Montenegrin-British military cooperation against the French in the Bay of Kotor (1813-1814)

I

The French in Kotor learned that the Metropolitan was conducting secret talks with the British. General Gauthier, the commander of Boka Kotorska, wrote to the Metropolitan,

I know that English emissaries will be coming to you. The English are two-faced, so beware of their deceiving you as they had done with all the continental states, that have been drawn into an unfortunate war and then abandoned. ¹⁸

The alliance of European powers had brought Britain into these waters and it took a share in driving the French out of Boka with its fleet. This could not have been achieved only by the naval operations, so the British allied with Montenegrin ruler, Petar, for aid and cooperation.

By late 1813, the French military forces in Boka Kotorska were few, ethnically heterogeneous, without combat readiness, and surrounded by a hostile people. ¹⁹ According to the official data produced by Brig.-Gen. Gauthier, in the Gulf of Kotor there were only 1,507 French armed forces on 20 September 1813. ²⁰ For this reason, he could only think about the defence of the strong positions, in particular Kotor itself.

But apart from the numerically small forces, the ethnic heterogeneity of the French troops was conspicuous and Gauthier had naturally been taking special care: in the garrisons of Bokelian fortified points, there were 958 Croats and 293 Italians, but besides that the French troops could hardly hope for any military assistance at that time. ²¹

For all these reasons, the military situation of the French units was clearly serious, and the takeover of the fortifications in Boka was in fact merely a matter of time. The allied plans envisaged clearing the east coast of the Adriatic; and for taking over larger fortifications, a systematic siege with powerful artillery was necessary. That is why, according to the allied arrangements, the units of the British fleet were assigned to participate in the expulsion of the French forces and to encourage local uprisings. ²²

With regard to local uprisings, from mid-1812, the British sought cooperation with the Montenegrin Metropolitan Petar I. The early negotiations did not produce immediate practical results, but Petar I raise the idea of linking future anti-French operations with the unification of Montenegro and Boka Kotorska under the protectorate of Russia and Britain. ²³ The time for a joint action was also agreed. ²⁴ When the actual action was carried out, some of the fortifications in Boka (Budva, Trojica, Verige, Rose) fell to the Montenegrin troops and the Bokelian insurgents, some others were taken by local forces alone, and in some cases the British presence was only of moral significance. Only Kotor needed a genuine and organized war effort with well-positioned and powerful batteries because there the French not only had strong wall and artillery but also a high-quality command that was willing to organize stiff resistance.

The role of the British ships in the process of destroying the French troops was studied by previous generations of historians. ²⁵ As a result, the Kotor Archives contain both the Memoirs and Letters of the Commander of the British squadron in Boka, Captain William Hoste, ²⁶ and the Diary of the French General Gauthier. The combination of the records of the office of the Montenegrin-Bokelian civil authorities with those of the protagonists on the British and French sides makes it possible to give a convincing accounts of events in the region.

Boka Kotorska in 1812 presented a complex political scene full of contradictions where direct or indirect influences of all the three allies had been exerted. But their actual military forces in the Bay were inversely proportional to their political aspirations. Thus, Britain, which had no political and territorial aspirations in the area, found itself with armed forces in Boka and was in a position to realistically influence the development of events. But it did not do it because Hoste was exclusively focused on military solutions and never wanted to deal with political and diplomatic problems. On the other hand, Austria, which in its territorial aspirations was mostly interested in prolonging its earlier short reign of Boka (1797-1805), had no military units at all. Its official representative was Jacob Brounazzi. Acting on behalf of the third ally, Russia, with military units under the Russian flag, the Montenegrin Metropolitan Petar I was convinced that Russia would support his efforts to unite Montenegro and Boka, and that the sacrifices of Montenegro in liberating Boka from the French would have to be considered in any final settlement. Therefore, the Metropolitan endeavoured to free Boka with the use of his own forces as best he could and to carry through the organization of the administration. The allied powers, Petar I expected, would accept the fait accompli. This was, as we shall see, exactly what Hoste did by handing over the keys to Kotor to the representatives of the Central Commission (the joint provisional Government of Montenegro and Boka). But the ultimate solution came with the decisions of high diplomacy and the rulers of Russia and Austria themselves.

