Rebuilding an Austrian Army: The Bundesheer ’s Founding Generation and the Wehrmacht Past,1955–1970

The Scars of Two World Wars and the Beginnings in Two Republics

The dissolution of the Habsburg Empire remained a traumatic experience for Austria and its army. ¹⁵ While attempts to foster continuity were made, the politicization of the military weakened its internal cohesion. ¹⁶ The civil wars in 1934 cast a long shadow on civil–military relations in Austria, and laid the foundations for the political left’s persistent distrust toward the armed forces. ¹⁷ En lieu of Nazism, leading characters within the army, such as Wilhelm Zehner (1883–1938), Alfred Jansa (1884–1963), and the Austrian military attaché in Rome, Emil Liebitzky, were concerned that a considerable part of the officer corps were supporters of the forbidden Nationalsozialistischer Soldatenring (NSR, National Socialist soldiers’ association). The young Erwin Fussenegger and Otto Seitz (1911–1974), two key figures in the post-war period, can be found on an alleged list of NSR officers; this document should, however, be treated with great caution. ¹⁸

The unhindered German invasion of March 1938 marked another long-lasting trauma for the nation’s armed forces. After the Anschluss, the vast majority of Austrian soldiers swore their oath to Hitler and a total of 1.3 million Austrians fought on all fronts. Despite minor quarrels, Austrian soldiers saw themselves, and were in turn perceived, as equal to their ‘German’ comrades. They had the same perception through joint experiences, thought in the same categories during combat, and were thus not notably different. ¹⁹ The identity of the Austrian soldiers remained, like in civil society before, centred around ‘Germanness’ and regional definitions, before in the 1960s a new ‘Austrian’ distinctiveness was constructed.

The new Austrian authorities embraced the Moscow Declaration of 1943, to claim that the period between 1938 and 1945 should be seen as continuous time of occupation and victimhood. ²⁰ Initially, the Allied powers were not willing to grant Austria a new army, although they needed a force to uphold domestic order. Thus, the so-called B-Gendarmerie was developed as a precursor for the hastily created Bundesheer. ²¹ After the Staatsvertrag restored the country’s independence, the armed forces law of 7 September 1955 reintroduced conscription and the Bundesheer grew from around 25,000 men by a factor of six until the mid 1970s. ²² The Bundesheer’s duties were to protect the Republic’s borders, its institutions, and to conduct disaster relief. ²³ While linking internal and external security, one can note the desire to prevent politicization and the aim to bridge the distance to a very sceptical society. Yet, even the unanticipated proficient performance during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, where in contrast to 1938 a shooting order was issued, ²⁴ did not ultimately manage to increase the acceptance, social prestige, or support for the armed forces. ²⁵

There was a second problem with Austria’s recent history: how to handle the Wehrmacht past? The so-called Oberstenparagraph (Colonel paragraph) excluded everyone who had held the rank of colonel or higher in the Wehrmacht. ²⁶ However, there were loopholes through which a limited number of colonels entered the Bundesheer – either in active service or in civilian roles within the ministry. ²⁷ This included important figures such as Albert Bach (1910–2003), Werner Vogl (1909–1978), ²⁸ Ernst Nobis (1901–1963), Erwin Steinhardt (1893–1976) – and possibly even Erwin Fussenegger. ²⁹ The Oberstenparagraph thereby defined much of the personnel contours of the Bundesheer: officers that had received their socialization in the Habsburg army were almost exclusively banned – not least to an age limit of 54 years for active service. ³⁰ Thus, the majority of Bundesheer officers were recruited from the junior officer generation of the Second World War who had by and large received their complete socialization under a dictatorship. Political considerations and Austria’s neutrality aside, the British deemed it ‘unfortunate, not to say alarming, that there are at present no experienced men in Austria competent to produce adequate strategic and organisational plans for Austria’s forces or indeed to command any considerable body of troops’. ³¹ While this assessment might hold true for Liebitzky, the group around Fussenegger certainly did not lack ‘experienced men’ that the Western countries so longed for.

