Setting the Record Straight: Scharnhorst and the Origins of the Nineteenth-Century Prussian General Staff

Prussia’s remarkable victories over Austria in 1866 and France in 1870 stunned the world. Not since Napoleon had any army managed to win such an amazing series of decisive battles. After 1871, the spotlights of military theory, organization, and practice focused on Berlin rather than on Paris, as German military thought, operational and tactical doctrine, and even segments of the language and uniform found imitators in every major army in the world. ¹

With the splendour of Prussia’s victories came a halo of respectability for its General Staff. Perceptive students of war attributed Prussia’s success to the quality of its collective leadership, epitomized by a general staff that was a centre of living thought and realistic planning. More importantly, it possessed a flexible quality of mind and an uninhibited imagination – a far cry from the sedentary routines of military bureaucracy. ²

Endeavouring to explain the exclusive characteristics of the Prussian General Staff, Colonel Paul Bronsart von Schellendorff published The Duties of the General Staff (1875). ³ This work became a classic, was translated into English, and has been cited as the authoritative account of the Prussian General Staff. ⁴ Unfortunately, few scholars have taken the time to verify the accuracy of this text. Contrary to Bronsart’s account, it was Gerhard von Scharnhorst and not Christian von Massenbach who created the general staff concept that proved to be the decisive factor in Prussia’s victories over Austria and France. It is time to set the record straight.

Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst (1755–1813) led the modernization of the Prussian army after 1807. He was among the first anywhere to grasp the transformation of war wrought by the citizen armies of revolutionary France. ⁵ Prussia’s catastrophic defeat at Jena and Auerstedt in 1806 provided the impetus Scharnhorst needed to accelerate a process already underway before 1806. This uniquely Prussian system was designed to command and control national armies with a combination of organization and intellect – a collective or corporate genius called the General Staff with Troops.

As the art of war expanded in scope and complexity during the French Revolutionary Wars (1792–1802), battle command became increasingly more difficult. As early as 1793, Captain Scharnhorst (a battery commander in the Hanoverian artillery) recognized this conflict had no parallel in earlier wars. The challenge Coalition forces faced was fighting French armies far larger than their professional armies. The French leveé en masse had unleashed powerful forces, produced the nation-in-arms, and completely altered warfare. ⁶ Instead of a single army marching in a long column along a solitary route and manoeuvred in battle by one general, French military power was now a group of armies, led by different generals and often scattered over a vast countryside, marching along parallel routes and only united under the eye of a commander-in-chief on the field of battle. A more effective means of controlling this awesome power had to be developed, simply because the commander-in-chief could no longer manage to concentrate all the burdens of command in his person. Leadership had to rise to the challenge of leading armies of citizen soldiers.

There soon crystallized in Scharnhorst’s mind a set of specific reforms designed to meet the challenge of the national army. ⁷ During the winter of 1793/94, he sent General of Cavalry Johann Ludwig ‘Imperial Count’ (Reichsgraf) von Wallmoden-Gimborn (1736–1811), the Commanding General of the Hanoverian Auxiliary Corps attached to the English army, his thoughts concerning ‘the expansion of our General and General-Quartermaster Staff’. ⁸ Scharnhorst advocated augmenting the staff of the commanding general with talented officers to assist him in the vital areas of reconnaissance, security, and the disposition of the army. ⁹ Here he laid the first foundations of his general staff with troops concept, one which he continually refined to meet the needs of a changing art of war.

Scharnhorst believed Coalition forces had operated blindly in 1793. Allied leaders had little knowledge of the theatre of operations, its key terrain, the best roads, and the most favourable manoeuvre areas. ¹⁰ Cavalry had not conducted adequate reconnaissance to ascertain and report critical information on the topography or on the French. Nor had it provided reliable security throughout the campaign. ¹¹

As Scharnhorst pointed out these deficiencies, he provided his solutions. He explained the need for additional staff officers to reconnoitre and provide a detailed analysis of the countryside, complete with maps and sketches that showed the salient features of the terrain. Next, he felt adding several more officers to oversee the establishment of outposts and the security arrangements of the army ‘would be of great use’. These officers would move initially with the advance guard and monitor the security of the army. After establishing the outpost network they would maintain liaison among the field units and gather intelligence on enemy dispositions. During battle they would serve ‘as senior assistants to the commanding general, as commanders of the flank and other columns, etc.’

In the last section Scharnhorst addressed his major point. ‘Indispensable to the commanding general are a few officers he can use to strengthen his control of the overall situation.’ ¹² This meant assisting the commanding general with the dispositions of the army, advising subordinate commanders as responsible and authoritative spokesmen of the commanding general, and developing contingency plans. Scharnhorst ended his recommendations by noting that a few good officers on the general staff would enable the commanding general to operate as Frederick the Great had campaigned during the Seven Years’ War.

Citing Frederick the Great was Scharnhorst’s favourite technique whenever he sought to modernize the army. He knew nearly all the generals in Hanover, Hesse, Brunswick, and Prussia had fought under the Prussian king. They admired Frederick and were proud to have served with him. The mere mention of Frederick’s name would catch their attention. Scharnhorst was also a great admirer of Frederick. He knew Frederick never modified the tactical doctrine, organization, or administration of his army without good reason. Using examples from Frederick the Great to introduce his concepts became second nature for Scharnhorst.