As for the populace of Boka, they were politically divided into two groups, and this had a significant impact on their attitude towards the British. Some were in favour of the Russian protectorate and the unification with Montenegro, and openly took up arms to assist the Montenegrin troops. The others, outnumbered but still significantly influential, wanted the return of the Austrian rule, hoping for the expansion of their maritime trade. As to how much this group felt such trade to be their primary interest is witnessed by the fact that they made requests to Hoste to immediately allow them the use of British or Dubrovnik flags during their voyages. ²⁷

Even before entering the Bay on 13 October 1813, the British had a very clear plan. They relied on the support of the local population and the well-known disinclination of the Croatian contingent amongst the French troops that, constituted the majority of the forces, to fight. ²⁸

However, the blockade of Kotor by the Montenegrin-Bokelian forces begun on 14 October and lasting for over two-and-a-half months could not vanquish the fortified and armed city with scarce artillery. It was only during Hoste’s second stay from early December 1813 that, after exhaustive preparations and ten days of shelling, Gauthier capitulated. Accordingly, the participation of the British squadron made a substantial contribution to victory and accelerated the final expulsion of the remaining French armed forces from Boka.

II

Two personalities in the British squadron in Boka were of particular influence. They were the commanders of the frigate Bacchante Sir William Hoste and the brig Saracen John Harper.

Born in the county of Norfolk, Hoste (26 August 1780 to 6 December 1828) experienced his naval ‘baptism’ in the same year as the French revolutionaries declared war on Britain. That year (1793) Hoste’s father asked his friend Nelson to take his young son on to his ship. Despite his family’s friendship with the Captain and his own delicate health, including seasickness, the young Hoste – having just turned 13 – would not avoid dangers. On his first voyage in the first year of the war, he was wounded in his right leg and remained lame for life. Somewhat later he was wounded again, in his right hand. At the Battle of Aboukir Bay, he had excelled so much in seamanship that, at the age of 18, he was entrusted with HMS Mutine, with which he sailed into the Mediterranean for the first time in 1801. Although by his psycho-physical constitution Hoste was not fit for a hard maritime life, the suggestive character of Nelson had finally persuaded him and had a decisive influence on him. He became a seaman and a warrior of great capacity. ²⁹ Later, he would be appointed to bigger and better ships, like the Greyhound and the Amphion, on which he, as Commander of the Adriatic, fought the Battle of Vis on 13 March 1811 defeating the French Captain (Bernard) Dubourdieu. The same year he was given command of the 38-gun frigate Bacchante, with which he entered Boka in 1813. He himself had chosen both the ship and the area of the Adriatic wishing to be under the command of Rear Admiral Fremantle, a friend and associate of Nelson. There he had great successes in capturing enemy ships. In April 1813, he was ordered to return to Vis. In late September, he participated in the siege of Trieste, but again was summoned to Vis, where the Admiral personally gave him the order to sail to Dubrovnik. When on 11 October he reached Dubrovnik, he learned from Captain Harper that the inhabitants of the Kotor area had rebelled against the French. As encouraging and aiding such rebellions was among his tasks, he took HMS Saracen and three more gunboats and sailed for Boka. ³⁰ After Kotor, Hoste collaborated with the Austrian Army and participated in the taking of Dubrovnik (Ragusa). Hoste commented, not without bitterness, that his ‘services are better and sooner recompensed by strangers than at home’. ³¹

After the Kotor campaign, which he had led at the age of 33, Hoste lived for only 15 years more, his health being compromised by his malaria and an earlier lung infection. ³² Towards the end of his life, he received recognition in his homeland as well. For the actions in the Adriatic waters, he was called ‘the hero of the Adriatic’ or ‘Young Nelson’, and also was raised to the dignity of a Baronet. He was also awarded one gold medal for the Battle of Vis and another separately for Kotor; ³³ on the latter was the crown, the hand holding a staff, the flag, and the inscription Cattaro. The liberation of Kotor was considered his most notable achievement. He married in 1817 and had six children. One of his sons became a renowned commander in the Royal Navy. ³⁴

Captain John Harper (1772-1855) came from a family of seafarers. He joined the Navy in 1781 and fought in the same battle in which his father died. He served on various ships and in various parts of the world (Guadalupe, Nile, Cádiz, Siracuse, etc.), excelling in numerous actions, especially in capturing 16 Italian ships at Trieste in 1809. Then he was promoted to the rank of commander, and from mid-1812 he was in command of HMS Saracen for two years ‘carrying out a series of brilliant tasks’. ³⁵ For these services, the Commander-in-Chief entrusted him with the command of the blockades of Dubrovnik and Kotor. For the actions in Boka, he was decorated with the Austrian Imperial Leopold Order. Harper’s war career ended with the blockade and fall of Venice. As an officer, he also served in India and America and retired in 1846.