Notwithstanding the missing colonels and generals, there was a large pool of war-experienced men. For example, 42 Ritterkreuzträger of various rank joined the Bundesheer, out of a total of 320 Austrians ³² who were awarded the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross during the war. ³³ By 1960, the army’s officer corps had grown from 340 to 1600, of which 250 had served under the First Republic and 860 in the Wehrmacht. ³⁴ However, sheer numbers alone do not explain the role models and values that were adopted, and therefore one has to investigate the key groups during the early phase of reconstruction.

Liebitzky: The Outsider

Beyond officialdom and the 1967 Traditionserlass (Guidelines on tradition), ³⁵ the early period of the Bundesheer was marked by a dualism between the few officers that had been ousted or had refused service, and a majority that had fought in the Wehrmacht. There were only a handful of suitable candidates from the first Bundesheer who could possibly take eminent positions in the new army. Some were barred by the Oberstenparagraph, whereas Wilhelm Zehner had been killed by the Gestapo ³⁶ and Alfred Jansa lacked the energy to rebuild a new army, albeit offering assistance in response to pleas from Chancellor Leopold Figl in 1947. ³⁷ Others did not feel the required support and were afraid that the army might be used as scapegoat again. ³⁸

Emil Liebitzky was comparatively unburdened by events in 1934 or between 1938 and 1945. ³⁹ However, without service during the Second World War, his expertise on modern war and operational problems was questioned, as his active duty in the First World War was now almost 40 years previous. Liebitzky had made his career under the decade-long tenure of Defence Minister Carl Vaugoin, before receiving the important political appointment as military attaché in Rome (1933–38). ⁴⁰ This made him a symbol of the archconservative elements of the First Republic, but it did not bar his post-1945 appointment and in fact he became the crucial figure in drafting the contours of the new army before its official creation. ⁴¹ The British saw him as ‘not a strong character, but a cultivated and agreeable man. Conservative by temperament, but not politically inclined.’ ⁴² Liebitzky could also be seen as continuum to Habsburg traditions, which the new Bundesheer intended to follow. ⁴³

While Liebitzky was neither admired nor seen as a heroic role model, he could claim the moral high ground as far as other soldiers’ political pasts were concerned and influenced personnel decisions even before the Bundesheer was founded. In 1954, he threatened to resign as advisor to the Chancellor when former SS men were to be taken into the B-Gendarmerie. Including such men, Liebitzky argued, would undermine his efforts to ban unfaithful former Nazis, while soldiers that had been ousted in 1938 were waiting to rejoin Austrian formations. ⁴⁴ Further, Liebitzky feared that bad light would be shed on the troops if veterans’ associations and meetings with dishonourable figures were to be continued. ⁴⁵

For example, Liebitzky expressed his doubts on appointing former Generaloberst Erhard Raus (1889–1956). The Americans and British valued Raus’s vast experience in armoured warfare ⁴⁶ and had envisaged him to lead the new army, while in Austria he had been briefly considered as Defence Minister. In opposition to this, Liebitzky turned to his political superiors, including the Chancellor. ⁴⁷ He claimed that there were National Socialist tendencies in Raus’s character, ⁴⁸ while he also felt responsible to uphold the interests of those officers who had been sidelined after 1938. ⁴⁹ Raus’s early death solved this problem for Liebitzky, but it hinted at the inevitability to incorporate former Wehrmacht soldiers. Indeed, Blasi has argued that there had been a general compromise to give operational positions to officers with Wehrmacht experience and leave the build-up and organizational positions to those without wartime service. ⁵⁰ This settlement seemed to satisfy the Allies, who desired an Austria that could effectively defend itself. Liebitzky was judged as ‘completely reliable and [it was assured that] the greatest care would be taken to exclude unreliable officers and to inculcate a sound outlook into the new army’. ⁵¹ Hence, his personal standing contributed to gain legitimacy from the former occupation powers and softened concerns about Austrian rearmament and authoritarian tendencies in the army.

