Hermann von Boyen the Elder and his Impact on the Prussian Army After 1815

The goal of this text is to present the influence that Field Marshal Hermann von Boyen the Elder had on the Prussian army in the first half of the nineteenth century. Perceptions of the two-time director (1814–1819 and 1841–1847) and the actual creator of the Prussian Ministry of War (Kriegsministerium) have been largely determined by the monumental biography of the Field Marshal penned by Friedrich Meinecke, ¹ who painted Boyen as a symbol of Prussia's liberal faction. According to Meinecke, Boyen's departure in 1819 motivated by his disagreement with reforms to the Landwehr introduced by King Frederick William III, signalled not only the end of reforming tendencies in the kingdom but was in fact a turning point in the history of nineteenth-century Prussia. ² Although the work of the German historian is extremely insightful and based on rich source material, the trend described above leads to a one-dimensional perception of Boyen's influence on the development of the Prussian army. As a result, apart from his well-known and oft-discussed views on the Landwehr, ³ his ideas concerning military matters remain virtually unknown, and he is seen more as a politician in uniform than a soldier. ⁴

Contrary to current trends in literature, the issue of the creation of the Landwehr is only of marginal importance to this study – in fact, the institution in the shape dreamt of by Boyen was destroyed in 1819 and never returned to its original form. ⁵ The aim of this article is to present Boyen's long-term influence on the perception of strategic issues functioning in Prussia until the middle of the century, which can be synthesised as the concept of a ‘defence system’. In fact, the idea was a kind of metatheory, in which Boyen's Landwehr was to also play a part, and according to which the whole system of war planning and mobilisation of the armed forces of the Hohenzollern monarchy was organised.

The picture of the Prussian army in the first half of the nineteenth century is still dominated by the myth of the Unification wars of 1864–1871, with the image of an ‘exemplary’ General Staff and symbolised by the monumental figures of Carl von Clausewitz and Helmuth Moltke the Elder. ⁶ In one of his books, Robert M. Citino described a clear consistency in the way Germans had waged war from the seventeenth century up until the Battle of Kiev in 1941. In his opinion, this was a period of continuity regarding the Prussian-German art of war. ⁷ It was to have its original characteristics: the will to end the war quickly with a decisive battle, aggressiveness, offensive actions and a penchant for unconventional operational manoeuvres carried out using individual initiative without relying on the high command. I questioned this point of view in my recent book that discusses Prussian strategic thought between 1815 and 1830. In my opinion, the Prussian approach to war was eclectic: a conviction was derived from the Napoleonic campaigns that war was of a human and unpredictable nature, while at the same time, it was also assumed that all efforts should be made to make material preparations for war. Prussian military thought during this period was in no way uniform, but rather a clash of typically eighteenth-century perspectives of war with that were legacies of the Napoleon era. ⁸ I share Meinecke's opinion that the basic difference between Clausewitz's and Boyen's views was in their attitude to warfare. The author of Vom Kriege was primarily interested in ‘great war’, conducting major operations to achieve strategic goals. Whereas Boyen's domain concerned the sphere of war preparations, including the organisation of military authorities as well as defence and mobilisation planning. ⁹ Although they both continued Gerhard von Scharnhorst's thinking and felt a strong bond with the person who mentored and promoted them, it also appears that they interpreted the most important elements of Scharnhorst's thoughts slightly differently.

With this in mind, I would like to present the foundations of the theoretical views of the two-time Minister of War and indicate how they were implemented and rooted in the Prussian army. This will be achieved by utilising my many years of research spent investigating Boyen's legacy, aided by source materials left behind by the former Prussian army.

The ‘Defence System’ Idea

Boyen's views on the art of war were to a large extent an embodiment of those held by Scharnhorst's mentor Count Wilhelm von Schaumburg-Lippe, ¹⁰ who was the first to propose the concept that the army could be used as a tool to ensure security and peace for the citizens. Patriotic, educated and imbued with high morale, the armed forces (which included members from every social stratum) were to be capable of waging an effective defensive war against stronger neighbours. The defence system concept proposed by Boyen fully complied with these assumptions. In a broader context, it could be also considered as the final stage of the process of reflection that began in Prussia after the Seven Years’ War. The end of that conflict provided the catalyst for Prussia to seek a way of solving the problem of the kingdom's limited resources, which prevented it from becoming a major European power. After the war, Prussia was economically and demographically exhausted, and King Frederick the Great was entirely focused on efforts ‘to make good these losses and to strengthen his country’. ¹¹ Unfortunately, one of the effects of these efforts was the creation of a dysfunctional structure of government that depended on the royal initiative, a problem that went unresolved before the catastrophe of 1806.

