Far from Armageddon: Austria-Hungary’s officers and their visions of a general European War before 1914

Introduction

For the decision-making process in the European capitals in July 1914, the expertise of military professionals was essential. Their assessments of the potential risks and costs involved in different war scenarios shaped the positions of both military and civilian leaders. As Austria-Hungary was among the principal actors in the July crisis, it is especially relevant to study its military and their views on war. The visions of future war among Austria-Hungary’s top-ranking military officers in the years before 1914 have been thoroughly studied using official records from different governmental agencies as well as autobiographical sources like memoirs and letters. The picture that emerges from these sources shows that many high-ranking officers saw the continuation of peace under the prevailing conditions as less and less appealing. If national and social conflict was not pacified permanently, Austria-Hungary would disintegrate. Although other parts of society were relatively more optimistic about Austria-Hungary’s future if peace in Europe continued, the military elite was rather pessimistic. ¹

To Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, who held the post of Chief of the General Staff in the pre-war years since 1906 with only a temporary interruption in the winter of 1911/1912, the only real remedy for Austria-Hungary’s domestic and foreign problems was war. Believing that a small, limited war would see a quick and resounding victory, he clamoured repeatedly for the state leadership to seek the opportunity to wage a localised war against either Serbia or Italy. In Conrad’s view, it was easily winnable, would revitalise the state, be beneficial for domestic stability and the international standing of Austria-Hungary, and would stave off the looming prospect of a multifront war against several adversaries. Conrad’s aggressive stance on foreign policy was shared by many other high-ranking officers. ²

While scholarship has provided us with a good understanding of how Habsburg officers imagined the character and outcome of a minor war, it is much less clear how they regarded the prospect of a major war in Europe. The available government records and autobiographical sources of high-ranking officers offer little or contradictory evidence as to pre-1914 visions of the character and outcome of a conflict between the great powers. While government records contain detailed information on the General Staff’s plans for mobilising and deploying troops, other aspects like financial costs or the expected number of casualties were hardly discussed at all. In the historiographical debate, the question of whether Habsburg officers fell prey to the ‘short-war illusion’ remains controversial. Some general studies on the origins of the First World War argue that the idea of a protracted war fought in the manner of a war of attrition dominated military thinking in Austria-Hungary. ³ In contrast, historians specialising in the Habsburg military have shown that the short-war concept was dominant in the Habsburg officer corps. ⁴

Even more controversial than the question of the likely duration and character of potential war is the question of the mood in the officer corps, in particular officers’ assessments and sentiments regarding Austria-Hungary’s chances of victory in a major conflict. The written and oral sources left by Conrad and other high-ranking officers on Austria-Hungary’s chances to win a great power conflict are inconsistent and often hard to interpret. Some historians have argued that Conrad and the military elite in general were pessimistic about Austria-Hungary’s chances of victory in a great war and often showed feelings of resignation and hopelessness in the face of overwhelming enemy forces. ⁵ In contrast, Günther Kronenbitter has argued that the officers in the Vienna offices of the General Staff in July 1914 showed a high degree of optimism. They were hoping to defeat the Russians in the early stages of the war and were confident that a two-front war was manageable. Optimism prevailed although feelings were ‘somewhat less euphoric’ than in Berlin. ⁶

In the international debate on the origins of the First World War, officers’ visions of future war and especially the question of the ‘short-war illusion’ have received much attention, especially in Germany. Gerd Krumeich has argued convincingly that the high-ranking German officers were ambivalent about the prospect of a general European war. They simultaneously feared a long war of attrition which Germany might lose and hoped for a swift campaign which Germany would win. ⁷ Stig Förster emphasised the nightmarish scenario of a protracted ‘people’s war’ (‘Volkskrieg’) present in the thinking of the German military elite. ⁸ More recently, the debate has shifted to studying the expectations among civilian elites by comparing the views in the capitals of the European great powers. Some historians, among them Christopher Clark, maintain that civilian and military leaders were torn between dark foreboding and swagger, while others argue that civilian elites understood very well that war would bring about a European catastrophe. ⁹

This article explores how Habsburg officers assessed the risks and the potential costs and benefits of a major European war. It contributes to the ongoing scholarly debate by expanding the source base on the pre-1914 Habsburg officer corps through a systematic analysis of all the major military journals published in Austria-Hungary before 1914. Many of the articles published in the military periodicals were concerned with the scenario of a general European war and thus give new insight into officers’ expectations of the character and outcome of a major conflict. This study covers the decade prior to 1914, beginning in 1904 when the Russo-Japanese War attracted the attention of the commentators in the military journals and tensions with Italy and Serbia were intensifying.

