A Tale of Two Fronts: China’s War of the Central Plains,1930

Abstract

Western writing on China’s 1930 War of the Central Plains emphasizes shifting alliances and bribery, but a close analysis of the war indicates that military operations determined the outcome. Chiang Kai-shek defeated the coalition of regional commanders who rose in revolt against him not through political alliances, but rather because his military forces kept his enemies divided and eventually drove them back on all fronts. It also reveals the significance of Chiang’s victory on the war’s southern front, which prevented Chiang’s opponents in the south from uniting with those in the north and paved the way for final victory.

Keywords

Central Plains War China Chiang Kai-shek Feng Yuxiang Yan Xishan Li Zongren

In the summer of 1930, less than two years after the end of the Northern Expedition and the establishment of the new government in Nanjing, Chiang Kai-shek faced a massive revolt from within the ranks of the National Revolutionary Army (NRA). Yan Xishan, Feng Yuxiang, and Li Zongren, commanders of three of the NRA’s four group armies, publicly announced their intention to remove Chiang as commander in chief and put an end to what they described as his ‘dictatorial rule’ over the Nationalist government, the Guomindang (GMD), and the NRA. This conflict between military commanders reflected the fluid political situation and continuing factionalism that characterized the Nationalist camp in its early years until Chiang’s consolidation of control over the GMD in 1932.¹ In this context, the War of the Central Plains amounted to the most serious challenge the new government had faced in its brief existence, with several months of intense combat across multiple fronts. Chiang and his supporters triumphed in the end, pushing enemy forces back into their regional bases and driving the three rebellious commanders into temporary exile.

Interpretations of the consequences of the War of the Central Plains differ. Some view it as a sign of continuing internal conflict and violence of the late 1920s, as well as evidence that Chiang and the Nanjing government lacked a strong mandate.² Others argue that the war enhanced Chiang’s national standing, strengthened the Nanjing government’s claim to legitimacy, and extended its reach beyond the Yangzi River basin.³ Regardless of one’s view, it is certain that had the war turned out differently, if Chiang had lost and the Yan–Feng–Li coalition taken control of the central government, the history of modern China would have been quite different. Moreover, while it is tempting to see the 1928 capture of Beiping as the starting point for the so-called ‘Nanjing Decade’ (1928–1937), it is clear that military conflict on a significant scale continued in the ensuing years. The outcome of the War of the Central Plains in the fall of 1930 put an end to military challenges from former ‘warlords’ and marked an important point in China’s tumultuous path from ‘warlordism’ to greater political and military unity. Chiang’s victory meant the true start of the ‘Nanjing Decade’ and serious attempts at state building under the Nationalists, though not the end of factional struggle within the Nationalist camp.

Seen in this light, the War of the Central Plains is one of the most important military conflicts of the Nationalist period, yet it is largely unknown in the West. There is no single English language scholarly work – book or journal article – devoted to this war.⁴ A search of the terms ‘War of the Central Plains’ and ‘China’ using search tools such as JSTOR, WorldCat, or Google Books yields only a handful of English-language sources, mostly books addressing larger issues of China’s twentieth-century history that devote a few paragraphs, or at most a few pages, to this conflict. Most survey texts ignore it altogether.⁵ Why then, have Western scholars paid so little attention to it?

There are likely a variety of reasons for this, but perhaps two stand out as most important. First, the War of the Central Plains was one of many military conflicts the Nationalists engaged in from the mid-1920s through the 1940s, and lasted only five months. Longer conflicts, such as the Northern Expedition, the Encirclement Campaigns against the Jiangxi Soviet, and the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and subsequent Sino–Japanese War, have garnered greater attention from Western researchers. Historians who looked back on this period from later decades saw that the Nanjing government had extended struggles against the Japanese and the Chinese Communists throughout the 1930s and 1940s, and naturally focused their attention on these topics. Second, the War of the Central Plains featured conflict between commanders of the NRA’s group armies who rose to challenge their own commander in chief. This might lead some to see it more as a scramble for political power or the result of factional rivalry, rather than a full-blown military conflict. At the start of the war, Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister to China, reported to his government, ‘[l]ike all recent wars in China there is a feeling of unreality about the whole business and there has so far been little or no fighting.’⁶ Indeed, existing descriptions of this war in English works, few as they may be, tend to follow Lampson’s initial view and present it as more political than military, with shifting alliances and bribery more responsible for the outcome than military operations. This view is also reflected in the fact that most Western writings on the subject stress the impact of Zhang Xueliang’s September 1930 decision to throw his support behind Chiang Kai-shek and the Nanjing government as the decisive moment in the war that tipped the balance of the conflict against the Yan–Feng–Li coalition.⁷ These accounts also typically refer to large bribes that Chiang Kai-shek allegedly paid to Zhang Xueliang and others, suggesting that Chiang won the war with ‘silver’ bullets, rather than lead.⁸ In recent years, a number of scholars have published works that cast the work of the Nationalists in a more positive light, marking an important shift in the scholarship on this period.⁹ Unfortunately, the existing English-language treatments of the War of the Central Plains reinforce the traditional views of the Nationalist military as incompetent and corrupt, which perhaps makes the conflict less attractive as an object of study for those more interested in combat operations.¹⁰

Whatever the reasons, the general neglect of this topic in Western historiography on modern China has obscured its importance to the history of the Nationalist period. Despite its short duration, the War of the Central Plains involved more than one million soldiers, ranged across multiple broad fronts, and produced hundreds of thousands of casualties. To put this in perspective with other conflicts of the time, R.J. Rummel’s work on mass deaths in twentieth-century China estimates casualties in the two years of combat during the Northern Expedition at between 44,000 and 65,000, less than 25 per cent of those incurred in the War of the Central Plains.¹¹ Such statistics reflect the size and scope of the war’s combat operations and indicate that even if there were strong political aspects to the conflict, it featured significant military operations. One foreign observer compared the combat in the War of the Central Plains to that of the First World War in France, with large frontal assaults against positions defended with machine guns.¹² The men and materials both sides devoted to the war also suggest that the stakes were quite high and that much rode on the outcome. If one calls to mind Paul Cohen’s admonition to write history with a degree of ‘outcome blindness’, meaning to block out knowledge of later events, then one must acknowledge that at the time Chiang Kai-shek and the Nanjing leadership most likely saw this conflict as the gravest of challenges. Indeed, the revolt of the Yan–Feng–Li coalition threatened the very existence of the Nanjing government.¹³

With this in mind, this article makes three arguments. First, the War of the Central Plains was one of the most important military conflicts of the Nanjing Decade. Far from an internal spat or minor conflict between factions within the GMD or the NRA, it was rather the culmination of long-standing disputes and deep-seated distrust within the Nationalist movement. Cracks in the fragile alliance of forces that undertook the Northern Expedition first appeared in 1926–1927, resulting in the violent break between the GMD and CCP. The nominal unification of the country and establishment of the new government at Nanjing did little to repair the inherent distrust that had emerged between Chiang and the other NRA commanders and GMD officials. The War of the Central Plains is therefore best understood as the final stage of the Northern Expedition, in which Chiang defeated his rivals in the last major military challenge to the new government.

Second, it argues that the outcome of the War of the Central Plains came as a result of military operations conducted on the field of battle, rather than through shifting alliances or bribery. Specifically, it rejects the view that Zhang Xueliang’s September 1930 public declaration of support for Chiang and the Nanjing government marked a decisive turning point in the war. The Yan–Feng–Li coalition that rose in revolt against Chiang Kai-shek and the Nanjing government did not end the struggle due to Zhang’s decision to enter the war, but rather because their strategic plan of uniting for a combined attack failed. Chiang’s ‘central army’ forces kept them divided and eventually drove them back on all fronts. Events on the battlefield determined the outcome of the war well before Zhang Xueliang stepped in.

Third, it argues that the true turning point in the war came with the victory of Nanjing’s forces on the war’s southern front, in Hunan province, which prevented Li Zongren from uniting with Feng and Yan in north China and allowed Chiang to shift much-needed forces to the northern front. Most who write about the War of the Central Plains, in English or in Chinese, tend to pay greatest attention to the northern front and the fighting in Henan in particular. Yet it was Chiang’s victory on the southern front in late June and early July 1930 that disrupted the strategic plan of the Yan–Feng–Li coalition and paved the way for the victory of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nanjing government.

The article has two parts. Part I examines the origins of the war, which lie in Chiang Kai-shek’s efforts to impose central authority through a plan to reorganize and demobilize parts of the NRA. This revealed deep distrust among NRA commanders that lingered well after the nominal unification of the country and establishment of the new government at Nanjing. Chiang’s efforts also triggered a series of revolts in 1929, which marked the rise of resistance to Nanjing’s authority as well as Chiang’s willingness to use military force to impose unity. Part II analyses combat operations in the War of the Central Plains from May to September 1930, demonstrating that Chiang’s forces had already achieved a military victory prior to Zhang Xueliang’s declaration of support in September 1930. In doing so, it reveals the importance of the southern front, connecting the victory in Hunan in early July to the turning of the tide of battle on the northern front in August, which made a significant contribution to Chiang’s victory over the Yan–Feng–Li coalition.