In one of his works, Boyen stated that the central issue with the application of military science concerns the principles on which the state's defence system (Vertheidigungs System) was based and the ways in which the leader used it to create a war system (Krieges System). ¹² The term ‘defence system’ was understood by Boyen to comprise all actions taken in peacetime to offensively or defensively face up to the enemy, at both the state and local level. ¹³ The defence system of the state was always to be derived from the premise of the state's internal condition in times of peace. Boyen included four components in the system: strategy, organisation, fortification and tactics. ¹⁴ He described the strategic component as a complete study in the military and political dimension, which allowed for the preparation of armed forces to repel hostile aggression. This required a thorough understanding of the forces of the potential adversary, in order to determine which elements of that force might be directed against Prussia. The peacetime dislocation of armies and initial plans for their concentration and operation also had to be adapted to meet this challenge. Any analysis should not be solely limited to troop numbers; it should also determine whether the troops are on a permanent war footing or if they need to be mobilised, as well as taking into account other factors such as finances and communication lines. According to Boyen, the enemy's art of war was fully reflected in his defence system. He also considered that border and hinterland provinces should together form a coherent system. To this end, it was necessary to take legal measures to regulate the rules of conduct in the event of war. The mass mobilisation of troops was an existential task, so it had to take place in an orderly manner and guarantee the satisfaction of all human and material needs. This required first of all a determination of the shape of the armed forces, taking into account both their own and their neighbours’ positions; to shape them in a way that takes into account the economic conditions of the state and the nation; to determine the form and time at which the armed forces were to be activated; to take care of the country's material and spiritual development in terms of conducting warfare. ¹⁵ This was to be backed up by security measures (Schutzmitteln) at key points of risk, that is, fortresses and fortifications. The system was concluded by the tactical sphere, that is, the science of weapons, positions and manoeuvres, thanks to which it was possible to force the enemy to cease operations. ¹⁶ Boyen clearly distinguished the defence system from the war system, a concept that refers to all actions by which a leader conducts a campaign, commands and uses the means available to him. ¹⁷ He considered these elements to be completely immeasurable and dependent on the genius of the commander-in-chief.

Boyen's point of view in this regard is best reflected by the well-known distinction made in 1817 by General Karl von Grolman, who was the future Field Marshal's closest friend and collaborator. In his most well-known memorandum written in May 1817, ¹⁸ Grolman divided war planning into defensive (Vertheidigungsplans) and operational (Operationsplans) spheres. The former was based on general principles deriving from geographical, political and internal relations. Such a plan defined in general terms only those measures and orders which could be considered necessary irrespective of the current circumstances and political order. Therefore, the plan consisted of preparing the armed forces (regular forces, Landwehr, Landsturm) and adopting measures to support their activities (fortresses, camps and supplies). Regarding the first point, Grolman viewed the maintenance of universal military service as a primary concern, which he regarded as a guarantee of state security. The measures that were adopted to support troop activities included the development of fortresses and fortified points. The operational plan was to be drawn up after the outbreak of the conflict and was to specify how these measures would be used to achieve the objective of the war. ¹⁹ Boyen and Grolman divided the sphere of strategy into two parts: on the one hand preparing the country for war and on the other exclusively its conduct. ²⁰ Therefore, detailed considerations concerning the creation of an operational plan cannot be found in Boyen's writing. ²¹

These views were the reason for the broad presence of the ‘small war’ concept in Boyen's deliberations, which were based on the conviction that the defence of the country was in the common interest of the whole nation. Thus, the old form of training which resulted in a passive army needed to be replaced by a system that produced conscious, creative and independent citizen soldiers. The role of the state in this regard was, first and foremost, to develop a sense of duty and love of the homeland within the ranks. Boyen's concept required spontaneous nation's participation in the defence of the country ²² ; therefore, he considered the state's most important task was to prepare its inhabitants to combat any possible aggression. A constant theme that appeared in Boyen's writing was the conviction that in the case of aggression Prussia would have to initially rely on the mobilisation of its subjects in the endangered provinces, who had to hold off the enemy for as long as possible using small war or guerrilla war tactics. The changed landscape after 1815 resulted in each country searching for a system appropriate to its political order and possibilities. The French Revolution created a ‘new war’, with more troops engaged than ever before. ²³ As a result, whole nations became active participants in warfare. ²⁴ Therefore, it would be a mistake to base the art of war solely on the desire to wage battle. Open clashes were of an immeasurable nature; it was much safer, according to the Prussian government, to prepare positions, camps, supplies and other means of military support in times of peace, so that everything would be ready for conflict. ²⁵ This required, first of all, the creation of institutions to efficiently manage the entire defence system.

