FDA lay within the TTD for the Laval sector (4801 W; Figure 4).²⁷ Target briefs within each TTD were illustrated with annotated target areas on photo-maps in conjunction with the British War Office maps produced by the Geographical Section General Staff and, on occasion, French maps dating back to the 1880s. Dossiers were updated periodically to accommodate newly-identified targets and to delete those deemed to be inaccurate or no longer important.

Figure 4.

Tactical Target Dossier for the Laval Sector (January 1944 edition) (The National Archives, AIR/40/1285).

Early intelligence on military targets in the FDA was forthcoming from Escape and Evasion (E&E) reports filed by members of a B-17 bomber crew that crashed close to the forest in July 1943; these yielded maps and descriptions of parts of the Lager Berta fuel depot close to the Carrefour du Guarde Général (see Berta I, Figure 3).²⁸ One of the crew, Olof M Ballinger, provided a detailed map that included not only the location of Lager Berta but also the construction of a munitions depot to the southwest²⁹ and the location and quantities of fuel stocks near the railway yard at Domfront (Lager Beere; Figure 5). Ballinger’s sketch appears to have been influential in designating the northern extent of Lager Berta as one of two FDA target areas in the January 1944 edition of the TTD (TTD-A, Figure 6(a)). The brief also noted that fuel was supplied by road from the fuel depot at the Domfront railway yard and was stored both in tanks (possibly underground) and in 200 L barrels in the forest (this was at the time standard operating procedure for the Wehrmacht³⁰). The second target area in the January TTD, identified via interpretation of aerial reconnaissance photographs, was a fuel tank on the southern margin of Bagnoles de l’Orne (TTD-B, Figure 6(a)).³¹ Early information specific to munitions storage in the forest appears to have been limited to a detailed location map of part of a munitions depot provided by André Rougeyron, a member of a French E&E network communicating via carrier pigeon in October 1943.³² Since no munitions targets were designated in the January 1944 TTD it is presumed here that Rougeyron’s report was overlooked or was omitted on account of it lacking corroborative intelligence.

Figure 5.

Sketch Map from Escape and Evasion Report EE248 (Olof M Ballinger), 4 December 1943 (NARA).

Figure 6.

Maps of the FDA showing (a) target areas delimited on Tactical Target Dossiers for January and June 1944 (labelled A-F by the authors for purposes of identification in the text), (b) aiming points (TTD target areas) and target areas for raids on 18 June and 6 August (derived from Tactical Target Lists) for light and medium bomber raids, June-August 1944 and (c) aiming points or target areas for raids conducted by IX TAC fighter bombers, August 1944. See text for details.

A revised TTD in June 1944 reflected updating of the target intelligence for the FDA, most likely from reports communicated by Resistance workers based in Champsecret (to the north of the forest) over the period March-May 1944.³³ The target area for Lager Berta fuel depot was now focused on roadside areas radiating from a crossroads located in the centre of the depot (TTD-C, Figure 6(a)) while the TTD also defined roadside storage of munitions from the Carrefour de l’Etoile in the central part of the forest eastwards astride the D908 to the forest edge north of Bagnoles de l’Orne (TTD-F, Figure 6(a)). The January TTD fuel storage target at Bagnoles de l’Orne was deleted and two new target areas designated nearby, respectively for roadside storage of fuel and munitions along forest roads to the northeast of Bagnoles de l’Orne (TTD-D and E, Figure 6(a)).

By the time of the invasion in June 1944 allocation of targets was decided on a daily basis by the Royal Air Force (RAF) and United States Army Air Force (USAAF) at Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF) Headquarters, RAF Stanmore.³⁴ Ninth AF mission planning continued to draw on the TTDs but was increasingly informed by Tactical Target Lists (TTLs) coordinated by Major Lucius Buck, a special security officer at AEAF Headquarters responsible for overseeing the synthesis of existing intelligence with evolving operational priorities and the array of newly-emerging information from Ultra decrypts, photo-reconnaissance, PoW interrogations and updates from air and ground forces,³⁵ the latter including Resistance workers as well as inserted British Special Air Service (SAS) units and American ‘Jedburgh’ teams from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).³⁶ Mission planning in the context of tactical air operations also required a high degree of cooperation between Army commanders and air staff and this process was greatly facilitated by co-locating air and ground-equivalent headquarters. For example, the Ninth AF, under General Hoyt Vandenburgh and exercising control over IX Bomber Command’s light and medium bomber groups, was for the most part attached to General Omar Bradley’s 12^th Army Group operating on the right flank of the Allied ground forces in Normandy while IX TAC fighter bomber groups were co-located with the US First Army.³⁷ With the exception of operational decisions made by the 12^th Army Group or Ninth AF, daily target decisions and field orders for attacks were generally made at army and tactical headquarters³⁸ and were forwarded down the command chain to individual groups in the form of teletypes. The results of raids, again in the form of teletypes, were then sent back up the chain of command.³⁹

A chronology of Allied air attacks on the FDA

Air attacks on the FDA and the adjacent railhead and fuel facility at Domfront were overwhelmingly the concern of the Ninth AF.⁴⁰ The majority – and heaviest – of the attacks on the FDA were conducted by light (A-20 Havoc) and medium (B-26 Marauder) bombers of the 97, 98 and 99 Bombardment Wings of the IX Bomber Command, attacking in strengths between one and four Bomb Groups (BGs) (36 to 144 aircraft). Also participating in attacks on the forest were fighter bombers (mainly P-38 Lightnings and P-47 Thunderbolts) of the IX Tactical Air Command (IX TAC). A similar mix of forces was also engaged in raids on Domfront, although here there were contributions by the 2^nd Tactical Air Force (TAF, Royal Air Force) and the US Eighth Army Air Force. Details of the dates, participating aircraft and targets of all known air raids on the FDA and Domfront are summarised in Tables 1 –4.⁴¹

Table 1.

Summary details of US Ninth Air Force raids on the Forêt domaniale des Andaines, June–July 1944.

Date	Aircraft type	Wing / Group	Number of aircraft	Target area	Tonnage
13 June 1944	B-26	99 / 322	37	TTD (January 1944) (Figure 6(a), Area A)	0.0
13 June 1944	B-26	98 / 397	36	TTD (January 1944) (Figure 6(a), Area A)	71.5
15 June 1944	A-20	97 / 409	29	TTD (January 1944) (Figure 6(a), Area A)	39.3
15 June 1944	A-20	97 / 410	31	TTD (January 1944) (Figure 6(a), Area A)	44.0
15 June 1944	P-38	370	16	TTD (January 1944) (Figure 6(a), Area A)	1.5
18 June 1944	B-26	99 / 391	36	TTL (Figure 6(b))	63.0
18 June 1944	A-20	97 / 410	35	TTL (Figure 6(b))	46.5
18 June 1944	B-26	99 / 386	36	TTL (Figure 6(b))	72.0
22 June 1944	A-20	97 / 410	36	TTD (Jan / June 1944) (Figure 6(a), Area B)	46.1
22 June 1944	B-26	99 / 322	36	TTD (Jan / June 1944) (Figure 6(a), Area A)	69.9
22 June 1944	B-26	99 / 391	36	TTD (Jan / June 1944) (Figure 6(a), Area A)	63.6
22 June 1944	–	–	–	Unspecified area of Lager Beere^a	–
24 June 1944	A-20	97 / 416	36	TTD (June 1944) (Figure 6(a), Area B)	43.3
24 June 1944	P-38	474	???	TTD (June 1944) (Figure 6(a), Area B)^b	–
25 June 1944	A-20	97 / 416	34	TTD (January 1944) (Figure 6(a), Area A)	38.5
25 June 1944	A-20	97 / 410	32	TTD (January 1944) (Figure 6(a), Area A)	42.5
25 June 1944	B-26	98 / 394	24	TTD (January 1944) (Figure 6(a), Area A)	46.6
				Total (June)	688.2
11 July 1944	A-20	97 / 409	32	TTD (January 1944) (Figure 6(a), Area A)	29.9
11 July 1944	B-26	Pathfinder	2	TTD (January 1944) (Figure 6(a), Area A)	2.5
12 July 1944	A-20	97 / 410	26	TTD (January 1944) (Figure 6(a), Area A)	34.3
12 July 1944	A-20	97 / 416	30	TTD (January 1944) (Figure 6(a), Area A)	37.3
12 July 1944	B-26	Pathfinder	4	TTD (January 1944) (Figure 6(a), Area A)	4.0
24 July 1944	A-20	97 / 410	35	TTD (January 1944) (Figure 6(a), Area A)	35.0
24 July 1944	B-26	Pathfinder	2	TTD (January 1944) (Figure 6(a), Area A)	2.0
				Total (July)	144.9

Sources: Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA) B5785, B5786, B5787, B5788, B5679 and B5680.