From Nimwegen in October 1794, Major Scharnhorst built upon his earlier recommendations. He now possessed actual combat experience as General Quartermaster-Lieutenant to Wallmoden. After reiterating his insistence that general staff officers continue to assist the commanding general with operational planning, tactical disposition, and logistical support of the army, he advocated a clear delineation of their duties, responsibilities, and authority. These had never been firmly established, nor were specific qualifications of general staff officers ever set forth. Both usually depended on the prerogatives of the commanding general. This had to change. With this treatise Scharnhorst promoted the creation of what later became known as the Truppengeneralstab or ‘General Staff with Troops’. ¹³ What is noteworthy here is that Scharnhorst was not the least interested in a capital staff that advised a monarch, prince, or head of state. His sole focus was on an organization to command and control the field army on campaign. It was this general staff with troops that set the Prussians apart from other armies and enabled them to defeat the Austrians and the French.

To improve operational control and battle command, Scharnhorst advocated better organization. Because a national army possessed more men, guns, horses, supplies, and transportation than a dynastic force, he recommended the army be partitioned into smaller, more manageable units that combined infantry, cavalry, artillery, and supporting elements. ¹⁴ A general staff with troops would centralize and control the activities of these corps and divisions and assist the commander-in-chief on campaign. As Scharnhorst stated,

I am becoming more convinced every day that without a well-organized general staff no army can be well led.A poorly organized and slightly trained army with a good general staff will accomplish more than a good army with a poor general staff. ¹⁵

Because the leveé en masse had increased the size of armies dramatically, and because the scope of their operations now extended over progressively larger geographical areas, the conduct of war had become an art pursued upon the map. Commanding generals found it essential to have accurate maps of the theatre of operations and to assign talented officers from their staffs to their subordinate commands to maintain effective command and control. ¹⁶

Scharnhorst understood better than most that the challenge of leadership in an age of mass armies could only be met with a general staff whose members had clearly defined duties and responsibilities, and who could adapt quickly to ever-changing circumstances on the battlefield. These officers had to possess considerable talent and ability, enthusiasm and determination, because they would provide the ‘impulse’ (Mechanismus), as Scharnhorst wrote, that set the army in motion and then animated its operations. Only the best minds could bring flexibility to size, agility to might. ¹⁷

‘With an army of 30–40,000 men’, Scharnhorst wrote in the fall of 1794, ‘the following arrangements could be made.’ He then presented his vision of the General Staff with Troops, beginning with the commanding general’s personal staff.

The General Staff must consist of the Chief of Staff [General-Adjutant] and four to five senior assistants [Ober-Adjutanten], and several others attached to the Chief of Staff. The Commanding General must never issue a command that does not go through the Chief of Staff. No report, no message most come in that the Chief of Staff does not handle. ¹⁸

The Chief of Staff and his senior assistants would form the brain of the army.

Scharnhorst’s concept of the ‘Chief of Staff’ and his senior assistants was a wholly new form of leadership. The first senior assistant would be responsible solely for the logistical support of the army. ‘All matters pertaining to the subsistence’ of the army is the responsibility of this officer, who works with the commissariat, the regiments, and smaller detachments to accomplish his mission. Administrative support of the army was the duty of the second senior assistant, who keeps ‘the rosters’. ‘He always knows where all of the troops are and takes care of them, so when the army marches, no one is forgotten.’ The third senior assistant manages ‘the correspondence with the hospitals and depots, and with the commanders [Chefs] concerning advancements, etc.’

‘These senior assistants are to a certain extent senior assistants to the army. They must be talented and energetic men; and as soon as a corps is detached, one senior assistant goes immediately with that corps and performs the duty of the corps chief of staff.’

Scharnhorst concluded that the Chief of Staff must be a rigorous and orderly man, one who could write and speak multiple languages.

Apart from the Chief of Staff being able to write and speak multiple languages, the functions of a modern chief of staff are evident in Scharnhorst’s concept. So are the duties of his senior assistants. Together they form the corporate genius of the command. As Scharnhorst stated, they must be proven combat leaders who, ‘upon arriving at a location, are able to assist when necessary, and are capable of making and executing decisions’. ¹⁹

Turning his attention to the General Quartermaster, Scharnhorst redesigned this staff to be the nervous system that animated the various parts of the army. The major duties of the General Quartermaster would remain unchanged; it was still responsible for planning and executing marches, quartering troops in the field, and maintaining the supply system. Because the General Quartermaster ‘always has much to do’, he must have a dozen aides and two dozen guides to assist him. Scharnhorst then described in detail how these men would perform their duties.

