Abstract
It is well known that the reality of the Axis Alliance could not compete with its myth. Contrary to what had been hoped for by the fascist regime, there was no close cooperation within the ‘Berlin-Rome Axis’ after the war started. Historians certainly went too far when they called the Italy of 1941 a German satellite state. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the balance of power within the axis had been redefined. The purchases of German troops, tourists, and politicians in Italy and the countermeasures taken by the fascists are good indicators of how relations had changed.
‘Here in Italy the tension between Germans and Italians is undoubtedly on the increase’, the American Ambassador William Phillips reported to his president on 16 September 1941. ‘No one is permitted to know how much food is being shipped to Germany, but everyone is aware that food is becoming scarcer, that food prices are continually rising, and that in certain districts people are very hungry.’ 1 And that, even though the harvest was good. 2
Already the suspicion that the missing food went to Germany was spreading among the Italians.
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And Phillips had even more to report: Last week’s decree forbidding the sale to anyone of gold, jewels and precious stones, has been put into effect to prevent an internal flight from the lira, as well as to prevent the Germans from buying up these stocks. Likewise decrees have been issued limiting the sale of clothing, shoes, leather goods, etc., to residents of Italy, and forbidding the sale of autos to foreigners, both issued to protect Italians from German greed.
4
It is well known that the reality of the Axis Alliance could not compete with its myth. Contrary to what had been hoped for by the fascist regime, there was no close cooperation within the ‘Berlin-Rome Axis’ after the war started in June 1940. From the outset, the alliance was characterized by the inequalities between the two partners resulting from Italy’s economic and military inferiority. Mistrust and competition dominated the agreements and prevented the potential power offered by the coalition from being developed effectively. At the end of 1940, the bitter defeats in Greece and North Africa brought the Italian government to its knees. Benito Mussolini had called both campaigns ‘parallel wars’ to underline the regime’s independence; now Italy had to accept the help of German troops and subordinate itself within the axis. 5
Historians such as MacGregor Knox and Brunello Mantelli certainly went too far when they called the Italy of 1941 a German satellite state. 6 Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the balance of power within the axis had been redefined. Thus, in the preliminary talks on the trade agreement of 26 February 1941, the Italian negotiators felt compelled for the first time to report on the true (devastating) state of their armaments economy. The exchange of information was no longer on an equal footing, as Germany did not grant such insights. 7 In addition, the Germans now entered Italian theatres of war – and Italy itself. In December 1940, a contingent of German transport aircraft was stationed in Foggia, and shortly afterwards a Luftwaffe air corps moved to Sicily. From February 1941, German troop transports regularly passed through Italy. The German Africa Corps under General Erwin Rommel intervened in the North African War, and supplies were shipped via Italian ports. 8
It has not yet been examined how the Germans behaved in the country of the ally – although it is a matter of great interest: The behaviour of the German troops, tourists, and politicians is a good indicator of how relations had changed. The same applies to the countermeasures taken by the Italian government, which William Phillips mentions in his letter. It is worthwhile to extend the interest that recent research has shown for everyday life in fascist Italy 9 to the field of axis relations. For much can be learned from the behaviour on this small scale with regard to the cooperation of the allies in general. In order to outline the initial situation, the following section first describes the consequences of dealing differently with the war-related shortage of food and goods. Then the German purchases in Italy will be discussed, whereby the purchase of works of art will also be addressed. This is followed by an analysis of how the cohesion of the Axis Alliance was ultimately put to the test: first by the decrees by which the Italian Government defended itself against German purchases and second by the collapse of the Italian food supply, which necessitated German aid measures.