German report of strafing attack on Lager Beere (forest-site) destroying 150 cubic metres of fuel (7 AOK Kriegstagebuch, NARA, T312, R-1571, p.000538).

Escorts for A-20 raid: did not attack target.

TTD: Tactical Target Dossiers; TTL: Tactical Target List.

Table 2.

Summary details of US Ninth Air Force raids on the Forêt domaniale des Andaines, August 1944.

Date	Aircraft Type	Wing / Group	No. of Aircraft	Target Area	Tonnage
6 August 1944	A-20	97 / 409	36	TTL (Figure 6(b))	34.3
6 August 1944	B-26	99 / 322	36	TTL (Figure 6(b))	35.8
6 August 1944	B-26	99 / 386	36	TTL (Figure 6(b))	49.7
6 August 1944	B-26	99 / 391	36	TTL (Figure 6(b))	46.9
6 August 1944	P-38	370	10	TTD (June 1944) (Figure 6(a), Area C)	24 × 150 Gal Napalm^a
6 August 1944	P-38	370	13	TTD (June 1944) (Figure 6(a), Area C/F)	24 × 150 Gal Napalm
6 August 1944	P-47	366	12	TTD (June 1944) (Figure 6(a), Area C/F)	4
6 August 1944	P-47	366	12	TTL (Figure 6(c))	4
8 August 1944	P-47	368	8	TTL (Figure 6(c))	2
8 August 1944	P-38	370	12	TTD (June 1944) (Figure 6(a), Area D/E)	6
8 August 1944	P-38	367	12	TTD (June 1944) (Figure 6(a), Area D/E)	4
9 August 1944	P-47	50	8	TTL (Figure 6(c))
9 August 1944	P-47	48, 50 & 368	32	TTD (June 1944) (Figure 6(a), Area E/F)
10 August 1944	P-38	370	12	TTL (Figure 6(c))	12
10 August 1944	P-38	370	11	TTD (June 1944) (Figure 6(a), Area E/F)	11
10 August 1944	P-47	50	12	TTL (Figure 6(c))	5.25
11 August 1944	P-38	370	12	TTD (June 1944) (Figure 6(a), Area F)	5.5
11 August 1944	P-38	370	12	TTL (Figure 6(c))	11.75
11 August 1944	P-38	367	11	TTL (Figure 6(c))	7
11 August 1944	P-38	474	14	TTL (Figure 6(c))	13
11 August 1944	P-47	50	26	TTL (Figure 6(c))	13
12 August 1944	P-47	368	11	TTL (Figure 6(c))
12 August 1944	P-47	404	13	TTL (Figure 6(c))	13
13 August 1944	P-47	404	12	TTL (Figure 6(c))	432 × 20 Frag
14 August 1944	P-47	368	8	TTL (Figure 6(c))	4
				Total (August)	282.1^b

Sources: AFHRA B5788, B5683 and B5684.

Alternative targets in FDA struck.

Excludes fragmentation bombs and napalm.

Table 3.

Total bomb tonnage dropped on raids for target areas identified in Tactical Target Dossiers for January and June 1944.

TTD / TTL	Target area^a	Bomb tonnage^b
TTD January 1944	TTD-A (Figure 6(a))	566.3
TTD January 1944	TTD-B (Figure 6(a))	93.4
TTD June 1944	TTD-C, D, E, F (Figure 6(a))	40.5
TTLs	Various (Fig 6b-c)	427.1
	Total:	1127.3

Author codes – see text for details.

Excludes napalm and fragmentation bombs.

Table 4.

Summary details of Allied air raids on Domfront, May–August 1944.

Date	Units	Aircraft Type	No. of Aircraft	Source / notes
21 May 1944	Not Known	Not Known	Not Known	TNA Air 37/958; 2nd TAF Operational Report Section (27 November 1944).
28 May 1944	Not Known	Not Known	Not Known	TNA Air 37/958; 2nd TAF Operational Report Section (27 November 1944).
2 June 1944	US Ninth Army Air Force	P-47	53	TNA Air 37/850; Attacks on POL Ammunition and Supply Dumps (SHAEF, 9 August 1944).
3 June 1944	US Ninth Army Air Force	P-47	53	TNA Air 37/850; Attacks on POL Ammunition and Supply Dumps (SHAEF, 9 August 1944).
7 June 1944	US Ninth Army Air Force	P-38	Not Known	AFHRA B0344, p. 362. Fuel target.
14 June 1944	US Ninth Army Air Force	B-26	36	TNA Air 37/850; Attacks on POL Ammunition and Supply Dumps (SHAEF, 9 August 1944).
14 June 1944	US Ninth Army Air Force	A-20	38	AFHRA C0070, p. 1645. Raid intended for Flers but bombed Domfront.
15 June 1944	US Ninth Army Air Force	A-20	36	AFHRA B5786, p. 152.
15 June 1944	US Ninth Army Air Force	P-38	16	TNA Air 37/850; Attacks on POL Ammunition and Supply Dumps (SHAEF, 9 August 1944).AFHRA B0342, p. 1372. Part of raid on FDA, carrying 1000lb.bombs
24 June 1944	RAF 2nd TAF	Typhoons	15	TNA Air 37/850; Attacks on POL Ammunition and Supply Dumps (SHAEF, 9 August 1944).
27 June 1944	US Eighth Army Air Force	Not Known	53	TNA Air 37/850; Attacks on POL Ammunition and Supply Dumps (SHAEF, 9 August 1944).
6 July 1944	US Ninth Army Air Force	B-26	36	AFHRA B5787, p. 165. Rail cutting target.
7 July 1944	US Ninth Army Air Force	P-47	12 App	AFHRA B0344, p. 705 Armed Reconnaissance
13 July 1944	US Ninth Army Air Force	A-20	26	TNA Air 37/850; Attacks on POL Ammunition and Supply Dumps (SHAEF, 9 August 1944).
1 August 1944	US Ninth Army Air Force	P-38	11	AFHRA C0027, p. 590/599. Fuel storage target.
1 August 1944	US Ninth Army Air Force	P-38	12	AFHRA C0027, p. 590/599. Fuel storage target.
4 August 1944	US Ninth Army Air Force	P-38	12	AFHRA B0342, p. 1685. Fuel 1719 FDA Stores.
12 August 1944	US Ninth Army Air Force	P-47	12	AFHRA B0491, p. 765-796. Armed Reconnaissance

TNA: The National Archives; TAF: Tactical Air Force; SHAEF: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force.