The article argues that many Habsburg officers shared Conrad’s view that war seemed the best solution to Austria-Hungary’s domestic problems and crumbling international standing. Their favoured scenario was a minor war, preferably against Serbia, but they were also ready to fight a major war, as the analysis of the Austro-Hungarian military journals shows. Contrary to what is commonly assumed, Habsburg officers faced the prospect of a general European war with confidence. A two-front war against Russia and Serbia, fought alongside Germany, seemed a feasible and winnable endeavour. A general European war would be short. Essentially, Habsburg officers imagined the scenario of a general European war as a kind of modern cabinet war, a conventional war fought in the manner of the European wars of the middle of the nineteenth century.

Military Journals as Historical Sources

This article is based on a systematic analysis of 11 military journals published in Austria-Hungary in German. ¹⁰ While military journals have been used extensively as sources providing insight into military thinking in the pre-1914 period, most studies have focused on questions of tactics and weapons technology. ¹¹ Even if military technology and tactics took up the majority of the pages in the military journals, some articles also provide us with the opportunity to study military thought on the strategic level. The two journals that provided their readers with the most material for thought about the character and outcome of a future war were the Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift (ÖMZ) and Danzer’s Armee-Zeitung (DAZ). The ÖMZ was owned by the private publishing company L. W. Seidel & Sohn based in Vienna, but it had an official character as it was subsidised substantially by the War Ministry and published the official communications of the k.u.k. Armeeschießschule. ¹² The ÖMZ, which was Austria-Hungary’s most respectable and distinguished military journal, refrained from commenting on the domestic political debate. The DAZ was owned by the Danzer family and did not receive government subsidies. It was the most pugnacious military journal, regularly commenting on political events in Austria-Hungary and Europe. ¹³

Military journals were primarily geared towards officers. In 1912, the DAZ had 2,800 subscribers, while other journals sold between 1,000 and 3,500 copies. ¹⁴ Over half of the articles on future war were published completely anonymously, while 17.5 percent of articles were published under an abbreviation, cypher, or the author’s initials, and only 21 percent were published under the author’s full name. ¹⁵ At that time, writing anonymously was very common in the military press in both Germany and Austria-Hungary. ¹⁶ All officer ranks were represented among those authors who are identifiable, and General Staff officers were especially active. It was very rare for civilians to write for military journals, with the very notable exception of Carl Maria von Danzer who was the editor of the DAZ but was unable to join the military due to health issues. ¹⁷

Officers were allowed to write for the press if the media outlet in question was deemed non-political and if they refrained from discussing matters in a way which went against discipline, military spirit, or duty. ¹⁸ Generally, military journals were deemed non-political, but in 1908, War Minister Schönaich reclassified the DAZ as a political outlet. Officers were officially prohibited from working for the DAZ until autumn 1914. However, several General Staff officers, some of whom also worked in the War Archives (which was part of the War Ministry), did not comply and continued to write for the DAZ anonymously. ¹⁹ As we know next to nothing about the workings of the editorial process, it is hard to assess the degree to which the state leadership used military journals to spread their own views and influence officers’ opinions. ²⁰ For reasons of military secrecy, some issues could not be discussed in any detail in the military press, for example, the plans for mobilisation, deployment, and initial operations. We must also take into account the mechanism of self-censorship when it came to discussing delicate, controversial, and overtly political issues where a junior officer might want to adjust his stance in order to protect his career.

Habsburg military journals were part of a transnational military debate involving the military professionals of all major powers at the time. While Habsburg military attachés and intelligence officers would routinely read military publications in French, English, or Russian, the German military press had the most influence on Habsburg military thought, not least because of the common German language. It is possible that Habsburg officers might have overemphasised their own confidence of victory to signal to their allies and opponents that Austria-Hungary was a serious military power. However, officers might also have overemphasised the army’s funding, equipment, and manpower problems in order to rouse support among their domestic readership. In any case, we must remain critical of military journals as historical sources.