In addition to Chinese-language primary and secondary sources, this article makes extensive use of English-language primary sources to shed new light on this conflict. British and American diplomats and military attachés sent a steady stream of telegrams to their superiors and home governments, describing major battles, providing details on troop movements, and reporting on military and political developments. These sources offer a new perspective on the war that reveals the decisive nature of combat operations and the importance of the Nanjing victory on the southern front.

Part I: The Origins of the War of the Central Plains

In early 1928, commander in chief of the NRA Chiang Kai-shek had nominally completed the Northern Expedition, unified the country, and established a new capital at Nanjing. Beneath this façade of unity, he faced continued military and political division, particularly within the ranks of his army. Chiang had only recently returned to his position as commander in chief, having stepped down in August 1927. His decision to make a violent break with the CCP and the GMD ‘left’ in April of that year sent shockwaves through the NRA, which produced a backlash that forced him into a temporary leave of absence. He returned to duty in January 1928 with the support of many Whampoa Academy graduates, but he had to acknowledge the regional authority of others such as Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, and Li Zongren. He did so by appointing these three commanders of NRA group armies and chairs of Branch Political Councils of the Military Affairs Commission, based in Kaifeng (Feng), Taiyuan (Yan), and Wuhan (Li). These amounted to, as Taiwanese scholar Chen Jinjin puts it, ‘multiple centers’ of political and military power, which posed a threat to the central authority of Chiang’s government in Nanjing.¹⁴ Chiang knew well the tenuous nature of this power-sharing alliance and made extending central political and military authority from his capital at Nanjing his top priority. As a first step in this process, Chiang Kai-shek and his supporters began discussing the need to reduce the size of China’s military with a movement to ‘reorganize and demobilize’ (bianqian) the four group armies. Critics interpreted this as a deliberate attempt to weaken the other group army commanders, so that Chiang might consolidate his own power under a military dictatorship.¹⁵ Chiang, to the contrary, presented it as an essential step in the state-building process, arguing that building a modern, unified state required a disciplined and truly national military force under central command. He pointed to the examples of Germany and Japan, where strong, centralized militaries formed the foundation for the creation of modern governments, as models for China.¹⁶ Chiang repeatedly stressed the need to reorganize and demobilize the Nationalist army as necessary to cut government expenses and mobilize all forces to begin work on building a modern state and society. China needed to make dramatic reductions in the size and cost of the military, he argued, in order to provide good and effective government for its people. Nanjing’s statistics indicated that the total armed forces of China had reached two million soldiers and military expenditures exceeded 800 million Yuan, far beyond the government’s annual revenues of 500 million Yuan.¹⁷ From Chiang’s perspective, reorganization and demobilization had as much to do with financial retrenchment as with centre–region relations.¹⁸ The issue of reorganization and demobilization of China’s military forces not only revealed the level of distrust among NRA commanders, but also served as a catalyst that set in motion a series of events that would culminate in the War of the Central Plains.

The Reorganization and Demobilization Conference

In order to convince others of his sincerity, Chiang began the process of reorganization and demobilization with his own First Group Army, the core of his central army. This group army featured officers from the Whampoa Military Academy, staunch Chiang loyalists, but it also included numerous provincial forces that had joined the NRA in the course of the Northern Expedition. The reorganization of the First Group Army essentially involved rotating officers among different units, as Chiang believed that a modern army must have interchangeable officers who would serve loyally and effectively in any unit, regardless of their ties to a particular region or commander.¹⁹

To encourage the other group army commanders to embrace reorganization and demobilization, Chiang proposed a meeting to discuss the issue. A group of high-ranking military officers including Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, Li Zongren, and others gathered at Tangshan in July 1928, where they came to a general agreement on the need to reduce the size of the overall force and to reorganize their group armies to create a unified, national force.²⁰ Those present approved a ‘Plan for Military Reorganization’ (junshi zhengli’an) which called for reorganizing and reducing China’s various military forces into a single Nationalist army of 60 divisions, all under a centralized system of command, training, and discipline. At the end of the meeting, Chiang drafted a circular letter in which he stressed the financial rationale for demobilization, reiterated the need for central command over the national military, and announced plans to convene a formal Reorganization and Demobilization Conference (bianqian huiyi) to move forward with this process. He sent the letter to all senior military officials.²¹

Chiang Kai-shek succeeded in creating a preliminary plan for military reorganization and in securing general agreement from the four group army commanders. Yet he had no guarantee that these regional commanders would follow through on implementation of the plan, submit to Chiang’s central authority, and truly reduce their forces to the desired levels. They had all agreed to it in principle at Tangshan, but would they ultimately abide by the plan? Chiang followed up on the Tangshan agreement with a series of meetings of a ‘preparatory committee’, which again included Feng, Yan, and Li, charged with determining the specifics of the plan. In discussing the details of the reorganization process, each committee member had the opportunity to offer his own plan for reducing the size of their collective forces.²² Feng Yuxiang suggested reorganizing those troops with the best equipment, training, and discipline, while designating those with inadequate training, poor discipline, and lacking weapons for demobilization. Specifically, he recommended reorganizing the First (Chiang’s) and Second (Feng’s) Group Armies into 12 divisions each and the Third (Yan’s) and Fourth (Li’s) into eight divisions each, with an additional eight divisions composed of other assorted regional forces. Yan Xishan remained quiet during many of the nine meetings of the preparatory committee, but eventually proposed an alternative to Feng’s plan in which the First and Second Group Armies would have 10 divisions each while the Third and Fourth Group Armies would have eight divisions each. This plan, not surprisingly, reduced the numerical advantage of Chiang’s and Feng’s forces over those under Yan’s command.²³ The ostensible purpose that drew them all together was to shrink the army in order to reduce government expenditures and to support unification of command, but each of the regional group army commanders remained concerned with maintaining his own troop strength and a favourable balance against the others.

The Reorganization and Demobilization Conference formally opened in Nanjing on 1 January 1929, bringing together a large contingent of military officers and political officials. At the opening ceremony, Chiang Kai-shek offered remarks on the state of the Chinese military and reiterated his views on the need for demobilization. Minister of Finance Song Ziwen also spoke, laying out the problem of excessively large military forces in stark economic terms, predicting financial disaster if the government failed to dramatically reduce military spending.²⁴ The conference attendees met in numerous sessions throughout the month of January, ultimately agreeing on several resolutions that would create an army of at most 65 divisions of 11,000 soldiers each and limit the military budget to a maximum of 40 per cent of the government’s annual budget.²⁵ Feng, Yan, and Li all pledged support for the tasks of demobilization and building a truly national army.²⁶ Despite their acceptance of the conference’s stipulations, both Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan had reservations and privately balked at the plan. According to Li Zongren, they still believed that Chiang intended to avoid reducing his own First Group Army while targeting their Second and Third Group Armies for large-scale reductions. Before the conference completed its sessions, Yan left Nanjing to return to his base in Shanxi, claiming urgent business, and Feng feigned illness and departed as well.²⁷ This did not bode well for actual implementation of the plan.

Most observers have described the conference as a failure, as it accomplished neither a large-scale demobilization of troops nor did it significantly strengthen central authority.²⁸ Instead, it revealed the continuing division and lingering distrust among the regional military commanders, an issue that had plagued the NRA since its creation. Chiang Kai-shek stressed the political and financial motives behind the Reorganization and Demobilization Conference, which no doubt played a role in his thinking, but one also might argue that he never intended it to achieve its stated goals. Rather, he may have intended it to bring about a final clash of rival commanders, completing unfinished business of the Northern Expedition. If so, he succeeded, as the conference exacerbated suspicions among the regional commanders that Chiang intended to whittle away at the strength of their group armies. This triggered a series of military challenges to Nanjing’s authority over the course of 1929, which marked the shift to a new phase of struggle between Chiang and the group army commanders. In this new phase, the disputants dropped any pretence of unity and resorted to military force to settle their differences.