Questions concerning personnel were not the only challenge for the Bundesheer – it had to be trained and educated. In a draft for soldiers’ guidelines, Liebitzky had outlined his views on military values and the army’s role in society. He feared that the Bundesheer might be abused for party politics, ⁵² a rise in civilian opposition to conscription, and time pressure preventing the inclusion of ‘lessons learned’ from contemporary wars. Liebitzky sought to safeguard that the Bundesheer would form ‘young recruits into warriors who know their duties as soldiers, but also know how to be responsible citizens in uniform’. ⁵³ In an aide-memoire for Liebitzky, Oskar Regele (1890–1969), an influential soldier-scholar, outlined the curriculum’s goals. He wanted to teach the soldiers that political leaders make the decisions for war, and hence bear the responsibility for victory or defeat. ⁵⁴ Regele, and others, emphasized the need to prevent soldiers from feeling guilty or even personally responsible for the lost war. At the same time, the aide-memoire highlighted individual soldiers’ importance to form ‘scholars in uniform’ (Gelehrte im Waffenrock), which embody a chivalrous and human way of fighting. ⁵⁵

However, other officers like Heinrich Jordis von Lohausen (1907–2002), a member of the educational board for officers, ⁵⁶ added that ‘“democratisation” [within the army] does not mean neglect of soldierly toughness but the duty for unconditional justice and caring … [as] bravery graces man, obedience the soldier, justness the officer’. ⁵⁷ Jordis stipulated Härte ⁵⁸ as a fundamental value:

being a soldier means being hard. Hard first against oneself, then hard against the enemy, and if necessary, also hard against one’s own fellows – not hard hearted, but vigorous in demanding. If you do not have hardness in war, you are defeated and will have to experience even greater hardships … Hence the education for war has to be one for hardship … hardship is not the opposite of beneficence … it is the opposite of softness. ⁵⁹

Following this interpretation, the civilian outlook and non-combat duties took only secondary importance. Indeed, Jordis took an opposite stance to the ideas of Count Baudissin on educating German Bundeswehr soldiers as ‘citizens in uniform’ – which was even noted in the German press. ⁶⁰ In contrast, Liebitzky desired to create ‘warriors and soldiers’, but also wanted to instil them with values of good citizens. ⁶¹ Indeed, hardness posed a problem for the Bundesheer. Excessive demands and abusive treatment of young soldiers were blamed on the instructors’ Wehrmacht experience. Thus, a regulation lessened the possibilities for disciplinary punishment in 1961, which was yet again tightened in 1967. ⁶²

The emphasis on combat-orientated values was linked to the most recent war experiences, role models, and points of reference. Retired General Karl Tarbuk von Sensenhorst (1881–1966), who had not commanded front-line troops during the Second World War, publicly warned to form the new officer corps with old Bundesheer (First Republic), let alone Habsburg officers. He demanded that men who had personally fought between 1939 and 1945 should train the youth. ⁶³ The war experience of most officers and NCOs was thought to be helpful for camaraderie and internal cohesion. ⁶⁴ With regard to the first staff courses, the British highlighted that ‘younger officers just did not exist, and they were therefore compelled to take officers who had learnt their soldiering in war time until a new generation of officers had grown up’. ⁶⁵ Therefore, not surprisingly, veterans wrote the new training plans ad hoc and enjoyed wide freedom to influence guidelines and best practices. ⁶⁶

Liebitzky’s work and educational goals were repeatedly challenged publicly, for example by Gordon M. Gollob (1912–1987) ⁶⁷ in 1950. Gollob had strongly argued against promoting officers without service in the last war. He could barely hide his disgust that such men would rebuild and lead the new Bundesheer – while the ones who earned their ranks during the war were overlooked. ⁶⁸ Gollob demanded that the officers’ selection should be unrestricted by party politics and merely based on experience and expertise. In a rebuke in the Steirerblatt, another officer demanded a balance between officers who had served in the Wehrmacht and those who had not, while criticizing Gollob for his political demagogy as general secretary of the far-right Verband der Unabhängigen (VdU, League of Independents). ⁶⁹