Minor and Major War

Compared to the other great powers, Austria-Hungary had the highest number of states directly neighbouring its borders. The complex system of international relations additionally increased the challenges of risk assessment. As we can see from the military journals, many different scenarios of coalition building in peace and war were discussed and deemed possible. Before 1912, the scenarios of a localised, small war against the minor powers Serbia (and Montenegro) or Italy were discussed much more frequently than the scenario of a general European war. At the time, many officers thought that it would be possible to localise an armed conflict to the Balkans or Northern Italy because all other European powers would refrain from entering the war as they were busy with other issues, domestic and foreign, or were militarily unprepared for a major war. ²¹ In the military journals, there was a marked shift of expectations following the diplomatic and military conflicts in the Balkans in 1912/1913. Russia’s recovery from its defeat against Japan in 1905 and its rearmament programme made it less likely that a war would be localised. ²² The scenario of a general European war thus came to dominate the military debate and seemed increasingly inevitable. ²³

In all scenarios of a general European war, Germany was sure to fight alongside Austria-Hungary. ²⁴ When it came to Austria-Hungary’s relationship with Italy, opinions diverged. While some articles prophesied that Italy would renege on its commitment to the Triple Alliance if an opportunity to make gains at Austria-Hungary’s expense presented itself, ²⁵ other articles firmly believed Italy’s support could be counted on in a general European war ²⁶ or hoped at least for Italy’s neutrality. ²⁷ Other powers like Romania, Bulgaria, or the Ottoman Empire were only mentioned in passing. The behaviour and performance of the Ottoman State in a European conflict were not regarded as crucial as the decision would come on the battlefields in France and Russian Poland. ²⁸ A general European war might also see Great Britain joining the ranks of the Dual Alliance’s adversaries. However, Great Britain’s behaviour was similarly negligible from the perspective of Austria-Hungary’s officers, as the Germans would certainly make short work of any British expeditionary forces on the continent and would hold the British navy in check. ²⁹ That a war might drag on long enough for Great Britain to mobilise forces from its home population, colonies, and dominions was completely beyond Habsburg officers’ horizon of expectations.

As the many articles about a future European war show, authors and readers of the military journals were accustomed to the idea of a general European war, which would see the great powers clash on the continent, the North Sea, and the Mediterranean. However, there is nothing in the military journals to suggest that officers envisioned a truly global war. Terms like Weltkrieg, Weltenbrand, or Weltdrama ³⁰ were used occasionally to characterise a major conflagration, but there is no evidence pointing to any visions of war going beyond the European continent. This Eurocentric view is especially understandable in the case of Austria-Hungary, which did not have any colonial possessions and focused its foreign policy firmly on Europe.

It was a widespread notion that war was an inevitable phenomenon of world history, an expression of natural and thus inevitable competition between states fighting an endless struggle for their existence. The military journals show strong currents of Social Darwinist thinking. ³¹ The underlying causes of a European war, officers argued, lay in the never-ending rivalries between the European states over territory and spheres of influence. ³² In contrast to Germany, the notion that a racial war between Germandom and Slavdom was imminent and inevitable was not popular in Austria-Hungary. Habsburg officers repudiated such visions of a racial war sharply as they clashed with their self-image of being part of a multinational, multicultural, and, in the parlance of the time, multiracial force. ³³

Short War

The military journals agreed that a general European war would be won or lost within a short span of time. Some officers believed that victory would come to the Dual Alliance after only one or two decisive battles on French and Russian soil, putting an end to the war after only a few months. Other officers reckoned that a European war would last about half a year and some estimated that the fighting would go on for up to a year. There is no evidence to suggest that Habsburg officers thought they would fight a protracted war of several years’ duration. ³⁴ If we agree with Hew Strachan, who argues that a projected war of 1 year still counted as a short war, then the military journals clearly conveyed the notion of a short war. ³⁵

Some of these projections of war duration were based on comparing historical data from earlier wars and extrapolating any emerging tendencies onto the future. One example of this kind of statistical futurology is an article published anonymously in the ÖMZ in 1911, which, as we know from comments in the DAZ, had been commissioned by the War Ministry. The article concluded that the duration of a future European war would be around 1 year as this was somewhere in between the duration of the War of 1870/1871 (6 months), the Russo-Turkish War (1 year), the Boer War (2.5 years), and the Russo-Japanese War (1.5 years). ³⁶

Other projections of war duration were based on officers’ expectations of the speed of operations on the battlefields. In the last decade before 1914, the main point of comparison was the Russo-Japanese War, and here, the dominant argument was that a war in Europe would be shorter due to better organisation, more widespread use of modern communication technology, shorter distances, and a denser network of railways which would increase the speed of mobilisation and deployment. Therefore, the decisive, major battles in Europe would be fought earlier in the war than in Manchuria. As Ignaz Rodić, infantry captain and officer of the General Staff, put it in 1909, ‘On European soil, armies of millions of men will be ready to fight only a few days after the order of mobilisation and battles like Mukden will be fought only a few weeks later’. ³⁷ Officers were convinced that a major war in Europe would be characterised by mobile warfare and swift manoeuvres. ³⁸ Even if armies were compelled to dig trenches and field fortifications in certain situations, Europe would only see occasional and temporary phases of positional warfare. ³⁹ There was only limited recognition that the changes in firepower over the last decades would have any significant impact on tactics. Especially infantry officers (among them many General Staff officers) underestimated the firepower of modern field artillery and persisted in the belief that troops would still be able to launch decisive assaults if they had enough offensive spirit. ⁴⁰

