Book Review: Byzantine Military Tactics in Syria and Mesopotamia in the Tenth Century: A Comparative Study

The present reviewer has a peculiar relationship with the author of this monograph as almost simultaneously he was producing his own book on a very similar topic, that is, a study of Byzantine military manuals and Arab-Byzantine warfare in the tenth century, albeit from a different perspective.

Theotokis’ book puts emphasis on military operations, institutions, tactics, equipment, conduct of warfare, and military culture of Byzantines and Arabs in the tenth century. These aspects are studied in the context of Arab-Byzantine warfare mainly in Armenia, Cilicia, and Syria. The author argues convincingly that the Byzantines had established notions of tactics and strategy with geostrategic factors as well as economy and manpower playing a crucial role in shaping strategic planning. He then continues to explore whether ‘cultures of bravery and cowardice’ in the Western European, Islamic, and Byzantine worlds played a role in the same respect. Theotokis notes that, with some exceptions, the Byzantines and Muslims fought mainly with ruses, while most of the times, the Westerners (excluding the Normans) put emphasis on pitched battles and prowess in arms. Due to the short space dedicated to this interesting and complicated topic, discussion is sometimes preliminary and simplified. Perceptions of bravery and cowardice were more complicated in Byzantium and depended on the period and its political, social, military, and literary background. For instance, in the context of the rise of the military aristocracy and the production of biographies of famous generals, a tenth-century Byzantine military manual, the Sylloge Tacticorum, explains that some night-attacks were considered dishonourable (ch. 48.7), while historical narratives both praised and condemned daring acts, according to the situation and the idiosyncrasies of every historian.

Next, Theotokis expounds on the type of warfare which dominated the period, arguing correctly that it cannot be qualified as ‘Vegetian’ in the sense that both parties usually avoided pitched battles. The author also elaborates on the defence-in-depth system of the empire and explains the goals and practices of Byzantines and Arabs regarding raiding. The latter is perceived as a significant factor which caused the instability, militarization, and economic decline of Asia Minor. Theotokis moves on to explore Byzantium’s shift of focus from Armenia and northern Mesopotamia to Cilicia and Syria. His main contribution to this study is the convincing view that both Sayf ad-Dawla and Constantine VII switched their attention to this frontier in search of victories, even minor ones, which they could use to propagate their authority through literature, military harangues, and ceremonies.

The perception of the ‘other’ has also drawn the attention of the author. Theotokis is right to distinguish between the stereotypical accounts of Arabs (depicted as unsophisticated, uncivilized, greedy, and bloodthirsty) found in sources which had a broader audience and more realistic ones that mainly occur in manuals of war and administration. To complement this view, however, one would benefit at taking into consideration and engaging with the ideas of Meredith Riedel in ‘Fighting the Good Fight: The ‘Taktika’ of Leo VI and Its Influence on Byzantine Cultural Identity’ (University of Oxford, D.Phil thesis, 2010) and Leo VI and the Transformation of Byzantine Christian Identity (Cambridge University Press, 2018). What is more, at times, John Skylitzes’ perception of the Arabs might be misleading due to the brevity of his narrative when it comes to warfare, as argued by Catherine Holmes in Basil II and the Governance of Empire (976-1025) (Oxford University Press, 2005).

Chapters 5 and 6 on reconnaissance, intelligence, and espionage are very well argued and include a great deal of original material. Theotokis offers evidence from Greek, Latin, and Arab sources which also shed light on society, administration, and everyday life in major cities and in frontier areas. The author discusses methods and factors which had not been explored in detail so far, such as the akritai (army units guarding the eastern borders) and trapezitai (scouts), pilgrims, travellers, geographers and envoys, as well as examining the role of markets, ports, fairs, and inns among much else. The next two chapters explore the development of Byzantine battle formations and tactics which are discussed in connection with Arab material so as to demonstrate that these adaptations were a response to the Arab methods of war. Theotokis advances Eric McGeer’s arguments about the evolution of infantry tactics (such as the menavlatoi or hollow-square formation) and cavalry tactics (such as the kataphraktoi or three-lined cavalry formation) as seen mainly in the Taktika of Leo VI, the Sylloge Tacticorum, and the Praecepta Militaria. Moreover, the author draws interesting parallels between ancient and Byzantine military manuals and pursues further the idea that the hollow-square formation was evolved from the deployment of the Byzantine camp.

In the last chapters of the book (nine and ten), Theotokis attempts to study the most important sources of the period, Byzantine and Arab, and then determines to what extent the theory of the manuals translated into practice by studying their accounts. The author looks critically at Byzantine sources, highlighting the differences in troop estimates and the in coverage of Balkan and Syrian expeditions. The main weakness of the chapter is that Theotokis accepts that Byzantine manuals were followed in battle and that historical narratives offer a reliable description of military expeditions, without considering the views of scholars who have expressed different views on these matters. Important relevant studies, notably by Catherine Holmes, Lars Hoffmann, Anthony Kaldellis, and Athanasios Markopoulos, are altogether absent from the author’s work. ¹ Theotokis argues that some sources were eye witnesses and experienced officers, and thus scholars should refrain from perceiving them as ‘dependent on rhetorical devices or having the tendency to reduce battles to a series of conventional images’ (p. 250). As it stands, however, this argument is not very convincing. While, Theotokis himself notes that a military historian ought to ‘know the background, life and specific context in which they [medieval historians] wrote’ and ‘become cognisant of how they understood battle and what the literary models that underscored their writing were’ (p. 250), he does not take into account that rhetorical education, even at an elementary level, instructed the Byzantines how to draft plausible battle and urban descriptions by imitating older sources. Thus, an experienced officer could have written his history being influenced simultaneously by literary conventions and education as well as by his military knowledge. Theotokis’ observations about armament, marching, and battle formations go into great detail and attempt to demonstrate how the advice of the manuals was applied on the battlefield. His argument, however, is mostly speculative due to the fact that the sources preserve very little relevant information, while sometimes they clearly report that the instructions of the manuals were not employed word for word.

Although this book has some weak points, it is a very welcome contribution to the field. It contains much fresh argument about Byzantine and Arab warfare and evidence from Muslim and Latin sources previously neglected. Last but not least, its comparative approach will stimulate more discussion in the future and will encourage further dialogue between disciplines.