Liebitzky noted that Gollob’s piece was just one of many vicious articles by young former Wehrmacht officers aimed against the new army. He acknowledged that hitches in providing financial recognition and compensations for their deeds fuelled such anger. Liebitzky referred to the Colonelparagraph as a measure to safeguard professionalism, but also a flawless ‘Austrian attitude’ so that ‘the new army will not become a continuation of the German Wehrmacht’. ⁷⁰ Liebitzky stressed that losing a war of aggression could hardly be an example for the tellurian army of a neutral country. He therefore ascribed a questionable value to war experiences, for example from the North African desert. ⁷¹ In addition to promoting a new Austrian citizen soldier, he also tried to counter the ‘experience and expertise’ arguments. But these critiques were not easily silenced.

Lothar Rendulic: An Unlikely Candidate

Lothar Rendulic (1887–1971) was the prime example of a compromised Nazi general mauling Liebitzky; while the latter, in turn, collected many articles and material on him. ⁷² Rendulic had served on the Eastern Front, before commanding the 2nd Panzerarmee in the Balkans in 1943 and 1944. As a result of the Otok massacres, the treatment of Italian prisoners, and harsh counter-guerrilla actions, he was sentenced to twenty years in the so-called Nuremberg ‘Hostage Trial’ in 1948. ⁷³ His wartime memoirs were banned due to their National Socialist tendencies and in subsequent works he did not spare the Bundesheer criticism – naming the inexperience of the ‘first lieutenant from the First World War’ (i.e. Liebitzky) as a chief malaise. ⁷⁴

The Colonelparagraph and his conviction as a war criminal made any official role unthinkable; yet, he became an informal adviser to the Bundesheer and drafted studies on various topics. ⁷⁵ The head of the military academy ⁷⁶ repeatedly invited him for discussions with cadets, where Rendulic was treated with great respect and addressed with full rank. ⁷⁷ He stayed a wanted commentator and writer on military affairs with close contacts to the political far right. ⁷⁸ During his imprisonment, several hundred former comrades had signed petitions for his release. This created predicaments for some: officers who had endorsed the petition sent letters of self-exculpation to Liebitzky in 1951, distancing themselves from their erstwhile support for Rendulic. ⁷⁹ A furious Liebitzky wrote to newspaper editors that their coverage on Rendulic had been too positive in describing ‘one of the worst figures that discredited the Austrian officer corps [who] had never been an Austrian Generaloberst … but had been discharged already in 1935 for treason and subversion’, and thus reached this rank in the German Wehrmacht. ⁸⁰

In fact, Rendulic signed articles with his old German rank, in which he warned of party politics destabilizing the army like during the First Republic. ⁸¹ In 1955, he argued that officers should have ‘the key attribute of lived experience in wartime’, and that luckily ‘among those higher officers allowed to serve in the new army’ some do meet this criteria. ⁸² Without attacking Liebitzky directly, he clearly warned to hand him the army leadership. Rendulic also sent a letter to the renowned German military journal Wehrkunde in which he complained about an article that he deemed too benevolent vis-à-vis Liebitzky. He reasoned Liebitzky’s war experience had been as a junior officer 37 years ago, while at the same time he lacked appreciation and respect for the Wehrmacht-experienced officers, their sacrifices and experiences. ⁸³ Later, he criticized the Bundesheer’s privation of practical orientation and the rapid manpower increase during its first years. ⁸⁴

The question of which role model to follow was encapsulated in a headline in the weekly Die Furche: ‘Jansa or Rendulic?’ The former was portrayed as the quintessential quiet and modest Habsburg officer who had not betrayed Austria and felt no desire for revenge or judgment on those who had served in the Wehrmacht; whilst Rendulic had not only undermined the First Republic before 1938 but retained his National Socialist ideology even after 1945. The Bundesheer had to decide ‘which of these two it would choose as role model for its young soldiers. There can be no compromise solution.’ ⁸⁵ But indeed there was a third way, personified by the first Generaltruppeninspektor Erwin Fussenegger.