To provide accurate maps of the theatre of operations, Scharnhorst recommended the creation of a Geographical Department. This agency would be part of the General Quartermaster and would provide detailed maps of the operational area, along with the locations of the various camps and their ‘supporting chains’, the locations of magazines and depots, their defensive networks, and all projected future locations. Half a dozen aides and a dozen guides, along with assistance from the field engineers or the regiments, would be necessary to perform these tasks. The commanding general would then have a visual picture of the arrangements of his army, while ‘the Geographical Department would have a repository of plans and maps, which are extremely important’. ²⁰

To highlight the importance of security, Scharnhorst advocated creating an ‘Outpost Commander’ and a general officer position with ‘special supervision’ over all security arrangements. This general must not be ‘the General Officer of the Day’ (General du Jour), because this ‘never worked’. The Outpost Commander, along with the security general, would insure units had adequate security on the march and properly established and manned outposts once encamped. Outposts were to be ‘linked together in mutual support’. Security of the army was so important to Scharnhorst that he recommended attaching ‘a senior assistant of the General Staff’, as well as ‘an aide-de-camp from the General Quartermaster’ to the security general to assist him. ²¹ To make sure regiments constructed quality defensive positions, Scharnhorst also wanted to enlarge the Field Engineer Department with at least ‘a Director and 15 to 20 officers, and twice as many engineer non-commissioned officers’ to oversee the accomplishment of these tasks. ²²

In the hierarchy of Scharnhorst’s general staff with troops, the Chief of Staff ‘administers all arrangements, all commands’. The General Quartermaster assembles all reports from the regiments and detachments and presents the disposition of the army to the Chief of Staff:

The Chief of Staff then issues ‘specific orders and instructions to insure everything is in its proper order, and that no misunderstandings exist, etc.’ ²³ During combat operations, ‘The Chief of Staff and the General Quartermaster must stay near or with the Commanding General, to inform him of the arrangements to be made, and then to see that all commands are executed, and to keep everything in context.’

The senior assistants to the Chief of Staff, the aides and guides to the General Quartermaster, as well as the Director of the Field Engineer Department, must to be kept up-to-date on current operations so they can perform their duties proficiently. ‘The most skilful general must never be without these talented people.’ ²⁴

With this general staff with troops in charge, the army would function automatically, like ‘an engine’ (eine Maschine), since the general staff acted with authority from the commanding general to insure the smooth, effective conduct of operations. ‘No mistakes can be made without them being noticed’, Scharnhorst concluded.

‘With this arrangement the Commanding General can never forget what must be done, and can make sure that what needs to be done is accomplished, even when it comes to all the decisions he must consider, when fatigue is at work and his mind is often numb, and he suffers from other health issues, etc.’

Scharnhorst was convinced his concept was sound. ‘On order, the General Staff sets the engine [the army] in motion.’ ²⁵ In no other army of the time did anyone other than Major Gerhard Scharnhorst conceive of such a command and control model.

With Wallmoden’s permission, Scharnhorst began training this general staff with troops. He issued staff officers a quick reference guide ‘in a tabular design’ that summarized their duties. ²⁶ As training progressed he updated his thoughts. ²⁷ He also informed Wallmoden the best work an army accomplishes in peacetime is the labour general staff officers perform through their study and exercises in the field. ²⁸ He then recommended a staff officer direct wartime intelligence operations, especially the use of spies. ²⁹ In a much larger study, he outlined plans for this general staff with troops to destroy the nepotism hindering the development of talented officers. Scharnhorst argued far too many officers rose to positions of leadership who possessed neither the mental aptitude nor the physical strength to carry out their strenuous duties. ³⁰

Recognizing general staff officers required specialized education and training, Scharnhorst repeated his pre-war advocacy for education. He called for the establishment of an institution specifically designed to prepare selected officers for general staff service. ³¹ Graduates would be assigned temporarily to the General Staff for additional training and leader development. An examination would determine those who would become part of a general staff corps. This group would be systematically educated and trained in a common doctrine and groomed for senior command and staff assignments. Scharnhorst concluded that those who had studied their profession in peacetime were usually the best leaders under fire. Education must become the hallmark of the military leader, not just the social polish required to enter court life. Promotions and assignments must be based on merit and ability, not birth and privilege. ³²

Following the example of Frederick the Great, Scharnhorst held the constant rotation of talented regimental officers through the General Staff with Troops would furnish the best vehicle for eliminating mental incompetence and nepotism, while obtaining ‘superior minds’. ³³

‘Through this rotation the spirit of despotism would die; such an individual would not be slavishly bound to the spectre of senior officers. His success would not be made by them, and his future success would not depend upon them.’ ³⁴

Rotating officers between staff and troop duty would also provide ‘a great and substantial service’ to the regiments, since ‘a great number of well-educated officers’ would be constantly returned to the line units, and this would raise the quality of leadership throughout the entire army. The General Staff with Troops would become ‘to some extent a school in which many officers are educated for the army’. The General Staff with Troops would also benefit. In time of war it could obtain talented officers already educated and trained in the duties of the general staff. ³⁵

Here is the essence of the later Prussian general staff system – a corporate genius selected, educated, and trained along uniform lines. Gerhard Scharnhorst clearly understood the need for an operational field staff in an age of mass, citizen armies. Careers had to be opened to all classes, and especially to those officers with proven talent and ability. He believed French military success was a direct result of the transformation of French society and the emergence of a national army. Developing leaders capable of leading a national army was Scharnhorst’s primary concern, even if this meant creating an entirely new officer corps.