I. Food shortages: exports and rationing measures
The increased presence of German troops caused discontent and fear among the Italian population. As the German soldiers passed through the entire country on their way to the ports of Naples and Taranto, rumours circulated about an immense number of Germans in Italy. In Milan, the population rumoured – according to the Italian security police – that there were now more Germans in Sicily than orange trees. Furthermore, it was said that German soldiers in Calabria and Puglia were carrying away as much food as possible 10 – dangerous rumours, since agriculture and food supply were a central theme of fascist propaganda from the very beginning. 11 However, the idea that there was an organized buying up of Italian products was widespread. 12 In fact, the military attaché at the Italian embassy in Berlin, Efisio Marras, had already warned in January 1941 that the Germans were likely to buy up Italian products – as many food and consumer goods were already rationed in Germany, but not in Italy. 13
General Marras therefore recommended rationing textiles and footwear in order to solve this problem in advance. A lack of rationing – so he feared – would confirm the opinion circulating in the German Reich that in Italy people live in abundance. 14 In reality, in February 1941, the Italian shoe industry was only able to meet half of its military requirements due to a lack of leather. The production of leisure and gymnastics shoes had long been postponed; boots had been replaced by half-boots for all soldiers, and a rigid restriction on sales to civilians was envisaged. 15 Since November 1940, the Italian population had been complaining about the lack of basic foodstuffs. 16 In February 1940 sugar had been rationed, in October edible fats followed, and since November pasta had only been issued on ration cards. 17 Other products such as potatoes, legumes, meat, stockfish, eggs, and dairy products were subject to quotas, that is, each province was allocated a certain quantity of the product in question. 18 In comparison with the precautions taken in the German Reich, however, this was only a minor measure. Rationing measures had already been introduced there since 1933. More consistently than the Italians, 19 Nazi agricultural politicians had drawn the conclusion from the experiences of the First World War that the food situation could be a decisive factor in a war. In order not to repeat the mistakes of the Kaiserreich, a possible war had to be prepared in terms of food policy 20 – as early as possible. As a result, the German system of food rationing was introduced immediately before the attack on Poland, with the decree of 27 August 1939. According to the first cards, the average German consumer was entitled to 700 g of meat; 280 g of sugar plus 110 g of jam (i.e. a total of 335 g of sugar); 63 g of coffee; 150 g of barley, semolina, sago, or other foodstuffs per week; and 0.2 L of milk and 60 g of fat per day. Potatoes, legumes, eggs, and cacao initially remained freely available. 21 One month later, the bread ration was fixed at 2,400 g per week. 22
Although the food policy in the German Reich was handled more rigorously, the Italian people at that time already lived much more modestly than the Germans. This was well known in government circles. 23 But the knowledge of the food situation of the alliance partner did not change anything about the behaviour of the German government, which only had the needs of its own citizens in mind. The food situation in the German Reich in the winter of 1940/1941 was also precarious. 24 In the economic negotiations of February 1941, 25 the aim was therefore to even raise imports from Italy. It was agreed, for example, that the Italians would increase their rice deliveries from 108,000 to 135,000 tonnes in 1941. 26 Since the Italian government made this increase in exports conditional on the absence of serious nutritional problems in Italy, the German delegation promised to enable Italy to obtain 200,000 tonnes of maize from southeastern Europe. In a telegram of 21 January, negotiator Carl Clodius recommended this procedure so that the Italian population would at least be supplied to some extent and the German Wehrmacht would receive its rice. 27 Since maize dishes were a staple food at least in northern Italy, the exchange of maize for rice was plausible. 28
Not only rice was imported from Italy. Fruit (grapes, apples, pears, citrus fruits, etc.), vegetables, cheese, wine, almonds, and potatoes were also supplied to the German Reich in considerable quantities. According to German statistics from 1944 (Table 1), total exports of livestock and food in Italy rose from 3,370.0 million lire (1939) to 5,813.5 million lire in 1941. The German share of Italian exports had climbed in the past years from 29.4 per cent (1939) to 47.4 per cent (1940) to 59.8 per cent (1941), and in 1942 it would even reach 64.3 per cent. 29 In concrete terms, this meant that between 1939 and 1941 the export of potatoes to the German Reich doubled; that of wine, vermouth, and cheese tripled; while the export of fish even increased eightfold. 30 As early as 1939, Germany had clearly been the main buyer of the Italian agricultural industry, well ahead of Switzerland and Great Britain. 31 Now as much as 86.8 per cent of the additional food exports (1941) went to Germany, that is, the enormous increase in exports between 1940 and 1941 was essentially caused by German demand.
Italian exports: livestock and food – 1939-1942.
Compiled and calculated according to: BArch, Statistisches Reichsamt, R 3102/alt R 24/870, Der Außenhandel Italiens 1939-43, Stand Frühjahr 1944, tab. 4 and 6.