The Revolts of 1929

The year 1929 began with the Reorganization and Demobilization Conference, designed at least in part to strengthen the central authority of the Nanjing government, but the rest of the year featured a series of military revolts against that same government. The shift from discussion to armed conflict began with the ‘Hunan Incident’ of February 1929, a dispute over control of that province and its tax revenues. In the spring of 1928, Chiang Kai-shek appointed Lu Diping governor of Hunan, who dutifully passed on tax revenue to the central government in Nanjing. In a clear attempt to exert control over Hunan and its resources, three generals under Li Zongren, commander of the Fourth Group Army and chair of the Wuhan Branch Political Council, led their forces into Changsha to take control of Hunan. Lu Diping fled in the face of their advance, and the invading force replaced him with Hunan military commander He Jian.²⁹

From Nanjing’s perspective, Li Zongren and the officials of the Wuhan Branch Political Council had clearly exceeded their authority in dismissing and appointing a provincial governor, presenting Chiang with a direct challenge that he could not ignore. Chiang ordered the First Group Army to take up positions for an attack on Wuhan, appointing his chief of staff He Yingqin to supervise the preparations. On 14 March, the Nanjing government abruptly abolished all of the branch political councils and ordered Li’s Guangxi forces to withdraw from Changsha.³⁰ Chiang’s central army units under command of Zhu Peide and Liu Zhi formed the bulk of the force sent against Li, but Feng Yuxiang also supported Nanjing, sending six divisions of his Second Group Army under Han Fuju to participate in the attack.³¹ Rumours at the time suggested that Chiang paid Feng a two million Yuan bribe to participate in the campaign, which has led some to emphasize Chiang’s tendency to rely on ‘silver bullets’, or cash payments, to deal with his adversaries.³² Hard evidence of such a payment is lacking and others claim that Feng willingly supplied the troops without a bribe, eager to contribute to the weakening of one of his rival commanders.³³

Chiang Kai-shek gave the order to begin the attack in late March and the battle proved a short affair. Hunan militarist He Jian, who had tried to balance relations with both Chiang and Li Zongren’s Guangxi Clique, announced his support for the Nanjing government. Li Zongren’s forces withdrew, allowing Nanjing to capture Changsha and Wuhan in early April.³⁴ The generals who had driven Lu Diping from office announced their retirements and Li Zongren went into temporary exile in Hong Kong.³⁵

As the first of a series of brief military confrontations between the Nanjing government and the regional commanders, the Hunan Incident played a critical role in the origins of the War of the Central Plains. When the dispute began, Chiang first sent He Yingqin to Hunan to talk with Li Zongren’s representatives, but he failed to resolve the issue through discussion.³⁶ Chiang then had little choice but to use military force to restore his authority. The immediate result of Nanjing’s successful handling of this challenge was that Chiang extended his control over Hunan and Hubei. Moreover, the campaign against Li, along with Chiang’s subsequent reorganization of the Hunan and Hubei provincial forces, served notice to other regional military commanders that Chiang would take aggressive action against any who resisted central authority.

The next revolt came when Feng Yuxiang broke with Nanjing in May 1929. Feng Yuxiang had supported Chiang against Li Zongren during the ‘Hunan Incident’, but he did so at least in part because he anticipated acquiring control of Shandong. Feng held part of Shandong at the end of the Northern Expedition and expected to take control of the rest in the near future, hoping to acquire access to rail lines and seaports that would ease the isolation of his base in Shaanxi and open up new sources of revenue. When Chiang ordered Chen Diaoyuan’s forces to occupy the rail line between Jinan and Qingdao in April, Feng quickly deduced that Chiang did not intend to allow him to take control of Shandong and feared that Chiang would now target him for a military campaign, as he had Li Zongren. In response, Feng pulled his forces back towards Henan and Shaanxi, destroying rail lines in the process to obstruct any advance by central army forces.³⁷

The formal break between Chiang and Feng came in late May, when a group of Feng’s subordinates sent out a ‘circular’ telegram criticizing Chiang Kai-shek for his dictatorial rule. The officers demanded that Chiang resign as commander in chief and asked Feng Yuxiang to lead a revolt against Nanjing. Feng accepted the invitation and announced his command of a new force called the ‘Northwest Army for the Protection of the Party and National Salvation’.³⁸ In Nanjing, the GMD expelled Feng Yuxiang from the party and all positions of authority and Chiang Kai-shek prepared a multi-column military force under Zhu Peide and Liu Zhi to advance into Henan and Shaanxi.³⁹ At the same time, Chiang made overtures to two of Feng’s generals, Shi Yousan and Han Fuju, hoping to persuade them to abandon Feng and accept Nanjing’s central authority. This effort bore fruit when Shi Yousan’s secretary Liu Yidan arrived at He Yingqin’s field headquarters in Wuhan in late May with a letter indicating that Shi and Han had broken with Feng and would support the central government, bringing nearly 100,000 of Feng’s best troops with them. Facing the crippling loss of nearly one third of his army, on 27 May Feng promptly announced his ‘retirement’ and took refuge with Yan Xishan, who gave him sanctuary in Taiyuan.⁴⁰ Yan had thus far remained neutral in these conflicts involving Li and Feng, but he no doubt believed that he would be Chiang’s next target. Yan gave sanctuary to Feng, perhaps hoping that the threat of a Yan–Feng alliance would deter an attack from Nanjing.⁴¹

With Li Zongren and Feng Yuxiang in seclusion for the time being, Chiang Kai-shek returned to the task of promoting reorganization and demobilization, holding a second conference on the subject in August 1929. This prompted another uprising in September, when Zhang Fakui, commander of multiple Nationalist divisions in Guangdong, denounced Chiang and revolted against Nanjing’s authority. Like Feng Yuxiang, Zhang Fakui had supported Chiang’s suppression of Li Zongren’s Guangxi Army in the ‘Hunan Incident’ just months earlier, but Zhang now moved his forces from Hubei across Hunan into Guangxi to ally with elements of the Guangxi Clique to attack central army units in Guangdong.⁴² Shortly thereafter, another revolt in the north appeared imminent. Despite the fact that Feng Yuxiang had stepped down from his command and taken refuge in Shaanxi with Yan Xishan, a group of 27 officers of Feng’s Northwest Army issued a circular telegram announcing their opposition to Nanjing and proposed that Yan Xishan take command of their forces with Feng as deputy commander. This force moved east along the Long–Hai railroad and other routes, preparing to engage Chiang’s central army forces on several fronts in Shaanxi and western Henan. Chiang directed units from Xuchang, establishing a defensive line across northwestern Henan, while He Yingqin assumed command of other units from the Kaifeng field headquarters.⁴³

The 27 officers had clearly named Yan Xishan as commander of this Yan–Feng–Li force, but Yan himself avoided open commitment to either side in this conflict, preferring to wait to see how things developed. He even accepted a position as Chiang Kai-shek’s deputy commander in chief.⁴⁴ Chiang’s forces again made short work of their opponents, defeating Feng Yuxiang’s subordinates in Henan in late November. He Yingqin travelled south to establish and command the Guangzhou field headquarters from which to direct combat operations against Zhang Fakui, taking along several additional divisions of central army troops. In a swift campaign, He Yingqin’s divisions defeated Zhang’s forces and pushed west to capture Wuzhou in Guangxi. From there, Nanjing’s forces separated and threatened to march south towards Nanning and north towards Guilin, essentially ending the threat to Guangzhou.⁴⁵

Before the dust had even settled, yet another regional militarist revolted against Nanjing’s authority in December. Observing these conflicts from his position at Zhengzhou, Tang Shengzhi denounced Chiang Kai-shek, took control of the southern portion of the Ping–Han railroad, and threatened to attack Wuhan. Chiang immediately dispatched He Yingqin back to Wuhan to take over command of the Wuhan field headquarters and direct central army units in southern Henan against Tang.⁴⁶ He directed a swift campaign from Wuhan that surrounded Tang’s force, prompting Tang’s surrender in January 1930. He Yingqin disarmed Tang’s 10,000-odd troops, ending the revolt.⁴⁷ This marked the end of a tumultuous year, but not the end of the conflict between Chiang and his regional commanders.

The successive revolts of 1929 demonstrated a significant level of animosity and distrust among the various regional army commanders and the Nanjing government. More than one year after the nominal completion of the Northern Expedition, this new round of conflict provided ample evidence that unity remained elusive. These revolts also set the precedent for using military force to resolve their differences. Yet the regional commanders remained divided from each other and acted largely on their own. In some cases, one or more had been willing to cooperate with Nanjing in suppressing the revolts of the others. Chiang succeeded in keeping his enemies separated in 1929, but if they managed to combine forces, it would pose the greatest military challenge the young Nanjing regime had faced to that point.

Part II: Combat Operations in the War of the Central Plains

This is exactly what happened in the War of the Central Plains of 1930, when the combined forces of Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, Li Zongren, and other commanders, totalling more than 700,000 soldiers, took the field against Chiang Kai-shek’s 300,000-odd central army and allied provincial forces in the largest conflict that Nanjing had faced up to that time.⁴⁸ The war takes its name from the region of the middle and lower reaches of the Yellow River, the centre of much of the fighting, but combat operations stretched over broad fronts in both northern and southern China. The most intense combat took place in Henan province, along the Long–Hai and Ping–Han railroads, the major lines of transportation and communication. Shandong served as a secondary sector of the northern front, where combat operations followed the Jin–Pu railroad. The southern front saw important operations in Hunan province, where a large force of Guangxi troops marched north to unite forces with Feng and Yan.⁴⁹ This set of circumstances strained Nanjing’s resources to the limit and posed a far greater challenge than the individual revolts of 1929.⁵⁰

Throughout 1929, Yan Xishan had remained cautious as the various revolts rose and fell. Even as Feng Yuxiang’s subordinates urged him to take command of their forces, Yan avoided an open rupture with Chiang Kai-shek and the Nanjing government. Following Feng’s defeat in May 1929, he spent the next several months in Taiyuan, where Yan provided sanctuary and listened to Feng’s arguments in favour of revolt. Yan no doubt found Feng’s arguments persuasive, but he also might have had concerns that if he did not ally with Feng against Chiang, Feng might change his mind and ally with Chiang against Yan.⁵¹ By February 1930, the two men had come to an agreement and declared their formal opposition to the Nanjing government. They found additional support from Li Zongren, Zhang Fakui, and a host of Chiang’s political rivals such as Wang Jingwei, Chen Gongbo, and others from the ‘Reorganizationalist’ and ‘Western Hills’ factions of the GMD.

