Discussing Maritime Defence Programmes During the Interwar Period: Argentine Navy Officers and the Lessons of the First World War (1919-1924)

A total and global event, the Great War spread far beyond Europe. ¹ Its impacts reached the Argentine Republic, where, despite the nation’s strict neutrality and distance from the European war theatre, the development of the conflict attracted the attention of different local actors, including members of the Armed Forces. ² They observed the war from different positions, either as attachés in diplomatic legations or as mere consumers of the press media that provided coverage of the conflict. ³

During the First World War, it was difficult for the Argentine Navy to modernize and acquire new equipment. ⁴ Its officers protested the stagnation and disinvestment of their institution during a major conflict. ⁵ However, even after the war was over, the demands continued. Major military investment programmes were required to guarantee Argentina’s sovereignty over its coasts and waters. These claims were finally heard by President Marcelo Torcuato de Alvear (1922-1928), who supported the Navy’s demands. ⁶ While some historians have studied the development of this extensive modernization programme, several issues still need further analysis. ⁷ Did the events of the Great War have an impact on the development of these defence programmes? What were the opinions of the officers of the Argentine Navy? How did the national and international context affect Argentina’s desire to modernize its naval forces?

This work has two primary purposes. First, to understand why the First World War remained significant for some members of the Argentine Navy during the interwar period, despite being seemingly contradictory to the ideas of pacifism that began to emerge during those years. Secondly, to understand how the war experience influenced the design of modernization projects for the Argentine Navy. To do this, the article will examine writings, speeches, and lectures produced by various Argentine naval officers between 1919 and 1924. ⁸ This timeframe spans from the beginning of the postwar period until the first modernization project’s completion in 1924.

This article focuses on the need to provide a social and cultural approach in historical studies of the Argentine Armed Forces. This allows us to consider the attributes that military professionals share with civilians: education, work experiences, and identities, among others. ⁹ Likewise, it contributes to scholarship that connects the Argentine Navy with one of the most important events of the twentieth century, the First World War, and its legacies during the interwar period. ¹⁰

An Overview of the South American Naval Context in the Early 20th Century

The beginning of the century found Argentina and Chile in dispute over border issues. Diplomatic disagreement gave rise to a naval arms race, which completely exhausted both countries’ finances, and ultimately forced them to end their dispute with the signing of the Pactos de Mayo (May Pacts) in 1902. This treaty contained several parts, one of which was a convention on arms limitations that prohibited the acquisition of ships for the next five years. Despite this agreement, the border issue was not entirely settled, and rivalries between the two countries would continue throughout most of the 20th century. ¹¹

A second arms race took place in South America before long. It was initiated by Brazil, which aspired to build a powerful and modern navy that would consolidate its international prestige. It began with a costly naval expansion programme, which included the purchase from Britain of two dreadnoughts (Minas Gerais and São Paulo), two light cruisers, and a flotilla of ten destroyers, as well as three Italian submarines. ¹² Argentina watched the growth of the Brazilian navy with concern and decided to respond with its own naval expansion programme. In 1909, it ordered twelve destroyers from Germany, Britain and France, followed in 1910 by two dreadnoughts from the United States (Moreno and Rivadavia), which were more modern and powerful than the Brazilian battleships. ¹³ In turn, Argentinian naval expansionism attracted the attention of Chile, which feared it would lag behind the other South American powers. Chile joined the naval arms race by ordering two superdreadnoughts (Almirante Latorre and Almirante Cochrane) and six destroyers from Britain. ¹⁴

The course of this arms race took a number of turns upon the outbreak of the First World War. ¹⁵ The belligerents looked for ways to build up their naval forces rapidly and began requisitioning ships that other countries had ordered from their shipyards. ¹⁶ Argentina was the country most affected by this policy. Of all the units expected, it only received the Rivadavia and Moreno, while the destroyers ordered from France and Germany were requisitioned. Chile also suffered requisitions, but to a lesser extent, for although the two battleships and four of the six destroyers it had ordered were retained, most of the ships were delivered when the war ended. The Chilean Navy eventually received three of those destroyers and one of the battleships (Almirante Latorre), as well as six submarines in compensation for the other battleship. For its part, Brazil did not suffer any requisitions, and received all its vessels before the outbreak of war. ¹⁷