Raids on the Forêt domaniale des Andaines

The aerial campaign against FDA logistics facilities had an inauspicious start on the morning of 13 June with a raid intended for the Lager Berta target area (TTD-A; Figure 6(a)); this failed to reach the target area having been diverted when 37 aircraft of the 322 BG flew into flak over Le Havre, resulting in 26 aircraft damaged and two lost. On the evening of the same day, however, the second attack on Lager Berta by 36 B-26 aircraft of the 397 BG was on target and yielded impressive results with ‘many crews reporting fires and explosions in the target area and smoke rising up to 3000 feet in the air’.⁴² On the following day the German Army logistics staff diary reported the loss of 300 m³ of fuel (79,252 US Gallons) at Lager Berta.⁴³ The Berta target area (TTD-A, C and also part of F; Figure 6(a)) was subsequently attacked on no fewer than 15 occasions by medium and light bombers during June and July, delivering bombs totalling 566.3 tons (Table 3), and a further four times during August by fighter bombers of the IX TAC (Table 2; Figure 6(c)). It was frequently the case that the area was hit on more than one occasion on the same day, although on the 15 June an attack by P-38 aircraft of the 370 BG obscured the target area with smoke and hindered the bomb runs of a follow-up raid by A-20s of the 410 BG.⁴⁴ With an area of only c.1.4 km² this part of the forest was the most frequently and most heavily struck part of the FDA; indeed, in the post-mission report of 12 July the crews noted that the area already showed signs of extensive bomb cratering and tree damage (Figure 7).⁴⁵

Figure 7.

Photograph of preserved bomb craters in the northern part of Lager Berta I, Forêt domaniale des Andaines, Winter 2014 (TTD-A, see Figure 6(a)).

Raids on the 22 and 24⁴⁶ June also saw the Ninth AF’s medium bombers attacking the fuel target (TTD-B) on the southern edge of Bagnoles de l’Orne (Figure 6(a)).⁴⁷ Attempts to hit the fuel tank obtained mixed results since, although the raids missed the aiming point, some bombs struck the town and in doing so hit a building which was used as storage facility for the Seventh Army which then had to be abandoned.⁴⁸ The railway lines in the south of the town were also destroyed (Figure 8) and reports of considerable smoke after one raid indicated ignition of fuel.

Figure 8.

Photograph showing bomb damage to railway lines at Bagnoles-de-l’Oŕne, most probably during raids of 22 or 24 June 1944. The presence of American troops indicates the image was taken sometime after 14 August.

Mid-June also saw the first raids on the FDA in response to TTLs from AEAF Headquarters; three sorties by medium and light bombers attacked a stretch of the D908 and its adjacent forest on the 18 June (Figure 6(b); Table 1) with reports of smoke around the Carrefour de l’Etoile⁴⁹ suggesting ignition of fuel stored in the northern part of the Berta II depot (Figure 3). On the eve of the German Mortain counteroffensive on 6 August the D908 in the central and western part of the FDA was struck by the last of the medium bomber raids using maximum effort on the forest (Table 2).⁵⁰ The same day was also notable for a series of attacks by fighter-bombers, including two strikes on the forest with napalm (Table 2). By this stage of the campaign the FDA had been attacked by the Ninth AF’s light and medium bombers on no fewer than 22 occasions since D-Day, earning recognition as a ‘familiar’ target in the official history of the Ninth AF operations for mid-late 1944.⁵¹

The RAF were also active overnight on 7 August. An attack by Mosquitos from 140 Wing of the Second Tactical Airforce was observed to cause explosions and fire in the area of the D218 immediately north-northeast of the Carrefour de l’Etoile in the FDA⁵² and is likely to have been responsible for the destruction of the final stocks of fuel held in Beere.⁵³

Thereafter, from 8 August until the arrival of American ground forces on 14 August, the forest continued to be attacked on a near-daily basis by the tactical arm of the Ninth AF. During June and July, the Ninth AF’s fighter-bombers had been largely engaged in general armed reconnaissance (AR) and fighter sweeps over the region and, with the break-out of American forces in Operation Cobra in late July and the development of a more fluid front, Allied fighter-bomber activity in the German rear echelons intensified. On 13 August, for example, Ninth AF records list 22 AR missions with no less than 247 aircraft operating in the Lower Normandy area and attacking primarily moving targets.⁵⁴ In addition to AR missions the tactical fighter-bombers were also tasked with attacks on specific logistical targets in the FDA. Targets continued to reflect the influence of the June TTD with attacks on target areas D-F (Figure 6(a); Table 2), but the majority of raids over this period were guided by the daily TTLs, with a particular emphasis on targets alongside and near the road network in central and western parts of the FDA (Figures 6(b) and (c)). Roadside storage of fuel and munitions on the margins of Lager Martha to the east of Bagnoles de l’Orne was also designated for attack following reports from an SAS team operating in the area.⁵⁵ While increasing in intensity, the switch to fighter-bomber attacks during this later period accounts for the relatively low overall tonnage of ordnance (282.1 tons, Table 2) dropped on the forest by comparison to June (688.2 tons; Table 1).

Domfront raids

Early in 1944 the Allies had confirmed the presence of a fuel depot at Domfront railway yard (Lager Beere; Figure 1) and by March had established that fuel held here was being transferred by road in 200 L drums to depot facilities in the FDA.⁵⁶ Accordingly, Lager Beere also became an important target for air raids on the regional fuel supply and storage network over the period 21 May to 12 August 1944 (Table 4; Figure 9). Few details of the two earliest raids in May are available although it was reported that the first of these on 21 May hit the railway station but not the depot itself.⁵⁷ The Germans subsequently transferred fuel stocks from the depot into the FDA and by 24 May the tanks were empty.⁵⁸ Four days later on 28 May the Domfront railyard and fuel storage facility was bombed again and was subsequently targeted on at least 15 occasions up to 12 August while also being inadvertently attacked on 14 June. However, from 24 May onwards the storage facility at Domfront is unlikely to have held significant fuel stocks itself.⁵⁹. Shortly after the bombing of the Lager Berta I site on 13 June it is likely that the administrative arrangements for FDA fuel depots were re-organised with Lager Berta being shut down and facilities in the western part of the forest (sites Lager Berta II and III) being transferred to the now forest-located Lager Beere (see below).

Figure 9.

Photograph of A-20’s participating in a raid on Domfront railway yard.

Perspectives on the effectiveness of Allied bombing in the FDA

Targeting techniques – the forest problem

In the days and weeks following the D-Day landings on 6 June 1944 the raids on the FDA contributed to an increasingly significant deployment of the Ninth AF light and medium bomber groups against the German logistics network, such that by September 1944 they were mainly occupied by raids against petrol, oil and lubricant (POL) depots, munitions dumps and military vehicle parks.⁶⁰ Many of these targets were first identified through Ultra decrypts but it was usually the case that other information sources were required in order to define precise locations for air attacks.⁶¹ Accordingly, the definition of actual target coordinates or areas were developed by integrating a wide range of intelligence material including aerial reconnaissance photographs and eye-witness testimonies. Nevertheless, the well-camouflaged forest setting of these targets proved ill-suited to standard ‘pin-point’ bombing procedures and this contributed to the Ninth AF’s decision to introduce ‘area bombing’ techniques with the intention of distributing a lower density of bombs over a larger designated area than in pin-point contexts.⁶²

For raid-planning purposes, flights were allocated specific aiming points within the target area (Figure 6(c)) and were typically configured around a pre-determined line of approach with bomb-release triggered by visual sighting of the aiming point using the aircraft’s bomb sight. However, and even in conditions of good visibility and accurate navigation in the bombing approach, a persistent problem faced by bomb aimers in forested areas was the lack of reference points in or around the target areas. In circumstances where especially poor visibility was anticipated, tactical bomber forces in Normandy made use of the radio-transponder based Oboe ‘blind’ bombing aid. Installed in specialist ‘Pathfinder’ aircraft the system was generally reliable although it was not designed to be used in total cloud cover or zero visibility on account of the difficulties in maintaining aircraft formation. Three raids on the FDA in July, respectively on the 11, 12 and 24 and all aimed at the Berta fuel depot (TTD-A; Figure 6(a)), were led by Pathfinder B-26 aircraft, but all other raids in the FDA required visual sighting by bomb aimers in the main forces (Tables 1 and 2).