Of course, such an increase in exports was not very popular in times of food shortages. As early as December 1940, Alessandro Pavolini, the Minister of Popular Culture, had reminded the press in his instructions never to report on food exports to other countries. 32 On 5 December 1940, on the occasion of a German-Italian agricultural agreement, he confirmed his order and expressly instructed not to mention under any circumstances that Italian exports had increased during the war. 33 However, his instructions could not prevent the Italian population in 1941 from wondering why they were suffering from hunger; the harvest had been good. 34 And the culprit was quickly found: As early as December 1940, a report by the German security police stated that rationing measures in Italy led to disgruntlement against Germany. The population knew that strictly rationed foodstuffs such as rice went to the Reich. 35
But the impression of a good harvest was also deceptive, because considerably less land had been cultivated in 1941. From 1939 to 1941, the area had shrunk from 5,229 million hectares to 4,970 million hectares and wheat production had fallen from 7,981 million tonnes to 7,071 million tonnes. 36 Moreover, a large part of the harvest no longer appeared on the market because it was hidden by the farmers. 37 In addition, since the beginning of 1941, it has hardly been possible to obtain food from abroad due to the sea blockade. Italian grain imports in 1941 and 1942 corresponded to only 18.4 per cent of imports in 1939. 38 Wheat imports, for example, fell from 648,060 tonnes (1939) to 85,814 tonnes (1941) after a peak of 690,557 tonnes (1940). That was just 13.2 per cent of the 1939 import. In 1941, only 56,618 tonnes of maize was imported, corresponding to about a quarter of the previous year (1940: 204,670 tonnes). Barley imports shrank from 62,608 tonnes (1939) to 41,903 tonnes (1940) and finally to 5,692 tonnes (1941). 39 Last but not least, the conquest of Greece meant that from 1941 onwards the supply of the population living there had to be ensured also. Greece, which had always been dependent on grain imports and whose infrastructure had been severely damaged by the war, was on the brink of a devastating famine. 40 As early as the end of May 1941, the German and Italian authorities agreed that the Greeks had to be helped because ‘the food problem was the decisive point for maintaining order’. 41 But the two occupying powers did not feel the same obligation: In Berlin, it was thought that primarily Italy was responsible for Greece. 42 After all, Mussolini had officially declared the area part of the Italian spazio vitale on 10 June 1941. 43 And indeed, during the winter of 1941/1942 the Italians sent more food to Greece than the Germans. 44
Italy’s food shortage was therefore not caused solely by exports to the German Reich. But these exports were also a factor – a factor spread by Anglo-American propaganda and intensively noticed by the Italian population. For a long time, the German population, on the contrary, had the impression that life in Italy was wonderful and that everything was still available even during the war. The half-hearted rationing measures led to wrong conclusions about the living conditions of the axis partner. In the summer of 1941, the German embassy became aware of this problem and noted that the fact that one could still live in good hotels and restaurants almost as in peacetime should not hide the fact that ‘the situation was more difficult for the masses in Italy than in Germany’. 45 Although the upper classes could still supply themselves with almost everything, enormous price increases often made the non-rationed goods unaffordable for the poorer population. In general, it had to be said that the German population was better supplied than the Italian: In the Reich, everything was rationed, but in view of the relatively stable prices everybody could buy what he was entitled to according to his ration card. 46 Nevertheless, the fairy tale of Italy as the land of milk and honey remained. The few reports that correctly portrayed the situation circulated only in government circles, and these saw no reason to make their knowledge public.
II. Shopping in Italy: food, clothing, and art
The misperception of Italian living conditions had a fatal effect on German-Italian relations. For while the level of food exports could be concealed from the Italian population, the excessive local purchases by Germans inevitably caught the eye. In the summer, tourists joined the German soldiers who had been crossing the country in increasing numbers since January 1941. 47 While no figures are available on German tourists, the size of the German troops can be estimated at least approximately. On 22 December 1940, OKW and Comando Supremo had agreed that members of the Wehrmacht could be transported free of charge on the Italian railway. 48 Pavolini instructed the press not to report on the troop transports, 49 and the Ministry of the Interior ordered the railway staff to refrain from questions and checks. 50 First, with the X. Fliegerkorps – a formation of the German Luftwaffe – 14,385 men were transferred to Sicily; on 9 January 1941, about half of this corps had arrived on the island. This was followed by the Afrikakorps, which was to fight under Rommel in North Africa. For the period 8 February to 1 May 1941, the Seekriegsleitung (SKL) – the Maritime Warfare Command – noted that the transport of 33,549 soldiers from Italy to Libya had been successful. 51 Since there had been heavy losses, it has to be assumed that considerably more German soldiers had crossed Italy. In October 1941, the German Afrikakorps consisted of 48,500 men; about 65,000 German soldiers took part in Operation Crusader a few weeks later. 52 All of them had been shipped to Africa via the Italian ports. 53 The German troop presence in Italy took on such proportions in the course of 1941 that even high-ranking politicians like Galeazzo Ciano and Giuseppe Bottai began to fear a German invasion. 54
Little can be said about the number of German tourists – except that it also increased significantly in the second half of the year. At the end of July 1941, the two governments had agreed on significant simplifications in travel to Italy
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so that the international tourists who had been absent due to the war were replaced by a flood of Germans.