From 1795 to 1801, Scharnhorst tried to convince Hanoverian officials to establish a general staff with troops with clearly defined duties and authority. Not surprisingly, Hanover rejected his ideas. To modernize the army according to Scharnhorst’s vision would require significant political and social reforms ‘no less than a revolution in the service’. ³⁶ Frustrated by the tenacious resistance of the Hanoverian elites, Scharnhorst realized the Prussian army offered the best promise to gifted men who lacked noble birth or wealth. When Frederick William III (1797–1840) offered him a position in his army, Scharnhorst left Hanover in 1801 for Berlin.

Around the time Scharnhorst was refining his concept of a general staff with troops, Prussian Major Christian Ludwig ‘Imperial Knight’ (Reichsfreiherr) von und zu Massenbach (1758–1827) was working in Potsdam on the General Quartermaster Staff. The General Staff had recently been tasked with preparing a military map of Prussia, which had been divided into three regions – western, central, and eastern. Lieutenant Colonel Karl Ludwig von Lecoq (1754–1829) was given the job of compiling these maps.

Eager to work on more important tasks, Massenbach focused his efforts instead on reorganizing the Prussian General Staff. In November 1795 he sent his concept to Field Marshal Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand, Sovereign Prince of the Holy Roman Empire and Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg-Wolfenbüttel (1735–1806), who commanded Coalition forces in Westphalia. Before being posted to Potsdam, Massenbach had served as a staff officer with the Duke in Holland in 1787, in France in 1792, and along the Rhine during the 1793 and 1794 campaigns. ³⁷ The lack of a steady direction in Prussian foreign policy worried Massenbach. His solution was to unify the political, economic, and military spheres under the auspices of a ministerial cabinet that would advise the king.

In his treatise, ‘On the Necessity of a Closer Union of Matters of War and Statecraft’, Massenbach maintained it was time to end the confusion of multiple authorities in Prussia and produce realistic war plans at the national level. In words nearly identical to those Scharnhorst used more than a year earlier, Massenbach told Brunswick:

‘An army in which there is no well-organized General Quartermaster Staff is a badly organized army. The Prussian army is in this category.’ ³⁸

Massenbach felt the Prussian army operated like a ‘blind lion’, because it lacked educated and talented men who thought about war during peacetime. He proposed reorganizing the General Quartermaster Staff into three brigades corresponding ‘to the three main theatres of war’ (the survey regions) and charging each with conducting operational studies and formulating contingency plans for their respective theatre of war. Staff officers would maintain their leadership skills by rotating between general staff service and troop duty. The Chief of the General Staff would possess ‘direct access’ (unmittelbar Vortrag) to the sovereign and the right to express his opinions on military matters. ³⁹

Like Scharnhorst, Massenbach proposed something alien in Prussia. The idea of civilian and military leaders collaborating to develop contingency plans ‘before the war had been declared, before it was likely, before danger was imminent’, was unheard of in Prussia at that time. ⁴⁰ The notion of studying potential enemies, even traveling abroad to gather intelligence, while not unusual, was also rare. Conducting regular staff rides and war gaming scenarios on the ground where future operations might occur was uncommon, too. While Duke Karl acknowledged Massenbach’s initiative, he was loath to support any change, especially the radical ones Massenbach put forth. ⁴¹ Still, Christian von Massenbach sought to restore unity of effort in Prussia, as it had been under Frederick the Great. In doing so he proposed an organization typical of modern capital staffs. In Prussia this became known as Grosser Generalstab or ‘Great General Staff’.

When Lieutenant Colonel Gerhard Scharnhorst entered Prussian service in 1801, his reputation as a soldier and scholar preceded him to Berlin. Long before entering the Prussian army he ‘was the best-known military writer in Germany’ and an acknowledged authority on military education. ⁴² Shortly after his arrival in Prussia, he agreed to direct the newly founded Militärische Gesellschaft (Military Society). Here was an institution where those devoted to the study of war could come together openly to examine and discuss the art of war systematically, in an atmosphere like other learned societies. By assuming the leadership of the Militärische Gesellschaft, Scharnhorst placed himself in a position to advance his concept of a general staff with troops.

In another move toward his goal, Scharnhorst expressed the desire to take charge of the moribund Berlin Institute in the Military Sciences for Young Infantry and Cavalry Officers. This school offered Scharnhorst the ideal place to begin educating future general staff officers. Frederick William agreed with Scharnhorst’s plan to transform the Berlin Institute into the army’s central institution of higher military education. On 5 September 1801, he appointed Scharnhorst director and provided a small budget and even a room in the royal residence for a classroom. The king was convinced these reforms would provide ‘very real advantages’ for the army, thanks largely to Scharnhorst’s ‘special supervision over the entire programme’ and his unique emphasis on ‘field instruction in the art of war’. ⁴³ According to one graduate, the Berlin Institute was a real experience in higher education. ⁴⁴

In January 1802, Colonel Massenbach submitted a ‘Memorandum on a New Organization for the General Staff’ to Frederick William. ⁴⁵ This paper was virtually identical to the one he had presented to Duke Karl of Brunswick in 1795. Discussions with members of the Militärische Gesellschaft may have encouraged Massenbach to submit them directly to the king. Massenbach was an active participant in the Society’s deliberations, in which doubts about the ability of the Prussian army to defeat the French under Napoleon were a topic of much debate. The foremost spectre haunting the Prussians was the absence of the great man. Many longed for the glory days of Frederick the Great, especially Massenbach. Scharnhorst sensed this anxiety and used it to advance his general staff with troops concept.