Another critical factor affecting the South American naval race was the accelerated technological innovation of the First World War. The belligerents used every element at their disposal to seek tactical and strategic advantages over their opponents, which led to the development of new fire control and propulsion systems. ¹⁸ This process caused a relative loss of military value in the navies of Argentina, Chile and Brazil. With the international arms market closed by the war, they could not acquire or modernize their units to avoid the obsolescence of their fleets. ¹⁹

Lack of Investment and Obsolescence, 1919-1920

Of the three South American nations, Argentina was hit worst by wartime requisitions. Of its initial armaments programme, it only managed to incorporate the battleships Rivadavia and Moreno, while the rest of the units were confiscated without any compensation. Nevertheless, in the early post-war period, Argentina’s fleet maintained considerable naval superiority, in terms of tonnage displacement, but was relatively older than those of Chile and Brazil. Moreover, it had no submarines, which was a strategic and tactical disadvantage. ²⁰ This obsolescent condition caused concern among the officers of the Argentine Navy.

First of all, the Navy’s ships had not yet been modernized for oil consumption and still depended on coal to operate. It was imported from Great Britain because government authorities had little interest in exploiting local coalfields. This lack of self-sufficiency generated problems for the Navy’s warships, which did not have the means to carry out their regular training and instruction voyages. ²¹ Only the tankers assigned to the oil transport between Comodoro Rivadavia (Chubut Province, Argentina) and Buenos Aires, such as Ministro Ezcurra, Ingeniero Huergo, and Aristóbulo del Valle, maintained continuous navigations. ²² The limited activity of the warships impacted officers’ training, depriving them of the opportunity to learn sailing practices and gain specific knowledge of the Argentine coastline. As a temporary solution, the Navy assigned sailors to work in the oil tankers, with rapid crew changes, up to three times a year, thus allowing more men to be trained. ²³

The preceding situation caused criticism within the Navy. For many officers, such as the retired Frigate Captain Esteban De Loqui, it was essential to count on an efficient fleet for several reasons. ²⁴ De Loqui believed that the Allies owed their success in the Great War to their naval superiority, thinking there was ‘no doubt that the final victory would not have been so complete without the powerful tenacity of the British Navy’. And therefore it was necessary to have a competent fleet that could defend Argentina’s maritime interests in future conflicts as well. ²⁵

In the last war, all neutrals have suffered … Regarding Argentina, we have lost ships, we have seen our trade injured … because of the lack of tonnage … and our budgets and finances have been generally unbalanced. Our customs income has been reduced to such an extent that without the enormous productivity of the country we would have reached a catastrophe.

As De Loqui pointed out, the risks posed by blockades, submarine warfare, and shipping rates threatened Argentina, which depended on an economy open to trade. ²⁷

During the early postwar years, the Argentine Navy tried to maintain its performance. For example, tactical manoeuvres were carried out to train against submarine attacks. ²⁸ The purpose was to keep Argentine naval officers up to date with the ways of modern warfare. ²⁹ Although these defensive practices were essential, for some, it seemed equally necessary to incorporate submarines as a combat unit. In mid-1919, Lieutenant Lucio González wrote a long article on the subject. He pointed out the potential of the submarine and its value in protecting Argentinás maritime access. ³⁰

… being the River Plate the natural route where our production is transported abroad and where we receive what we need from overseas for our needs and to sustain our industries, it is clear that defensive measures should tend, above all, to ensure that we are allowed to control and manage the navigation of the River Plate in time of war.

As can be seen, submarines were thought to be a valuable tool to protect the country against any blockading fleet. Likewise, for González, submarines also had an offensive capacity against enemy trade.