How would a European war unfold on the battlefield? Here, the military journals only offer limited insights into pre-1914 thinking, which is partially explained by the need for military secrecy. Habsburg officers did not write in detail about how the German army was supposed to beat the French in a couple of weeks. Visions of a joint German-Austro-Hungarian campaign against Russia were also very vague. Officers expected a pincer movement to encompass and occupy Russian Poland with the Habsburg forces attacking from Krakow towards Warsaw and from Lemberg (Lviv) towards Brest-Litovsk. ⁴¹ Victory over Serbia would be so swift that ‘there would still be enough time to counter Russia with our undivided forces’. ⁴² While many officers clearly expected victory or defeat against Russia to materialise within the span of only a couple of weeks, others expected war to last half a year or even a full year. What would happen if the big battles in Russian Poland were inconclusive? Would the Russians withdraw into the interior, thus prolonging the fighting? On these questions, the military journals remained silent.

In contrast, images of a war against Serbia were much more detailed. It was thought that after the invasion by Austro-Hungarian forces and heavy fighting, Serbia would be beaten decisively after only 2 weeks. This victory over Serbia would be so resounding that Austria-Hungary would then be able to leave only Landsturm forces as an occupation force and transport the bulk of its south-eastern forces to the north-east. ⁴³ Habsburg officers expected to fight irregular forces aided by a civilian population hostile to the invasion forces. A second phase of counter-insurgency, of ‘fighting gangs’ (‘Bandenkrieg’) and guerrilla war (‘Guerillakrieg’), would ensue. In order to make this phase of the war as short as possible, officers recommended forming special units consisting of officers, soldiers, and gendarmes who would fight with the same mobility as the Serbian guerrilla forces. In addition, they recommended the imposition of martial law and threatening the civilian population with severe repercussions if they participated in any acts of sabotage or aided the irregular forces. Such measures, officers argued, had already been practised in earlier Habsburg campaigns in the Balkans in 1869, 1878, and 1881/1882. ⁴⁴ It would take between 4 and 6 months until Serbia was ‘pacified’. ⁴⁵

The Costs of War

Officers were aware that the size of the armies which would face off on the European battlefields of the future had increased significantly since the wars of the middle of the nineteenth century. Modern war would see ‘armies of millions’ (‘Millionenheere’) fighting each other. However, there is no evidence that Habsburg officers believed that mass mobilisation would change the character of warfare fundamentally. In the military journals in the decade before 1914, there was no talk of a ‘people’s war’, no talk of the need to mobilise the civilian population emotionally for the war effort, and no talk of whole peoples pitched against each other and fighting until both sides were utterly exhausted. ⁴⁶ Like the wars of German and Italian Unification, it was believed that another major war in Europe would not affect the civilian population much beyond those who were conscripted into the armed forces. The fighting would occur mostly outside of Austria-Hungary’s borders. War would only temporarily disrupt industry, commerce, and agriculture. Agricultural production and food imports would easily guarantee food supply for the troops and the civilian population since the war was not to last longer than a year. The argument that the British publicist Norman Angell made against a major war, namely that it would lead to the financial and commercial collapse of all belligerents, was not discussed in the military journals. ⁴⁷

A general European war would have the character of a war of annihilation, not attrition. A series of big battles would annihilate one side’s capacity to fight and would thus bring about the decision. Officers did not anticipate that the war would be fought and won by waging a war of attrition, wearing down the adversary by inflicting greater losses in personnel and material over a long period. Neither did they anticipate the necessity of boosting industrial output of ammunition, weapons, and military equipment. The provisions of the War Requirement Acts of 1912 seemed sufficient to ensure the military’s ability to request food, mobilise civilians into war services, and subject employees to military discipline. It seemed thus unnecessary to put large parts of the economy under state control. ⁴⁸

What would a European war cost Austria-Hungary in terms of financial expenditure? The general notion conveyed by the military journals was that it would put substantial strain on the state finances, but the costs would be on a scale expected and would be manageable. ⁴⁹ Two articles provide detailed insight into the calculations. In 1909, Rodić calculated that if a general European war lasted for 6 months and Austria-Hungary had to mobilise 2 million men, it would cost 25 million Crowns per day, resulting in a total of 4.5 billion Crowns. ⁵⁰ Two years later, the already mentioned article commissioned by the War Ministry calculated that if a European war were to last 1 year and Austria-Hungary had to mobilise 2.5 million men, this would incur costs of 20 million Crowns per day, in total about 7.5 billion Crowns. Rodić based his calculations on data from the War of 1870/1871 which he adjusted for the rise in prices that had since occurred. The War Ministry explicitly rejected data from the Boer War or the Russo-Japanese War as not pertinent for a future European war and instead based its calculations on data from the Russo-Turkish War of 1877/1878 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/1871.