Erwin Fussenegger: The Experienced Professional

Fussenegger was born into a Habsburg officer’s family, had a German wife, and his sister Gertrud was a renowned Austrian writer with pan-German ideas. ⁸⁶ When he attended the military academy in Wiener Neustadt, his peers in 1931 included Franz Böhme, Erich Watzek, Johann Vogl, and Franz Zejdlik. After serving in mountaineer units, he started the general staff course in October 1936, which he finished in Berlin in 1938. His comrades included inter alia Paul Lube, Leo Waldmüller, Werner Vogl, Ernst Nobis, August Rüling, Otto Seitz, Otto Mitlacher, Ignaz Reichel, Heinrich Jordis von Lohausen, and Karl Preßlmayer. ⁸⁷ All his acquaintances from the military academy and the general staff course would remain essential individuals in the early Bundesheer years.

During the war, Fussenegger held various staff positions within the 2nd Gebirgs-Division (Mountain Division) and the 19th Army Corps, fighting in Poland before serving in Norway between 1940 and 1943. ⁸⁸ From 5 February 1943 until 14 October 1943 he was operations officer in the 2nd Mountain Division under then-Generalleutnant Georg Ritter von Hengl (1897–1952). The Bavarian Hengl became head of the NS Führungsstab des Heeres beim OKH (National Socialist Staff of the Army at the Army High Command) on 15 May 1944, which had been implemented two months before under the fervent National Socialist Ferdinand Schörner (1892–1973). The position entailed overseeing the Wehrmacht’s political and ideological schooling. Hengl, as a firm Nazi and SS member, judged Fussenegger as an above-average soldier with a ‘National Socialist perception of life and his profession’. ⁸⁹ The Wehrmacht’s personnel files have to be treated with caution in regards to political convictions, but scholars have hitherto neglected them to describe the founding generation’s attitudes. Further, depending on the person writing the valuation and the wording used, one can deduct some conclusions. Hengl’s assessment was seconded and signed by Schörner; hence, one can at least assess Fussenegger’s closeness to National Socialism through shared values of hardness, sacrifice, and boldness. These ideals could later be used for any soldierly codex, also in a democratic army.

Fussenegger became lieutenant colonel on 1 January 1943 and between 12 December 1943 and 1 August 1944 he was operations officer of the 292nd Infantry Division, which was first part of the 2nd and then 9th Army of the hardly battered Army Group Centre. Interestingly, Fussenegger was judged more critically here, downgraded to ‘average’ and seen in need to show his capabilities as operations officer of a division on the Eastern Front. ⁹⁰ Further, he was considered overambitious and problematic to his superiors, while at the same time very hard on subordinates. ⁹¹ Interestingly, this rather critical evaluation was provided by Colonel Henning von Tresckow, a key figure in the military resistance against Hitler who politically disagreed with people like Ritter von Hengl, and not only in regard to evaluating Erwin Fussenegger.

Yet, assessments on Fussenegger varied. The 9th Army’s Chief of Staff, Generalmajor Helmut Staedtke, was full of praise for him and did not mention any National Socialist outlook. ⁹² In any case, it remains noteworthy that Fussenegger was never promoted after 1 January 1943. A fact which Liebitzky and others doubted after the war and rumours circulated that Fussenegger had indeed been a colonel and hence not eligible for active service in the Bundesheer. ⁹³