Partially Finished Work: The Structure of the Prussian Military Authorities

Fundamental to Boyen's system was the creation of a professional Ministry of War, which finally came to fruition in 1814. This was to be a break from the personal management system that was typical of the ‘military monarchy’ created by Frederick the Great. According to Hamisch Scott, ‘this “perverted system of government” was a legacy of the Seven Years War’. ²⁶ Brendan Simms described the Kabinett system that was introduced during the early years of Frederick William III's reign as a ‘personal fortress’. ²⁷ Indeed, ‘there was no power in Prussia without royal access’, ²⁸ and political authority was diminished due to in-fighting between the king's favourites and advisors. One of the main aims of the reforming faction long before 1806 was ‘to eliminate all limitations on monarchic “decisionism”’, ²⁹ and to introduce a new ‘constitutional system’ which was intended to be an effective structure of the executive and decision-making process, with the king at the centre of the political system. ³⁰ The Minister of War should, in this vision, be the king's closest and most important advisor. Additionally, a professional department, which would be subordinate to the minister, should be created to manage the army in an institutional manner.

Theoretically, from 1810, the tasks of the ministry were carried out by two equal organisational units: the General War Department (Allgemeines Kriegsdepartement, AKD) and the Department of Military Economics (Militärökonomiedepartement, MÖD). After the French threat subsided, Boyen began to push for the actual appointment of a Minister of War. ³¹ The reluctant Prussian monarch ³² finally agreed to the proposal and entrusted Boyen to chair the commission responsible for reorganising the ministry, subsequently installing him as Minister of War. ³³ In accordance with Boyen's intention, the minister was to report all matters that fell under the authority of the ministry to both the military and civil authorities, without exception. He was entitled to deal with these issues whenever the king had no intention of giving an order himself. ³⁴ His role as the king's chief advisor was further emphasised by the granting of Immediatvortragsrecht, which allowed him to address the monarch directly. He was also a member of the State Council. ³⁵

In accordance with its organisational structure as of 28 August 1814, ³⁶ the Ministry consisted of five departments, the form of which did not correspond with Frederick William III's wishes for the institution. Hence, from 1816, the king consistently pursued a policy of creating, alongside the ministry, other institutions that were directly dependent on the monarch: the Corps of Engineers and Pioneers (1816), the Monarch's Military Cabinet (de facto from 1817) and finally the position of Chief of the General Staff of the Army (1821). In the realities of the first half of the century, the second institution was of key importance. After the role was filled by General Job von Witzleben in 1818, the head of the 3rd Department was obliged to deal with all military issues affecting the king. This included the reporting of military matters to the monarch and preparing orders on his behalf. Through Witzleben, the minister of war submitted a twice-weekly report on the military situation in the kingdom. ³⁷ In fact, this department served as an additional ministry within the relevant Kriegsministerium. In the 1820s, due to budget cuts, the final (and long-lasting) restructuring of Prussia's military authorities was concluded. According to the orders dated 31 August 1824 and 3 February 1825, the existing five Departments were incorporated into the AKD and MÖD. ³⁸ The former 3rd Department was directly subordinated to the Minister of War and became the Personnel Department of the Ministry of War. ³⁹ The Ministry retained this structure until 1848.

Seemingly, this situation meant Boyen's aspirations had failed. On the other hand, even after Boyen's resignation, Frederick William III did not decide to liquidate the ministry. Moreover, the monarch's most trusted generals were appointed to head the institution. Between 1821 and 1833, this function was performed by Karl Ernst von Hake, who was followed (at first de facto and from 1835 officially) by Witzleben, who had a great influence on the king. Witzleben was succeeded in 1837 by the former head of the Corps of Engineers and Pioneers, General Gustav von Rauch, who was replaced by Boyen four years later. Throughout this time, the ministry remained the key intermediary between the monarch and the army, primarily dealing with military funding. Although Frederick William III appointed commissions to tend to the most important matters, such as the development of mobilisation plans or the military's use of the railway network, ⁴⁰ the Kriegsministerium organised these commissions and was their most important component. The General Staff was also de facto subordinated to the minister and its head could only contact the king through him. In fact, despite certain limitations, Boyen managed to create an institution of lasting importance for the Prussian military system, which survived until 1918.