Sailing from Dubrovnik at night, the British squadron arrived in the Bay of Kotor on the morning of 13 October 1813. ³⁶ It comprised five vessels: the frigate Bacchante, the brig Saracen, and three accompanying gunships from Sicily. ³⁷ In passing the French battery in Herceg Novi (Castelnuovo, sometimes Città Nuova ³⁸ ), they ‘exchanged a few shots’ so that the whole of Boka be informed of the Royal Navy’s entry. And it had an immediate effect: on that same day the inhabitants of Perast (Perasto) ³⁹ seized the fort of Sv. Križ (Holy Cross) above the city from the hands of the French military garrison.

The situation ⁴⁰ in Herceg Novi was critical for the French. There had been attempts at rebellion, and the reinforcements that had been sent to help the city as well as those that were already in it had deserted. ⁴¹ In the Memoirs, Hoste said that the garrison at the surrender consisted of only about 250 Croats and no more than 26 Frenchmen. ⁴²

In this sensitive area, at the entrance to Boka, diversions started early on. On 29 and 30 September and into early October, Montenegrin troops entered Risan, ⁴³ and the city of Herceg Novi and its fort were completely cut off and blockaded. In such a situation, on 14 October 1813 Captain Hoste made an offer for negotiations to the Herceg Novi fort commander. The fortress had to be surrendered, and the garrison had to lay down their weapons. Croatians would be sent to their homes, and the French and Italians would be detained as prisoners of war. ⁴⁴

According to Hoste’s record, the garrisons feared the intentions of the Montenegrin forces, so a special request was made to dispatch sufficient British troops to protect them from possible violence at the time of the city takeover. ⁴⁵ In the event, everything went peacefully. The British soldiers entered the city and the fortress without incident.

Faced with the contemporary political reality in Boka, Hoste felt all the weight of his own position between the pro-Russian aspirations of the Montenegrins and the pro-Austrian feeling of some Bokelians. ⁴⁶ Notably, in regard to Herceg Novi, the Montenegrin representative asked that the Russian flag be flown alongside the British and the Austrian flags. Thus, all the three allied flags were flaunted above the walls of the Herceg Novi port.

On the same day as he entered Boka, Hoste instructed captain Harper to assault the important strategic position of the island of Sv. Đorđe (St. George) and the four French gunboats, which he knew to be at anchor there. ⁴⁷

Gauthier greatly valued the position of St. George, giving it the status of the ‘Cattaro fortress’, and he had specially fortified it. ⁴⁸ When the British arrived off the island on the morning of 14 October, they found the French gunboats already in the hands of the Bokelians. On that day, the Perastans occupied the fortress above their village.

Thus, on the second day of the British squadron’s stay (14 October), this strategic passage towards Kotor was taken, and a British lieutenant and a boat were left to guard it. Hoste’s plans were clearly articulated in a proclamation to the Bokelians issued on 20 October – a week after his entering the Bay. ⁴⁹ Calling for a fight against the French, Hoste was specifically concerned with highlighting his exclusively military goals. ⁵⁰ In response, in his own proclamation from Kotor of 22 October, Gauthier instead made an allusion to the alleged English-style corruption that Hoste brought. ⁵¹

Problems first arose when, after taking the island of St. George, Hoste gave the order for removal of the artillery from it. Certain Bokelian coastal municipalities sought an explanation for why it had been done. This caused a reaction against Hoste and his temporarily leaving Boka. According to the documents, the first such hostile response was introduced by Prčanj and Dobrota; also declaring themselves in the same sense were Perast, Metropolitan Petar I, the National Assembly, ⁵² and the Austrian representative Brounazzi. ⁵³ Hoste found himself facing a united front of suspicions, even from factions otherwise in mutual conflict. Brounazzi, for instance, was pursuing Austrian aggrandizement, but in this instance ⁵⁴ his views on the guns on St. George fully corresponded with the perceptions of Petar I ⁵⁵ and Bokelian municipalities.

Hoste reacted in a vigorous and austere manner. Three letters he immediately addressed to the municipality of Perast, to Petar I, and to Rear-Admiral Fremantle were written in the heat of passion because of the ‘unfounded suspicions’ he faced. He suspected his critics of francophilia. ⁵⁶

Hoste’s intention had been to start the battle for Kotor as soon as possible and to use all the artillery from around the Bay. The conflict over the cannons at St. George convinced him that at that moment a quick and purely military solution for the liberation of Boka would not be possible. One needed to make political contacts and use persuasion, pressure, agreements, and the like. Hoste did not like this, but in pursuit of his military goals and solutions, decided to avoid all the possible problems.