Both articles argued that costs on this scale would be easily manageable when compared to the Habsburg state’s annual budget of 4.5 billion Crowns or its national wealth (‘Nationalvermögen’) of 100 billion Crowns. ⁵¹ How accurate were these pre-1914 projections of the financial costs of a war of 1 year? The most recent scholarship puts the state expenditure during the first year of the First World War at 11 billion Crowns, that is, 30 million Crowns a day, ⁵² which is significantly higher than either Rodić or the War Ministry had expected. Needless to say, the more consequential miscalculation lay in the illusion of a short war, lasting only half a year or a year at most, instead of 4.5 years.

In addition to financial costs, a general European war was certain to incur substantial human costs. In the military journals, a number of articles made forecasts about the severity of human losses the armed forces would suffer, whereas civilian losses were not discussed. One of the most detailed articles dealing with the question of war losses was the article commissioned by the War Ministry already mentioned above. ⁵³ The article set a casualty rate (dead, wounded or sick soldiers) of 3.5 percent as the most realistic estimate for a future European war. This rate, the article claimed, was derived from data collected and analysed by the German side in the War of 1870/1871. ⁵⁴ The authors were well aware that the recent Russo-Japanese War had seen a higher casualty rate of 10 percent, but they expressly dismissed these newer data claiming that a coming war on European soil would resemble the war of 1870/1871 much more than the war in Manchuria in 1904/1905. According to their estimates for a future European war of 1 year, Austria-Hungary would see about 100,000 soldiers killed, wounded, or sick. Carl Maria von Danzer opined that the projections of human losses as calculated by the War Ministry and published in the ÖMZ were realistic. ⁵⁵

To many officers, human losses of such an order were deemed an acceptable and unavoidable consequence of war. The expected scale of human suffering was not high enough to delegitimise war as an instrument of foreign policy. As lieutenant colonel Plundrich put it in the ÖMZ in 1910, ‘The scale of the human losses is therefore not serious enough to put an end to warfare’. ⁵⁶ Similarly, Carl Maria Danzer argued that the Habsburg Monarchy’s population, which was growing by 600,000 people per year and totalled over 50 million, would easily compensate for much higher losses. ⁵⁷ Pacifists like Bertha von Suttner who warned of destruction and a humanitarian catastrophe were dismissed out of hand as naïve dreamers who understood nothing about the realities of world history. ⁵⁸ If we compare these estimates with the reality of the First World War, we find that the pre-1914 forecasts completely underestimated the suffering and bloodshed of a major European war, even if we look only at the military losses. In the very first month of fighting, the pre-war estimates were already superseded when over 200,000 Austro-Hungarian soldiers were killed, wounded, sick, or missing. ⁵⁹

Victory

Habsburg officers were confident that a quick and resounding victory was certain in the event of a small war against Serbia or Italy. ⁶⁰ With regard to the scenario of a general European war, their risk assessments depended on the specific war case. Austria-Hungary would most likely face a two-front war against Russia and Serbia, and in such a case, its chances of success were high. ⁶¹ Pessimistic voices about this war case did exist, but they were rare. ⁶² In the less likely, but still possible, case that Austria-Hungary was faced with a three-front war, the odds of winning were generally rated as low. ⁶³

How did officers imagine victory would come about in a war on two fronts? Habsburg officers were well aware of Austria-Hungary’s military shortcomings, but nevertheless they were confident in success. Austria-Hungary had a comparatively small number of men with military training as the number of annual recruits had for decades lagged behind what might have been expected of a European great power. The slight increase in annual recruits which was approved in 1912 came too late to have any significant effect until the summer of 1914. Austria-Hungary remained unable to form a reserve army. Equally, the number and quality of field guns were lagging behind the German or the Russian army. ⁶⁴ Army reform was postponed for years as some politicians attempted to keep state spending low, while the military was the bone of contention in the conflict between Hungarian nationalist politicians and the Viennese political elite. ⁶⁵