Thus, in early 1930 a formidable group of military and political officials within the NRA and GMD came together in an unprecedented movement to unseat Chiang Kai-shek. The conflict began on 10 February, when Yan Xishan sent out the first of a series of circular telegrams to military and political officials, calling on Chiang to cease his reliance on military force against opponents, suggesting that they should both resign their positions for the ‘benefit of the country’. Chiang responded on 12 February, insisting that he only desired peaceful unification but that current circumstances rendered that impossible.⁵² This marked the start of a flurry of such messages from February through April, which historians have dubbed the ‘telegram war’ (dianbao zhan) in which both sides openly denounced each other. Unfortunately, this term contributes to the tendency to see this conflict as a minor, or perhaps even comical, political dispute, rather than a full-scale military revolt that threatened the very existence of the Nanjing government. In early April, Yan Xishan formally assumed the position of commander in chief of the Yan–Feng–Li coalition, with Feng and Li as deputy commanders.⁵³ Yan named Zhang Xueliang, who controlled Manchuria, a deputy commander as well, but Zhang did not accept and remained above the fray until September, when he sided with Chiang Kai-shek.

The Northern Front: Henan and Shandong

Feng and Yan met in early May at Xinxiang and Zhengzhou to consult with their subordinates and devise a plan of action.⁵⁴ They settled on a strategy that essentially divided the northern front into two sections. To the west in Henan province, Feng’s Northwest Army, now renamed the Second Front Army, would move east and south along the Long–Hai and Ping–Han railroads, through Henan towards Xuzhou in Jiangsu province. To the east, Yan’s Shanxi Army, now the Third Front Army, would advance south along the Jin–Pu railroad towards Jinan in Shandong province. Shi Yousan again switched allegiance and now joined the Yan–Feng–Li forces, providing support for Yan in Shandong. All of these forces would converge in a pincer movement on Xuzhou, the intersection of the Long–Hai and Jin–Pu railroads. From there, they planned a coordinated assault south against Nanjing, designed to topple Chiang Kai-shek and the Nanjing government.⁵⁵

In planning his strategy at the start of the war in early May, Chiang Kai-shek identified Feng Yuxiang as the greatest threat and therefore arranged his central army troops to take the offensive in the west, along the Long–Hai and Ping–Han railroads, and to defend in the east, along the Jin–Pu railroad.⁵⁶ Beginning on 11 May, Liu Zhi and He Chengjun, commanding Nanjing’s Second and Third Group Armies respectively, advanced along the Ping–Han and Long–Hai railroads into eastern and central Henan, attempting to check Feng’s eastward movement and prevent him from uniting with Yan’s forces.⁵⁷ Liu Zhi succeeded in driving back some of Yan Xishan’s troops stationed on the Long–Hai railroad and capturing Guide (modern Shangqiu), but the fighting continued for months around Guide, Ningling, Lanfeng, Minquan, Xuchang, and Zhengzhou, with neither side able to break through.⁵⁸ By late May, casualties ran high, with some units experiencing 50 per cent losses.⁵⁹ Feng had numerical superiority and made a strong effort to break through and connect with Yan Xishan’s forces to the east. Liu’s forces had smaller numbers, but an edge in technology, deploying British tanks and using American airplanes for bombing and reconnaissance in eastern and central Henan.⁶⁰ Chiang travelled to Guide to personally direct Nanjing’s military operations. In mid-June, the situation on the northern front began to change as Feng launched a fierce attack on Xuchang, driving Nanjing’s forces back.⁶¹ Feng’s cavalry units under Zheng Dazhang launched an attack on the Guide airfield, where they destroyed several aircraft. Little did they know Chiang Kai-shek stood less than two miles away on the platform at the train station with a small guard of 200 soldiers, preparing to leave Guide. Had Zheng’s men been aware of Chiang’s close proximity, the war might have come to an early end.⁶²

Chiang responded to these defeats in Henan with a counter-attack in late June, ordering Liu Zhi, Chen Cheng, and Zhang Zhizhong to attack Kaifeng with large numbers of troops and heavy artillery.⁶³ Feng Yuxiang guessed Chiang’s intentions and ordered his forces to fall back and ‘lure the enemy in deep’ (youdi shenru) in order to set up a ‘pocket war’ (koudai zhanzheng) in which they would surround and annihilate Chiang’s troops. Aerial reconnaissance reported an open route to Kaifeng, but Chiang intercepted a secret message from Feng to one of his subordinates that revealed the trap. Chiang therefore changed his plan, attacking Feng’s forces on the Ping–Han railroad in three days of intense combat. Feng’s plan for the ‘pocket war’ failed, but Chiang’s forces suffered significant casualties.⁶⁴

As fighting continued in Henan, combat operations developed on the eastern sector of the northern front. Having directed most of his central army forces to battlefields in Henan, Chiang Kai-shek had left the former Feng Yuxiang subordinate Han Fuju to defend Shandong. Han took up a position on the western bank of the Yellow River to block Yan Xishan’s forces from advancing towards Jinan.⁶⁵ In late May, as Yan Xishan’s Third Front Army advanced south along the Jin–Pu railroad, Chiang Kai-shek dispatched Chen Diaoyuan to intercept this force and defend the rail line in southern Shandong. Yan Xishan and his subordinate Fu Zuoyi split into separate columns to flank Chen’s forces and converged on Jinan. Chiang Kai-shek ordered Han Fuju to defend Jinan, but without additional support Han did not believe he could hold the city. He withdrew and yielded Jinan to Yan Xishan on 25 June.⁶⁶

This period in June and early July marked the low point of the war for Chiang Kai-shek, who saw his forces lose ground on both ends of the northern front. To make matters worse, Chiang learned that the Guangxi force had begun moving steadily through Hunan towards Wuhan, threatening his rear lines.⁶⁷ There is some evidence to suggest that Chiang Kai-shek initiated a ‘peace movement’ at this dire moment, requesting that Zhang Xueliang serve as an intermediary to help negotiate a political settlement to the war.⁶⁸ Miles Lampson noted in late June that ‘no progress seems to have been made for reconciliation with anti-Nanking factions’, which might indicate that Chiang had indeed initiated peace talks.⁶⁹ It is unclear what Chiang had in mind, but he likely envisioned a restoration of power-sharing, similar to the situation that existed in 1928. If true, this proposal fell on deaf ears, as Feng and Yan perhaps saw military victory within their grasp and declined to negotiate. Yet Nanjing officials denied the existence of any such ‘peace movement’. Dr Wang Zhengting, Nanjing’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, told American minister to China Nelson Johnson ‘there was no truth in the reports of efforts at peace by compromise’.⁷⁰ The New York Times reported in mid-June that the offer of peace came not from Nanjing but from Feng Yuxiang, who offered to accompany Chiang Kai-shek if the latter would agree to resign and go abroad. Chiang rejected the offer and instead redoubled his military efforts, focusing on the eastern end of the northern front.⁷¹ Whatever the case, with his forces in Henan already in retreat towards Shandong, Chiang shifted some central army forces under Liu Zhi, Chen Cheng, and Hu Zongnan to the east to recapture Jinan. Only in late July did Chiang manage to direct a general offensive in Shandong, recapture Jinan, and regain momentum on the northern front. Nanjing’s forces gradually wore down Yan’s troops, who eventually gave way and allowed Chiang to reoccupy Jinan on 15 August.⁷²

As Chiang’s forces approached Jinan in early August, Yan Xishan sent several messages to Feng Yuxiang, urging him to attack through Henan and threaten Chiang’s flank in order to relieve the pressure on Yan in Shandong.⁷³ Feng agreed and divided some 20 divisions into three columns for an attack through eastern Henan, with ultimate designs on Xuzhou at the junction of the Long–Hai and Jin–Pu railroads. Control of Xuzhou would allow close coordination of Feng’s and Yan’s armies and open the way for an attack on Nanjing and Wuhan. In one of the largest battles of the war, from 6 to 10 August, Feng launched this ‘August Offensive’ against Chiang’s flank in eastern Henan. The two sides fought in heavy rainstorms that turned the battlefield into a muddy mess. The bad weather perhaps favoured Chiang, as it complicated troop movements and resupply of Feng’s attacking forces. Chiang exhorted his troops to fight to the death, as he had shifted most of his forces east to recapture Jinan, and a loss in Henan would seriously undermine his position. After days of bloody combat, Feng withdrew and his offensive ended in defeat.⁷⁴ The successful defence against Feng’s ‘August Offensive’ and Chiang’s recapture of Jinan dealt a serious blow to the Yan–Feng–Li coalition. Following up on these victories with a counter-attack west into Henan along the Long–Hai railroad, Chiang’s forces captured Luoyang and pushed Feng Yuxiang back into northern Henan and Shaanxi. By the end of August, the battlefield situation had changed dramatically, with Chiang Kai-shek and Nanjing in a dominant position.⁷⁵