‘Each operation in war’, Scharnhorst told the Militärische Gesellschaft, ‘must be so calculated that its success does not depend solely on the participation of a single person.’ ⁴⁶ Scharnhorst understood that without substantial changes in organization and intellect, Prussia could never counter the French threat. ⁴⁷ ‘What will happen’, he asked one of his young associates in the Militärische Gesellschaft, ‘when the men Frederick II trained during the Seven Years’ War are no longer with us? This crisis can be met only by educating our officers.’ ⁴⁸ Somehow Scharnhorst had to introduce a collective genius into the Prussian army.

Massenbach had other designs for the General Staff. He sought to use the General Staff to end the confusion of multiple authorities at the national level. ⁴⁹ Massenbach never presented Scharnhorst’s idea of a collective genius to Frederick William. He also dismissed suggestions from Colonel Phull, another General Quartermaster-Lieutenant, who agreed with Scharnhorst and recommended the Berlin Institute be used as ‘the preparatory school’ for the General Staff. ⁵⁰ Interestingly, a month before Massenbach submitted his 1802 treatise, he had presented a talk to Frederick William and his entourage in Potsdam in which he once again called for the unity of war and state craft as it was under Frederick the Great, hinting that the General Staff was best suited for this task. Even the title of this lecture was nearly the same as his other papers on this subject. ⁵¹

In sharp contrast to Scharnhorst’s command philosophy, Massenbach never explained how his capital staff would enable the field commanders to execute the wartime decisions of the Prussian king. Scharnhorst’s general staff with troops would have executive authority, while Massenbach’s capital staff would have just an advisory role. In his memoirs Massenbach acknowledged this when he discussed his 1802 memorandum in terms of ‘forming a Military Committee’ (Comité militaire zu bilden) around the General Staff, which would integrate military, political, and economic affairs and then advise the king. ⁵²

Frederick William was impressed with the memorandum Massenbach sent him. Here was a plan that would bring some order to the work of the General Staff. On 25 April, he expressed his appreciation to Massenbach, thanking him for his ‘suggestions on the perfection of the General Staff’. Significantly, the king never acknowledged Massenbach’s main premise that the General Staff should be the governing agency in military affairs. He agreed to circulate Massenbach’s proposals among ‘several distinguished generals in the army to obtain their opinions’. These included Prince Friedrich Ludwig von Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen (1746–1818), Duke Karl of Brunswick, Field Marshal Wichard Joachim von Möllendorff (1724–1816), and Generals Levin von Geusau (1734–1808) and Friedrich Wilhelm von Zastrow (1752–1830). The king gave them until October to submit their responses. ⁵³

Discussion on the modernization of the General Staff took place throughout 1802 and 1803. Anxious for the acceptance of his ideas, Massenbach began soliciting others for their support. As early as 6 February (two months before the king had thanked him), Massenbach contacted Colonel Karl Leopold von Köckritz (1744–1821), a consummate courtier and the king’s favourite advisor, hoping to convince him the General Staff should be the organization dedicated to advising the king. ⁵⁴ This action clearly shows the naivety of Massenbach. Köckritz was a senior member of the powerful and secretive Generaladjutantur (a small group of officers who served as personal aides to the king and handled his military affairs). Because of their daily access to the sovereign, these royal adjutants exerted considerable influence. By 1802 they played an exceedingly active role in virtually all affairs of the state. ⁵⁵ Why then would Massenbach seek the support of the agency his general staff would replace?

Massenbach campaigned throughout 1802 to get his concept approved. He sent letters to Geusau, Möllendorff, Zastrow, Georg Friedrich von Tempelhof (1737–1807), and members of the Militärische Gesellschaft. ⁵⁶ He consolidated many of the suggestions he received and sent them to the Duke of Brunswick in a memorandum entitled, ‘General Remarks on the New Organization of the General Staff’. ⁵⁷ Why Massenbach kept sending concept papers to the Duke of Brunswick (who kept ignoring him) is another interesting question. Perhaps he was trying to demonstrate that a broad base of support existed in the army for his concepts, hoping for Brunswick’s backing as well.