Officers were aware that Austria-Hungary would be outnumbered and outgunned in a two-front war once Russia’s mobilisation was completed. However, many officers were convinced that mobilisation and deployment of the Habsburg land forces would be much faster than Russia’s. This would result in an operational advantage over Russia for several weeks and would therefore be the basis for victory on the battlefields in Eastern Europe. ⁶⁶ In addition, officers believed that it would be possible to compensate for the lack of men and guns through an advantage in soft factors such as superior military leadership, smarter war plans, higher troop morale, and stronger offensive spirit. ⁶⁷ Habsburg officers compared their own troops favourably to those of their Russian counterparts. They were especially condescending towards the Russians after their defeat against Japan, and argued that this outcome had again proven that Russians were ‘of inferior military value’ and ‘lacked warfighting spirit’ which was a ‘chronic phenomenon’. ⁶⁸ In contrast, Austro-Hungarian officers exhibited great admiration for the prowess of the German military, their presumed ally in a general European war. The support by this powerful coalition partner infused them with confidence in victory in a European war. ⁶⁹

Officers were well aware that in the European capitals the view was widespread that nationalism had subverted the morale of the Austro-Hungarian forces and that Austria-Hungary would see widespread unrest among the civilian population if war broke out. However, such arguments were soundly rejected as false allegations instigated by the foreign press and unsubstantiated by events in Austria-Hungary. While the DAZ admitted that Czech and South Slav troops had, at times, refused orders during the Annexation Crisis and the Balkan Wars, these events were portrayed as isolated cases. Austria-Hungary’s regular troops would remain calm and would fight. ⁷⁰ In contrast to Austria-Hungary, Russia was portrayed as very unstable and unable to withstand the strains of war for more than a couple of months. ⁷¹

What would be the likely rewards for Austria-Hungary if it emerged victorious from a war? Officers anticipated that the Habsburg Empire would benefit substantially from a victorious war, be it a localised war in the Balkans or a general European war. The most prized benefit of going to war against Serbia would be that the Kingdom would disappear from the map of Europe. It would either be annexed as a whole into the Habsburg fold ⁷² or be divided up among its neighbours. ⁷³ This would put an end to Serbia’s claims on Habsburg territory and its allure to Austria-Hungary’s South Slav population. ⁷⁴ In addition, it would make Austria-Hungary the dominant power in the Balkans, supplanting Russia’s influence in the region. ⁷⁵

Victory on the battlefield would also have advantages for domestic politics in Austria-Hungary, the DAZ argued. People would rally behind the flag, state patriotism (‘Staatsgefühl’) would rise up, and political parties would bury their hatchets in the face of common danger from outside. As the editorial board of the DAZ put it in 1909,

A war with Serbia which is waged swiftly and energetically, will invigorate the army’s morale, will invigorate our political self-confidence, and will increase our international prestige – the material damage which such a war would cause, would be compensated several times by the psychological gain. In addition, we will have finished off the small, but annoying adversary in the Southeast and there would still be enough time to counter Russia with our undivided forces. ⁷⁶

In addition, victory on the battlefield would raise the prestige of the army and the officer corps in particular, which would in turn make it easier in the future to obtain more military funding. ⁷⁷

A victory of the Dual Alliance forces over Russia was also seen as advantageous to Austria-Hungary’s interests. Russia would lose its slice of Poland which would either be split between Austria-Hungary and Germany or receive some kind of autonomy. Russia would also lose Podolia and Volhynia. ⁷⁸ Weakening Russia would have the added benefit of putting a lid on Pan-Slav propaganda measures, especially those directed at the Habsburg population in Galicia. ⁷⁹ However, officers did not expect that a victorious war would eliminate Russia as a great power and rival. Any territorial and political changes the post-war order might bring would not completely alter the balance of power between the European great powers. In contrast to certain circles in Germany, there were no visions of forming a political block to dominate the continent. Even if many Austro-Hungarian officers admired German military prowess and the German Empire’s vitality, they had little appetite for joining a Mitteleuropa under German dominance in which Austria-Hungary would play the part of junior partner. ⁸⁰