Another lasting legacy of the future Field Marshal turned out to be the peacetime command structure of the Prussian army. The first step towards its organisation was the establishment on 15 March 1813 of Military Governorates, ⁴¹ followed by the appointment on 18 June 1814 of commanders (Kommandierender General, KG) in the provinces located on the right bank of the Elbe. ⁴² According to an order dated 28 August 1814, ⁴³ the KG was to be the ultimate authority within the given Kommando-Bezirk, responsible for all military personnel (including provincial troops) as well as the governors and commanders of fortresses and major cities. This power may have been limited if the king himself commanded an army in the region or if the king (or the Minister of War on his behalf) directed a person with special power and authority (Vollmacht) to the province. Each KG was obliged to analyse the current situation in neighbouring countries, paying particular attention to any potential hostile measures, which should immediately be reported to the civil authorities. Finally, in the event of an emergency, the KG was required to issue whatever orders were necessary in order to defend the province, while also reporting the threat and any preparations taken to the king in the safest and most expedient manner. The KG was also responsible for drawing up draft orders concerning the defence of the province in the event of war, which were then to be forwarded to the Kriegsministerium. ⁴⁴ The essence of the KG's mission was, in Boyen's eyes, to play the role of a ‘provincial general’, responsible for all matters of defence in the territories entrusted to him. The assumptions of defence planning presented early on led to the belief that, as a result, centres conducting studies on state defence were placed at both the central and territorial levels. Their role, as the king's representative in the province and their ability to be able to address him directly regarding official matters (Immediatvortragsrecht), resulted in the commanders having a special bond with the monarch.

Although Boyen's intention was to concentrate all authority over the army in the hands of the Ministry, his decision contributed to a break in the system that he had himself designed. Initially, the Verordnung dated 3 April 1815 ⁴⁵ assumed the creation of five General Commands (Generalkommandos): Prussia, Brandenburg and Pomerania, Silesia and Posen, Saxony, Rhineland-Westphalia. ⁴⁶ However, due to the tense political situation at the time, it was decided that only Brandenburg and Pomerania (until 1820) would remain in union and thus seven Generalkommandos ⁴⁷ were created. Contrary to Boyen's wishes, the king pushed through plans to divide the permanent army during peacetime into eight army corps, whose supplementary districts (Ergänzungsbezirke) were to correspond to the new territorial division of the state. ⁴⁸ Unification of the post of army corps commander with the function of the Generalkommando did not take place until the order of 3 April 1820. ⁴⁹ Thus, eight army corps plus the Guards and Grenadiers Corps formed the basic structure of the Prussian army until 1866. In fact, until 1918, corps commanders recognised the authority of individual central institutions, ⁵⁰ for example, the Chief of the General Staff (who only obtained Immediatstellung in 1883) due to the delegation of powers by the monarch.

With regards to the functioning of Prussia's defence system in the first half of the nineteenth century, granting the commanders of the army corps so much independence had a rational motivation. The stretched territory of the kingdom exposed many border provinces to the risk of a prolonged isolated struggle until the main Prussian forces could be mobilised. This was in direct line with the two-phase defence planning that dominated throughout the period until 1848.

Prussian Defence Planning 1815–1848

For the first 15 years after the Congress of Vienna, Boyen's views concerning defence planning were firmly rooted in the Prussian army. The main problem with Prussia's geostrategic situation was similar to the position it found itself in prior to 1806 ⁵¹ and after 1815. ⁵² Territories ruled by the Hohenzollerns, with their limited resources, were surrounded by stronger neighbours that raised the danger of having to fight a war on two fronts. The new disadvantages were the result of the expanding shape of Prussian territory, the lack of natural strategic borders and the border character of almost every province. Troops in some regions (East Prussia, Rhineland) could be forced to operate in isolation for an extended period. In a memorandum from 1817, Boyen stated that the aim of the KG in each province was to hinder the enemy's progress as much as possible, making full use of any natural obstacles in the terrain, especially rivers, and to utilise the local inhabitants. ⁵³ The dominance of Boyen's views between 1815 and 1819 seems obvious on the surface and it resulted, of course, from his position as one of the monarch's chief advisors. His departure did not bring about fundamental changes in this area. Unfortunately, there are no signs of his successor's activities regarding defence planning. These come mainly from the General Staff, led from 1821 by Karl von Müffling, who certainly did not attach much importance to the very concept of the ‘defence system’. However, his actions followed the outline drawn by Boyen and Grolman. ⁵⁴