The difficulty of sighting forest-based targets was evaluated by the Ninth AF’s Operational Research Section (ORS) as part of its assessment of area bombing during the month of June 1944.⁶³ This analysis drew on data from raids on both the FDA and the Foret d’Ecouves (some 30 km to the east) and in both cases it was found that a higher percentage of bombs were dropped within the target area when (i) the bomb run approach was made over a well-defined (‘clear-cut’) forest edge that provided a clearly identifiable check-point ahead of the target and (ii) the target area lay relatively close to the forest edge (Table 5). Experience from the FDA thus contributed directly to the report recommendations for enhancing target identification in forested areas. Three solutions were offered,⁶⁴ the first of which required a carefully planned flight-path that entered the forest from a clearly defined edge with a fixed time before ‘bombs away’. The second was to carry out an attack as close to the target as possible and subsequently use this bomb-damaged area as a reference point in relation to the actual target (determined using reconnaissance photographs). In the FDA the heavily-damaged area of Lager Berta (TTD-A) effectively performed this function (see above). Finally, the use of OBOE was recommended as likely to improve the bomb coverage in areas lacking clear sighting points. These recommendations were especially intended for target areas and aiming points designated in boxed areas on the target maps. For attacks that were configured on roads then it was further advised that approaches be made either at an angle to the area to be attacked while sighting on the road, or that the lead aircraft should fly along the centre of the road with groups positioned on either side to maximise coverage.

Table 5.

Operational Research Section (US Ninth Air Force) assessment of bombing accuracy for differing directions of approach: Forêt domaniale des Andaines and Forêt d’Ecouves (Normandy), June 1944.

Number of aiming operations	Direction of approach	% of bombs dropped landing in target area
Forêt domaniale des Andaines
6	From east, over nearest clear-cut forest edge	40
4	From south, over fairly clear-cut forest edge	39
6	From west, across the forest itself	28
Forêt d’Ecouves
7	Across clear-cut forest edge	45
6	Across forest itself	0

Source: Operational Research Section, Ninth Air Force: Area Bombing for June (7 August 1944). AFHRA, B5656.

Archaeological and documentary evidence

While the experience and contemporary evaluation of air raids in the FDA contributed to evolving tactical bombing practice in the European Theatre of Operations during and after the Normandy Campaign, the ORS evaluations were less well placed to make a considered judgement on the accuracy of intelligence activities and target designations in the first instance, at least not until the target areas were finally overrun by ground forces. The authors are unaware of any such evaluation in the FDA. However, and some 70 years after the event, the availability of field survey data and the remarkable level of archaeological preservation in the forest – spanning both the depot facilities themselves and Allied bomb craters – does permit an analysis of the intelligence effort, the target designations and the landscape record of high-explosive bomb impacts. A detailed analysis of bomb craters associated with specific raids on the FDA will be developed in a separate paper⁶⁵; here we draw on a forest-wide assessment of bomb damage derived from a combination of field survey⁶⁶ and analysis of aerial photographs taken during the period 1946–1950 by the Institute Géographique National.⁶⁷ The correspondence between actual depot locations (as evidenced by archaeology) and TTD / TTL aiming points is shown in Figures 6(a)–(c). Figure 10 illustrates both the depot locations and those areas of the forest floor that currently preserve evidence of bomb cratering or can be shown on aerial photographs to exhibit evidence of bomb damage associated with blast and fire. The extent and character of bomb damage varies from severe damage and cratering associated with multiple raids (Figure 7) to isolated craters or localised areas of forest clearance likely associated with a discrete aircraft formation (see, for example, Figure 11).⁶⁸

Figure 10.

Map of the FDA showing supply depot locations and areas of the forest with evidence of bomb damage. See text for details.

Figure 11.

Vertical aerial photograph (Institute Géographique National 1949-06-28_C94PHQ3791_1949_F1416-1716_0058) of the Forêt domaniale des Andaines taken in 1949 showing part of Lager Berta III / Beere (note exposed fuel bunkers) and areas of forest cleared by blast and(or) fire associated with Ninth AF raids in August 1944. Note isolated bomb craters in upper centre of frame. See Figure10 for photograph location.

Undoubtedly the most successful combination of intelligence gathering, targeting and raid effectiveness was achieved in the northern part of Lager Berta I (TTD-A; Figures 6(a) and 10), an area of c.1.4 km² that was the focus of raids dropping over 550 tons of bombs and amounting to one half of the total bomb tonnage expended in FDA raids (Table 3). Indeed, this is the sole example of a large logistics facility in the FDA that was correctly identified, located and deliberately hit by one or more air raids (see above). Subsequent updating of the TTD to include the crossroads at the centre of Lager Berta (TTD-C; Figure 6(a)) was also accurate, although the southern extent of the depot and its associated vehicle park was not struck at all (Figure 10). Both the northern extent of Lager Berta I and II fall within the target area along the D908 identified in the June 1944 TTD (TTD-F; Figure 6(a)), while Berta II falls entirely within the TTL areas centred on roads radiating from the Carrefour de l’Etoile (Figure 6(b)). The latter areas were bombed on three occasions on the 18 June and were associated with reports of smoke around the Carrefour de l’Etoile. Some cratering in the northern part of the facility is most probably associated with these raids (Figure 10). The third of the major fuel facilities in the FDA, Lager Berta III (administered as Lager Beere by mid-late June), does not appear to have been identified as a target, being absent from the TTD and any of the TTL roadside attacks except where its northern limit approaches the D908 (Figures 6(a)–(c)). No evidence of immediate bomb damage is found at this site (Figure 10) although several nearby areas of low-density cratering are interpreted here as reflecting bombs intended for the D908 target areas on the 6 August (Figures 6(b) and 11).

Only limited landscape evidence of bomb cratering is evident in the vicinity of Bagnoles de l’Orne (TTD-B, D and E; Figures 6(a) and 10), although post-war urbanisation is likely to have eliminated at least some of the damage. Woodland in the area of TTD-D and E does, however, exhibit well-preserved evidence of vehicle shelters which are interpreted as part of the Bagnoles Stützpunkt facility and(or) Lager Martha,⁶⁹ and these do not appear to have been impacted by bombs. While intelligence available to the Allies suggested these areas were used for roadside storage of both munitions and fuel,⁷⁰ there is no landscape evidence of this immediate area hosting fuel or munitions bunkers that would be consistent with a formal forest-based depot facility (see, for example, Figure 2) although temporary storage in vehicle bays cannot be discounted. Woodland margins to the northeast of the TTD-B target area do, however, feature the remains of ruptured 200 L fuel drums; this may reflect temporary roadside storage that was impacted by the raids of 22 and 24 June and, if so, would account for the post-raid reports of smoke following the 410 Bomb Group raid of 22 June.⁷¹

While Allied bombing had some degree of success against fuel targets in the FDA (and at Domfront), the virtual absence of Lager Martha – one of the largest Seventh Army munitions depots in the vicinity of the D-Day beaches – from the TTD and any of the subsequent TTL (Figures 6(a)–(c)) is striking, especially so given that reports of its location had been received by Allied intelligence as early as October 1943.⁷² However, lacking corroborating evidence and given the proximity to Lager Berta (only 6 km to the west), intelligence analysts were content to regard this site as covered by the target area at TTD-A.⁷³ As a result, and with the exception of some marginal roadside storage areas, Lager Martha was never specifically targeted by the Ninth AF and there is no evidence of bomb cratering within the limits of this facility (Figure 10).

