Abstract
This book, based on Robert Mullins 2000 PhD thesis, but co-edited by Beeler, addresses a period of crucial transformation in naval policy on both sides of the Atlantic. These changes, although perhaps under-studied, precipitated the most remarkable growth of naval power of that era. Yet this study does more than simply offer a chronology of change, remarkable as it was, but investigates the impetuses, organizational cultures, and cultural aspects of the movements in both Britain and the USA, which eventually led both to the emergence of pre-dreadnoughts.
As John Beeler suggests in his excellent editor’s introduction, whilst there has been much debate about Arthur Marder’s analysis of John Fisher’s years as First Sea Lord, few studies have questioned his work on British naval policy in the 1880s. Thus, this book is a crucial addition to the historiography. In assessing this crucial period of change, it comes to two important conclusions about one of the defining moments of pre-First World War British naval policy, the Naval Defence Act of 1889. The first is that the threat of a Franco–Russian alliance, which would have allowed a pincer movement against the British fleet in the Mediterranean, simply did not exist, which on its own challenges much of what Marder concluded. The second chapter is particularly good here, showing both how the historiographical context of the time in which he was writing shaped Marder’s work, and where his studies are mistaken. The author importantly also reassesses the impetus behind the Act, suggesting that, again, Marder was mistaken in concluding that it was Salisbury who pushed the agenda – indeed it is clear that no thorough assessment of the naval situation suggested a viable threat. Instead, by looking in more detail at the Naval Scare of 1888, he shows how Beresford played a central role, both within the government, and in creating a ‘public relations blitz’ that allowed the fallacy of a credible threat to gain public credence.
The book does not simply look at the change in British naval policy, however, but shows how an even more remarkable change occurred in the USA, which witnessed a complete about-turn of naval strategy. This was despite the lack of real strategic need to do so, nor was it achieved by a public relations exercise to convince the American public of its necessity. Instead, its key proponents, most notably Stephen Bleecker Luce, lobbied officials, generally in private. Mullins’s book, then, adds considerably to the historiography of US naval history in looking at the origins and progress of, resistance to, and ultimate success of this tactic in changing policy. In doing so, amongst other things, Mullins shows how many of the ideas often attributed to Alfred Thayer Mahan in fact originated in this earlier movement, and were developed in Influence of Sea Power upon History (1890).
It is by examining these two movements on either side of the Atlantic that Mullins is able to show that both shared a common root: the naval historian Sir John Knox Laughton. It was his work in particular that influenced naval planners in learning ‘lessons of history’ when making policy, encouraging offensive orientation, ‘sea denial’, and blockade supplemented by coastal assault. Yet this influence was not passed down through naval hierarchies, but disseminated through organizations such as the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), whose journal influenced the so-called ‘historical school’, which whilst a minority in the officer corps, contained ‘the best and brightest’ who came to dominate key policymaking branches, notably the Naval Intelligence Department (NID). This school could also be found in the USA, key amongst them Luce and Mahan, and the American equivalents of the RUSI and NID, the US Naval Institute (USNI), and Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). Yet, there was a key difference. Whilst the threat to Britain may have been at best negligible, it at least had a global trading network and empire to protect. The USA, however, needed no such shift in naval policy – it had no substantial global interests to defend. Yet, in utilizing the lessons of British naval history, Mullins demonstrates, Luce and others were able to successfully argue for such a shift to occur.
The period before the major building programmes, and subsequent naval races, is one that needs much more attention. This book shows that it should not, and cannot, be simply seen as the preamble to a more exciting and crucial period. Yet, this is an important book not just because it simply fills a chronological gap in our understanding. In examining the machinations and impetuses behind the shifting of government naval strategy, it reveals far more about the changes witnessed in this period, and whether or not they were appropriate reactions to the level of threat that actually existed. Indeed, it shows how the perception of danger could be created, and exploited, both through the manipulation of public opinion, and in private lobbying of key figures in government. It also ably shows how these ideas diffused, and in doing so analyses the shifts in organizational culture in both respective navies. The first chapter in particular is an important argument for the understanding of a myriad of factors that contribute to naval history, particularly in terms of organizational culture. Whether it needed such a lengthy and wide-ranging exploration is perhaps debateable, but nevertheless it should be read by any aspiring, or indeed established, naval historian.
If one is to find fault, it is perhaps that the term ‘culture’ is sometimes used as a short form for ‘organizational culture’. Whilst a minor point, it is important to note that the study does not discuss this cultural theme in a wider sense (as, for example, Jan Rüger has), which makes this usage a little problematic.
This is a book that deserves the interest of more than just students of nineteenth-century naval administration, but also those of the naval arms race that follows it. More widely, it is an important addition to the historiography of military organizational cultures, geopolitics, government lobbying, and media campaigns.