After the war, Fussenegger did not take part in the B-Gendarmerie, but worked in private industry, where he secured his old comrade and future Defence Minister Karl Lütgendorf a position. ⁹⁴ After pleas by many younger officers to responsible politicians to include him, he left his lucrative position to join the new army as colonel, and became Generaltruppeninspektor in July 1956. ⁹⁵ In the organizational structure, there were three departments (Sektionen) subordinated to him. He himself headed one, which made him tour the country, inspecting all units, and strictly controlling proceeding developments. Liebitzky retained one department, as appointing him as Generaltruppeninspektor would have been unacceptable for the Wehrmacht-experienced officers. ⁹⁶ Fussenegger was meant to assist Liebitzky as equal partner and prepare the ground for younger officers to take more central positions and sideline the ‘old men’. ⁹⁷ This development did not go unnoticed, and the British described the new powerful man as ‘politically minded’. ⁹⁸ When Liebitzky retired in 1957, Fussenegger noted that the rebuilding of the armed forces had succeeded ‘despite all the down sides, of his [Liebitzky’s] character’. ⁹⁹ Liebitzky became the first President of the Austrian Officers Society (ÖOG), which in theory was an important position, linking old and young officers. Yet, Fussenegger critically observed Liebitzky’s appointment and the influence of other old Habsburg soldiers. ¹⁰⁰

Without Liebitzky, Fussenegger was less restrained in regards to personnel decisions and tried to increase his influence by appointing like-minded officers. In 1958, he advocated Otto Mitlacher (1907–1986) and Albert Bach (1910–2003) as new department leaders besides him. ¹⁰¹ Both men possessed wide experience in the mountaineers and in operational staff duties on the Eastern Front. Bach had been decorated in the civil war in 1934, before gaining both Iron Crosses as part of the 3rd Mountain Division at Narvik. Beginning in 1941, he served as general staff officer on the Eastern Front and was captured as part of the 16th Army in the Courland pocket. ¹⁰² Bach had repetitively been described as outstanding, practical, calm, and battle-hardened with an ‘impeccable National Socialist bearing, which he manages to convey to his subordinates’, in short as a ‘National Socialist of best quality’. ¹⁰³ Mitlacher had also served in the general staff of the 3rd Mountain Division in Norway, and on many fronts thereafter, before becoming a ‘competent, quiet and non-political’ ¹⁰⁴ administration specialist after 1945. ¹⁰⁵

Another Narvik veteran and holder of the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross became head of the military command in Carinthia. Anton Holzinger (1901–1989) had been a colonel in the Wehrmacht, but was nonetheless taken into active service in the Bundesheer where he was continuously supported by Fussenegger, Vogl, and Bach. ¹⁰⁶ He spoke twice at the controversial Ulrichsbergtreffen and remained an important person for contacts to ministries and civil society. ¹⁰⁷ Fussenegger also nominated Otto Seitz, another experienced general staff officer with service on the Eastern Front and in the 7th Gebirgs-Division, with whom he had finished the war academy in Berlin 1938. ¹⁰⁸ Another nominee was August Rüling (1904–1978) ¹⁰⁹ whom he had met at the last general staff course in Austria. ¹¹⁰ As mentioned above, Seitz can be found on the list of possible pre-1938 National Socialists within the Austrian army and was later judged by his Wehrmacht superiors as ‘faultless’ ¹¹¹ in his convictions as a ‘good National Socialist’. ¹¹² Anton Leeb (1913–2008) was another department leader and close associate of Fussenegger, who had attended the Neustadt academy with him. The mountaineer Leeb had fought as staff officer on all fronts ¹¹³ and was assessed as an outstanding, ‘well above average’ officer ‘permeated by the National Socialist spirit, which he attempts to convey to others’. ¹¹⁴ Particularly the Mountaineer Regiment 98 in which Leeb had served excessively has been described as a hotbed of national socialist views and marked by a ‘culture of hardness’. ¹¹⁵