The recent European war, … has not been able to prevent some information from reaching the outside … and according to it, we have seen that the submarine has been used in the open sea, not only to chase and sink war and merchant ships, … but its use has been effective in escorting a fighting squadron and being used when enemy forces were engaged in action. ³²

Another article about submarines was written by Frigate Lieutenant Miguel Tanco, who analysed the operational aspects of these units, both in defence and attack, and the available resources to counteract them. ³⁴

In summary, we can see how some officers of the Argentine Navy showed interest in submarines during the first years of the interwar period. Although there were considerable expectations for their incorporation, no progress was made. By 1920, the submarine already seemed a distant wish, and the lack of action by the government of President Hipólito Yrigoyen (1916-1922) provoked complaints. Compared to Chile and Brazil, Argentina was the only one of the three regional naval powers that still lacked submarines.

When coming back to Argentina after his stay at the Submarine School in New London, Connecticut, the Frigate Lieutenant Vicente Ferrer gave a lecture in the Centro Naval (Naval Centre). ³⁵ A detailed reading of several paragraphs shows the dissastisfaction the speaker felt when he returned to the country and became aware of the situation within the Navy. ³⁶

At the beginning of 1917, … ten Argentine officers were sent to the American fleet to study and get acquainted with the newest technologies …

One of the purposes of Ferrer’s conference was to share his training with other officers, who had only known about the submarine through specialized literature. ³⁸ It had been the idea of Ricardo Camino, who was chairman of the Naval Centre’s Studies and Publications Sub-Committee. ³⁹

… we have nothing left to do for the submarine, knowing its importance; but to write and speak to convince our readers and listeners of the imperative need to incorporate this formidable weapon into our fleet, of which very few will perhaps have glimpsed its true power, while our government makes up its mind to do so, and obtains the necessary funds. … for … such acquisition. ⁴⁰

So far, it can be seen that there was continuous written criticism of the Argentine Navy by some of its members between 1919 and 1920, condemning their branch´s obsolescence and lack of investments. A number of those complaints stemmed from the experience of the First World War, which revealed the dangers of lacking suitable means to protect the country. Officers also wrote about the need for reform in other areas, such as the preparation and training of new sailors. In particular, they complained that instruction still used sail training ships, like the frigate Presidente Sarmiento, for the education of the new candidates from the Escuela Naval Militar (Naval Military School). Many officers believed that learning about sails and manoeuvres was useless when the rest of the ships of the Argentine Navy navigated with engines. As an officer under the nickname Acquapendente opined, the instruction trip would be more profitable if it was devoted to other issues related to modern warfare, like firing practices and torpedoes. ⁴¹ Frigate Lieutenant Eduardo Jofré wrote about these topics as well. His writings criticized ‘our current teaching system of artillery’, which he considered one of the weakest points in the instruction of the Argentine Navy. ⁴²

We know the enormous advances made in artillery and its related mechanisms in the last war. Many professional and technical journals and texts bring us a lot of valuable [information], so let us take the opportunity and recognize that we can learn from those lessons … ⁴³

Jofré proposed changes to the study programmes of the Naval Military School, following the examples of the British and American navies, which already instructed on the latest naval innovations. ⁴⁴

Complaints and Proposals to the Government, 1920-1924

Claims against naval acquisition and modernization continued during the 1920s, since the Argentine government did not as yet seem to favour implementing policies to address these issues. Therefore, the operational situation of the Navy continued to decay as time went by. Ships that had started to show some signs of deterioration during the war were utterly obsolete by the early twenties because of their age. Frigate Captain Gabriel Albarracín touched on this situation. In his opinion, the need to develop a comprehensive project of maritime defence for the country was urgent, and the acquisition of new naval material had to be considered. ⁴⁵ On the one hand, this issue was linked to the situation of the rival navies of Chile and Brazil. They had submarines, while Argentina did not. ⁴⁶ Moreover, these navies had already begun their ship modernization initiatives. Albarracín noted how Brazil had sent its battleships São Paulo and Minas Gerais to the United States to receive modifications based on ‘the latest improvements in warfare’. ⁴⁷ On the other hand, the need to acquire and modernize units for the Argentine Navy was based on the lessons of the First World War. Albarracín said:

It is not convenient that we let time make us forget our yesterday’s worries. As it spreads across the oceans, the war that ends has attracted to our coasts and the gates of the River Plate the uncomfortable raids of opposing ships. Furthermore, with its intrinsic weakness as a small power, the Argentine Republic found itself engaged, in the face of the proud belligerents, in the difficult task of defending a neutrality beaten by powerful interests and even its … sovereignty rights …

For Gabriel Albarracín, the experience of the Great War had provided two specific lessons. First, modern warfare had the capacity to expand quickly, partly because of new naval technological developments. Secondly, international law had proven incapable of protecting the integrity of neutral nations during the First World War. As we shall see, these points would be a highly remarked upon issue in the Argentine naval literature of the time.

Meanwhile, in the postwar global agenda, a number of countries had come to challenge Great Power alliances as the pillar of international security. New concepts were discussed to guarantee peace, such as ‘Collective Security’ and ‘Disarmament’. ⁴⁹ The first of these continued to promote the balance of power among the strongest nations, but condemned the use of force as a method of solving disputes. The second one, in contrast, asked nations to reduce their armed forces, keeping just what was essential to guarantee the security of their territories. ⁵⁰

In keeping with those ideas, in March 1920 the British Admiralty sent Parliament a proposed naval budget, with significant spending cuts for military expenses. ⁵¹ This event caught Rear Admiral Juan Martín’s interest. Among the top staff in the Argentine Navy in the early postwar years, Martín thought the British projected a clear and accurate statement, of the need for a Navy to defend the Empire. ⁵² Although it seemed to be a new time of peace, with no conflicts looming on the international scene, Martín stated that Argentina should learn from the British case and take note of its example. ⁵³

These paragraphs are helpful to show, on the one hand, how the writings of some Argentine naval officers acquired new characteristics during the 1920s. Other matters began to be discussed in these requests and claims for modernization and weapons acquisition projects, including new ideas of disarmament. Notably, Navy officers began to interfere with issues beyond their professional field, giving their opinions about international diplomacy and the positions that Argentina should take, among other things. In this regard, the reading of El Poder Naval. Como garantía de la soberanía y prosperidad de la Nación (The Naval Power. As a Guarantee of the Nation’s Sovereignty and Prosperity), by Rear Admiral Manuel Lagos, is truly accurate. ⁵⁴

For Lagos, history and the experience of the First World War had shown the consequences of lacking an effective naval policy. In this sense, it was crucial to prepare a basic defence programme for Argentina, which should be ready to repel any aggressive force in the future.

All maritime nations provide us with examples … that we must use to overcome the obstacles that hinder the easy development of our naval fleet.

Lagos proposed that the naval programme should be progressive, following a systematic plan for the acquisition of modern combat units to replace obsolete existing material. According to Lagos, Argentine finances would not be able to fund modernization in the long term; however, it would be possible to attain the minimum amount of material needed to maintain a maritime defence of the country. Lagos thought that the disarmament of the great military powers, as a result of the postwar peace conferences, would make some matters easier. ⁵⁶ Argentina could benefit by acquiring warships at reasonable prices while other countries aimed at lowering their naval expenses by selling or giving away their equipment. ⁵⁷ The resources would come from an internal loan, which Manuel Lagos called Fondo Poder Naval (Naval Power Fund), made up from taxes on usury, luxury, gambling, and tobacco. ⁵⁸ At that time, Argentina had a solid exporting profile. ⁵⁹ Therefore, for Lagos, maritime defence was a crucial matter. Every effort should be made for it, even if it was necessary to alter decisions about local or foreign policies.