III

The problems that Hoste was faced with were both political and personal. Open allusions to the political problems in Boka one finds in a letter to Rear-Admiral Fremantle. The seizure of cannons meant in fact also the obligation of their transport and mounting in suitable places, as well as the organization of the final assault on Kotor. He returned the cannons and left Boka. One gets the impression that at that moment, he gladly accepted the reason for resentment, he dramatized it, left his deputy in charge of Boka, and threw off himself the onus for the development of events. He took a cruise out of the Bay to Dubrovnik with a single gunship. ⁵⁷

To Hoste, the political polarization in Boka and Montenegro which was hindering the military action was certainly clear. But instead of tact, Hoste acted with a great deal of coldness, even with an offensive contempt for the people. Before entering the Bay he had been informed of the political situation in Boka. Due to such political sensitivity, Hoste had even ordered his ships to hoist all the three allied flags. ⁵⁸ While the Montenegrin Metropolitan was expecting the Russian fleet, a part of the Bokelians was expecting the Austrian army. ⁵⁹

Without fully comprehending the motivations of the Bokelians, Hoste deemed that they only wanted the British to do the work for them and to be the means by which they would free Kotor. On this, Hoste judged their behaviour as ungrateful and arrogant. ⁶⁰

In his military actions Hoste also felt bound by his country’s diplomatic obligations to Austria. On the one hand, he was expressly forbidden to cooperate closely with and make use of the Montenegrins militarily, notwithstanding the fact that they were already there under arms. On the other hand, the British stand on the ‘legal right’ of Austria to Boka was clear to him, as well as the need to cooperate with the Austrians, although they had not yet arrived. In his view, Brounazzi and the Austrophile Bokelians were behaving odiously and with distrust. Such contradictions have undoubtedly affected Hoste to become reluctant to take any major actions in Boka.

The role of a personality trait is not insignificant here. As a British naval commander, Hoste felt deeply affected by not having been received with more regard in the style of a ‘liberator’. ⁶¹ This was so much the more insulting because he, in the final stage of the war here on the Adriatic periphery and in dealing with the local rebels, felt neglected. He also considered himself being insufficiently supported by the authorities of the Royal Navy. ⁶²

Leaving Boka for the first time, Hoste took with him the Croatian soldiers, who had deserted from the Kotor fortress. And when he learnt during the voyage that the French had left Split, Hoste disembarked these troops there.

As for those eight disputed bronze cannons from St. George, they were placed on the shore in Perast.

When, after a brief period of absence, he returned to Boka Kotorska, Hoste was informed that there were only a few defenders left in the city, that the situation with the garrison was bad, and that there was a shortage of food. ⁶³ He sent General Gauthier the first call for surrender in conjunction with Petar I, upon whom he had paid a call on 14 October 1813. Gauthier refused to surrender, as Hoste had expected. ⁶⁴

The defenders of Kotor numbered 724 troops, although the French made an insignificant percentage thereof. The Croats – commissioned and non-commissioned officers and soldiers – numbered 353, the Italians 255, with a small number of Frenchmen. The total number of cannons was 65 ⁶⁵ but they had few projectiles and an insufficient number of artillerists.

Since 14 October – at the same time as the British squadron entered Boka and for almost a week before the appearance of Captain Harper off Kotor (20 October) – the city had been under siege by the Montenegrin army and the insurgents from Boka. But the Montenegrin-Bokelian troops outside the walls of Kotor stood no chance of success without a fleet, despite the strong anti-French mood of the troops under siege in the city and the growing resistance to General Gauthier’s discipline.