Frederick William received mixed reactions to Massenbach’s modernization ideas. ⁵⁸ While most acknowledged the need for a definite organization and clearly defined responsibilities for the General Staff and understood the value of education for general staff officers, their approaches to achieve these goals were very different. Only Prince Hohenlohe praised Massenbach’s efforts. He found nothing to criticize, expressing his unreserved agreement with all his recommendations. ⁵⁹

As Chief of the Prussian General Staff, Geusau believed Massenbach aspired to ‘too high an ideal’. Perhaps seeking to avoid more work for himself, Geusau recommended caution. He advised Frederick William that while it might be possible to implement portions of the proposed concept, this must happen incrementally over time, so that anything new could respect custom and tradition. ⁶⁰

In a similar tone, Duke Karl of Brunswick feared what a general staff corps might do to custom and tradition. He sought assurances that ‘the General Staff would not be seen as the certain way to rapid advancement in time of peace’. Staff duty must remain what it had always been – a reward for distinguished service and special expertise, and only for those officers ‘whose advantage for the state and the army leave no doubt whatsoever’. Brunswick also demanded that any examination must seek to determine ‘the moral character’ of the applicant, his ‘proven devotion to the state’, and his ‘discretion and temperance’, because officers with intimate knowledge of state affairs must be trustworthy. ⁶¹

As head of the Supreme War Council, Field Marshal von Möllendorff felt it was indeed prudent to discuss strategic plans in time of peace. But it was ‘far too dangerous’ to commit ‘operational plans of the entire state and army to paper’. Preparing contingency plans could lead only to ‘indiscretion’, and this might aid potential enemies. Möllendorff also wondered if the proposed number of officers would be adequate to support the functions of the three brigades, and recommended that instead of a general staff corps, officers from the regiments could be called periodically to assist the General Staff. This is what Frederick the Great had done and could also serve as the school for the General Staff. ⁶²

While Geusau, Brunswick, and Möllendorff remarked that the Maasenbach’s work had some merits, Zastrow condemned it outright. As the senior adjutant to the king and head of the Generaladjutantur, Zastrow clearly saw an eclipsing of his own authority. This was definitely Massenbach’s conclusion. In his memoirs he expressed utter disdain for the sovereign’s personal staff, which consistently kept important transformation ideas from the king. ⁶³

Zastrow denounced the whole concept. He saw Massenbach’s concept as the beginning of a dangerous development. He attacked each point but dwelt primarily on the idea of using the General Staff as the school of the army. Zastrow felt any institution based on academic freedom would undermine obedience and authority in the army. He also maintained that rotating select officers through the General Staff would only ‘produce a legitimate discontent and endanger subordination’. Those not chosen would feel slighted. He wondered ‘whether it would be wise for an army if all of its generals were endowed with field marshal talents, where none of them would be willing to take orders from the other’. ⁶⁴ Additionally, commanding generals should choose their own staff officers and determine whatever training they required. Like Möllendorff and Brunswick, Zastrow probably feared what a general staff corps would do to aristocratic privilege and tradition. He noted Frederick the Great had learned ‘from many wars’ that it was better not to change things that worked, ‘and only in rare cases to promote young officers of conspicuous talents, etc.’ ⁶⁵

On 19 November 1802, Massenbach sent a second, more comprehensive version of his first memorandum to Frederick William. Perhaps seeing how receptive the king had been to Scharnhorst’s educational ideas, this revision may have incorporated concepts from Phull and Scharnhorst for improving the education and training of staff officers, since they later appeared in the king’s instructions. ⁶⁶ Massenbach also sought support from Generals Ernst Friedrich von Rüchel (1754–1824) and Tempelhof, even asking the king to forward them his second memorandum for their review. ⁶⁷ Rüchel was Inspector-General of the Prussian Guards and military educational institutions, as well as Governor of Potsdam and President of the Militärische Gesellschaft. ⁶⁸ More importantly, he considered himself the standard-bearer of the Frederician tradition in the Prussian army. ⁶⁹ Tempelhof was Chief of the Prussian Artillery and a noted military intellectual.

Both Rüchel and Tempelhof urged Frederick William to approve the proposed reorganization of the Prussian General Staff. Rüchel told the king the collective leadership of a general staff corps would not endanger subordination as Zastrow suggested. On the contrary, it would actually strengthen it. The truth was that Frederick the Great had come to realize this and had taken steps to educate and train selected officers in his personal suite. Rüchel was one of those young officers, and clearly recognized the importance of an educated and trained general staff corps. As he pointed out, ‘a well-organized General Staff belongs in any proposed theatre of war just as much as fortresses, magazines, and armies’. ⁷⁰

Tempelhof systematically demolished the arguments of Geusau, Möllendorff, the Duke of Brunswick, and Zastrow. ⁷¹ Modernizing the General Staff was imperative. A reorganized General Staff would bring much needed unity to military affairs and alleviate conflicts between commanding generals over prerogatives. Agreeing with Scharnhorst, Tempelhof noted how commanding generals were traditionally accustomed to a general staff with narrowly defined tasks, such as planning marches, quartering troops, logistical support, mapping, and other technical missions. Tempelhof knew Scharnhorst sought a larger sphere of influence for the General Staff and agreed. Remembering his unhappy experience with Brunswick in France and along the Rhine, Tempelhof clearly wanted to temper the prerogatives of commanding generals. ‘Limits to the sphere of action of the commanding generals should be set to avoid all misunderstandings.’