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Officially, the German government had wanted to help the Italian restaurant industry out of its existential crisis.
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But tourism had a different significance in time of war. The majority of the people who took advantage of the simplified procedure for obtaining exit permits showed ‘no interest in Italian art, nor in the country or its people. The main thing was that in Italy all the objects missing [in the German Reich] were still available in large quantities’.
58
Exactly what General Marras had announced clairvoyantly in January 1941 now occurred. According to the travel agency ‘München’, German tourists stayed ‘in very inferior houses [. . .], only to stay as cheaply as possible, in order to be able to buy as much as possible’.
59
The envoy Otto Bene reported from Bolzano that the arriving Germans ‘rushed like locusts into the restaurants and shops’. With outbursts of enthusiasm, they would throw themselves at the first bottle of Chianti at the Brenner and greet every dish in the restaurant joyfully, accompanying their purchases with phrases such as ‘Happy are you that you do not have any stamps’.
60
Under these circumstances, the envoy said, it would be better if the Germans did not come to South Tyrol at all. He had similar reports from Milan and other cities.
61
In fact, there had been purchases of ‘no less than 8000 pairs of boots’
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in the city of Naples alone. In some cases, German troops with incomplete equipment had gone to Italy only to be equipped there.
63
German Wehrmacht offices made ‘substantial purchases of automobiles’.
64
In addition, troops stationed in southern Italy and Sicily continuously acquired gold and jewellery.
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Officers and soldiers sent considerable quantities of consumer goods and food to Germany. Furthermore, ineptitudes such as collective buying for a large number of comrades caused a sensation among the population.
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In many places in Italy, tailors worked day and night to meet the countless orders for women’s costumes and coats.
67
Moreover, there was the organized purchase of Italian art treasures for German private collections. For example, in the documents of Agenzia Stefani, the Italian news agency, it says, There are [. . .] two or three groups of Germans who buy the few of our works of art that are currently freely available, and in some cases even steal them. One of these German groups, led by the Prince of Hesse, allegedly buys for the Führer’s private collection, another group for Göring, and so on. In Florence alone, about two months ago, these groups made purchases for seven million lire from antiquarian bookshops!
68
From 1940 onwards, 69 Prince Philipp of Hesse regularly received cash from the German Embassy to make purchases on the peninsula. As part of the ‘Linz Special Action’ (Sonderaktion Linz), he and Dr Hans Posse were commissioned to search for suitable objects for the planned Führer Museum in Adolf Hitler’s hometown. 70 In November 1940, he received 50,000 lire in Italy for this purpose and 800,000 lire in December. At the end of January 1941, the Reich Chancellery finally set up a special account for him at the embassy, with a budget of 2 million lire. 71 (In order to convey a sense of the value of the lira at that time, it should be noted that a pair of medium-quality men’s shoes cost about 105 lire in January 1941 and a pair of women’s shoes 85 lire. Wholesalers paid 1.17 lire for a litre of milk, 0.80 lire for 1 egg, and about 2 lire for 1 kg of wheat flour. 72 ) Hitler’s middleman was allowed to dispose freely of the money, and the account was always replenished by the Reich Chancellery. In exceptional cases – should the 2 million lire not suffice – the embassy was instructed to advance the corresponding amount to the prince. 73 Already in the summer of 1941, Prince Philipp’s art purchases went beyond the scope of the special account, and a transfer of 13,200,000 lire to the embassy was required to pay for the last purchases. 74 These figures speak for themselves. Hitler’s acquisition of art in Italy increased rapidly from the turn of the year; by mid-1941, it had already reached an extent for which even the German authorities were not prepared.