The iron hand of General Gauthier behind the solid walls supported by a small number of close faithful associates enforced the will to fight to the last. After Hoste’s first demand for surrender on 22 October, Gauthier rejected three more such demands. Petar I addressed to him his own demand on 30 October, immediately after a dramatic massive desertion by the Croatian troops, counting on the devastating effect of this desertion. ⁶⁶ But Gauthier replied negatively, even somewhat provocatively. ⁶⁷ Four days later (4 November), Jacob Brounazzi made a another attempt hoping that he, as an Austrian envoy, could have more success. However, Gauthier did not even reply to him because, as he wrote in his Diary, he did not want to get in touch with a ‘spiv’. ⁶⁸

From a Gauthier’s record in the Diary, we learn that the British, with the help of previously captured French Sergeant Andreis, hauled two cannons to the Vrmac Hill above Kotor between 23 and 27 October. ⁶⁹

From all this, it seems clear that Captain Harper, in the absence of Hoste, was making attempts, in November and early December, at organizing batteries for local forces and that he had asked the Central Commission for men to do so. On his second return to Boka in early December, ⁷⁰ Hoste took over as the chief commander. Thus, on 21 December he asked of the mayor to dispatch to him at Prčanj the artillery supplies from the warehouse in Perast. Once the bombardment of the city had commenced, Hoste asked (on 30 December) of the Central Commission the supply of 10 boats of soft soil, 160 bags, and 100 men with shovels. As for the Montenegrin troops, Hoste himself commended their active participation in the blockade and even in the bombardment.

This cooperation between the Bokelians and the Montenegrins in the British preparations for the assault does not diminish the great efforts made by the British crew to install the batteries on this unfavourable terrain. On his second visit, Hoste was aware of the great difficulty of the task awaiting him, and he stated so in his proclamation of 28 November. ⁷¹ In any case, as in late October, Hoste – in early December – had encountered difficulties in navigation, so the frigate was on station no earlier than 12 December. ⁷² Although Hoste had arrived earlier in a boat, the actual day of starting intensive preparations for the assault on Kotor is deemed to be 12 December. Hoste lauded the efforts of officers and seamen. ⁷³

British successes were met with the expressions of joy by the local population. Finally, complete supplies were brought to Vrmac on 21 December so that the officers could rest in their beds for the first time in 7 days. ⁷⁴

Hoste did not spare himself from exertions. In his letter to his mother, he said that he had performed all possible tasks – from issuing commands to the jobs ‘of all trades’. ⁷⁵

During 22 and 23 December, final preparations were under way. Before the main attack, a squad of seamen was sent to the hills to scout and harass the enemy. The order was issued to open fire from all batteries at dawn of 25 December at the Captain’s cannon signal. Simultaneously, the French garrison responded to the cannonade, which lasted all day. And the bombardment continued so until 28 December when it was abruptly suspended due to an explosion. But on the 29th, the mutual cannonade was resumed. Also on 1 January 1814 the mutual bombardment continued until midnight. Then, again, the demand for surrender was refused even though the defence was obviously weaker. ⁷⁶ Petar I was preparing for the occupation of the city and it was known therein. Gauthier had learned from his officers that the garrison would not resist the assault that was planned to take place at the night between 4 and 5 January. ⁷⁷ Then he summoned the Defence Council at which it was unanimously decided to dispatch a negotiator to the British. The negotiations lasted for two days, but the crews at the British batteries were still on the alert until Gauthier agreed to the given terms. ⁷⁸ These included sending the prisoners of war to Italy but that they might not be deployed to fight Great Britain and her allies. The British artillery was returned to ships. The British crews were stationed at various positions in Kotor, and General Gauthier boarded ship on 9 January together with 297 of his troops. Until 16 January the ships transported supplies for the campaign against Dubrovnik, and it was on that day that the British garrison withdrawn from duty: the city’s affairs were ‘left in the hands of the magistrates’, as Hoste said. ⁷⁹

With the gendarmes, the gunners, and the artillery commander, Gauthier sailed on 18 January on the brig Saracen, along with two other transport vessels.

Until handing over the keys, Kotor was managed by the British garrison under the command of Harper. Representatives of the Central Commission – the joint provisional Government of Montenegro and Boka – entered the city on 16 January 1814 and the Metropolitan arrived on the following day. ⁸⁰ Before his departure on 18 January, Hoste informed the Central Commission that he would take from the Kotor fort all the artillery and military stores which he considered ‘necessary for the siege of Ragusa’. ⁸¹ Gauthier recorded that ‘the English removed out of Kotor 18 cannons, ammunition and all the hospital equipment’. ⁸²

As one can see in the Memoirs, Hoste wanted something more than the mere taking of a fortified port. Relying on various of Hoste’s allusions, we can conclude that he would often think of Gauthier and the military prestige that was at issue there. It seems as if, through certain channels, a dialogue was being held between these two eminent warriors. So Hoste knew of Gauthier’s statement that he would not surrender before the enemy’s batteries were hauled to the top of the hill. ⁸³ The latter claimed that it would take six months for such transportation, and Hoste wanted to show him that six days would be enough. Finally, Gauthier allegedly claimed that the overall British operation was unsoldierly. ⁸⁴ It was, therefore, a ‘lesson’ that was to be given to the prominent French General, a recipient of the Legion of Honour ⁸⁵ who spoke sarcastically of the British ventures.