On 18 September 1930, approximately one month after the recapture of Jinan and the blunting of Feng’s August Offensive, Zhang Xueliang made his famous declaration of support for Chiang Kai-shek and the Nanjing government. Zhang immediately sent his troops through the pass at Shanhaiguan into north China, prompting Yan Xishan to pull his forces back into Shaanxi and forestalling any attempt at a counterattack on Shandong. Despite Zhang’s entry into the conflict, Feng wanted to continue the war, but several of his commanders gave up and defected to Nanjing, leaving him with insufficient forces press on. Chiang’s armies continued to push deeper into Henan and Shaanxi, capturing Kaifeng, Zhengzhou, and Xi’an in October, ending military operations in the war.⁷⁶

While most Western writers have described Zhang Xueliang’s declaration of support for Chiang Kai-shek as the decisive act of the war, Chinese scholars tend to give greater weight to battlefield developments. Xu Youli, Guo Xuyin, Chen Shenru, and Zhang Xianwen, for example, have argued that the failure of Feng’s ‘August Offensive’ combined with Chiang’s successful capture of Jinan in mid-August spelled the end of the Yan–Feng–Li coalition, well before Zhang’s announcement. Michael Richard Gibson is one of the few Western scholars to reject the claim that Zhang’s decision to support Chiang determined the outcome of the war. Gibson argues that the capture of Xuchang, Henan on 18 September, the same day as Zhang’s announcement, opened the road to Zhengzhou and Luoyang, and therefore served as the decisive battle of the conflict.⁷⁷ Regardless of which of these battles one deems ‘decisive’, there is strong evidence that the military balance of the conflict had already tipped far enough in favour of Nanjing by mid-September to ensure Chiang’s victory, as he had driven back enemy forces on all fronts. Indeed, one foreign observer at the time described Zhang’s decision as ‘not unexpected’ and noted that it ‘did not create unusual excitement’.⁷⁸ It did perhaps dissuade Yan Xishan from making a counter-attack on Shandong or Hebei, but by no means marked a decisive turning point in the war. In this light, it might be more accurate to describe Zhang Xueliang’s declaration as providing the ‘icing on the cake’ that Chiang and his central army had already baked.

The Southern Front: Hunan

If one accepts the argument that military operations, rather than Zhang Xueliang’s announcement, determined the outcome of the war, then one might well ask why the combat situation shifted in favour of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nanjing government? In other words, how did Chiang go from suffering defeats on all fronts in June to a decisive battlefield victory in mid-August? The answer to this question lies in the Hunan campaign. A close analysis of the war suggests that while the most intense and sustained fighting took place on the northern front, combat operations on the southern front provided the necessary opportunity for Chiang to achieve victory in the war. The War of the Central Plains proved a particularly challenging operation for Chiang because it compelled him to deploy his forces across multiple fronts, a situation he had sought to avoid whenever possible. From the earliest days of the Eastern Expeditions of 1925, the Northern Expedition of 1926–1928, and through the revolts of 1929, he had largely succeeded in dealing with his major enemies one at a time. In 1930, the three largest regional forces had come together in a united effort to defeat Chiang, forcing him to fight in Henan, Shandong, and Hunan simultaneously. At the end of June Chiang found himself in a dangerous position, as his best forces in Henan fell back to the east in the face of intense attacks from Feng Yuxiang, and Yan Xishan drove south into Shandong and captured Jinan. With his forces dispersed across the northern front and losing ground, Chiang also had to deal with an attack on his rear lines, through Hunan and Hubei. Ironically, the outcome of the fighting on the southern front provided Chiang with an opportunity to turn the tide of battle in the north and win the war.

Li Zongren’s Guangxi forces formed the bulk of the Yan–Feng–Li coalition’s First Front Army, which conducted operations on the southern front. Following his defeat in the 1929 ‘Hunan Incident’, Li Zongren had left China for a brief period of exile in Hong Kong and Vietnam, but he returned to Guangxi late that same year. By that time, Feng and Yan had already begun assembling their coalition, which included Zhang Fakui, Wang Jingwei, and Chen Gongbo. Li sent a telegram of support to Yan and dispatched representatives to meet with Yan Xishan in early March to discuss cooperation. Within a few weeks, Yan named Li Zongren one of three deputy commanders of the Yan–Feng–Li armed coalition, a position he accepted on 1 April 1930.⁷⁹

Fully committed to the Yan–Feng–Li coalition, when combat began on the northern front Li Zongren met in Nanning with his colleagues Bai Chongxi and Zhang Fakui, both of whom joined Li in support of Yan Xishan, in order to discuss how to deploy their troops. They concluded that they should send their forces north into Hunan en route to the strategic tri-city area of Wuhan. Once in control of Wuhan, they would secure Feng Yuxiang’s flank in southern Henan, allowing him to commit more of his force to the fighting in eastern Henan, and launch attacks on Chiang’s rear area. Most importantly, this would put the Yan–Feng–Li coalition in control of the middle Yangzi River area and pose a direct threat to the Nationalist capital, which lay just downriver. Li Zongren did not anticipate strong resistance from provincial forces in Hunan and envisioned a rapid advance on Wuhan to connect with Feng and Yan, leading to the destruction of Chiang’s central army. Estimates of the exact size of the Guangxi force varied, with some suggesting 40,000 while others went as high as 95,000.⁸⁰ In preparation for the campaign, Li divided his forces into three columns under the separate commands of Bai Chongxi, Zhang Fakui, and Huang Shaohong, which began moving across the border into Hunan and then along the Yue–Han (Guangdong–Hankou) railroad towards Wuhan. As expected, the invading force encountered little opposition as it crossed into Hunan, with Bai Chongxi and Zhang Fakui leading the way and capturing Yongzhou on 22 May and Changsha on 4 June. Huang Shaohong’s column moved more slowly, bringing up the rear of the invading force.⁸¹

Already heavily engaged on both ends of the northern front, Chiang Kai-shek now had to give serious thought to the southern front, which loomed as a dangerous threat. Once he learned of the Guangxi force’s advance into Hunan, Chiang sent He Yingqin to the Wuhan field headquarters to take command of all of Nanjing’s forces in Hunan, Hubei, Guangdong, and Jiangxi. He Yingqin took responsibility for defending Wuhan and preventing Li Zongren’s southern force from uniting with Feng and Yan in the north. Chiang understood that the Guangxi force had numerical superiority, so he ordered He Yingqin to ‘lure the enemy in deep and then look for an opportunity to annihilate them’.⁸² This proved sound advice, as He Yingqin commanded a relatively small force at Wuhan and could expect no reinforcements from neighbouring Henan, where central army units had their hands full with Feng Yuxiang. Hunan commander He Jian led the largest contingent of provincial troops, but these could not match the invading force. Moreover, Chiang had reason to doubt He Jian’s loyalty, as he had previously cooperated with Li Zongren.⁸³ With little chance of stopping the advance of the Guangxi force in Hunan, He Yingqin considered pulling back all his forces to Hubei in order to prepare a defence of Wuhan. After careful consideration, He Yingqin concluded that his smaller force could not defend Wuhan, so he pored over maps of the region, thinking long and hard about an alternative approach before he finally settled on an ‘empty fortress strategy’ designed to delay and confuse the advancing force. He Yingqin instructed He Jian not to fall back on Wuhan from Changsha, as Bai and Zhang undoubtedly expected, but to move northwest towards Changde.⁸⁴

This simple yet effective strategy accomplished multiple goals. First, it preserved He Jian’s force for the time being, which might have been crushed had it engaged the Guangxi force at Changsha or been isolated at Wuhan. Second, it confused the Guangxi leaders, who had expected He Yingqin to pull all available forces back to Wuhan. Instead, He Yingqin left the road to Wuhan wide open, seemingly unconcerned about an attack. Li, Bai, and Zhang not only suspected a trap in Wuhan, but they also had to prepare for the possibility of ambush as He Jian’s forces might launch a surprise attack against the Guangxi force as it moved towards Wuhan. This forced them to slow their advance and move cautiously. In the meantime, Chiang ordered the Sixtieth and Sixty-first divisions under Cai Tingkai and Jiang Guangnai to move overland from Guangdong into southern Hunan and sent an additional 10,000 troops under Tan Taoyuan and Miao Bingwan to travel by ship from Guangdong to Shanghai, and then down river to Wuhan.⁸⁵