Lieutenant Guillermo Ceppi published an extensive article with a similar subject on December 17, 1921. The main aspects of the text were the control and domination of the seas, the importance of which the author believed had been confirmed by events in the last war. ⁶⁰

As a resolute action, Jutland does not weigh heavily in the war balance, nor do other naval battles. However, on the contrary, by definitively securing the Allied domination of the seas, these actions give the land armies the most powerful weapon for the final victory. For them, troop transports, foodstuffs, the necessary weapons; for the people, elements of all kinds, free trade … ⁶¹

Ceppi emphasized the importance of maintaining of the Navy, in spite of the ideals of disarmament that had entered the political mainstream. In his opinion, it would be a mistake to trust in the effectiveness of conferences and peace treaties since there was always the possibility of a new war breaking out. He illustrated this thought in his writing:

… no one can ignore the lessons of the past. … the period from 1866 to the present day is characterized by a high level of pacifist or disarmament proposals, together with the higher percentage of wars … that history records. ⁶²

The First World War also served to create a repository of lessons and teachings when it came to acquiring warships. Argentine officers studied the performance of fleets during the conflict, to establish some common points on the objectives of the modernization programme. On this subject, it is worth repeating several paragraphs from Jorge Games’s work Utilización táctica de las diferentes armas en la Guerra Naval (Tactical Use of Different Weapons in the Naval War) published in 1922. ⁶³

The concentration of efforts supported by scientific advances, … and the belief in the imperative need to dominate the sea in order to win, to promote the development of new weapons used efficiently in the last war, influenced the tactical usage of the fleet. ⁶⁴

Likewise, we can mention at least two more important officers who shared Games’s ideas: Captain Segundo Storni and Vice-Admiral Juan Pablo Sáenz Valiente. ⁶⁶ In an issue of Caras y Caretas (a popular Argentine magazine published between 1898 and 1939) from May 27, 1922, Storni reported on the situation that the Argentine Navy was experiencing, including its response to the First World War and the policies on arms limitation and disarmament. ⁶⁷

Because of the horror of the recent great conflict and the enormous debts, the whole world is yearning for peace and crying out for the economy: this is why disarmament policy is so important. However, as the first powers have proved, disarmament has a limit: national security. ⁶⁸

Storni came out against disarmament. He thought that accepting a policy of arms reduction would undermine the nation’s capacity to protect its territorial sovereignty. He believed that the international trend toward disarmament could not be applied to Argentina, whose policies were no threat to world peace. For this reason, the country could study and carry out its defensive programmes without fear, since ‘… a Navy that is efficient, moderate, [and] not a threat to anybody … must be our aspiration’. ⁶⁹

For his part, Sáenz Valiente also believed in the importance of counting on well equipped and trained naval forces. In his opinion, the nature of war in history raised questions about the reliability of pacifism. He expressed these concerns in some lines from El desarme como política internacional (Disarmament as International Policy), his book published in 1923.

… the treaty signed in Washington by the United States, England, France, Italy, and Japan, … seeks partial disarmament – not the abolition of war – to relieve their budgets and improve their economic and financial situation. Will this pact be enough to create hope for peace?

Reflecting on the future of the Navy, Sáenz Valiente considered the recent experience of the First World War a significant issue in the Argentine defence projects.

Therefore, disarmament agreements are not enough to prevent war. Perhaps they are counterproductive …

The ideas developed by these officers, however, were not expressed only through books and technical articles. They were also vocalised at a number of social events attended by significant political personalities.