Tempelhof also sided with Scharnhorst on education. Examinations to select general staff officers must ascertain character and intellect. Comprehensive written and oral evaluations would determine the theoretical knowledge of the candidate, while his performance as a troop leader and general staff officer would offer the practical assessment. Combining the two would achieve objectivity. As Tempelhof said, officers could easily prepare themselves for these periodic evaluations by studying their profession and the art of war, and by continually rotating between general staff and troop duty. In an interesting note, he recommended establishing an ‘archive’ within the General Staff that could be consulted ‘like Sybil’s books’. ⁷²

The briefs from Rüchel and Tempelhof reached Frederick William on 3 March 1803. Three weeks later on 26 March, the king sent Massenbach’s second memorandum, along with the assessments of Rüchel and Tempelhof, to Geusau with instructions to draft a concept plan for the new organization of the Prussian General Staff. Before Geusau submitted his completed plan on 22 April, he had Massenbach revise the second memorandum two more times, incorporating important changes members of the Militärische Gesellschaft had recommended. ⁷³ Scharnhorst made sure his ideas were included, since he and Geusau had worked closely on reforming the curriculum of the Berlin Institute, and Scharnhorst was not one to let such an opportunity pass.

On 26 November 1803, Frederick William III ordered the reorganization of the Prussian General Staff. Overlooking the objections of his closest advisors, the king approved the new organization and its functions. ⁷⁴ Frederick William directed General Julius August von Grawert (1746–1821), another member of the Militärische Gesellschaft, to affect this modernization. Even though Prussia did not formally establish a general staff with troops, the king’s ‘Instructions for the General Quartermaster Staff’ included nearly all the ideas Scharnhorst had sent to Wallmoden a decade earlier. ⁷⁵

Bronsart von Schellendorff erred when he credited Christian von Massenbach with the modernization of the Prussian General Staff in 1802 and 1803. None of Massenbach’s capital staff ideas was included in the king’s instructions. Most were clarifications of the ‘Instructions’ Lecoq and Scharnhorst had crafted in Westphalia. Even Bronsart’s account agrees with this narrative. ⁷⁶

What is missing from every study of the Prussian General Staff is the crucial period in Westphalia, from 1795 to 1801. A careful inspection of Massenbach’s memoranda reveals their genesis came from Scharnhorst’s work in Westphalia. Assigned to Duke Karl’s staff in 1795 were Lieutenant Colonel Lecoq, and Majors Karl Ludwig von Phull (1757–1826) and Gerhard Scharnhorst. Phull handled the administrative and logistical support of the army, while Lecoq (Brunswick’s General Quartermaster) and Scharnhorst (Wallmoden’s General Quartermaster) worked closely together mapping Westphalia, developing contingency plans, and implementing Scharnhorst’s concepts. In 1801 they published a set of ‘Instructions’ on the duties of a general staff with troops. ⁷⁷

Meanwhile, Major Massenbach remained in Potsdam. Few paid attention to him. His fertile mind was ‘highly imaginative but undisciplined’. More importantly, his prolific memoranda constantly threatened the jealously guarded prerogatives of others. ⁷⁸ Unwilling to be left out, Massenbach often wrote to Brunswick, seeking to insert himself into activities in Westphalia. He certainly read Scharnhorst’s concept papers (which Phull likely sent him), since the ideas he promoted at the national level were identical to those Scharnhorst had advocated at the field army level. Even more significant is the fact that they appear only in his 1795 memorandum, and as an add-on. ⁷⁹ Massenbach may have been a good staff officer, but he had ‘failed miserably as a troop leader’, and was ignorant of the functions of a general staff with troops. ⁸⁰ His sole focus was on state organization and policy far above his rank and position. A comparative analysis of the concepts Scharnhorst and Massenbach proposed reveals Massenbach, ‘consumed by a devouring ambition’, clearly adopted Scharnhorst’s ideas in his memoranda to reorganize the Prussian General Quartermaster Staff. ⁸¹

Because most studies of the Prussian General Staff completely ignore the formative time in Westphalia, they fail to acknowledge Scharnhorst’s unique contribution. When discussing the modernization of the Prussian General Staff during the Napoleonic era, the literature begins with Massenbach’s 1802 memorandum. ⁸² And yet, it was in Westphalia that Gerhard Scharnhorst formalized his concept of a general staff with troops. It was also during this time that Massenbach first suggested similar ideas for a capital staff.

On 1 January 1804, Prussian officially had a new General Staff. Frederick William issued his updated instructions on 20 January. ⁸³ General Geusau became its chief, with Colonels Phull and Massenbach as heads of the Eastern (Russia) and the Central (Austria) Brigades, respectively. On 26 March, the king promoted Scharnhorst to colonel and appointed him head of the Western Brigade (France). ⁸⁴ Five days earlier, the first class had graduated from the Berlin Institute. In an examination to fill the 22 junior positions on the new General Staff, nine officers from that class obtained appointments. ⁸⁵

When Prussia march to war against France in 1806, it clung to the great traditions of its Frederician past without the corresponding leaders. Frederick William III was no Frederick the Great. Prussia had no unified direction of the war. Not even a rudimentary chain of command existed. Senior leaders quickly adopted Massenbach’s idea of a military committee to advise the king. Councils of war now debated Prussia’s options. Officers of the General Staff were scattered among the field commanders. Orders went into fantastic detail, providing ample opportunity for misinterpretation, delay, and confusion. ⁸⁶ Crippled from the start, the Prussian General Staff ‘made its debut on the stage of history with a fiasco’. ⁸⁷

At Jena and Auerstedt on 14 October 1806, the French army under Napoleon annihilated the Prussian army and left no doubt that a drastic overhauling of the Prussian war machine was required. Following the Peace of Tilsit (1807), Frederick William III promoted Gerhard von Scharnhorst to Major General and summoned him to rebuild what remained of his ruined army. As Chairman of the Military Reorganization Committee, Scharnhorst was able to implement his concept of a General Staff with Troops according to the principles he had sent to General Wallmoden in 1794.