Josef Angerer and Walter Andreas Hofer 75 acted as middlemen for Hermann Göring. The Reichsmarschall transferred his money to a special account at the embassy in order to buy furniture and art via Kulturattaché Adolf Wüster and his purchasing agents. In the Göring case, it is difficult to estimate the extent of the purchases, and only a sample list of some acquisitions 76 and a transfer of more than 5,000,000 lire in June 1941 are available so far. 77 However, a total of 33 boxes of art objects were finally stored in the economic department of the German embassy in November, as Göring’s middlemen were looking for a way to bring the art treasures across the border ‘without formalities’ – that is, without export duties. In vain, Angerer speculated on giving all the material to a high-ranking German politician in the next special train. 78
As can be seen from the documents of Agenzia Stefani, these machinations did not remain hidden from the Italians. In July, National Education Minister Giuseppe Bottai presented the Duce with a memorandum in which he called on him – not for the first time 79 – to take action against German art exports. Mussolini promised a tougher stance against the Germans. 80 A few days later, Bottai took the initiative and presented himself to the German embassy. In his opinion, the way in which the purchases were made at the time did not correspond to the state of German-Italian friendship, and the minister complained and asked for the official way to be taken from now on, that is, not to regulate purchases through middlemen, but from government to government. In addition, a German-Italian commission should ensure compensation. This sector was to be regulated as a whole, because after all there were also art treasures in Germany and France which were of interest to Italy. 81 Despite these clear words, however, nothing changed in the German behaviour, and the art purchases continued.
III. Italian countermeasures: the fascist alliance under pressure
In the autumn of 1941, the Duce was extremely annoyed by this ‘sell-out of Italy’. He received reports from all over the country in which the prefects complained vividly and pointed out that the friendly feelings of the population for Germany were severely impaired by the purchases. Cultural actions that were supposed to unite the peoples, such as the forthcoming promotion of Italian-German society, seemed like a farce when at the same time ‘the mood was affected by such mass purchases’. 82
When the German government – on 3 September – finally reacted by restricting travel to Italy and blocking the release of foreign currency ‘for unnecessary travel’, 83 it was already too late. Following numerous complaints from the population, the Italian authorities had carried out surveys to establish the volume of purchases made by Germans 84 and had then taken the necessary measures. In South Tyrol, the shoe and clothing stores were closed for 14 days, 85 followed by the closure of all jewellery stores in Italy. 86 Three decrees came into force, which were clearly directed against the German troops and tourists.
First, the royal decree of 3 September 1941 affected the sale and export of platinum, gold, silver, pearls, and precious stones. With the publication of this decree, the sale of these precious metals and stones was generally prohibited with a penalty of 2-10 years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to 50,000 lire. 87 As a consequence, the jeweller’s shops closed.
The second royal decree of 10 September 1941 was even clearer in its intention, since it prohibited the sale of automobiles and their spare parts to foreigners. Any violation of this decree was punishable by imprisonment of up to 6 months or a fine of between 500 and 10,000 lire. 88
The third decree was the ministerial decree of 12 September 1941, which only allowed the sale of clothing, footwear and leather goods, soap, antiques, and machinery and metal goods if the buyer could prove that he was Italian. For all purchases exceeding 20 lire, the seller had to register the name, address, and identity card of the buyer, as well as the quantity and price of the goods purchased. 89
It was clear to both the German diplomats 90 and the Italian population 91 that all three decrees were directed against the Germans in Italy. Even a foreign observer such as the American Ambassador William Phillips interpreted the three decrees as protective measures against ‘German greed’. 92 Giuseppe Bottai, who travelled through the German Reich at the end of September, noted that the decrees and the abrupt decline in exports of vegetables and fruit led his German interlocutors to suspect that Italy wanted to break away from the alliance. The rumour spread that Italy was striving for a separate peace. 93 Bottai did not only think that the friendly tone was dwindling, but that mistrust was growing. 94 The German population showed little sympathy for the Italian measures. 95
For Anglo-American propaganda, these events came just at the right time. 96 The British Daily Telegraph put the German travel restriction in direct connection with the troop gatherings at the Italian border and in the country itself and made a clever comparison to the events at the Polish border in August 1939. 97 Considering that at the same time in the Italian embassy in Berlin rumours were circulating about a so-called plan ‘Walküre’, in which the Germans went through the invasion of Italy, 98 one can assume that such thoughts also emerged in Italian government circles.