Our understanding of Prussian thoughts concerning the waging of war with France between 1830 and 1831 is usually limited to Clausewitz's memoranda written at the time. However, there is no evidence that these materials were ever treated as potential plans for war with France, ⁵⁵ although, of course, Clausewitz was called to Berlin as early as December 1830, ⁵⁶ where for a short time he worked with the Rhineland defence commission. The consensus reached during one of the commission's meetings on 7 February 1831, ⁵⁷ which was also attended by the then commander of the VIII Army Corps in Rhineland, Ludwig von Borstell, was similar to the conclusions reached before 1819. The participants of the meeting agreed that Prussia should concentrate 80,000 troops in the Rhineland, whose role was to man the fortresses and avoid a direct clash with the French. The concentration of its main forces, however, would take at least 2–3 months; any decision regarding further action would take place only after this was completed. However, the principle was to avoid provoking the French. Meanwhile, Clausewitz's concept of defensive action was completely subordinated to preparations for an offensive on Paris, which in his opinion was the only means of subjugating France. It seems that Clausewitz's view of the potential war was a little too one-dimensional. This resulted in the merging of the political goal with the object of the offensive, which was the occupation of Paris. This situation meant that his proposals for the cooperation of the coalition forces, despite all his reservations, should be considered a manifestation of the domination of military views over the political realities and actual capabilities of the Hohenzollern monarchy.

A memorandum written by Wilhelm von Krauseneck, which was commissioned by the king in March 1832, ⁵⁸ clearly shows how close he was to Boyen's principles. According to the declaration of the Chief of the GS, this text was a recapitulation based on an unknown memorandum submitted to the king on 14 June 1831, containing two main variants of war between France and the German Confederation. The date of the memorandum confirms beyond any doubt that the plans created by Clausewitz did not become the basis for shaping Prussian war planning between 1830 and 1833. The Chief of the GS believed Prussia should not commit to lead a main offensive in the western theatre of war on its own accord. Krauseneck thus rejected the main thrust of Clausewitz's idea, bearing in mind the complicated process of mobilisation and marches of individual Prussian units. In this situation, despite the idea of the immediate deployment of the IV Army Corps to Westphalia in the event of war, it was to be expected that only two army corps would be available in the western provinces. Therefore, it was assumed that VII and VIII Army Corps would be used to man the fortresses and border areas and to provide cover for the concentration of the Landwehr and reservists. The enemy's strength and initiative were to determine when the garrisons in Aachen and Trier were to be maintained whilst awaiting support from the East, creating the conditions for offensive operations or a defensive war between the Rhine and the Meuse. ⁵⁹ Thus, the Prussian plan of war was defensive and combined the experiences of Napoleonic warfare with the use of well-known canons of manoeuvre warfare.

This was also confirmed by the last action of the crisis of 1830–1833, which was the siege of Antwerp by French troops in November and December 1832. ⁶⁰ In view of the French declaration of willingness to help Belgium, on 3 November Müffling was ordered to form an Observation Corps from the ranks of the VII and VIII Army Corps in order to defend the border against potential aggression. ⁶¹ Shortly afterwards, Müffling prepared an analysis of the position of subordinate forces. ⁶² The Observation Corps were stationed inside the border, and its role depended on whether this was violated. There were three possible variants in which the corps would be compelled to use force. The Commander of VII Army Corps complained about the situation in the fortresses, even when an invasion seemed imminent three to five days prior to the attack and before the concentration of the Landwehr on the left bank of the Rhine for the manning of their fortresses. Although the concentration of the Landwehr would increase the number of Prussian forces to almost 50,000, it was hard to believe that the military infrastructure of the Rhineland could support such numbers. The fortifications, as well as the storehouses of the region, catered only to the needs of the garrisons; however, the additional units needed to be close to the fortresses in order to maintain their defensive capabilities. In view of the considerable numerical advantage that the enemy was expected to have, Müffling concluded that the safest option was to avoid conflict for at least six weeks until the main forces arrived from the interior. Therefore, the preferred courses of action included manoeuvring under the cover of the fortresses along with the Rhine, or alternatively, leaving them unprotected and offering resistance at the Rhine. The choice largely depended on the morale and attitude of the population. In the event of a spontaneous civil uprising, the riskier second option could be considered. However, the former head of the GS was rather inclined to a manoeuvre war.

