Abstract
Between 1640 and 1668 the Portuguese fought a war of restoration (of independence) against Spain. For many historians Portugal’s ultimate success against a Spain in apparent crisis and decline needs little explanation. The reality was less straightforward. The insurgents succeeded in part because they received invaluable help from various foreign powers, including England. Charles II’s restoration in 1660 raised the problem of what to do with the army which had facilitated his return but also represented a potential threat to the new order. Charles’s marriage to the Portuguese Princess Catherine of Braganza offered a partial solution: the marriage contract provided for the despatch to Portugal of 3,000 men, two foot regiments of 1,000 men each and two regiments of horse of 500 each. The foot regiments were drawn from among the three regiments remaining in Scotland, their departure leaving no English troops there. As for the horse, these were found by raising new units in England and by drawing on several Cromwellian regiments in garrison at Dunkirk. While the troops were largely ‘Cromwellian’, many of the officers were drawn from among numerous royalists expecting rewards from the restored king – by no means the happiest of combinations.
By the end of 1662 this ‘English Brigade’ was in the Alentejo in Portugal, on the road between Badajoz and Evora, along which a Spanish invasion aiming to seize Lisbon might pass. The brigade was commanded by the Catholic royalist, earl of Inchiquin, who had fought against the Spanish Habsburgs in Catalonia, but he returned home in 1662, in part due to quarrels with Castelo Melhor, chief minister to the Portuguese King Alfonso VI. Inchiquin left his brother in charge, but the latter’s position was undermined by quarrels within the brigade and the command passed to the French Huguenot Duke of Schomberg who had arrived in Portugal with a French contingent in 1660. Henceforth, until the end of the war the English would fight with the French troops under Schomberg.
The English brigade was never at full strength. Following the battle of Ameixial (1663) in which the horse incurred great losses, the surviving officers were given commands in the foot regiments while the rest of the horse was amalgamated with the French regiment under Schomberg’s son and although more than 700 men were despatched from England to recruit the foot, no attempt was made – despite the want of horse in Portugal – to return the English horse to strength. But the foot too suffered, and after the engagement of Montes Claros, or Vila Vicosa (1665), amounted to just 800 men. By early 1666 the horse had fallen to 300 and the foot to 700 and about one-third of these may have been foreigners, possibly including many Irish and German deserters from the Spanish army; the two regiments, whose ‘English’ identity was thus being diluted, were merged into just one, of well below 1,000 men.
Losses in action were clearly one factor in this diminution of the English brigade but falling numbers were also a symptom of the fact that the experience of the troops was not a happy one in Portugal. Internal divisions were one aspect of this. Another was a difficult relationship with the Portuguese authorities which focused above all on the troops’ pay, or rather the accumulating arrears. After Almeixia a mutiny demanding arrears of pay resulted in the dismissal of some officers and the execution of a corporal. In December 1664, Schomberg even threatened to take the troops back to England. Matters were patched up but the arrears of pay continued to grow, eleven months being owed in February 1668. The want of pay – and supply – inevitably contributed to losses by desertion and sickness.
Following the end of the war early in 1668 and the departure of Schomberg, the English brigade – by now just 1,000 remaining of the original 3,000 men plus 730 recruits – remained in Portugal, under Schomberg’s son, while its arrears and future were sorted out. In late 1668, their arrears paid but not wanted in England, 400 men plus officers were sent to replace some of those in garrison in Tangier, where a number soon succumbed to disease. The other 500 men embarked for England, some joining the garrison of Portsmouth, the rest being disbanded in London, although some individuals joined various existing units such as the Royal Horse Guards.
What was the contribution to Portugal’s success of the English troops? We cannot be sure of their role in all operations, but contemporaries were very appreciative of the English contribution on specific occasions, for example at Montes Claros. There is some hint that the performance of the English brigade was informed by the ethos and tactics of the New Model Army, the horse at Ameixial deploying the distinctive shock attack of the latter rather than the caracole, while on the whole the English troops were apparently among the most disciplined units and esteemed for being so. However, more might have been said about these aspects of the brigade’s history. That they contributed a dwindling body both in absolute terms and as a proportion of Schomberg’s entire force suggests that the contribution of the English troops may not have been as decisive as Riley believes.
Riley has written a narrative of the English brigade, from 1662 to 1668, against the backdrop of the larger Portuguese–Spanish struggle. The narrative is enhanced on the one hand by illustrations, battle plans, campaign maps and photographs of the terrain today, and on the other hand by more general discussions of both the broader political context and of the nature of early modern warfare. More specifically it discusses the distinctive features of this specific Iberian conflict, including the relative absence of battle and the practice of taking summer quarters. Besides drawing on the very important work of Lorraine White, Riley utilizes the contemporary reports of the English diplomat in Lisbon, Sir Richard Fanshawe, and the published memoirs of the French envoy in Lisbon, Nicolas de Fremont, sieur d’Ablancourt, despite acknowledging that the latter often gets things wrong. He also relies upon an early nineteenth-century account of Schomberg’s operations in Portugal. Riley is perhaps unduly critical of the Portuguese Court and might have made greater use of Portuguese – and Spanish – sources, if only to better appreciate the Portuguese position and Portuguese – and Spanish – strategic thinking. Occasionally, too, the grasp of the bigger picture is less certain: while Portugal’s empire had taken a battering in the middle decades of the century it was being successfully rebuilt around Brazil. Occasionally, Riley speculates – about, for example, relations between the English and French troops as Anglo–French relations deteriorated – without producing any evidence.
Overall, however, this is a very readable account – one to be enjoyed by specialist and general reader alike – of an obscure episode in English military history which is also of relevance to the Restoration, and which makes available to an English reading audience an account of a European conflict which is not well covered in English. Riley draws on his own experience of conflict and of command of multinational operations to comment in a very insightful way on the problems such operations raise and also takes the opportunity to discuss the concept of the decisive battle, arguing that Ameixial does not meet the criteria whereas Montes Claros does. An annexe helpfully lists the officers serving in the English brigade, giving details regarding their royalist or protectorate affiliations and their careers before and after service in Portugal.