On 10 June, Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai, and their two divisions of approximately 16,000 Guangdong troops arrived at Hengyang, Hunan, 120 miles south of Changsha. Jiang and Cai would later command the Nineteenth Route Army, which achieved a degree of fame and notoriety for its resistance to the Japanese Imperial Army in the 1932 Shanghai War.⁸⁶ At this time, Li Zongren’s force had moved north from Changsha and its advance unit had already crossed into Hubei, leading Li to anticipate connecting with Feng’s forces by 15 June.⁸⁷ Yet his forces stretched out in a lengthy line, as the third column under Huang Shaohong’s command lagged behind and had not yet even crossed into Hunan. The Nationalist occupation of Hengyang therefore cut the invading Guangxi force in two and severed its supply line. This posed a serious problem as Hunan had suffered a terrible drought and food was scarce. A surprised Li Zongren and his commanders had two choices before them: they could collect those forces north of Hengyang and continue on to Wuhan as originally planned or turn around and recapture Hengyang. Concerns about the food supplies left Li feeling vulnerable, which no doubt influenced his decision to turn south to attack Cai and Jiang at Hengyang, restore the supply line and connection to the rear column, and then proceed with the original plan to attack Wuhan. Moreover, Huang Shaohong’s column, still to the south of Hengyang, carried all of the engineering equipment that might be necessary for a siege of a major city like Wuhan.⁸⁸ Beginning on 15 June, Li’s force moved back to the south towards Hengyang, leaving Changsha in the hands of local troops.⁸⁹

Central Plains War map.

Chiang Kai-shek and He Yingqin saw their opportunity and ordered all available forces to converge on southern Hunan to join attacks on the Guangxi force. He Jian attacked from the northwest, smaller units attacked from the Jiangxi–Hubei border, and naval ships arrived to provide additional artillery support from the Xiang River. Beginning on 18 June, the Guangxi force attacked in the area around Hengyang, inflicting losses on Jiang’s and Cai’s divisions at Leiyang.⁹⁰ With support from Hunan forces of the Fourth and Eighth Route Armies, the Nationalists turned the tide of battle and forced Li, Bai, and Zhang to work their way to the west of Hengyang in order to cross the border into Guangxi. The Guangxi units suffered heavy casualties in the campaign, with an estimated 12,000 killed, wounded, or taken prisoner.⁹¹ The battle at Hengyang marked the end of operations on the southern front for the duration of the war.

With the victory over the Guangxi force in Hunan, Chiang’s central army now quickly returned focus to the northern front. Some of Nanjing’s units pursued the Guangxi force as it left Hunan, but others shifted to the northern front, including Sixtieth and Sixty-first divisions.⁹² American military attaché Captain Parker G. Tenney interpreted the victory in Hunan as a ‘decided change in the situation’, noting that it allowed the Nationalists to ‘transfer large numbers of troops from the Wuhan area to the eastern [Shandong] front, with which Chiang has been able to replete an exhausted reserve’.⁹³ These forces landed at Qingdao to provide what Miles Lampson called the ‘final stroke’ in the recapture of Jinan from the Shanxi Army on the Jin–Pu railroad front, which drove Yan Xishan’s forces back into Shanxi and essentially ended their role in the war. Chiang Kai-shek then shifted the bulk of his forces to Henan for an offensive against Feng Yuxiang on the Long–Hai railroad front, which ultimately compelled Feng to announce his resignation.⁹⁴ While it proved of relatively short duration and produced far fewer casualties than the combat in Henan and Shandong, victory in Hunan provided Nanjing’s forces with a much-needed boost and changed the overall military situation.

Conclusion

This analysis of the War of the Central Plains points to a number of conclusions. First, far from a minor spat or simple scramble for power, this important war settled unresolved issues left over from the Northern Expedition. This largest, bloodiest, and most consequential of a series of internal revolts in the immediate years after the establishment of the new government in Nanjing ended military challenges to Chiang’s authority from within the Nationalist camp. It by no means ensured complete subordination, but afterwards Feng, Yan, and Li returned to their regional bases and eventually reconciled themselves to cooperation with Chiang Kai-shek. The war also marked the expansion of Chiang’s power base to include Anhui, Henan, Hunan, and Hubei. Success in the war stabilized the young Nanjing regime and demonstrated a certain degree of competence and skill on the part of its military commanders. As Chiang Kai-shek biographer Jay Taylor argues, the War of the Central Plains played a critical role in preserving Chiang’s dominant position in the early days of the Nationalist government, but also established his reputation as an accomplished military commander.⁹⁵ The Nanjing government would then turn to other concerns, including state building and dealing with the CCP and the Japanese military.

Second, in contrast to most English-language descriptions of the war, the outcome came as a direct result of military operations, rather than Zhang Xueliang’s declaration of support for Nanjing. The combination of the defeat of Feng Yuxiang’s ‘August Offensive’ and the recapture of Jinan from Yan Xishan’s forces on 15 August spelled the end for the Yan–Feng–Li coalition, a full month before Zhang made his famous declaration on 18 September. By the time Zhang sent his troops through the pass into north China to join the war, Chiang’s forces had already driven Feng, Yan, and Li back into their regional bases. The formal conclusion of the war came in November, but the die had been cast in August.

Third, military operations on the southern front proved critical to the Nationalist victory in the War of the Central Plains. In June, the Yan–Feng–Li coalition scored important victories on the northern front, which put Chiang’s forces on the defensive and threatened to topple him from his position as commander in chief. In Henan, Feng Yuxiang launched a fierce attack on Liu Zhi’s forces at Guide, driving them back along the Long–Hai railroad and inflicting serious casualties, pushing the Nationalist line back, and nearly capturing Chiang himself. At the same time, Feng also drove He Chengjun’s Second Group Army from Xuchang. In Shandong, Yan Xishan’s forces went on the attack, capturing Jinan on 25 June and threatening to push south along the Jin–Pu railroad towards Xuzhou and Nanjing. In Hunan, Li Zongren’s First Front Army stood within weeks of reaching Wuhan, posing a dire threat to Chiang’s southern flank. At this critical point in the war, Nationalist forces won an important victory at Hengyang, which boosted morale, eliminated the threat to the rear lines, kept the major enemy forces divided, and allowed Chiang to transfer additional troops to the northern front to support operations in both Shandong and Henan. The Nationalist success in Hunan altered the balance of power on the northern front and proved the decisive battle of the war. Had things been different, had Li Zongren’s force succeeded in taking Wuhan in early July 1930, it is likely that Chiang Kai-shek would have lost this war and his positions within the Nanjing government and Nationalist military, and seen his career as a commander come to an abrupt end. Instead, he survived this greatest military challenge to the Nanjing government and moved on to other challenges of the ‘Nanjing Decade’.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their suggestions and guidance in the preparation of this article.

Funding

The research for this article was supported by the A.M. Pate, Jr. Professorship.

1

On the factionalism and consolidation of the GMD, see Brian G. Martin, ‘The Green Gang and the Guomindang State: Du Yuesheng and the Politics of Shanghai, 1927–1937’, The Journal of Asian Studies 54 (1995), pp. 64–92.

2

Hans van de Ven, War and Nationalism in China, 1925–1945 (London, 2003), p. 139.

3

S.C.M. Paine, The Wars for Asia 1911–1949 (Cambridge, 2012), p. 71; Ray Huang, ‘Chiang Kai-shek and His Diary as a Historical Source’, Chinese Studies in History 29 (1995), p. 61.

4

There is one non-scholarly book on the subject, composed exclusively of articles available on Wikipedia. See Frederica P. Miller, Agnes F. Vandome, and John McBrewster, eds, Central Plains War (Alphascript, 2010).

5

For a notable exception, see Bruce Elleman and S.C.M. Paine, Modern China: Continuity and Change, 1644 to the Present (New York, 2009).

6

Lampson telegram, 4 April 1930, The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 371/14692. Hereafter TNAUK.

7

See Jack Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions: China from the 1800s to 2000 (Oxford, 2001), p. 233; James Sheridan, China in Disintegration: The Republican Era in Chinese History, 1912–1949 (New York, 1977), p. 186; Lloyd Eastman, ‘The Nanking Decade, 1927–1937’, in John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker, eds, The Cambridge History of China. Volume 13 Republican China, Part 2 (Cambridge, 1986), p. 127. One notable exception is Rana Mitter, who writes that Zhang Xueliang ‘did not intervene in the war until Chiang’s victory was fairly assured’. Rana Mitter, The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China (Berkeley, CA, 2000), p. 57.

8

Eastman, ‘The Nanking Decade, 1927–1937’, p. 127; van de Ven, War and Nationalism, 1925–1945, p. 139; Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China (Cambridge, MA, 2009), p. 90.

9

For an excellent introduction to the changing scholarship on the Nationalists, see Frederic E. Wakeman and Richard L. Edmonds, eds, Reappraising Republican China (Oxford, 2000).

