Abstract

The states of Tennessee and Kentucky sit in the heartland of America. During the Civil War, they occupied vital strategic territory, and thus assumed a great importance for the leaders of the Union and the Confederacy. These bordering states were remarkably similar; as the editors of Border Wars: The Civil War in Tennessee and Kentucky point out, they shared a primarily agricultural economy based upon enslaved labor. Tennessee seceded in 1861, and Kentucky, despite a strong secessionist movement and an early attempt at neutrality, remained in the Union. As a measure of how the crisis split the populations of the states, thousands of Kentuckians flocked to Tennessee to join the Confederate cause, while Tennesseans headed over their northern border to enlist in the Union Army. The essays in this volume all examine the military dimensions of the Civil War in the two states.
Four of the essays highlight just how deeply the Civil War divided Tennessee and Kentucky. Two essays examine guerilla warfare in different regions of Kentucky; Scott A. Tarnowieckyi considers the area of the Green River while Patricia A. Hoskins examines the Jackson Purchase. A pair of essays cover Tennessee, with Derek W. Frisby looking at the occupation of Middle and West Tennessee and Michael Toomey looking at the campaign to liberate East Tennessee in 1861. These authors all demonstrate how the Civil War unleashed deeply destructive forces that neither Union nor Confederate authorities could control. Indeed, ineffective and halting Union advances prompted outpourings of Unionist sentiment, which led to Confederate retribution when the Union troops withdrew or redeployed. Union commanders in these states never had enough troops to ensure security for the populace; sometimes the presence of Union troops led to greater danger for civilians as they became targets for Confederate guerillas. The animosities created lasted beyond the end of the war.
Another cycle of essays offers reassessments of Union and Confederate military leaders. Brian McKnight deftly demonstrates how Confederate general Felix Zollicoffer, a military amateur, aptly utilized the weather and terrain to block Union advances into Appalachia. Stephen D. Engle describes how Union general Don Carlos Buell proved an able organizer of armies, but failed to adapt to the changing political circumstances of the war. Buell, unwilling to consider the emancipation of enslaved African Americans as a war aim, ran afoul of popular opinion. The much maligned Confederate general Braxton Bragg receives a reconsideration from Earl J. Hess, who argues that the general’s prickly personality clouded a just evaluation of his performance at the Battle of Stones River. Contrary to most interpretations, Bragg put in an able performance which became overshadowed by his habit of quarreling endlessly with subordinates. Christopher Losson discusses the personal conflict between the contentious Bragg and Frank Cheatham, leader of the Tennessee division in Bragg’s army. In a separate piece, Sam Davis Elliott looks at Cheatham’s political patron, Tennessee Governor Isham G. Harris. Harris, tirelessly advancing the interests of his state, worked to mobilize resources and exerted political pressure to see his favored generals put in positions of authority. While Harris served as an advocate for his state, his intrigues also brought about problems with the Confederate high command in the West.
The essays in this volume are all strong contributions to the story of the Civil War in Tennessee and Kentucky. The authors make many thoughtful points, and their essays also provide starting places for new investigations.
