Abstract
It is a rare book that manages to coherently chart the development of a single topic across many case studies and even more years, let alone a topic as complex as inequality during the most chaotic of scenarios: war. Beginning from the premise that ‘the drivers of battlefield performance in modern war are still only poorly understood,’ (p. 1) Jason Lyall sets himself the objective of showing how various levels of inequality can and do limit the battlefield performance of armed groups. Lyall succeeds in this, and his book, Divided Armies, will provide readers with significant food for thought. True, readers from various perspectives will challenge Lyall's findings from their own specific areas of interest, but that is to be expected of any work that tries to bring together so much information, from so many geographical and historical perspectives, across such a broad chronology and at such length. This reviewer believes that, while arguments around the edges may be possible, the central findings of this book are powerful. For instance, the discussion of military sociology could have been broadened to account for recent developments within the task cohesion school, however, this may have diverted attention from Lyall's focus on the meso or intermediate level of analysis. Furthermore, the specific highlighting of the role played by relative performance was welcome with Lyall correctly stating that ‘defining performance in terms of victory and defeat risks tautology’ (p. 9). Across our various disciplines, we all too often focus on the absolute outcome rather than the specific context and results which means we often let this point pass us by.
Divided Armies is a book that requires careful reading and is not one to be picked up on a whim. However, close reading and perseverance are rewarded. Lyall manages to bring together such a variety of case studies that readers from (almost) any background will find something of immediate relevance and much more beyond. The chosen case studies, whether historic or more recent, successfully demonstrate how different armed forces responded to consistent criteria with a variety of outcomes and, more importantly, Lyall reveals how these armed forces were often powerless in the face of decisions made by their political masters before conflict commenced. Very often these decisions are made deliberately to further other ethnic, ideological, or political motives – the consequences of which only become apparent when it is too late. Although this reviewer was looking forward to the Soviet case studies from the outset, the earlier material focusing on the First and Second Mahdi Wars (1881–85 and 1896–99) was an excellent example of Lyall's central argument and successfully demonstrated how we can see dramatic change by the same actor over a short period of time.
The various discussions of desertion and defection within each chapter were also a very welcome element. When these issues are discussed, they often focus on non-state groups or solely on specific battles. Alternatively, desertion and defection are taken as one and the same, neglecting the challenges posed by each and the historical legacy of these actions, even within victorious and peacetime forces. Lyall includes these two actions within his ‘Perils of Military Inequality’ framework (the other two being poor loss-exchange ratios and the use of blocking detachments), which he draws on throughout the book. His continued discussion of desertion and defection finally provides those who are interested in this topic more broadly with something generalizable and offers a basis for future study. For those who are interested in understanding the workings of armed forces throughout time and space, this book will be an essential touchstone, regardless of methodological background.