Under the auspices of the Círculo Militar (Military Circle) and the Centro Naval (Naval Centre), a group of Army and Navy officers gathered to celebrate their comradeship on July 7, 1923. ⁷² Important leading figures also attended, including the Argentine President Marcelo Torcuato de Alvear (1922-1928) and the Naval Minister, Manuel Domecq García, among others. ⁷³ Rear Admiral Ismael Galíndez gave a speech at the event, taking advantage of the presence of the Argentine president to ‘make him fully aware of opinions in the Navy on military issues, which had been updated given the recent [war]’. ⁷⁴

Although I personally attribute doubtful effectiveness to congresses and conferences in limiting or reducing expenditure on armaments, it would seem crazy for these new countries, which have had to take advantage of the painful experience of the last war and which are in such great need of all their resources for the development and use of their natural wealth, to embark on an arms struggle; But this does not mean that we should not look around us and, according to the circumstances, take the measures most suitable to our security. On this point, it should not be forgotten that the naval power of a nation cannot be improvised, nor can its defence be abandoned … ⁷⁵

Galíndez affirmed that Argentina required enough naval power to defend its resources, and its extensive maritime coast. Likewise, the navigable routes through which trade flowed had to be kept free. For Galíndez, in all these aspects, the lessons and experiences of the Great War should be considered totally current. ⁷⁶

Eventually, the continuous claims by these naval officers, which we have analysed throughout this work, caught President Marcelo Torcuato de Alvear’s attention. Unlike his predecessor, Hipólito Yrigoyen (1916-1922), Alvear had shown a favourable position towards the Armed Forces since the beginning of his presidency on October 12, 1922. This was noticeable in his opening messages to the National Congress. In the first one of these addresses, in May 1923, Alvear acknowledged the lessons of the First World War and the lack of investment that the Navy was experiencing. ‘One of my purposes … is to devote the greatest attention to improving the armed institutions’. ⁷⁷ In addition, he also shared the opinions of some Argentine Navy officers on the need to undertake defence projects, despite the new ideas of disarmament popular at that time.

The [government] has said … that it is far from his spirit to enter into an arms competition that has no justification in this part of the universe. … But this cannot prevent the nation from having the necessary elements for its defence; the security of the nation demands it … ⁷⁸

In the same message before Congress, Alvear announced that he would answer the investment requests made by the Navy so that the ‘already decayed material could be preserved in the best way, be it modernizing it, or adapting the improvements and progress that it could get’. ⁷⁹ In this sense, one of the first measures was incorporating ten auxiliary ships, acquired from Germany on January 22, 1923. ⁸⁰ These acquisitions allowed a substantial improvement in the Navy, even though there was still the issue of acquiring modern warships.

A brief statistical survey allows us to verify the conditions of obsolescence denounced by critical officers. In 1923, the Navy had nineteen warships. ⁸¹ Of that number, the only effective naval power was two dreadnoughts (Moreno and Rivadavia), four armoured cruisers (Gral. San Martín, Gral. Belgrano, Pueyrredón and Garibaldi), two cruisers (9 de Julio and Buenos Aires), one armoured ship (Almirante Brown), and four destroyers (Córdoba, Jujuy, Catamarca and La Plata). Moreover, several of these ships needed urgent modernizations to keep their operational conditions within reasonable efficiency. And many other vessels were reaching the end of their lifespan and needed urgent replacement. ⁸² Fifty-eight percent of Navy warships were over twenty years old, while some vessels had reached or exceeded their third decade. ⁸³

In another address to Congress, President Alvear pointed out the complex operational scenario of the Navy. Lack of material not only impacted national security and maritime coast surveillance but also the instruction and practice of the fleet.

The Navy has continued to develop its activities in a commendable manner … even though it is very outdated and the material at its disposal is scarce. It is essential to provide it with the elements to ensure that the effectiveness of its well-proven official status is developed and maintained under the conditions required by the country. Given that … most of our production needs sea routes in order to circulate, we must ensure that our Navy has the conditions to carry out all its tasks of exploration and surveillance. It is essential for their better use and to make effective its mission of providing for national security. ⁸⁴