Although in the face of the three decrees the German Government found itself confronted with a fait accompli, it did its utmost to demonstrate initiative. When on 3 September 1941 a recommendation arrived from Bolzano to restrict the entry of Germans due to excessive purchases and Italian measures, 99 the German government reacted the very same day. 100 On 19 September, the Auswärtiges Amt asked its ambassador to inform Ciano’s Head of Cabinet, Filippo Anfuso, that there had been concern for some time as to whether the strong influx of German travellers and the purchases they had made might not lead to a negative mood among the population. Anfuso should be made aware of the restrictions on travel and of the fact that the German Government had called its troops stationed in Italy to order. 101
In fact, however, these instructions came too late and were only intended to cover up the fact that the Germans had been taken by surprise by the decrees. In view of the decrees, the members of the Wehrmacht could no longer buy anything for private purposes anyway. The orders were superfluous or at best a gesture of goodwill. In reality, von Mackensen had to speak to Anfuso in person to obtain exemptions for Germans living in Italy. At that time, ‘not even the German diplomats [. . .] could do any shopping.’ Although it had been arranged that the German army members could cover their most necessary needs with small purchases, the remaining Germans had not been thought of. 102
In mid-November, Field-Marshal Wilhelm Keitel expressly instructed the troops stationed in Italy to avoid any burden on the Italian economy from then on. Supply from Italian stocks or purchases in the country were only permitted if they were specifically authorized or even desired by the Italian government. This directive applied not only to food and consumables, but also to spare parts for motor vehicles, tools, and the like. 103 The dispatch of insufficiently equipped troops therefore no longer took place. Nevertheless, Carlo Favagrossa, Undersecretary of State for War Production and Head of Fabbriguerra, lamented the uncontrolled purchasing in the country still in March 1942: Since the German government continued to pay out the Italian lire to its soldiers without consulting Rome, the purchases were beyond any control, because after all one could not block all domestic trade. 104
Conflicts arose on the German-Italian border. As a result of the new decrees, numerous German travellers had to find out that their jewellery was demanded from them at customs. The decree of 3 September prohibited not only the sale but also the export of precious metals and jewellery and was rigorously implemented by the Italian customs authorities, in some cases even going beyond the regulations. In the first days of October, even the watches and wedding rings of some departing people fell victim to the eager officials. The German embassy protested in order to achieve a relaxed handling of the regulations. In a letter to Berlin, the diplomats sent instructions that travellers should only take the most necessary jewellery with them and that they should ask for a confirmation of their belongings when entering the country. Nonetheless, the harsh treatment at the border led to a strong disgruntlement among the German travellers, which, according to Mackensen, was likely to worsen German-Italian relations. 105
The decrees also put a stop to German art purchases. From October onwards, it was no longer possible for Germans to acquire art objects. If one considers that an amount of 20 million lire remained in the Führer’s special account,
106
it becomes clear how much had been purchased in the last few months. To Germany’s embarrassment, it also turned out that the Italian government was very well informed about all the acquisitions. At the end of September, Bottai sent Mackensen a list of all art objects acquired by Germans, with a precise description of each piece.
107
In fact, the Italian Ministry was even aware that some of the works were kept in the Economic Department of the Embassy and others in the Consulate General of Milan. It was obvious that Berlin had not intended to ask the Italian authorities for the necessary export licences. The German Ambassador therefore stated that ‘it [would] be extremely difficult to get out of this unpleasant matter with some decency.’
108
In fact, the possible excuses he plays through in his letter to the Foreign Ministry seem rather helpless. The main objective was to keep the person of the Führer and the Reichsmarschal out of the affair. However, this proved to be the wrong approach. A few days later Mackensen learned that Göring had personally discussed the matter with the Duce and had received his consent.
109
Shortly thereafter, Bottai promised to keep the export tax, which simply had to be paid and could therefore not be circumvented, extremely low. Since Hitler had previously announced that he would make available to the Italians all the art objects abducted from Italy by the French, this concession was easy for the Minister of Education.
110
On 20 November, Göring’s boxes were to leave the German embassy and travel towards Germany.
111
Mackensen had been wrong, the matter was easier to settle than expected. Mussolini even let the German embassy know that he was generally willing to accommodate Hitler or Göring at any time, if they only chose the official way through the embassy. Count Ciano, who had approached Mackensen especially for this purpose, concluded the conversation with the expressive remark: You can be assured that the Führer or the Reichsmarschall or the German Government, if they have wishes and even if they want to have the bell tower of San Marco, will receive everything – in view of the support which Germany gives to Italy, especially in the area of coal supply.