It is apparent that Fussenegger manoeuvred a group of loyal associates in the most important positions. Seitz and Leeb would follow Fussenegger as the top-ranking soldiers of the Austrian Republic. Hubert Wingelbauer’s (1915–1987) appointment as Generaltruppeninspektor in 1978 marked the first time that a sidelined officer and close aide to Liebitzky reached the highest echelon of command. Many major figures had served closely under fervent Nazis like Lothar Rendulic, Julius Ringel (1889–1967), ¹¹⁶ Franz Böhme (1885–1947), Ferdinand Schörner, Georg Ritter von Hengl, and Eduard Dietl (1890–1944). In these units, they had cemented a network that sometimes had previously existed and retained a lasting influence on decisions after 1945. ¹¹⁷ Bach and Leeb, for example, both enjoyed a long life, published widely, and were often interview partners for historians. A majority had firm roots in the mountaineers, but also in armoured units on the Eastern Front; hence most of the founding leaders had been exposed to the hard fighting on the Eastern Front. For this group of officers, their wartime service was nothing to be ashamed of. The Wehrmacht was portrayed as a glorious army, which had resisted a Soviet intrusion and exemplified soldierly values of discipline, obedience, and sacrifice. ¹¹⁸ Chivalrous combat was lauded in contrast to irregularity, treacherous behaviour, desertion, and propaganda that had brought blind hatred to the battlefields. ¹¹⁹ Albert Bach lamented that the Wehrmacht had been misled for ‘utopian, amoral, [and] yes, partly criminal orders’. ¹²⁰ Yet, it was argued that the Austrian soldier had never been involved in Prussian bloodthirstiness. ¹²¹

After the war, old bonds could become problematic. In 1956, Fussenegger was on the cover of Der Spiegel, where he was speaking out for his former superior, the infamous Field Marshal Ferdinand Schörner. When Schörner returned from Russian captivity in 1955, an outraged public, press, politicians, and former soldiers demanded consequences for his brutal methods, for which a German court convicted him in 1957. ¹²² Nonetheless, Fussenegger recalled good memories of his time under Schörner and argued that the Field Marshal had always attempted to ‘save blood’. ¹²³ Hence, while official taboos existed, for example including colonels, generals, or high-ranking Waffen-SS soldiers, ¹²⁴ Fussenegger’s comments about Schörner show how far he was willing to go in support of former comrades, even when this marked a no-go area for Liebitzky. But embracing Schörner was not only a taboo for Liebitzky. Most former Wehrmacht officers in West Germany were appalled about the death penalties Schörner had ordered against his own men and the abandonment of his surrounded troops in 1945. Whereas the highest Austrian soldier publicly supported Schörner, the German Bundeswehr authorities tried to prevent any unrestricted statements, fearing it might undermine the rearmament process and legitimacy of the new army. ¹²⁵ The episode showed that bonds of shared experiences and personal networks could become contentious if the wrong values (or men embodying them) were defended.

The network around Fussenegger was only weakened in the early 1970s. In the decade before, political and societal changes, as well as a chronic underfunding had led to great frustration among the officers. The British Ambassador even described it as ‘depressing to be an Austrian soldier or indeed to have anything to do with the Austrian Armed Forces’. ¹²⁶ In objection to a Socialist reform idea to reduce military service from nine to six months, 1,700 of 2,267 Bundesheer officers had signed a letter of protest in 1971. ¹²⁷ Fussenegger resigned over this issue in 1970, which he thought would degrade his soldiers to defenceless cannon fodder. ¹²⁸ Together with Vogl, Watzek, Bach, Seitz, and Ignaz Reichel (1908–1990), ¹²⁹ six crucial generals of the early years ended their careers by 1973. When Fussenegger died in 1986, the Generaltruppeninspektor Othmar Tauschitz (*1925), praised him as role-model officer who had fulfilled his duty during the Second World War and should not be held responsible for political decisions at the time as he ‘lived through these dark years as an honourable man and officer … [without denying] that he had been a good soldier’. ¹³⁰ The memory of Fussenegger and the founding generation was kept alive, while the ‘clean Wehrmacht’ myth and the established Bundesheer framing was perpetuated. In contrast to the praising words for Fussenegger, there was no effort to take care of Liebitzky’s grave in Vienna, nor to honour him by naming barracks after him – quite the opposite. ¹³¹