Towards an evaluation of the Allied raids on the Forêt domaniale des Andaines

Historical analyses of the German logistics effort have placed much emphasis on the limited stocks of fuel and munitions held in Normandy on the eve of D-Day and on Allied efforts to degrade the French transport network, especially with regard to railway marshalling yards and key railway bridges across the Loire and Seine connecting the Normandy theatre with logistics nodes east of the Seine.⁷⁴ The importance of communications infrastructure as targets for Allied aerial attacks is clearly reflected in the Allied Expeditionary Air Force monthly summaries of operations; these show the total bomb tonnage expended on regional bridges (both road and rail), railway centres and the wider railway infrastructure amounted to around a quarter of all General Purpose (GP) bombs used against targets in support of Overlord for the months of June and July (Table 6).⁷⁵ An early focus of attacks on regional road and rail infrastructure had the dual benefit of disrupting both re-supply and reinforcement of German forces in the battlefield areas, while also presented targets that could be both readily identified and assessed in terms of raid effectiveness.

Table 6.

Summary of target types attacked and weight of bombs (General Purpose (GP) types) and rocket projectiles (RP) delivered by Allied air forces in support of Operation Overlord during June, July and August 1944. Attacks on fuel and ammunition stocks (‘Store bases’) are also shown as percentages of bombs and RPs delivered by (i) all Allied air forces and (ii) by the Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF).

	June^a		July^b		August^b
	Tons of bombs	Tons of RP (60 lb)	Tons of bombs	No. of RP (60 lb)^c	Tons of bombs	No. of RP (60 lb)^c
Airfields	221	56	3035	–	6918	–
Store bases (fuel dumps, etc.)	2278	371	4249	48	15817	198
Industrial centres (factories, oil refineries, etc.)	160	14	14	–	348	–
Signals facilities (radar, W.T., etc.)	361	2628	14	82	88	143
Coastal defences and gun positions	3215	577	726	5381	2848	4408
Chateaux, headquarters, barracks	501	448	133	102	97	420
Railway centres and marshalling yards	2886	290	11988	48	6213	–
Rail facilities (other than centres and bridges)	–	–	1704	74	1139	102
Bridges and embankments (road and rail)	4701	338	7141	248	7689	260
Road convoys (vehicles, tanks, etc.)	860	3120	443	3234	1825	21198
Shipping (in harbour & at sea)	29	904	351	443	4731	3021
Flying bomb targets	1335	–	30545	–	24215	–
Tactical targets & targets of opportunity	11877	8069	23690	10434	20451	5052
Total	28424	16815	84033	20094	92379	34802
% of Store bases as total	8.0	2.2	5.1	0.2	17.1	0.6
% of Store bases as total of AEAF attacks	8.0	2.2	16.0	0.2	14.6	0.6

Source: TNA AIR 37/ 539.

Attacks by the AEAF. only.

Attacks by the AEAF., US VIII Air Force and RAF Bomber Command.

Data reported as number of projectiles.

In the face of challenges in identifying and targeting fuel and munitions stores it is perhaps not surprising that attacks on supply depots commanded less than 10% of the total GP bomb tonnage during June and July, although by August this effort had risen to 17% and was broadly equivalent to the weight of bombs expended on transportation targets (Table 6). Nevertheless, these targets still involved 4778 aircraft sorties during June and July⁷⁶ and some of these attacks have been recognised as achieving the destruction of major logistics bases, including the fuel depot at Gennevilliers to the north of Paris on 22 June, and subsequently Lager Bruno near Châteaubriant (Figure 1) on 16 July,⁷⁷ although the latter destroyed only 130 m³ of fuel.⁷⁸ That the facilities in the FDA were considered an important logistics target can be inferred from the weight of Ninth AF attacks here – of the 22 regional fuel and ammunition sites attacked in June, nearly 27% of sorties and 29% of GP bombs were expended on the forest (Table 7). Landscape and photographic evidence from the FDA would suggest, however, that these efforts were only partially successful. In particular, the failure to target the Lager Martha munitions depot is especially striking and, having escaped even inadvertent bombing, the facility was operational throughout the Normandy Campaign until being overrun by American troops on 14 August 1944.

Table 7.

Summary of Allied Expeditionary Air Force raids (total aircraft sorties and tonnage of bombs) on Store Bases (fuel and ammunition) classified as Overlord Targets during June, July and August 1944. Also shown are figures for attacks on fuel and ammunition stocks in the Forêt domaniale des Andaines as a percentage of the total raids on Store Bases.

	All Store Bases (AEAF Overlord Targets)			Forêt domaniale des Andaines
	Total no. of sites	Total aircraft attacking	Total tons of GP bombs	% of total aircraft attacking	% of total tons of GP bombs
June	22	1718	2278.5	26.6	29.1
July	49^a	2832	3163.5	3.3	3.4
August	63^a	5827	15817	2.5	2.9

Source: TNA AIR 37/ 539.

includes one site listed as ‘miscellaneous’.

Rather more effective were strikes on the forest’s fuel stocks, but these cannot be taken as comprehensive and the claim of Lager Berta’s destruction on 13 June⁷⁹ would appear to overstate the case. Although the northern part of Lager Berta I was struck with the loss of 300 m³ of fuel (see above), this is unlikely to have comprised the entire stock at the site and OB West records show the depot lodging a request for 30 m³ of petrol on the day after the raid (Table 8). From this point onwards, however, Lager Berta no longer features in the OB West allocation logs for the remainder of June and through July (Table 8). This is taken to indicate the likely closure of the Lager Berta I site and the transfer of fuel storage responsibilities in the FDA to Lager Beere, most probably operating from the facility in western margin of the forest (site Lager Berta III) but likely also from the site at Lager Berta II (Figure 3; Table 8).

Table 8.

Orders for fuel and oil deliveries to Lager Berta and Lager Beere, 10 June–21 July, 1944.

Date Ordered	Date Required	Lager	Quantity (m³)
Date Ordered	Date Required	Lager	Petrol	Diesel	Oil
10 June 1944	11 June 1944	Berta	594	–	–
10 June 1944	12 June 1944	Berta	210	–	–
12 June 1944	14 June 1944	Berta	235	–	30
12 June 1944	13 June 1944	Beere	140	–	–
14 June 1944	16 June 1944	Berta	30	–	–
18 June 1944	21 June 1944	Beere	240	–	–
20 June 1944	23 June 1944	Beere	110	90	–
23 June 1944	25 June 1944	Beere	330	–	–
8 July 1944	10 July 1944	Beere	100	30	–
10 July 1944	13 July 1944	Beere	135.5	10	–
12 July 1944	15 July 1944	Beere	40	12	–
14 July 1944	17 June 1944	Beere	60	20	–
15 July 1944	18 July 1944	Beere	70	10	–
16 July 1944	19 July 1944	Beere	60	20	–
18 July 1944	21 July 1944	Beere	50	–	–
20 July 1944	23 July 1944	Beere	80	20	–
21 July 1944	25 July 1944	Beere	160	–	–

Source: Versorgungsübersicht für AOK 7: NARA, T-311, R-15.

Considered in the context of the wider network of Army-level depots in the Normandy theatre both Martha and Berta/Beere stand out as the most long-lived and well-stocked logistics bases administered by the Seventh Army and Panzer Group West (hereafter PGW). Figures 12 and 13 show that on the eve of D-Day the Berta/Beere and Martha facilities were among eight operational Seventh Army depots in the region but, together with Max/Mimose near Alençon, were the only sites that are known to have continued to function through to early August; the remaining depots, and a further twelve sites that were established by mid-late June, had been shut down (or overrun) by mid-late July. The arrival of PGW in the region was associated with the establishment of an additional six fuel (Figure 12) and seven munitions facilities (Figure 13) while it also took over four existing Seventh Army depots, including Lager Max (renamed Mimose) near Alençon.

Figure 12.

Seventh Army and Panzer Group West fuel depots in the Normandy area showing depot codenames, locations, timescales of known operation and fuel allocations (petrol only) from OB West, 7 June–8 August 1944.

Figure 13.