112
In the end, the Italian government could not afford to reject the wishes. The economic dependence on the ally was far too strong to allow any serious confrontation. The only advantage that the Italians derived from the affair was the face-saving vis-à-vis their strong ally. Reichsmarschall Göring followed from then on the official way and submitted in the year 1942 a list of the art objects desired by him. 113
IV. The collapse of Italy’s food supply
At the end of 1941, the imbalance within the axis increasingly came to the fore. The Italian food supply collapsed under the demands of the war. In the German Foreign Ministry, Clodius suspected already in October that it was pointless to shift the responsibility for supplying Greece to the Italians. Because of the war, he noted, Europe’s grain supplies were so limited that one had always to consider the overall supply for the axis. If Italy supplied grain to Greece, its demands on the German government would automatically increase. Sooner or later, therefore, the supplies for Greece would affect the German Reich. 114 Instead of benefitting from the Italian range of goods, the Germans soon found themselves confronted with the task of supplying their alliance partner with food. After the fascist government had neglected this sector for a long time, the situation quickly deteriorated in autumn 1941 and required rapid action: On 22 September, the sale of baked goods of all kinds, such as cakes and biscuits, was banned. 115 The bread 116 and clothing cards 117 were introduced on 1 October 1941. In the food sector, rationing was extended. Rintelen reported in November that now all important foods are affected by the controlled economy: The average Italian was entitled to 200 g bread, 66 g rice, 53 g potatoes, 13 g meat, 5 g butter, 17 g sugar, 3.3 g cheese, 8 g oil daily, and 4 eggs per month. Since these quantities were completely insufficient, from now on more free food such as fish, game, poultry, vegetables, and fruit would have to be used. 118 In particular, the rationing of bread hit the Italians hard, since bread was the main food of the Italian people. 119 In many Italian cities, such as Padua, Venice, Messina, and Naples, women took to the streets to protest against the too scarce rationing. 120 The Questors of Milan, Genoa, Bologna, Parma, and Forlì received orders on 6 October to increase the number of secret agents to immediately oppose any protests. 121
Only slowly and reluctantly in the course of October did the Italian government admit that it had to struggle with supply problems. Mussolini, in particular, tried for a long time to save face with the Germans. On 25 October, in a conversation with Clodius, he emphasized that he did not see any serious danger in the question of nutrition; oil supplies were much more important than bread. 122 Count Ciano had to affirm to Hitler that the Italians themselves would master this problem. At the end of November, on the occasion of a trip to Germany, the Foreign Minister was instructed not to talk about food issues at all. 123 Raffaello Riccardi, the foreign trade minister, already spoke of an ‘emergency’ at this point. The German authorities thus had quite contradictory information at their disposal. Already in October Riccardi insistently pointed out to the German envoy Clodius that Italy must receive grain and maize ‘in order to avert famine and revolts’. 124 During the discussions on the distribution of grain surpluses from the southeast, Riccardi asked for two-thirds of the Romanian surplus, or at least 100,000 tonnes of wheat. Clodius initially did not grant him more than 50,000 tonnes, although he also considered the Italian food situation to be threatening. 125 In December, even these deliveries had not been made by the Berlin authorities; only 600 tonnes of wheat had arrived in Italy. The contracts concluded for the southeast did not show any practical results for Italy, a staff member of Riccardi complained to the German Embassy on 14 December. The June 1941 agreement, according to which Italy was to receive 30 per cent of Serbia’s agricultural production and 40 per cent of Bačka’s production, also existed only on paper. The Ministry therefore asked to inform Berlin ‘that for 14 days there have been daily consultations at the Duce on the Italian food situation’. 126 The emergency could no longer be denied.
On 21 January 1942, Riccardi, on behalf of the Duce, requested an advance delivery of 200,000 tonnes of grain. Otherwise it would not even be possible to guarantee the bread rations, which were to be reduced to 150 g from 1 March anyway. 127 At that time, a bread card of 150 g per day corresponded almost to the lowest ration in all of Europe; 128 protests were not long in coming. 129 Even in October 1944 the German bread ration was still more than twice as high as the Italian one of March 1942, despite cuts. 130 Some figures from the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture show how large the gap between the Italian and German rationing systems had already become in October 1942 (Table 2).
Ration cards in Italy and Germany – October 1942.
Corni/Gies, Brot. Butter. Kanonen, p. 572-573, note 932.