With such a development of events and the military solution of the Kotor fortress issue, another delicate problem regarding the further political destiny of Kotor and Boka was exacerbated. The handing of the keys to the city to Petar I, acting as the President of the Central Commission, complicated the political situation from a purely British standpoint. The British, in fact, deemed that Austria had a ‘legal’ right to Boka. Thus, as Hoste had already prolonged the takeover of the city, his actual haste in leaving Kotor and failing to aid the ally was striking.

On 6 January – right after the French capitulation – Hoste addressed the members of the Central Commission. He pointed out that the goal of forcing out the French troops from Boka had been achieved so that the British squadron was preparing to sail out for new operations. Yet, no one was allowed to enter the city until the French garrison embarked. This, actually, had been agreed upon between Hoste and Gauthier. But his ultimate decision was to leave the keys to the city in the hands of the chief civic authority. ⁸⁶

From Hoste’s correspondence with the British ambassador in Vienna, the Earl of Aberdeen, we can see that the decision had serious implications. ⁸⁷

Accepting the full responsibility upon himself, ⁸⁸ Hoste was trying to prove the logic and the necessity of his actions, accusing Austria of two things. First, that during all the events in Boka not a single Austrian soldier had ever appeared there. ⁸⁹ Hesitation was the main characteristic of the Austrian practical attitude towards Boka. So when, even after his second arrival in the Bay, he did not see the possibility of cooperation, he took the initiative on his own. The second fundamental Austrian mistake, in the opinion of Hoste, was to send as its representative Jacob Brounazzi, who proved to be so oppositional that Hoste threatened him with being confined to the frigate! Especially important was Hoste’s claim that Brounazzi kept preventing him in all ways from getting to Kotor. ⁹⁰

Hoste claimed that the populace of Boka, together with the Montenegrins, protested against the advance of the Austrian troops into the Bay, and that the Metropolitan had told him that the civil war might erupt. Hoste, therefore, felt that from his own point of view he had to choose a more logical and a fairer solution, and the lesser evil, accepting the ‘decision of the Bocchesi’ – that is, leaving the keys of the city of Kotor in the hands of the representatives of the Central Commission, chaired by the Montenegrin Metropolitan. ⁹¹

IV

Although there was a general British instruction to cooperate with the Montenegrins militarily to the smallest possible extent, the troops of Petar I together with the rebels from Boka actively participated in the liberation of Kotor and other parts of the Bay. The Montenegrins reached Boka and the gates of Kotor even before the British appeared and had already established certain forms of government. On the other hand, the Austrian army was slow in coming. ⁹² In Hoste’s opinion, the Austrian General Milutinovich should have forced his march if he wished to deal in timely fashion with the Montenegerin Metropolitan. ⁹³ A commander of Hoste’s rank primarily appreciated military contributions and actual engagement: he had no interest in an ally who merely waited for the British to do their work for them. The Metropolitan called himself ‘a general in the Russian service who fights under the Russian flag’, ⁹⁴ the civic authority existed, and the British squadron had other duties to perform as well. Therefore, Hoste believed that he had taken the only viable option in such circumstances. ⁹⁵ In the event, the diplomatic dispute did not escalate and the Austrian Emperor honoured both Hoste and Harper with medals.

The issue of Boka Kotorska was resolved in 1814 in a fashion that no-one had predicted. The Russian Emperor Alexander I agreed that Boka should be annexed by Austria, which had not fired a single shot to liberate these provinces. Official Russian circles responded to Metternich’s request to influence Petar I to withdraw his troops from Boka. The attempt of the Metropolitan to win the Russian Court over to the unification of Montenegro and Boka failed, even though he sent one of his men to the Russian Emperor Alexander in late 1813. In May 1814, Emperor Alexander informed the Metropolitan that the Allies had decided to incorporate the area into the Austrian state. ⁹⁶ This decision by the Allies was received in Montenegro and by most of the coastal population as a great injustice. Boka Kotorska and the Budva area would remain under Austria for over 100 years – until the end of World War I, the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian empire, and the formation of the Yugoslav State in 1918.