Seventh Army and Panzer Group West munitions depots in the Normandy area* showing depot codenames, locations, timescales of known operation and munitions allocations from OB West, 7 June–8 August 1944.

The limited success of Ninth AF raids on the logistics facilities in the FDA testifies not only to the effectiveness of the German practice of ‘methodical dispersal’⁸⁰ of supply depots in forested settings but also the difficulties experienced by Allied air forces in accurately identifying, locating and hitting these facilities.⁸¹ In general, however, many of the depots established in late-June and through July were relatively short-lived sites that were allocated only a small proportion of supplies issued to Army-level bases in the region (Figures 12 and 13), and especially by comparison to the aggregate allocation totals of 3663 m³ of fuel (petrol) for Berta/Beere and 3957 tons of munitions for Martha. It is accepted, however, that allocation figures need not accurately reflect the actual quantities arriving at depots, although in the case of Martha it is interesting to note the Seventh Army reporting the depot as holding 4530 tons of munitions on 9 August.⁸²

Considered in the light of the Seventh Army’s daily requirement of 1000 tons of ammunition and 1500 m³ of fuel,⁸³ the depots in the FDA can be seen as constituting significant local supply stockpiles (at least with respect to munitions) within a wider logistics system that has been recognised as inadequately prepared and supported.⁸⁴ The depot network must also be seen in the context of operational circumstances that over the course of the campaign not only saw continued degradation of the transport network – especially the bridges across the Seine and Loire – but also the aggregate effect of Allied air attacks on supply columns that served to progressively diminish the German transport vehicle fleet and hence the ability to get supplies to combat units.⁸⁵ In response the OB West supply chain increasingly turned to issuing fuel and munitions directly to combat units but, since divisional units at the front were required to collect their own ammunition and fuel supplies from depot areas and railheads well outside of the immediate battlefield area, this compounded and exacerbated the problems of re-supply itself.⁸⁶ Thus, while in June all supply allocations to the Seventh Army were routed via its depot network, by the period 15–31 July some 48% of fuel and 58% of munitions allocations were being issued direct to units of the Seventh Army (Table 9). Allocations to PGW in this latter period were even more weighted towards direct issues, respectively totalling 92% for fuel and 65% for munitions (Table 9).

Table 9.

Allocations of fuel and munitions from OB West to Seventh Army and Panzer Group West between 11 June and 31 July, 1944. Note that direct issues required collection by Army units at locations outside the main battlefield area.

Period / Army Group	Allocation	Fuel(m³)	%	Munitions(tons)	%
11–30 June
Seventh Army	Depot allocation	3833	100	5057	100
	Direct issue to Army unit	0		0
	Direct issue (no unit specified)	0		0
Panzer Group West	Depot allocation	0		0
	Direct issue to Army unit	0		0
	Direct issue (no unit specified)	0		0
	Totals	3833		5057
1–14 July
Seventh Army	Depot allocation	1164	63	1923	100
	Direct issue to Army unit	413	22	0	0
	Direct issue (no unit specified)	280	15	0	0
	Sub-totals	1856	100	1923	100
Panzer Group West	Depot allocation	276	16	669	72
	Direct issue to Army unit	1127	63	258	28
	Direct issue (no unit specified)	370	21	0	0
	Sub-totals	1773	100	927	100
	Totals	3629		2850
15–31 July
Seventh Army	Depot allocation	1801	52	4143	42
	Direct issue to Army unit	1164	34	278	3
	Direct issue (no unit specified)	500	14	5356	55
	Sub-totals	3465	100	9777	100
Panzer Group West	Depot allocation	672	8	2315	35
	Direct issue to Army unit	3641	41	1597	24
	Direct issue (no unit specified)	4559	51	2655	41
	Sub-totals	8871	100	6567	100
	Totals	12336		16344

Source: Versorgungübersicht AOK7/Pz.Gr.West, 7015166-7015472; NARA T-311 R-15.

Although these circumstances reflect a diminishing emphasis on fixed Army-level depots in the immediate vicinity of the battlefields, it is argued here that the enduring operational status of depots in the FDA enabled these sites to maintain an influential contribution to the German combat capacity. Although no systematic record of supply outgoings from the depots are available, it is evident from Ultra decrypt reports that Beere, for example, released at least 435 m³ of fuel between 27 July and 7 August, and on 9 August Lager Martha allocated to 84 Korps a range of munitions including 3000 stick grenades and 10.5 tons of 88 mm high explosive shells.⁸⁷ Lager Martha will have assumed particular importance after 17 July following the cessation of munitions deliveries to Lager Michel, the closest of the Seventh Army munitions depots to the front (Figure 1), and the subsequent diversion of stocks to the FDA some 70 km to the southeast.⁸⁸

It is recognised, however, that in the face of rapidly deteriorating vehicle stocks throughout the Army – described as ‘demotorization’ by Hart⁸⁹ – geographical factors will have become increasingly significant with respect to the ability of combat units to access these supplies. Both Lager Berta / Beere and Martha were well-positioned to contribute to Operation Lüttich, the Mortain counter-offensive of 7–13 August since, although some specialist munitions types were lacking (e.g. white phosphorous⁹⁰), during the initial phases of the operation both fuel and munitions had been available from well-stocked supply depots in the Alençon area⁹¹ and this includes the FDA, only 45 km east of Mortain. More distant units, by contrast, faced lengthy and dangerous supply runs that would further jeopardise remaining vehicles. One account, for example, describes a return journey of 200 km required by two trucks of the 711^st Infantry Division collecting ammunition from Lager Martha from their location on the front to the east of the River Orne – one of these vehicles was stranded at Falaise through lack of fuel. ⁹² Other solutions to the lack of dedicated truck and tanker capacity involved deploying alternative vehicles; between 2 July and 7 August, for example, eye-witness accounts describe field ambulances arriving at a field hospital at Perrou (operated by the 9^th and 10^th SS Panzer and the 271^st and 277^th Infantry Divisions) with casualties and returning to the front via Lager Berta III / Beere in the FDA to pick up fuel.⁹³

Perhaps the final testimony to the German transport difficulties in Normandy lies in the amount of ammunition left unused in depots and requiring post-war disposal. German troops were detonating remaining ordnance stocks at Lager Martha immediately before withdrawing on the 14 August⁹⁴ yet even these efforts failed to empty the depot since a significant quantity of live munitions were recorded as present in a September 1944 Office National des Forêts inventory.⁹⁵

Conclusions

The restrictions imposed on German ground forces in the Normandy Campaign by fuel and munitions shortages have been well-documented and testify not only to the shortcomings of German preparations for the defence of France but also the overall effectiveness of Allied air power, and especially that of the tactical air forces. In developing a multi-disciplinary landscape approach to these studies, this paper has permitted a wider and more detailed evaluation of German logistics sites than hitherto possible, while also yielding new perspectives on Allied attempts to identify and bomb these facilities. In particular, the combination of archaeological and documentary evidence would suggest that, with respect to the German supply depot network in Normandy, Allied intelligence, targeting and bombing practice during the air campaign was of only limited effectiveness against those sites that had been dispersed and well-camouflaged in regional forests. In the case of the Seventh Army’s Lager Berta / Beere fuel depots in the FDA it is evident that while the Allies had successfully identified and repeatedly attacked one part of the facility, two of the sites in the forest suffered only little damage. Furthermore, in the case of Lager Martha it can be demonstrated that Allied intelligence efforts – even with the benefit of a mature photoreconnaissance system, Ultra decrypts and ground-based observations – failed to gather sufficient evidence to adequately target one of the largest Seventh Army munitions depots in Normandy. This facility remained undamaged even by stray bombs and was operational up until it was overrun by American forces on 14 August, only seven days before the closure of the Falaise Pocket.