10

See Hans van de Ven’s analysis of Western writings on the Chinese Nationalist military and government in War and Nationalism in China, pp. 6–8. See also Peter Worthing, General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China (Cambridge, 2016), pp. 2–3.

11

R.J. Rummel, China’s Bloody Century: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900 (New Brunswick, 1991), p. 59. Zhang Xianwen of Nanjing University estimates that the War of the Central Plains produced between 300,000 and 400,000 casualties. Zhang Xianwen, ed., Zhonghua minguo shigang [An Outline History of the Republic of China] (Henan, 1985), p. 368.

12

Situation Report, 17 June to 1 July, 13, U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China, 1911–1941 (Frederick, MD, 1982), Reel I, 0479. Hereafter USMIRC. The observer, an American military officer, noted that while operations on the Western front of the First World War usually featured an artillery barrage prior to the assault, Chinese forces in the War of the Central Plains often attacked without artillery support.

13

Paul Cohen, History in Three Keys: The Boxers as Event, Experience, and Myth (New York, 1997), p. 61.

14

Chen Jinjin, Difang shilipai yu zhongyuan dazhan [Chinese Warlords and the Civil War in 1930] (Taibei, 2002), p. 6.

15

Lloyd Eastman describes contemporary views of Chiang’s attempts at reorganization and demobilization in ‘Nationalist China during the Nanking Decade, 1927–1937’, pp. 125–6.

16

Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo, p. 85; ‘Speech of Chiang Kai-shek at the Opening of the Disbandment Conference’, USMIRC, Reel VI, 0034.

17

He Yingqin jiangjun jiuwu shouyan congshu bianji weiyuanhui. He Yingqin jiangjun jiuwu jishi changbian [A Record of General He Yingqin’s 95 Years], 2 vols (Taibei, 1984), pp. 202–3. Hereafter HYQJJ.

18

See Chiang’s remarks at the 1929 Conference on the financial aspects of reorganization and demobilization in ‘Speech of Chiang Kai-shek at the Opening of the Disbandment Conference’, USMIRC, Reel VI, 0044.

19

Michael Richard Gibson, ‘Chiang Kai-shek’s Central Army’ (PhD dissertation, George Washington University, 1985), pp. 154–5.

20

HYQJJ, p. 209; Li Tsung-jen and Te-kong Tong, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen (Boulder, CO, 1979), p. 257.

21

‘Disbandment of Troops in the Chinese Armies’, USMIRC, Reel VIII, 0330; Li Baoming, ‘Guojiahua’ mingyixia de ‘sishuhua’ – Jiang Jieshi dui guomin gemingjun de kongzhi yanjiu [‘Privatization’ in the Name of ‘Nationalization’ – A Study of Chiang Kai-shek’s Control of the National Revolutionary Army] (Beijing, 2010), p. 53; van de Ven, War and Nationalism, pp. 134–5; Li Yuan, Jiang Jieshi he He Yingqin [Chiang Kai-shek and He Yingqin] (Changchun, 1996), p. 96.

22

HYQJJ, pp. 208–9.

23

Li Baoming, ‘Guojiahua’, p. 58; Li Zhongming, He Yingqin dazhuan [Biography of He Yingqin] (Beijing, 2008), pp. 61–2; Li Yuan, Jiang Jieshi he He Yingqin, pp. 96–7.

24

‘National Military Reorganization and Disbandment Conference’, USMIRC, Reel VI, 0034.

25

‘National Military Reorganization and Disbandment Conference’, USMIRC, Reel VI, 0034.

26

‘Circular Telegram Issued at the Conclusion of the Conference Pledging Faithful Carrying Out of the Resolutions Adopted’, USMIRC, Reel VI, 0057.

27

Li Tsung-jen, Memoirs, p. 261; Li Baoming, ‘Guojiahua’, p. 59, note 2. Li Baoming claims that both men left Nanjing on 29 January, after the final sessions of the conference.

28

F.F. Liu, A Military History of Modern China, 1924–1949 (Princeton, 1956), pp. 73–4; James Sheridan, Chinese Warlord, p. 243. Captain Parker Tenney, assistant military attaché in China, described the effort as a ‘failure’ due in part because of its ‘wide scope’ and lack of ‘machinery for its execution’. See USMIRC, Reel VI, 0058.

29

For descriptions of the ‘Hunan Incident’, see van de Ven, War and Nationalism, p. 137; Zhang Xianwen, Zhonghua minguo shigang, pp. 358–59; Li Tsung-jen, Memoirs, pp. 266–7; Edward L. Dreyer, China at War, 1901–1949 (New York, 1995), p. 152; Sheridan, Chinese Warlord, p. 253.

30

Keiji Furuya, Chiang K’ai-shek: His Life and Times (New York, 1981), p. 274.

31

Li Zhongming, He Yingqin dazhuan, p. 64.

32

Van de Ven, War and Nationalism, p. 137; Dreyer, China at War, p. 152; Eastman, ‘Nationalist China during the Nanking Decade’, p. 126.

33

Li Tsung-jen, Memoirs, p. 267; Sheridan, Chinese Warlord, p. 254.

34

Liu Zhi, Wode huiyi [My Memoirs] (Taibei, 1982), p. 69.

35

The generals involved in the ‘Hunan Incident’ were Hu Zongduo, Xia Wei, and Tao Jun.

36

HYQJJ, 213.

37

Zhang Xianwen, Zhonghua minguo shigang, p. 361; Gibson, ‘Chiang Kai-shek’s Central Army’, p. 180; HYQJJ, p. 218; Sheridan, Chinese Warlord, pp. 255–9; Keiji Furuya, Chiang K’ai-shek, p. 275.

38

Sheridan, Chinese Warlord, p. 260.

39

HYQJJ, 219–20; Zhang Xianwen, Zhonghua minguo shigang, p. 362.

40

HYQJJ, pp. 220–1; Sheridan, Chinese Warlord, pp. 261–2. Again, some have seen bribes at work here. Hans van de Ven claims that Chiang bribed Shi and Han; see van de Ven, War and Nationalism, p. 138. Chen Jinjin offers one of the more detailed studies of the conflict and makes no mention of bribery. Chen, Difang shilipai, p. 64.

41

Donald Gillin, Warlord, pp. 111–12; van de Ven, War and Nationalism, p. 138.

42

HYQJJ, p. 223; Sheridan, Chinese Warlord, pp. 263–4; Keiji Furuya, Chiang Kai-shek, p. 280.

43

HYQJJ, p. 222.

44

Sheridan, Chinese Warlord, p. 264.

45

HYQJJ, pp. 224–6.

46

HYQJJ, p. 226; Xiong Zongren, He Yingqin: xuanwo zhong de lishi [He Yingqin: History in the Vortex], 2 vols (Guiyang, 2001), pp. 252–3.

47

Li Zhongming, He Yingqin dazhuan, pp. 66–7; HYQJJ, pp. 227–8.

48

Most order-of-battle estimates fall within this range. See Liu Zhi, Wode huiyi, p. 87; van de Ven, War and Nationalism, p. 138; Liu Yi, ‘Jiang Feng Yan guanxi he zhongyuan dazhan [Relations between Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yuxiang, and Yan Xishan and the Central Plains War]’, in Zhao Zhengmin, ed., Zhongyuan dazhan neimu [The Inside Story of the Central Plains War] (Taiyuan, 1994), p. 10.

49

Lu Ping, He Yingqin jiangjun yinxiang ji [A Record of Impressions of General He Yingqin] (Taibei, 1946), pp. 14–15. Lu Ping is a pseudonym for Liu Jianqun who served as He Yingqin’s secretary in the early 1930s.

50

British observers noted that fact that the war effort strained Nanjing’s resources to the point that they doubted the government’s ability to pay its troops. See Intelligence, Shanghai, 18 August 1930, TNAUK, FO 371/14693; BMA to WO, 13 August 1930, TNAUK, FO 371/14693.

51

Chen, Difang shilipai, pp. 66–8.

52

For a brief review of these telegrams, see United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1930, vol. II (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1945), pp. 4–5. Hereafter FRUS.

53

Lampson telegram, 4 April 1930, TNAUK, FO 371/14692.

54

The China Critic, 8 May 1930, p. 444; British Military Attaché (BMA) to War Office (WO), 3 May 1930, TNAUK, FO 371/14692.

55

Xu Youli, ‘Zhongyuan dazhan henan zhanchang shishikao [A Historical Study of the Henan Battlefield during the War of the Central Plains]’, Xuchang shizhuan xuebao 14 (1995), p. 41; Chen, Difang shilipai, p. 56; Chen Shenru, ‘Ping zhongyuan dazhan’ [A Review of the Central Plains War], Junshi lishi yanjiu (December 1992), pp. 93–4; Wang Xiaohua and Zhang Qingjun, eds, Zhongyuan dazhan [The Central Plains War] (Nanjing, 1999), pp. 202–3.

