Book Review: The Italian Army in North Africa: A Poor Fighting Force or Doomed by Circumstance

The Italian Army in North Africa: A Poor Fighting Force or Doomed by Circumstance addresses the role of the Italian Regio Esercito in the North African theatre of World War II. The author’s thesis is that the Italian army fighting in North Africa did contribute to Rommel’s tactical victories and that Italian soldiers fought bravely, with their failures being due to lack of proper equipment and leadership (p. 131).

After some brief chapters concerning the origins of the Italian involvement in Africa and the state of the Italian army before the conflict, the author proceeds to list the divisions making up the Italian, German, and British Commonwealth forces in North Africa. Of the three chapters addressing the forces on the field, only the first is primarily focused on the Italians. The chapter describes the engagements of each of the listed divisions. Subsequent chapters deal with some of the operations in which the Italian forces were involved: the British attempts to break the siege of Tobruk, the battles at El Alamein, the battle of El Agheila, and the battles in Tunisia. It follows an analysis of the Italian Army’s performance in the North African theatre, summing up the whole campaign up to the eventual defeat at El Alamein. In the epilogue, the author concludes that

As we examine the performance of the Italian Army in North Africa, it becomes obvious that despite inadequate equipment and poor leadership, the Italian soldier fought bravely and, in many cases, to the last man. The Italians were praised by the Germans, the British, and the New Zealanders for the tenacity and bravery. The Italian soldier was certainly doomed by circumstances beyond his control.

The author’s conclusions are well-founded, and confirmed by previous works in the literature. For example, MacGregor Knox underlines that

in hilly or mountainous terrain, and despite all their deficiencies in cadres and armament, Italian infantry units often fought remarkably well, as demonstrated by their dogged stand at Keren in East Africa throughout February and March 1941, Cavallero’s laboriously constructed but ultimately impenetrable ‘wall’ against the Greeks in Albania, and the often excellent performance of improvised Italian units in the final battles in Tunisia. Even in the desert, infantry units such as the paratroopers of the ‘Folgore’ and the improvised unit of volunteers that became the ‘Giovani Fascisti’ division fought in a manner that inspired German respect. ²

Indeed, Zapotoczny would have benefitted from engaging with the literature concerning the military effectiveness of the various sides in World War II and especially of the Italian armed forces, such as, for example, MacGregor Knox’s article on this topic. ³ Despite one brief section concerning ‘the Italian army before World War II’, there is also no in depth-analysis on the long-term causes of the problems affecting the Italian armed forces. The book is hence limited in the sense that as a (somehow fragmentary) operational history it does not address the roots of the question it aims at answering. The work would also have benefitted from a greater reliance on Italian historiography. Of the massive series of volumes on the operations in North Africa written by General Mario Montanari on the Italian army in North Africa, for example, only the third volume is passingly referred to in the footnotes. Furthermore, more space could have been given to episodes in which the Italian forces fought well, like the battles of El Mechili (January 1941) or of Bir el Gubi (November and December 1941).

The work is hence useful for the general public but offers little to a specialist or academic readership.