Abstract
A number of books (as well as academic articles) have been published recently examining the alliance’s strategy, politics and intelligence assessments, as NATO official documents have become increasingly available to scholars during the last years. One such notable contribution to the new historiography on NATO, which goes beyond the traditional fields of study (such as the Alliance’s nuclear strategy, its war-planning in the Central Region or intra-allied relations and tensions), is Bernd Lemke’s research monograph Die Allied Mobile Force 1961 bis 2002 (The Allied Mobile Force from 1961 to 2002). This well-researched piece of work analyses the concept, development, organization, composition and operational history of NATO’s first quick-reaction force during these four decades. The AMF (Land) and its air component were a quick reaction force available to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). Its establishment began in 1961 and was soon developed into a small, yet elite, multinational force (a brigade-sized formation) with headquarters at Heidelberg (FRG). Its units could be deployed on very short notice to any part of Allied Command Europe (ACE) under threat – either to the Central Region or, particularly, to the Flanks (both the Northern and the Southern), which, contrary to the Federal Republic of Germany, hosted little allied military presence. For over four decades the AMF projected its capabilities in numerous NATO exercises within the Allied Command Europe area of responsibility.
The book covers the period from 1961, when the first elements of the AMF (Land) were established, to 2002, when the force was eventually disbanded (and soon replaced by NATO Response Force – the NRF). Lemke, a military historian at the Bundeswehr Centre of Military History and Social Sciences in Potsdam, Germany, had been researching this topic for several years. His book is the product of exemplary multi-archival research, as the author has searched and made use of disparate archival sources, such as: the NATO Archives (including the SHAPE Archives in Mons), the UK National Archives (various AIR, CAB, DEFE, FCO and FO, PREM, and T series), the US National Archives and Records Administration (RG59 and RG218) as well as the Nixon Presidential Library, plus German military and political archives (both the Bundesarchiv, Abteilung Militärarchiv, Freiburg i. Br., and the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin). In addition, Lemke has fully utilized existing academic literature on issues relating broadly to the subject.
This book is structured thematically along three main parts (plus the introduction and the conclusion), each of which contains several chapters. Much can be said, but perhaps the real strength and major accomplishment of this study is the fact that Lemke examines the development and role of a specific NATO military ‘tool’ (the AMF) within the organization’s broader military strategy and political role. Existing literature has already pointed out that the greatest political priority for NATO was to guard and enhance its solidarity, cohesion and unity and to provide wider security – including, of course, military defence. As NATO gradually began to shift from the strategy of ‘massive retaliation’ and, after a long process, adopted the ‘Flexible Response’, the exposed flanks got more weight: the new doctrine demanded quick and commensurate (that is, most certainly, conventional) countermeasures to limited forms of aggression, such as local incidents. By extending NATO’s conventional tripwire mechanism, the AMF provided for deterrence of Soviet bloc aggression or provocation, and for reassurance of member states (especially Norway, Denmark, Italy, Greece and Turkey) should a local crisis erupt. Lemke was not only able to integrate into his study the various – and often divergent – national, regional and global interests and policies of NATO members (including their conflicts) and how these influenced the internal processes of the alliance, but also managed to combine them with the international developments and the political-diplomatic, military and even economic factors which shaped the AMF function during the Cold War and beyond.
Die Allied Mobile Force 1961 bis 2002 fills a significant gap in the historiography of NATO. This book is not only the first comprehensive study of this subject, but it also offers the definitive account (though in German) of the history of the AMF. It is a book of great value for scholars of the transatlantic alliance, Cold War historians, military historians and experts, and strategic and defence studies specialists. Especially as, in today’s challenging security environment, elite rapid-reaction and deployable forces not only retain their relevance, but are now considered a major component of military operations and are expected to perform a wide spectrum of roles and missions to protect the key security interests of NATO and its partners.