56

Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State, 15 May 1930, FRUS, 1930, Volume II, p. 11; Guo Xuyin, ‘Ping zhongyuan dazhan zhong Feng Yuxiang de juece’ [A Review of Feng Yuxiang’s Decision-Making in the Central Plains War], Junshi lishi yanjiu (October 1990), p. 51.

57

The China Critic, 24 April 1930, p. 398.

58

‘Drive on Shantung Threatens Nanking’, The New York Times, 15 May 1930.

59

Xu Yongchang, ‘Zhongyuan dazhan shiweiji’ [A Complete Record of the Central Plains War], in Zhao Zhengmin, ed., Zhongyuan dazhan; Liu Yi, ‘Jiang Feng Yan guanxi’, p. 40; Gibson, ‘Chiang Kai-shek’s Central Army’, p. 196; Xu Youli, ‘Zhongyuan dazhan henan’, p. 42; Situation Report, 16 June 1930, USMIRC, Reel VIII, 0654; Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State, 10 June 1930, FRUS 1930, Vol. II, 14; The China Critic, 5 June 1930, p. 541. The China Critic reported rumors that Chiang Kai-shek had been wounded in the fighting.

60

Situation Report, 19 May 1930, USMIRC, Reel VIII, 0639; BMA to WO, 10 May 1930, TNAUK, FO 371/14692.

61

Xu Youli, ‘Zhongyuan dazhan henan’, p. 42; Lu Fangsong, ‘Zhongyuan dazhan zhong fanJiang zhenying de zhanlue shiwu [Strategic Mistakes of the Anti-Chiang Camp in the War of the Central Plains]’, Shangqiu shifan xueyuan xuebao 17 (2001), p. 60.

62

BMA to WO, 18 June 1930, TNAUK, 371/14692; Guo Xuyin, ‘Ping zhongyuan dazhan’, p. 52; Liu Yi, ‘Jiang Feng Yan guanxi’, pp. 14–15; Xu Youli, ‘Zhongyuan dazhan henan’, p. 42; Zhang Xianwen, Zhonghua minguo shigang, p. 367.

63

BMA to WO, 26 June 1930, TNAUK, FO 371/14692.

64

BMA to WO, 4 July 1930, TNAUK, FO 371/14692; BMA to WO, 11 July 1930, TNAUK, FO 371/14692; Liu Yi, ‘Jiang Feng Yan guanxi’, p. 18; Wang and Zhang, Zhongyuan dazhan, p. 220.

65

Chen Shenru, ‘Ping zhongyuan dazhan’, p. 93.

66

BMA to WO, 25 June 1930, TNAUK, 371/14692; Lampson telegram, 27 June 1930, TNAUK, 371/14692; ‘The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State’, 11 June and 10 July 1930, FRUS, 1930, II, pp. 17, 20; Zhang Xianwen, Zhonghua minguo shigang, p. 367; Chen, Difang shilipai, pp. 74–5.

67

British military intelligence, Shanghai, 24 June 1930, TNAUK, FO 371/14692.

68

Van de Ven, War and Nationalism, p. 139; Liu Yi, ‘Jiang Feng Yan guanxi’, pp. 17–18.

69

Lampson telegram, 27 June 1930, TNAUK, 371/14692.

70

Memorandum by the Minister in China (Johnson), 13 June 1930, FRUS, 1930, Vol. II, p. 18.

71

‘Feng Offers to Quit, Ending Chinese Civil War, If Chiang Will Go Too’, The New York Times, 9 June 1930; ‘Chiang Reaffirms Aim to Crush Foes’, The New York Times, 14 June 1930.

72

Lampson telegram, 16 August 1930, TNAUK, FO 371/14692; The Minister to China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State, 12 September 1930, FRUS, 1930, Vol. II, p. 34; Zhang, Zhonghua minguo shigang, p. 367.

73

BMA to WO, 9 August 1930, TNAUK, FO 371/14693.

74

Intelligence, Shanghai, 18 August 1930, TNAUK, FO 371/14693; Guo Xuyin, ‘Ping zhongyuan dazhan’, p. 55; Chen Shenru, ‘Ping zhongyuan dazhan’, p. 95; Xu Youli, ‘Zhongyuan dazhan henan’, pp. 42–3.

75

The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State, 12 October 1930, FRUS, 1930, Vol. II, p. 44.

76

The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State, 17 November 1930, FRUS, 1930, Vol. II, p. 56; Situation Report, 23 October 1930, USMIRC, Reel VIII, 0519.

77

Gibson, ‘Chiang Kai-shek’s Central Army’, pp. 202–5.

78

See comments by Lieutenant-Colonel Nelson Mangetts, American military attaché in Beijing, Current Events 11–25 September 1930, USMIRC, Reel I, 0507.

79

Lampson telegram, 4 April 1930, TNAUK, FO 371/14692; Chen Jinjin, Difang Shilipai, p. 91; Li Tsung-jen, Memoirs, pp. 276–8.

80

British sources placed the Guangxi force at approximately 40,000 and 6,000 troops supporting Nanjing in Hunan. GOC (General Officer Commanding), Hong Kong to Military Attaché, Peking, 25 February 1930, TNAUK, FO 371/14691. American military officers estimated the Guangxi force at 95,000. Situation Report, 16 June 1930, USMIRC, Reel VIII, 0654.

81

Wang and Zhang, Zhongyuan dazhan, p. 214; Keiji Furuya, Chiang K’ai-shek, p. 284; van de Ven, War and Nationalism, p. 138; Li Tsung-jen, Memoirs, pp. 278–9; Liu Zhi, Wode huiyi, pp. 83–97; Gibson, ‘Chiang Kai-shek’s Central Army’, pp. 196–200; Chen Jinjin, Difang Shilipai, p. 93.

82

HYQJJ, p. 232.

83

Edward McCord, Military Force and Elite Power in the Formation of Modern China (London, 2014), p. 125.

84

Intelligence, Shanghai, 10 June 1930, TNAUK, FO 371/14692; Wang Zhiping, ed., ‘He Yingqin (1889–1987)’, Zhongwai mingren zhuan 64.10 (October 1997), pp. 75–6; Wang Chengsheng, ‘He Yingqin Zhuanqi’ [The Legend of He Yingqin], Zhongwai zazhi 44.1 (July 1988), p. 16; Wu Xiangxiang, ‘He Yingqin dajiang caineng fujiang mingyun’ [General He Yingqin’s Luck and Capability], Minguo bairenzhuan, vol. IV, p. 104.

85

Consul General Phillips to Sir Miles Lampson, 15 June 1930, TNAUK, FO 371/14692; The China Critic, 29 May 1930, p. 517; Wang Zhiping, ed., ‘He Yingqin (1889–1987)’, Zhongwai mingren zhuan 64.10 (October 1997), pp. 75–6; Wang Chengsheng, ‘He Yingqin Zhuanqi’ [The Legend of He Yingqin], Zhongwai zazhi 44.1 (July 1988), p. 16; Wu Xiangxiang, ‘He Yingqin dajiang caineng fujiang mingyun’ [General He Yingqin’s Luck and Capability], in Minguo bairenzhuan, vol. IV (Taibei, 1971), p. 104.

86

See Donald A. Jordan, China’s Trial by Fire: The Shanghai War of 1932 (Ann Arbor, 2001).

87

Consul General Phillips to Sir Miles Lampson, 15 June 1930, TNAUK, FO 371/14692; Guo Xuyin, ‘Ping zhongyuan dazhan’, p. 52.

88

Consul-General Phillips to Sir Miles Lampson, 14 July 1930, TNAUK, FO 371/14692; Li Tsung-jen, Memoirs, p. 279.

89

Lampson telegram, 20 June 1930, TNAUK, FO 371/14692; Commander in Chief, China to Admiralty, 19 June 1930, TNAUK, FO 371/14692.

90

GOC Hong Kong to WO, 1 July 1930, TNAUK, FO 371/14692; Intelligence, Shanghai, 1 July 1930, TNAUK, FO 371/14692.

91

Mr. Consul-General Phillips to Sir Miles Lampson, 14 July 1930, TNAUK, FO 371/14693; HYQJJ, pp. 234–6; Li Tsung-jen, Memoirs, pp. 279–80.

92

GOC, Hong Kong to WO, 24 July 1930, TNAUK, FO 371/14693; BMA to WO, 26 July 1930, TNAUK, FO 371/14693; Wang and Zhang, Zhongyuan dazhan, pp. 226–9; Lu Ping, He Yingqin jiangjun yinxiang ji, p. 17.

93

Situation Report, 17 June to 1 July 1930, USMIRC, Reel I, 0479.

94

Sir M. Lampson to Mr A. Henderson, 6 November 1930, TNAUK, FO 371/14690; BMA to WO, 5 August 1930, TNAUK, FO 371/14693.

95

Taylor, Generalissimo, p. 89.

Author Biography

Peter Worthing is Professor of History and Associate Dean for Graduate Studies at Texas Christian University. He is the author of General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China, Occupation and Revolution: China and the Vietnamese August Revolution of 1945, and A Military History of Modern China.