These findings are consistent with late-war analyses of tactical air operations that recognised medium bombers could be ‘disappointing’ against forest-based supply dumps⁹⁶ and also Oberst Otto Eckstein’s post-war assertion that air raids on depots in Normandy had little impact on their ability to operate.⁹⁷ Accordingly, at least at certain times and places, these sites enabled combat units to muster sufficient supplies to sustain their defence and on occasion even mount significant operations. Amongst the depots supporting the Mortain counter-offensive, for example, were the major Seventh Army fuel and munitions facilities in the FDA. Yet the achievements of the German logistics operation in sustaining a number of large supply facilities in Normandy did not prove to be a decisive failing in the Overlord air campaign. Indeed, the fact that Allied troops were overrunning unused stocks of material held in depots points not only to their speed of advance but also the difficulties faced by the Germans in transferring fuel and ammunition held in the region out to combat units, and especially those that were fighting at locations more distant from the supply points. This serves to underline the conclusions reached by those confronting these issues at the time⁹⁸ and also more recent historical analyses of the Normandy campaign – that the success of air operations was most keenly felt against the more vulnerable elements of the German logistics chain, most notably the regional communications infrastructure and a Wehrmacht vehicle fleet that was already deficient even before the campaign launch.⁹⁹

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful to the reviewers for their constructive comments on the original manuscript. We also wish to thank Christian Clement (ONF), Stephen Walton (Senior Curator, Documents & Sound Section, Imperial War Museum, Duxford) and Stéphane Robine (Historical Researcher, Flers, Orne) for their support and assistance.

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

1

See, for example, Niklas Zetterling, Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness (Winnipeg, Manitoba, 2000), p.37.

2

R.A.Hart, ‘Feeding Mars: the role of logistics in the German defeat in Normandy, 1944’, War In History 3 (1996), pp.418–35.

3

R.S. Ehlers Jr., Targeting the Third Reich: Air Intelligence and the Allied Bombing Campaigns (Lawrence, Kansas, 2009), pp.221–44.

4

Op. cit., p.244.

5

M.J. Reardon, Victory at Mortain: Stopping Hitler’s Panzer Counteroffensive (Lawrence, Kansas, 2002), p.113.

6

D.G. Passmore, S. Harrison and D. Capps Tunwell, ‘Second World War conflict archaeology in the forests of north-west Europe’, Antiquity 88 (2014), pp.1–16.

7

D.G. Passmore, D. Capps Tunwell and S. Harrison, ‘Landscapes of logistics: the archaeology and geography of WW2 German military supply depots in central Normandy, NW France’, Journal of Conflict Archaeology 8 (2013), pp.165–92.

8

D. Capps Tunwell, D.G. Passmore and S. Harrison, ‘Landscape archaeology of World War Two German logistics depots in the Forêt domaniale des Andaines, Normandy, France’, Journal of Historical Archaeology 19 (2015), pp.233–261.

9

OB West Supply and Administration, 15 Jan 1943–30 Jun 1944. Otto Eckstein, FMS B-827 (dated 20 January 1948), p.45. Eckstein had been OB West’s Logistics officer prior to the invasion and was re-appointed to Germany at the start of July. He was debriefed by US members of the European Theater Operations for the Foreign Military Studies programme.

10

National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), T-312, R1567, 000153, Stützpunkt Bagnoles 31.1.44.

11

Capps Tunwell et al., ‘Landscape archaeology of World War Two logistics depots’.

12

Bevorrtung von Munition, Betr.Stf u.Verpfegung u Parke im der 7 Armee, 5.6.44, NARA, T-312, R1571, 000607.

13

Bevorrtung von Munition, Betr.Stf u.Verpfegung u Parke im der 7 Armee, 5.6.44, NARA, T-312, R1571, 000607.

14

Kriegstagebuch AOK7/QU 5.1.44, NARA, T-312, R1567, 000009.

15

Bevorrtung von Munition, Betr.Stf u.Verpfegung u Parke im der 7 Armee 5.6.44, NARA, T-312, R1571 000607.

16

A. Rougeyron, Agents d’Evasion (Alençon, 1947).

17

Aktennotiz, Establishment of fuel depot in the Forêt domaniale des Andaines, 12.4.43, NARA, T-312, R1557, 000133.

18

Berta was one of three Führer Reserve Heeres-Betriebsstofflager in the Seventh Army sector, the others being Bruno (near La Guerche-de-Bretagne) and Brigitte (Pontivy); Bevorrtung von Munition, Betr.Stf u.Verpfegung u Parke im der 7 Armee 5.6.44, NARA, T-312, R1571 000607.

19

Captured German Documents, German 7th Army Logistics Diary, NARA, T312 R1571, 000304.

20

Handbook on German Military Forces, 1 September 1943, Military Intelligence Division, US War Department.

21

Stützpunkt Bagnoles 31.5.44, NARA, T-312, R1571, 000456. These figures exclude horse-drawn transport units.

22

Ehlers Jr., ‘Targeting the Third Reich’, pp.141–81.

23

Op. cit., p.214–44.

24

Royal Air Force Centre for Air Power Studies. Air Historical Branch (1). Air Ministry RAF Narrative. The Liberation of North-West Europe, Vol. 1.

25

The National Archives of the UK (TNA), Kew, London, UK; WO 219/1828. Describes the production and delivery of the Tactical Target Dossiers for Operation Neptune.

26

The TIS developed the target dossiers from a number of sources but the ultimate responsibility for the dossiers rested with AI 3(C). The TIS also passed a variety of other types of intelligence to the SHAEF G2 organisation for processing. TNA; WO 219/1661.

27

Tactical Targets Dossier, Laval Area, 2^nd Edition, Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), A5303, p.174.

28

NARA, Escape and Evasion reports; EE380 McConnel 4/2/44, EE248 Ballinger 4/12/43 and EE328 Howell 1/18/44.

29

Note there is no further documentary or archaeological evidence of the munitions depot shown as under construction on Ballinger’s map.

30

Handbook of German Forces, p.216; TM-E 30-451, September 1943.

31

This is not believed to be part of the Lager Berta facility.

32

Rougeyron, Agents d’Evasion. This is a personal account of Rougeyron’s wartime experiences. The map mentioned here arrived at the Willesden Loft in October 1943 (Bletchley Park, Special Section Pigeon Rm. N Pelling, pers. comm.).

33

Orne Departmental Archives, Alençon, France; Series J Fonds Viel.

34

Army Air Forces Evaluation Board in the European Theatre of Operations, ‘The Effectiveness of Third Phase Tactical Air Operations in the European Theater’, Part 18 (Orlando, 1945), p.331. (Combined Arms Research Library). These meetings were held on a daily basis in the run up to the invasion and thereafter through to the middle of August; they consisted of staffs from the US Eighth and Ninth Army Air forces, RAF’s Bomber Command, Second Tactical Air Force, Coastal Command, Air Defence of Great Britain and the First Allied Airborne Army.

35

J.F. Kreis (ed), Piercing the Fog: Intelligence and Army Air Forces Operations in World War II (Washington D.C., Air Force History and Museums Program, 1996), p.232.

36

Ehlers Jr., ‘Targeting the Third Reich’, p.231.

37

Op. cit., p.232.

38

Op. cit., p.234.

39

The teletyped field orders that form the basis of much of the research detailed here in this paper are held at AFHRA

40

Comparable medium bombers (Mitchell and Boston aircraft) of the RAF’s Second Tactical Air Force (TAF) did not attack the forest (TNA; Air 27 Series). It is known, however, that other Allied aircraft were operating in the general area and will have conducted additional localised attacks.

41

Air raids tabled here include all planned raids and, in the case of Domfront, some AR attacks. It should be noted that there may have been additional AR attacks on the forest that have not yet been identified.

42

Mission teletype, AFHRA, B0459, p.352.

43

Captured German Documents, German Army Logistics Diary, NARA, T311 R14, 014539.