Conclusion: The Sinews of Necessity

The foundation period of the Bundesheer has many parallels but also dissimilarities to the initially described developments in Germany’s Bundeswehr. In the Austrian case, the network around Fussenegger dominated the new army in a way that Liebitzky and the few sidelined officers could not. Fussenegger was able to rally followers from the mid-level general staff officers, many of whom had attended the same educational courses with him. Their professionalism was defined by shared experiences during their socialization and values gained in combat, often as mountaineers, in the high north, the Balkans, and on the Eastern Front. This was not only a generational issue or a matter of values, but rather a question of ‘professionals versus inexperienced amateurs’. Whilst also Liebitzky wanted an army capable of defending Austria, he sought a mentality change and a stronger tabula rasa among officers who had served in the Wehrmacht. Sidelined as he was, a real impetus for a mentality change along the lines of the German Innere Führung did not develop. While Liebitzky was no second Baudissin, he fulfilled an important role. His function as a watchdog and standard-bearer of moral integrity, even before the foundation of the army, helped to define no-go areas and successfully combatted the influence of men like Rendulic or an influx of former Waffen-SS soldiers. This resulted, for example, in an overall ban on wearing Wehrmacht decorations, even in the de-nazified versions that were allowed in Germany. On the other hand, one also has to note that the few men who had directly fought with the Allies during the war were isolated and had no chance to revive their career in the Bundesheer.

While one has to be careful with overstating the value of political assessments in the personal Wehrmacht files, it seems that the soldierly values of Fussenegger and the men around him put them closer to National Socialist ideas than later claimed. It is also noteworthy that in contrast to West Germany, no one at the Bundesheer’s top echelon can be linked to the core of the military resistance against Hitler. Indeed, the Austrian Traditionserlass in 1967 neither mentioned the 20th of July 1944 nor the Wehrmacht in any regard. The narrative of being Nazi Germany’s first victim was used to silence the 1938–1945 period, while within the Bundesheer the Wehrmacht-experienced men prevailed with their values and role models. However, the soldierly values referred to were nothing exceptional in comparison to armies in other countries.

It would be misleading, however, to argue that ‘old Nazis’ rebuilt the army. The Bundesheer had, like Austria and Germany in general, a lasting problematic relationship to National Socialism and the Wehrmacht memory until the transformations in the 1980s and 1990s. Military service in the Wehrmacht continued to be seen as a normal experience. Hence, allegations of the army’s careless dealing with its past should always be juxtaposed to other state institutions or Chancellor Bruno Kreisky’s inclusion of former NSDAP and SS members to his cabinets. ¹³² The continuity of Austrian military elites hints at a general phenomenon that can be observed for other countries and institutions, as the cited scholarship on the German Bundeswehr has demonstrated. Continuity prevailed in many institutions and was supported by Western demands to quickly form a capable army.

The military had to make sense of the disastrous defeat and rebuild a credible and cohesive deterrence in face of the Soviet threat. Pure (self-)victimization did not suit the military, given that it is an institution whose primary goals are valorous fighting and professionalism. Without experienced cadres, no new Austrian army would have been conceivable and the more unpleasant episodes between 1938 and 1945 were therefore overlooked. One could not expect that the ‘clean Wehrmacht’ myth and a retreat to core and ‘timeless’ soldierly values would be quickly challenged from within. In a way, the Bundesheer overcame the passive victim role earlier than society, yet without acknowledging any responsibility in Hitler’s crimes. Indeed, the question of an officer’s behaviour before 1938 remained more important than possible crimes committed during the war. The Bundesheer’s low prestige, its lack of proper funding, and little appreciation made it ‘the Cinderella of Austrian national life’. ¹³³ But this ‘Cinderella’ institution had to balance political desires for a fresh start without Wehrmacht men, the limitations of the Colonelparagraph, and the realities of the Cold War. In the end, wartime expertise and ‘timeless’ values of fighting soldiers were indispensable to uphold a credible armed neutrality and to instil confidence in Austria’s Bundesheer.