When Prussia took the field against Napoleon in 1813, Scharnhorst was Chief of the General Staff and military advisor to the king. His General Staff with Troops transformed the army’s command philosophy. ⁸⁸ Every army, corps, and division commander had a small staff of responsible officers Scharnhorst personally chose to assist the commanding generals and to direct the planning and execution of operations. Each army and corps commander also had a chief of staff as his personal advisor and executive authority. These chiefs of staff were generally well received and consulted, becoming a kind of ‘alter ego’ for their commander. Scharnhorst had established a new command philosophy in the Prussian army – the so-called military marriage of the commanding general and his well-educated and superbly trained chief of staff. ⁸⁹

Although Scharnhorst and his associates recognized that disciplined intellect and sound organization were fundamental to the leadership of national armies, it would take another 50 years and two wars before the Prussian army fully embraced Scharnhorst’s plan to mobilize its military brain power and shape it into an effective instrument of war. In the meantime, the Prussian General Staff remained a work in progress, as the campaigns of 1813, 1814, and 1815 demonstrated. Scharnhorst understood this and recognized that changing the traditions of Frederick the Great was a long-term effort that might take decades to realize. As he told his favourite pupil, Carl Philipp von Clausewitz (1780–1831), their task was ‘to plant the seed of a new tree’, whose ‘fruit would ripen with new strength and vitality’ in due course. ⁹⁰ This occurred half a century later during the Wars of German Unification (1864–71).

An enlightened soldier of extraordinary character and intellect, Gerhard von Scharnhorst established the embryo of the Prussian general staff system. In total agreement with his civilian counterpart, Friedrich Karl Reichsfreiherr von und zum Stein (1757–1831), Scharnhorst centralized military affairs under a Ministry of War, in which the General Staff was not even a major subordinate agency. ⁹¹ Only after 1871 did the Great General Staff assume the character Massenbach had envisioned for it, and with which Bronsart agreed completely. This unfortunately led to disastrous results for Germany. ⁹²

The Duties of the General Staff contradicted virtually everything Christian von Massenbach proposed in 1802. The ‘duties’ Bronsart von Schellendorff described as the ‘calling’ of the general staff officer were those associated with a general staff with troops. ⁹³ When he discussed the specific duties of the general staff, Bronsart used words virtually identical to the language Scharnhorst had employed 80 years earlier. Nowhere in his book did Bronsart discuss the capital staff Massenbach sought. Instead, he focused on the field army, its corps and divisions, and their staffs. These were the staffs that had led Prussia to victory and Bronsart was explaining how this concept of sound organization and intellect (Scharnhorst’s idea) was the key to Prussia’s success. Even his chapter headings mirrored the subjects Scharnhorst had used in his concept papers.

As his authoritative source, Bronsart quoted Clausewitz. It was Clausewitz who said the General Staff converts ‘the ideas of the commanding general into orders’, thereby relieving ‘the mind of the general from a great amount of unnecessary trouble’. This was the exact mission Scharnhorst gave his General Staff with Troops in 1794. In closing his discussion of the duties of the general staff, Bronsart summarized them as ‘invariably watching over the fighting condition [Schlagfertigkeit] and material welfare of the troops’. ⁹⁴ Again, this is language characteristic of Scharnhorst, not Massenbach.

None of his German biographers has acknowledged the pivotal role Gerhard von Scharnhorst played in the creation of the Prussian General Staff before 1806. This apparently did not seem important to their story. Not even students of the General Staff have recognized the subtle but significant difference between Massenbach’s idea of a Prussian capital staff (Grosser Generalstab) and Scharnhorst’s concept of its operational field staff (Truppengeneralstab), often thinking they are the same. By the mid-nineteenth century, most nations had a capital staff, but none had a general staff with troops like the one Prussia possessed. This peculiar organization had ‘no exact parallel elsewhere’. ⁹⁵ This may be the reason few have fully understood the Prussian General Staff.

The ‘great reforms’ of Gerhard von Scharnhorst became the standard of large professional organizations and ‘the model upon which virtually all other officer corps were ultimately patterned’. ⁹⁶ This uniquely German concept combined organization and intellect into a collective genius. A rigorous process identified, selected, educated, and trained the best minds in the army and then promoted and assigned them to key leadership positions as commanders and staff officers. In sharp contrast to previous ideas that all an army needed to fight was the proper amount of discipline, drill, and a great man, Gerhard von Scharnhorst introduced the concept of corporate genius into the nineteenth-century profession of arms.