44

Mission teletype, AFHRA, C0070, p.1295

45

416 Bomb Group Mission teletype, AFHRA, B0530, p.1806

46

A squadron of P-38s from the 474th Fighter Group escorted the main attack and then struck after the A20s (Mission teletypes, AFHRA, B0332, p.605).

47

Removed from the June edition of the Tactical Target Dossier, the fuel tank listed was attacked on 22 and 24 June and mentioned as a target in Ninth Air Force intelligence evaluation as being relevant on 28 June. Ref AFHRA B 5680. The tank was however, not subsequently attacked.

48

Captured German Documents, German 7th Army Logistics Diary, NARA, T312, R1571, 000572.

49

The 410 Bomb Group post-raid report also recorded dropping bombs on a railway line to the SE edge of the forest; the timing of this raid coincides with the first recorded attack on Bagnoles de l’Orne. AFHRA, C0070, p.1464.

50

This being in response to an Operations Request on 5 August noting that fuel and munitions supplies were being taken into the forest from other depots. AFHRA, B5683, p.894.

51

The Army Air Forces Historical Studies (AAFHS) History of the Ninth Army Air Force from April to November 1944 describes the scope and character of operations throughout the battle for France. AFHRA, AAF-HS-36, p.096, p.177 and p.217.

52

Allied Expeditionary Air Force, Post D-Day daily Intelligence/operations summaries (August). TNA AIR 37/397.

53

Intelligence from intercepted German, Italian and Japanese radio communications, WWII. TNA DEFE 3/115. XL5436. DTG 092301Z/8/44.

54

AFHRA, B8684, p.263–265.

55

Logistics targets in the FDA were among many potential targets identified by SAS units operating behind the lines as part of Operation Haft between 7/8 July and 11 August 1944. TNA WO 218/191; TNA WO 219/2414.

56

SHAEF Theatre Intelligence Section Dossier No 3, 1,3,44, TNA, WO 219/1894.

57

Report on examination of “POL” targets attacked by aircraft of Second Tactical Air Force, June–Aug 1944. TNA, WO 291/1366, App. 11, Domfront.

58

Report on examination of “POL” targets attacked by aircraft of Second Tactical Air Force, June–Aug 1944. TNA, WO 291/1366, App. 11, Domfront.

59

The Seventh Army Quartermaster Report of 5 June indicates only 20 m³ of fuel (largely diesel) were held at Domfront – the lowest stocks at any of the Army’s 15 depots in the region; NARA, T312, 1571, 000607.

60

Kreis, ‘Piercing the Fog’, p.237.

61

Op. cit., p.234.

62

Operational Research Section, Ninth Air Force, ‘Area Bombing for June’ (ORS Report No.56, 7 August 1944). AFHRA, B5656.

63

Operational Research Section, Ninth Air Force, ‘Area Bombing for June’, (ORS Report No.56, August 1944). AFHRA, B5656.

64

Op. cit., pp.11–13.

65

D. Capps Tunwell, D.G. Passmore and S. Harrison, ‘Second World War bomb craters and the archaeology of Allied air attacks in the forests of the Normandie-Maine National Park, NW France’. Journal of Field Archaeology (in press).

66

See also Capps Tunwell et al., ‘German logistics depots’.

67

See also Passmore et al., ‘Conflict archaeology’.

68

Capps Tunwell et al., ‘Second World War bomb craters’.

69

Capps Tunwell et al., ‘German logistics depots’.

70

Tactical Targets Dossier, Laval Area, 2^nd Edition, AFHRA, A5303, p.215, p.218; SAS report from Operation Haft, TNA WO 219/2414.

71

410 BG OPFLASH Report 57, dated 23.6.44, AFHRA, B0517, p.553.

72

Rougeyron, Agents d’Evasion, p.60.

73

A Theatre Intelligence Section report dated 1^st March, 1944, notes in its target listing for the FDA “The reported dump in the FORET DE LA FERTE due to its unconfirmed nature and its proximity to the FORET D’ANDAINE is listed under the same heading” (TNA, WO 219 /1894, TIC Dossier No.3). The Forêt de la Ferte is the local name given to the eastern part of the FDA.

74

Hart, ‘Feeding Mars’, and Ehlers Jr., ‘Targeting the Third Reich’. See also W.F. Craven and J.L. Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume Three: Europe; Argument to V-E Day (Chicago, 1983), p.210.

75

Allied Expeditionary Air Force, Monthly Summaries of Operations, June–August 1994, TNA AIR 37/539.

76

Allied Expeditionary Air Force, Monthly Summaries of Operations, June–August 1994, TNA AIR 37/539, p.16 (June) and p.20 (July).

77

Hart, ‘Feeding Mars’, p.426, p.431.

78

Losses on 16 July were 80 m³ of petrol and 50 m³ of diesel; OB West Tätigkeitsbericht, NARA T 311 R1. 7000818.

79

Hart, ‘Feeding Mars’, p.426.

80

Craven and Cate, ‘Army Air Forces’, p.223.

81

Op. cit., p.223. See also E. Mark, Aerial Interdiction: Air Power and the Land Battle in Three American Wars, (Washington DC, 1994), p.248.

82

Government Code and Cypher School; German Section: Reports of German Army and Air Force High Grade Machine Decrypts (CX/FJ, CX/JQ and CX/MSS Reports). TNA HW5/561 Ultra intercept of Seventh Army signal dated 9 August. As this figure exceeds the 3500 ton design capacity of Martha it is likely that the excess stocks were stored in roadside or forest-floor stacks rather than bunkers.

83

As stated by the Seventh Army Quartermaster on 14 June 1944; Mark, ‘Aerial Interdiction’, p.253.

84

Mark, ‘Aerial Interdiction’, pp.252–253.

85

Hart, ‘Feeding Mars’, p.427.

86

Op. cit., p.429.

87

Government Code and Cypher School; German Section: Reports of German Army and Air Force High Grade Machine Decrypts (CX/FJ, CX/JQ and CX/MSS Reports). TNA, HW 5 Series Nos. 542, 549, 554, 559 and 560.

88

Hart, ‘Feeding Mars’, p.432.

89

Hart, ‘Feeding Mars’, p.419. See also Ehlers Jr., ‘Targeting the Third Reich’, p.225.

90

Reardon, ‘Victory at Mortain’, p.147.

91

R.von Gersdorf, ‘Avranches Counterattack, Seventh Army, 29 July – 14 August 1944’ (US Army, Foreign Military Studies Branch, 1945), NARA: FMS, A921, p.26. Gersdorf was Chief of Staff to the German 7 Army.

92

Ninth Army Air Force Intelligence Report to Combat Crews for the period 4th to the 10th August. AFHRA, B5755. p.144. The original journey distance is recorded as 200 miles but is more likely to have been reported in kilometres.

93

R.Hervel, ‘Bataille De Normandie’ (Paris, 1947).

94

The Forest was captured over a two day period by elements of the US First Army meeting with little concerted resistance. Of note however was the advance of the 26th Infantry Regiment who described explosions from the retreating Germans attempting to destroy the ammunition depots which lay within the forest. NARA, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office U.S. Army Records Group 407, E427 B5954.

95

Records of the Office National des Forêts, Bagnoles de l’Orne, France. An inventory of captured German munitions held at Martha detail significant quantities present in the forest in the September of 1944. A full analysis of this resource is currently in process (Capps-Tunwell, unpublished data).

96

Twelfth Army Group considered that “Results from medium bombardment on several ammo and POL dumps in woods in the Falaise area were disappointing”. Army Air Forces Evaluation Board, ‘Third Phase Tactical Air Operations’, Part 14, p.235.

97

OB West Supply and Administration, 15 Jan 1943–30 Jun 1944. Otto Eckstein, FMS B-827 (dated 20 January 1948), p.58.

98

Op. cit., p.58.

99

Hart, ‘Feeding Mars’; Ehlers Jr., ‘Targeting the Third Reich’.