Abstract
Avinash Paliwal’s first book, My Enemy’s Enemy, is an important contribution to understanding the trajectories of Afghan politics, South Asian regional relations, and the broader ‘War on Terror’ from the end of the twentieth century through the present day. As he deftly shows, dynamics in Afghanistan cannot be understood solely through the lens of ‘AfPak’ and US intervention. Pakistan and the United States have played critical roles in Afghanistan, the former especially since the 1980s and the latter particularly since 2001, but other states, India chief among them, have been heavily invested in the conflict (in both regional and global terms) and have shaped various political outcomes regarding the future of the Afghan state. What is clear from Paliwal’s narrative is that Indian state leaders, like those in Pakistan, the United States, and elsewhere, have struggled to define what they want in Afghanistan. Thus, from the 1980s until now, they have pursued a frequently ambiguous, contradictory set of policies that have done little overall to extend Indian interests.
Paliwal’s book is arranged chronologically and divided into three broad sections. ‘Debating neutrality’ summarizes Indian–Afghan relations through the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; ‘Debating containment’ focuses on Indian approaches (or lack thereof) to the Taliban in the 1990s; and ‘Debating engagement’ reflects on India’s involvement during and after the Western intervention in Afghanistan. Paliwal’s brief overview of the historical Indian–Afghan relationship up to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan will be useful for non-specialists less familiar with South Asian history, but the real heart of his analysis lies after the Soviet withdrawal. In the final two sections of the book, Paliwal documents a complicated Indian–Afghan relationship, where Indian perceptions of the Afghan state changed drastically from effectively a state without leaders (the Taliban era) to one whose sovereignty was invested in people and institutions (the Hamid Karzai era).
Paliwal locates Indian approaches to Afghanistan within two distinct camps – the ‘conciliators’ and the ‘partisans’ – and revolving around three key factors – the Afghan–Pakistan relationship and its regional impact on India–Pakistan interactions, international political dynamics, and Afghanistan’s domestic politics. Partisans emphasize the primacy of India–Pakistan hostilities and see Afghanistan along the lines of the book’s title – my enemy’s (Pakistan’s) enemy (Afghanistan) is my friend. In contrast, conciliators have focused more on Afghan domestic politics and prioritize developing broader Afghan goodwill and stability regardless of Afghan–Pakistan relations. Paliwal clearly demonstrates that over time, Indian state policy has depended on whether more conciliators or more partisans have been in power. Different individuals and governments have prioritized different factors (Afghan stability versus undermining Pakistan’s regional standing versus aligning or disagreeing with US-led policies). As such, Indian leaders ultimately have lacked long-term consensus about how best to engage with Afghanistan, and this has limited the efficacy of Indian approaches.
Paliwal provides a nuanced, careful account of how Indian officials at different points in time have wrestled with alternative visions for the future of Afghanistan. His analysis of Indian approaches to the Taliban in the 1990s versus in 2010 provides a particularly interesting example of how the partisan–conciliator divide has shaped Indian policy. While in the 1990s Indian officials refused to recognize the Taliban as representing Afghanistan because of its close ties with Pakistan, in 2010, leaders took a more flexible approach to Taliban leadership. Paliwal’s book is thoroughly researched and is particularly interesting where it draws on oral interviews. These clearly prove his point regarding two different camps within the Indian government with competing visions for India–Afghan relations.
My Enemy’s Enemy is an important text for any scholar interested in current and recent historical events in Afghanistan and South Asia more broadly. Paliwal’s narrative re-emphasizes the complicated nature of Afghan state-building and the ways that it has been shaped by numerous internal and external actors who have had diverse, frequently competing interests. Moreover, he demonstrates that South Asian regional relations are only bilateral in the most complicated sense. States like Afghanistan have had a fundamental impact on relations between India and Pakistan. Overall, this is an important contribution for understanding the recent past – and potential futures – of relations between India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.