From the Navy’s point of view, the modernization of the two dreadnoughts (Moreno and Rivadavia) and the four destroyers (Catamarca, Córdoba, Jujuy and La Plata) was the priority. Although they were the most recent warships acquired by the country, they required reforms in matters that had undergone accelerated innovation during the First World War, such as weapons and propulsion systems. ⁸⁵ However, the situation of the other South American navies also influenced the need to modernise Argentine ships. By this time, Chile and Brazil had already begun this process, starting with their battleships. Between 1918 and 1922, Brazil upgraded its Minas Gerais and São Paulo dreadnoughts with new firing and propulsion systems and anti-aircraft guns. Chile, meanwhile, had completely refitted its superdreadnought Almirante Latorre with improved weapons and armour. ⁸⁶ Witnessing this development, President Alvear was determined to comply with the Navy’s request.

The upgrading programme … has been carefully studied and will be submitted for your consideration [Congress]. It will be carefully and continuously implemented, as it should be, to avoid long periods of time without taking care of these needs … The two ‘dreadnoughts’ and the four explorers [destroyers], who have to undergo the authorized modernizations … are the current finest elements of our Navy. All the rest of our material is more than thirty years old. ⁸⁷

The modernization of the two dreadnoughts and the four destroyers was done by law 11.222, which provided the funds to carry out the indicated modifications. ⁸⁸ Between 1924 and 1926, the Moreno and Rivadavia were upgraded in the United States. Their weapon and propulsion systems were improved. On the other hand, the four destroyers were modernized in Argentina between 1924 and 1928. Their systems were also enhanced. ⁸⁹

After constant requests and claims made over different channels over a number of years, the Argentine Navy finally managed to comply with one of its most urgent needs: the modernization of the core of its naval power. However, there were still several matters not considered by the Argentine government, such as the acquisition of new units to increase the Navy’s operational capacities. The lack of answers on these issues would lead to further complaints in the years to come, which can hopefully be addressed in a future article.

Conclusion

This work has analysed different writings and speeches produced by officers of the Argentine Navy to explore the situation experienced within that institution during the first years of the postwar period, between 1919 and 1924. From those discussions, we can develop some considerations by way of conclusion.

First of all, certain principles about disarmament during the interwar period became widespread following the Great Powers’ celebrated conferences on arms limitation. Nevertheless, many Argentine naval officers showed distrust and suspicion to these new ideas. For them, the foremost lesson of the First World War was the failure of the international community to guarantee peace.

Within that context, we can see that the experience of the Great War was still fresh in the minds of the men of the Argentine Navy. The conflict continued to be a source of teachings. One of them was that the naval forces had to be prepared to safeguard the country’s sovereignty and interests. In order to do so, it was necessary to have a modern and efficient fleet, as well as a complex defence programme. Due to the lack of response by the government, Argentine officers found it necessary to press the issue with their own requests and demands. These were constant and expressed in multiple ways, from books and journal articles to lectures, speeches, and conferences.

In addition, we must point out the degree of sophistication and elaboration that many of these requests reached. Pushing for modernization and the acquisition of new weapons went beyond mere criticism. On the contrary, these arguments were accompanied by other issues that did not belong exclusively to the military field. Argentine officers also gave their opinions on a wider number of topics, from international politics and diplomacy to methods of collecting public funds to investment in new weapons. However, officers remained strictly professional in their claims, and avoided voicing opposition towards Presidents Hipólito Yrigoyen or Marcelo Torcuato de Alvear’s administrations.

Finally, it is worth noting that the Argentine Navy obtained a favourable response from President Alvear, who showed himself interested in their demands and knew how to become their spokesman. In his messages addressed to Congress, it is possible to see that Alvear shared many of the ideas that Argentine naval officers had previously expressed in their writings and speeches.

In sum, the references to the First World War in the analysed sources, even years after the end of the conflict, highlight the existential impact that the war created in neutral, distant countries like Argentina. Its naval officers were not isolated from the main historical events of the interwar period. On the contrary, they kept an expectant watch, trying to work out conclusions from their observations and interpretations of the international situation at the time in order to improve their own country’s defensive capabilities.