It was not only the request for cereals that signalled the imminent collapse of the Italian food industry. At the same time, the Italians also announced that no more rice would be delivered to Germany in 1942. 131 And indeed, food exports to the Reich fell dramatically afterwards. Rice exports were stopped immediately, falling from 59,875 tonnes (1941) to 56 tonnes (1942); fruit exports (grapes, apples, pears, etc.) fell from 208,809 tonnes to 97,147 tonnes, and citrus exports from 244,622 tonnes to 165,761 tonnes. Instead of 196,567 tonnes, only 22,670 tonnes of potatoes were delivered to Germany. 132
In Germany, one became aware of the extent of the Italian need. During a meeting at the end of January, Reichsmarschall Göring promised Mussolini to lend 150,000 tonnes of grain to the Italian government. 133 Although in the course of February this pledge shrank to 100,000 tonnes, due to internal German disputes, 134 the Italians were granted a further 50,000 tonnes of grain from Romania, independent of the previous agreements 135 – a political decision. Hitler, Ribbentrop, and the responsible authorities in the Foreign and Reich Food Ministries were aware that they were endangering their own supplies with the deliveries to Italy. 136
In the end, delivery and return delivery went relatively quickly and smoothly, although Italy retained about 15,000 tonnes of grain, on the grounds that Germany was in arrears with Greece, which was to be supplied by the two occupying powers. 137 Of course, this did not solve Italy’s supply problem. As early as October 1942, the Duce was again forced to ask the German Reich for an advance delivery. This time it concerned 500,000 tonnes of bread grain. 138 According to the German authorities, this request could not be denied to the Italians if the Allies’ ability to work was to be maintained. On the recommendation of the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Hitler promised the Duce 300,000 tonnes of grain, of which only 200,000 needed to be returned. He also promised to provide a train of wheat from Ukraine every week. 139 The relevance of these concessions for the Italians can already be seen from the fact that Mussolini personally thanked Hitler for them. 140
V. Conclusion
In the 1920s, the fascist regime had pursued a rigorous policy of self-sufficiency with regard to food and consumer goods. The most prominent measure in this context had been the so-called ‘Battaglia del grano’ in 1925 – an agricultural policy campaign with which the Italian government wanted to free Italy from the ‘slavery of foreign bread’. 141 Since its unification, Italy had suffered not only from a blatant lack of raw materials and fuels (coal, petroleum), but also from a lack of food (especially grain). The situation was aggravated by the fact that part of the agricultural products had to be exported in order to provide the necessary foreign exchange to buy raw materials for the industry. 142 After the invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, the fascist regime instrumentalized the sanctions of the League of Nations to propagandistically strengthen the ‘home front’ and influence the consumer behaviour of the population. 143 But although there was obviously a high sensitivity for this topic, Rome hardly reacted on this level when the Second World War broke out. Compared to Germany, rationing measures were issued relatively late and only half-heartedly. And even worse: In February 1941, the ‘policy of alimentary sovereignty’ was even taken ad absurdum when the Italian government promised in a trade agreement to increase food exports to Germany considerably. Since the Italians were increasingly dependent militarily and economically on the support of their coalition partner, this was – apart from sending workers – the only way to contribute to the functioning of the ‘Berlin-Rome axis’. Actually, the fascist regime could not afford an increase in exports; the Italian population complained about the lack of basic foodstuffs since 1940.
Contrary to better knowledge, the National Socialists took advantage of the difficulties of the Italians and pushed for an increase in food supplies during the 1941 trade negotiations. As German troops and tourists increasingly appeared in Italy in 1940/1941 – and with them their immense purchases – the development contributed to a rapid deterioration in the attitude of the Italian population towards the Axis partner. 144 At that time, German politicians regarded the coalition partner’s country only as a resource – which is also clear from the art purchases that Hitler and Göring made in Italy.
The countermeasures taken by Rome with the decrees of September 1941 impressively prove that Italy did not accept a role as a German satellite state. In particular, the ban on art purchases was a clear signal that the Italian government was demanding respect from its axis partner. Göring and Hitler should only be allowed to buy art treasures if the official way was followed. In the long term, however, the political scope of the Italians continued to shrink, especially when the food situation deteriorated in 1941/1942 and Germany had to be asked for help. And when the National Socialist government understood the dimension of the problem, it had no choice but to help: The ability of the ally to work and to fight had to be maintained, if necessary with German means. From October 1942, the German support measures even went so far that Hitler provided grain supplies that did not have to be reimbursed. This was unusual, as up to that point the Germans had always attached importance to procuring foreign grain or – if they had to use their own stocks – insisting on a complete return delivery. In general, the ‘Berlin-Rome axis’ did not understand itself as a unit, but, despite all ideological assurances, always remained a marriage of convenience based on power-political motives, in which one stood by the other only when this served one’s own good. This becomes just as clear in the purchases and imports of the Germans in 1940/1941 as in the support approved from 1942 onwards.
Footnotes
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: A portion of the research undertaken to write this article was conducted as part of a PhD thesis funded by the Gerda Henkel Foundation and the German Historical Institute in Rome.