In the period up to 1912, when many different scenarios were discussed, officers clearly preferred the idea of fighting a small war against a minor power to fighting a general European war which presented far more risks and costs. Some officers were very eager to seek an opportunity for a localised war against Serbia. In the DAZ, the warmongering was especially frequent during the Annexation Crisis of 1908/1909 and again during the Balkan Wars of 1912/1913. The argument was that a limited war in the Balkans was Austria-Hungary’s way to ward off a multifront war against a combination of its rapacious neighbours; it would be a true preventive war (‘Vorbeugungskrieg’). ⁸¹ The scenario of a general European war, however, did not engender equal levels of bellicosity. Even after 1912, when a general European war seemed increasingly likely, the military journals rarely showed signs of open warmongering for this war case. The DAZ only published one article openly calling for a general European war. The article was published in March 1914 and urged the Dual Alliance partners to seek an opportunity for a European war as soon as possible. For the moment, the odds of winning a major war were still in Austria-Hungary’s favour, but that would soon change with the completion of Russia’s armament programme and the Balkan states’ recovery from the exhaustions of war. The article argued that the window of opportunity, this last respite (‘Galgenfrist’), would remain open for a maximum of 5 years, after which the adversaries would pounce on Austria-Hungary. ⁸²

Defeat

While the notion of victory in a general European war dominated the military journals, warning voices were not completely absent. Some officers openly warned that any multifront war was beyond Austria-Hungary’s military capabilities even if Germany provided ample support. Only if the political decision-makers could be convinced to substantially increase Habsburg forces would victory again become a possibility in a multifront war. ⁸³ They urged Austria Hungary’s diplomats to prevent the scenario of a multifront war at any cost and warned that they ‘must make sure that this major war was split into several single-front wars (Einzelkriege), to be waged one after the other’. ⁸⁴

Emil Woinovich, general of the infantry and long-time Director of the War Archives, shared this line of thinking. In 1911, he published an article entitled Gedanken über den modernen Krieg in which he expressed his fears that Austria-Hungary would lose if it was forced to face multiple enemies at once. The wars of 1859 and 1866 had demonstrated Austria-Hungary’s inability to win a multifront war, and therefore, the scenario of fighting two or even more opponents must be avoided at all costs even if considerable sacrifices had to be made. ⁸⁵

In the public discussion on Austria-Hungary’s next war, a literary work, the novel Unser letzter Kampf, caused a sensation upon its publication in late 1906. ⁸⁶ The anonymous author was the then 34-year-old captain of the General Staff Hugo Kerchnawe who served in the War Archives in the section for military history and was part of the circle of officers around Franz Ferdinand and his military chancellery. ⁸⁷ In the novel, Kerchnawe painted a vivid and detailed picture of Austro-Hungarian defeat against a coalition of Serbia, Russia, and Italy, while Germany stood idly by. The novel portrayed the fatalism of the Austro-Hungarian officer corps fighting for a lost cause in the face of overwhelming enemy force. However, Kerchnawe did not want his readers to see the novel as a prophecy of impending doom, a point he made clear in the foreword. Instead, he had intended the novel to represent a plea for increasing Austria-Hungary’s military capabilities. ⁸⁸ In his non-fiction writings such as the book Die Vorgeschichte von 1866 und 19?? (sic) and a series of articles published in the DAZ, Kerchnawe emphasised his calls for an increase in military spending and raising the number of recruits. Only if politicians could be convinced of the need to increase infantry troops by 50 percent and artillery strength by 70 percent would victory in a European war become a realistic scenario again. ⁸⁹

What was at stake if Austria-Hungary suffered defeat in a general European war? Even here, optimism was a strong current in the military journals. There is clear evidence that some Habsburg officers fully believed that if a war was starting to go badly, diplomacy would be able to conclude a negotiated peace whereby Austria-Hungary would make concessions to its adversaries. How favourable or unfavourable such a peace settlement would be would depend on how Austria-Hungary’s military had been performing, on the level of support from allies and powerful neutrals in the international system, and on the clemency of adversaries. Military failure might result in considerable financial costs in the form of war reparations and loss of Habsburg territory, or even the loss of great power status, but a negotiated peace would still mean that Austria-Hungary would escape from an unlucky war with a slap on the wrist. This scenario was based on historical merit. The Habsburg Monarchy had repeatedly managed to end a war going badly by giving up some peripheral territory in order to safeguard the Habsburg heartlands, and this historical experience continued to shape visions of future war before 1914. ⁹⁰

Other officers, however, did not believe that Austria-Hungary would get off lightly in the case of a weak military performance. They prophesied that defeat would mean the end of the centuries-old Habsburg Empire, as a multinational state could not survive military defeat in the age of nationalism. One example of an imagined catastrophic outcome is the gruelling scenario predicted by lieutenant colonel Maximilian Ritter von Hoen in a 1910 article in the Organ für Reserveoffiziere:

