Abstract
One word summarizes Professor Jeremy Black’s masterful synopsis of naval warfare since 1860: outstanding. Whether the reader is a deep specialist with decades of knowledge and direct experience of the subject, or an interested lay reader with a penchant for naval history, this fine book suits all. What is so pleasing is that Professor Black covers this huge seascape in 250 pages, and he does so without drifting into inconsequential minutiae or losing the key threads of his arguments. He stays focused, with key themes enduring throughout. Maritime strategy and its execution during this tumultuous period are analysed in a most pleasing style, without some of the worst foibles of academic discourse. It is true that several other monumental books that have dealt with this period in the past are still regarded as the standard works. The work of Captain Stephen Roskill, James Cable, Sir Lawrence Freedman, Sir Laurence Martin, and from the USA Arthur Marder and John Hattendorf, and the great multi-volumes of Sir Harry Hinsley, immediately come to mind. However, notwithstanding these great works on naval history, what Professor Black has done is provide us with a very clear, concise, precise, and highly readable picture of naval warfare during a period that witnessed not only the greatest technological changes in history, but also the most devastating conflicts in the history of the world.
What does he tell us, and why is his style and presentation so compelling? Professor Black’s ability to synthesize is his greatest virtue, to piece together myriad amounts of information, distil them, and then present a coherent, highly readable picture of what happened. To achieve this without losing either accuracy or key relevant factors is no mean achievement. We are shown how steam and iron changed the course of history in the nineteenth century, how blockade became important, particularly against the Confederacy during the American Civil War, and how new bases and coaling stations became strategic assets. We move seamlessly through the Jeune Ecole in France, the development of battleships, torpedoes, light cruisers, and the Japanese defeat of Russia at Tsushima in 1905. He reminds us of both the transformative nature of naval systems, such as the battleship, and their eventual irrelevance, and even demise, such as the loss of the Prince of Wales and Repulse. We are shown how Britain’s carriage of about half the world’s trade between 1890 and 1914 drove innovation and strategy to protect seaborne trade. The Dreadnoughts with their ten twelve-inch guns in five turrets and marine turbine engines were revolutionary, later surpassed and challenged by aircraft carriers, naval air power, and, most effectively of all, submarines. US Pacific Fleet submarines inflicted more damage on the Japanese than any other single entity during the Second World War.
The span of time, technology, and operations is huge. Economic blockade of Germany by the Royal Navy in the Great War is challenged by Kriegsmarine submarines in the Second World War. It is a salutary fact that if Hitler had built significantly more submarines by 1939–40 the Second World War may have had other outcomes. If there is one omission, perhaps Professor Black should have examined how Room 40 in the First World War, and Bletchley Park and the US Office of Naval Intelligence in the Second World War changed the course of naval warfare. When, in 1974, Bletchley’s existence first became public knowledge and then Sir Harry Hinsley published the official British Intelligence in the Second World War, historians changed their assessments of the Second World War.
Naval Diplomacy and the interwar naval Agreements, and disagreement, are handled with perfection, and he rightly indicates the still enduring British error not to have naval air warfare totally in the hands of the Royal Navy, including what became the assets and operations of RAF Coastal Command during the Second World War and afterwards. Organic naval fighter protection for the Fleet became vital, and in this the British were lacking, while the United States Navy became masters of naval air warfare after the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. He may stray a little, after commenting on the great British victories at Cape Matapan and Taranto, that carriers became vulnerable. American analysts would disagree, with the defence of aircraft carriers developing its technology base, tactics, and today a considerable array of defence, including nuclear-powered attack submarines, hugely long-range air-to-air missiles, and counter anti-ship cruise missiles. The precursor to all this was of course the United States naval aviators’ finest hour, the Battle of Midway, on 4 June 1942, that began the sealing of Japan’s fate.
Submarine warfare is here to stay for the long term. Professor Black shows us the why, the how, and the what in very well-presented terms, both during the war in the Pacific, the Cold War (when the Cold War was very much underwater), and in support of amphibious operations. HMS Courageous’ sinking of the Argentine cruiser Belgrano in 1982 was reminiscent of what happened in the Second World War, and what could have happened between the Soviet Union and NATO. Today the US Virginia Class and the British Astute Class are superb exemplars of submarine technology and operations.
The latter part of Naval Warfare covers Korea through to the present, a period that has been so thoroughly analysed and written about that there are bookshelves full of naval literature. However, the very good news is that Professor Black makes the latter part of this period most enjoyable reading, keeping our attention while one compares notes with other studies and well-known works, and also while constantly keeping the reader’s attention. What he does is make us totally aware that in an age of Chinese maritime expansion, renewed challenges at sea from Russia, and other seaborne threats, maritime power and indeed a grand naval strategy for the Western powers is undoubtedly the key to maintaining the vital national interests of the Western democracies and their key global allies. The sea will indeed be the key to modern strategy. Thank you Professor Black for your wonderfully thought-provoking and highly readable book.