Abstract
The broad outlines of the story of why Cyprus descended into violence in 1955, and how that violence was only temporarily resolved five years later are already well-known, having been the subject of several recent studies. But not the least of Andrew Novo's achievements is that using these published works, together with material drawn from archives in London, Washington, and Nicosia, he is able to produce in little more than 200 pages a compelling narrative explaining why by 1960 all of the parties involved felt compelled to sign an agreement that fell far short of their real aspirations.
The author's starting point is that the Cyprus crisis was unique in at least two respects. First, unlike other anti-colonial movements, the Greek Cypriot insurgents of EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) did not seek independence from Britain. They wanted enosis, that is union with another sovereign state, namely Greece. Secondly, the insurgents were quite unlike the normal run of anti-colonial left wing activists. Instead they were right wing nationalists working in tandem with the Orthodox Church. Novo then shows how the crisis was further complicated because it involved not merely the Greek Cypriots and the British, but also the minority Turkish Cypriot population and the wider international community. The Greek government was vocal in its support of enosis at the United Nations, while in secret it provided EOKA with arms and explosives. But that was not enough to tip the balance in its favour. The British were determined to continue using the island as a base from which to project their power into the Middle East, and also (a point Novo overlooks) to retain it as a vital listening post for GCHQ. Turkish Cypriots opposed enosis because they feared that it would lead to their extinction, and the government in Ankara supported them, not just because it shared their worries, but also because it did not welcome the possibility that its hereditary Greek enemies might one day govern an island on its doorstep.
Novo is even-handed in his judgements about who was responsible for the instigation and continuation of violence on the island. The British were prepared to make concessions to both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but these were never enough to meet their full aspirations. In 1948 they offered the island a new constitution which Novo suggests represented a better settlement for the Greek Cypriots than the agreement they reluctantly signed in 1960. They rejected both offers because they fell far short of enosis. In 1957 the British offered the Turks partition, an offer Novo suggests was a cynical bargaining tactic to make the Greeks more reasonable. If it was it quickly backfired. Based on an interview with the Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş, Novo confirms what other historians have suspected: that by 1958 the Turkish government was covertly fomenting intercommunal violence on the island to bring the goal of partition a step nearer.
The author is justifiably forthright in insisting that the Greek Cypriot leaders, Archbishop Makarios and Colonel Grivas, were so blinded by the righteousness of their quest for enosis that they wilfully disregarded the reality of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot opposition, the determination of the British to stay put, or to understand the ramifications of the international context within which they were working. Consequently, the crisis was resolved over their heads by the Greek, Turkish, and British governments. As the island descended into intercommunal violence in 1958, each of them reluctantly accepted that they must reduce the scope of their goals. The Greek government feared a war with Turkey might mean that it would forfeit British and American support in its Cold War struggle against communism. The Turkish government, threatened by hostile and increasingly unstable Arab neighbours, was prepared temporarily to shelve its support for partition. As for the British, they were concerned that their whole position on the island might soon become untenable and decided to accept almost any settlement that ended violence but allowed them to retain sovereign base rights. The settlement left everyone, except perhaps the British, deeply dissatisfied. Perhaps Novo might now produce a companion study explaining how and why in 1974 their dissatisfaction brought about another outburst of intercommunal violence, the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus, and the collapse of the fragile Republic of Cyprus.