It is not necessary to be a great prophet to prognosticate that if a war reveals . . . weaknesses of our force, even if it was started by only one neighbour, this would certainly lead to a surge of rapacious enemies on the majority of our borders and most likely, if no special lucky star guides our ways like at the time of Maria Theresia, this will end in the collapse of the Monarchy. ⁹¹

Hoen’s vision continued well into the imagined post-war period. He was convinced that it would be impossible to agree on a post-war order which would bring lasting peace to Central Europe after the Habsburg Monarchy was dismembered:

If someone should believe that at least the ruins would enjoy a long period of peace, he would be mistaken. The great cataclysm would not be the end but only the beginning of great troubles. The solution resulting from the moment of victory would not satisfy any of the enemies, the newly formed borders would become the cause for continuous frictions, it would take a long time until the disturbed balance of power among the European states would be restored and during all this time the territories of the Monarchy would be the foremost theatres of strife. ⁹²

Hoen’s vision of conflicts engulfing Central Europe for decades caused by the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire can only be called prophetic, foreshadowing the catastrophe of the ‘Second Thirty Years’ War’ of the twentieth century.

Conclusion

The analysis of the debate among the military professionals offers us instructive detail on several aspects which government records or autobiographical sources do not cover. Habsburg officers imagined a general European war to be limited in character. Fighting would be restricted to the continent and the coastal seas surrounding it. It would last no longer than a year, most likely half a year. Combat would be restricted to regular armies abiding by the international laws on the conduct of war. The only exception would be the Balkans where Serbian guerrilla fighters would challenge the invading forces of the regular Austro-Hungarian army, but even here, fighting would stay within the limits of experiences made in earlier campaigns. The belligerents were pursuing war aims which would not fundamentally alter the balance of power in Europe. The financial costs of a general European war would be substantial, but manageable. Similarly, the human costs of war would be within the scope of earlier wars.

To Austria-Hungary’s military experts, a long, protracted war of attrition simply was not a realistic scenario. First, this did not correspond to the historical reference points they were oriented towards, that is, the wars of the middle of the nineteenth century. Second, they did not believe that their economy would be resilient enough to sustain the strains of a protracted war. Compared to Germany and Great Britain, Austria-Hungary had far less economic and industrial power, raw materials, financial reserves, or industrial facilities to produce weapons and military equipment to wage a long war. And thus, if a war started to go badly, the state leadership would simply have to find a way to conclude some sort of compromise to end the war. Third, they did not believe that Russia’s society would tolerate the strains of a protracted war. Domestic unrest or open revolution would force the Russian Government to bring a major war to an end as soon as possible. And finally, officers knew that Austria-Hungary lacked the military capabilities to sustain a long conflict as it lacked a reserve army.

Habsburg officers were well aware of the significant increase in troop numbers and the substantial developments in weapons technology and tactics in land and sea warfare. However, they did not have a sense that they were living in an age of fundamental change to the character of warfare. The general expectation was that a major war in Europe would be similar to the wars of the middle of the nineteenth century. Recent wars like the Boer War, the Russo-Japanese War, or the two Balkan Wars were studied in detail, but commentators did not find anything which would have fundamentally challenged their vision of a conventional war in the mould of the Wars of 1859, 1866, or 1870/1871 or Austria-Hungary’s own campaigns of 1878 and 1882 in the Balkans. As Lawrence Freedman has pointed out, statesmen and officers then and now have often been wrong about how future conflicts would unfold. Overemphasising recent trends and drawing direct projections from recent historical data, military theorists have regularly suffered from failures of imagination. ⁹³ Austria-Hungary thus represents a classic case of overlearning the lessons from recent and geographically close history. Habsburg officers failed to keep their minds open enough to reckon with another global, protracted, and radicalised conflict in the manner of the Napoleonic Wars.

From reading the military press, the military leadership could rely on the fact that the officer corps stood behind them. Numerous articles supported Conrad’s aggressive foreign policy vis-à-vis Serbia. Many officers expected a quick and resounding victory over Serbia which would be a good solution to Austria-Hungary’s foreign and domestic problems. The scenario of a minor, localised war against Serbia (and possibly Montenegro) clearly remained the preferred option, but Conrad and other military leaders also received support for the eventuality that localisation would prove impossible. The military journals conveyed confidence that with German help, a two-front war would be feasible and winnable. Except for a few rare cases, Conrad did not have to contend with warning voices. All of this might have bolstered his bellicosity in the years before the summer of 1914. It might also have fortified his aggressive behaviour in the July Crisis when he was warmongering for a minor war against Serbia while being fully prepared to risk a major war in Europe. Officers were indeed blind to the horrors war would unleash in the summer of 1914. Armageddon seemed far off.