There is very little data concerning Prussian war planning in the late 1830s and the 1840s. Boyen's views during this period are clearly illustrated in a 76-page memorandum written by him ca. 1833, ⁶³ which in the main repeated the familiar views of the former Minister of War. The very existence of this memorandum reveals the behind-the-scenes influence that Boyen had on defensive matters. Correspondence preserved in his archives shows that on 30 April 1839 Prince Augustus sent Boyen the text of his study, ⁶⁴ in return for which he received a copy of the future Field Marshal's memorandum. ⁶⁵ There are claims in the literature that Prussian war planning took on a more aggressive character at the beginning of the reign of Frederick William IV. Interesting in this regard is a memorandum dated 6 August 1840, ⁶⁶ which concerned the state of the defences on the western border that was written by the Commander of the VIII Army Corps, General Adolf Eduard von Thile II. ⁶⁷ In view of the drastically worsening political crisis, Thile was prepared for a rapid French invasion of the Rhineland designed to disrupt the mobilisation of his corps. The territorial expansion of the kingdom, along with the organisational structure of its army, left Prussia's western border vulnerable to the enemy and open to a repeat of Frederick the Great's strategy in 1756, when he disarmed Saxony after a rapid attack. The only way to prevent this danger was to merge the forces of VII and VIII Army Corps at the right moment. Thile wanted to raise the border fortresses to full combat status as soon as possible, for which he wanted to use troops from the interior. This would allow VIII Army Corps to concentrate on the Rhine and operate in open territory, which would increase morale amongst the soldiers defending their homeland. The aim of all these activities was, of course, to buy time until the arrival of troops from the east, which would strengthen the defence of the province until an army capable of taking the offensive was formed. This short study clearly shows the challenges faced by the KGs in the border provinces, which were to prevent their dispersed forces being surprised and to concentrate them in order to secure the province. Its defence was to rely on classic Prussian plans involving fortresses and the Rhine line, while Thile wanted to deploy his corps in the field and assign defensive tasks to the neighbouring VII Army Corps. Thile was in close consultation with the central institutions, as evidenced by a preserved letter from the Chief of the Military Cabinet, Friedrich von Lindheim, to the then Minister of War Rauch, ⁶⁸ which contained his opinion on the above memorandum. ⁶⁹ In the letter, Lindheim confirmed the conviction that choosing the right moment to mobilise Prussian troops was of key importance. He also stipulated that the two KGs in the western provinces should not initiate mobilisation without the king's approval (in the form of a royal telegraph), which could be sent from Berlin within a few hours. Both commanders were to pause their preparations until they received instructions and authorisation concerning the political situation, and await the royal order to mobilise. It was emphasised that these orders concerned the entire army, for which mobilisation plans were drawn up to secure rapid communication between the individual corps and all points in the country, so there was no need to fear a threat to the Rhineland and its fortresses.

Evidence of a break with this defensive attitude is possibly provided by the plan for war with France, which was proposed by a commission established on 28 October 1840. ⁷⁰ Grolman, who was to author the plan and who played a key role in the committee, found that despite the overall defensive nature, the plan should also include an offensive variant. The existing scheme that included the grouping of German forces was retained, with a division into three armies on the Lower, Middle and Upper Rhine and a reserve on the Elbe (which could support individual armies in whole or in part). The text clearly suggests the possibility of an attack in Alsace, but it is not known exactly what the potential invasion would look like. Another unchanged element of the plan was the two-stage concentration of the main forces. This meant that the troops in the Rhineland would be initially forced to fight in isolation, similar to the scheme sketched during Boyen's first term as Minister of War. The assumptions of Prussian defence planning were still valid in this instance, and they never ruled out offensive variants after attaining a numerical advantage in terms of troops.

It is difficult to assume that Boyen's views had changed when he returned as Minister of War in 1841. On 9 December that year, a commission was established by Frederick William IV to reassess the defence of the north-eastern border. ⁷¹ Details regarding the proceedings of the commission are unfortunately only known from indirect sources. ⁷² The committee's first report was drawn up on 23 February 1842 and was accompanied by guarantees concerning the fortification of the indicated points. The text of the report is not known, but Bonin claimed that the proposals included in it followed the line taken by Grolman in his memorandum from 1817, adapted to the point of view present in the royal order. The king, prompted by the report, issued the first orders concerning the fortresses in Königsberg and Lötzen on 3 March 1842, which somewhat limited the proposal's momentum. ⁷³ Eventually, however, expansion of the two fortresses began between 1843 and 1844, which meant the realisation of an idea for which Boyen and Grolman had been fighting for more than two decades ⁷⁴ and which Boyen proposed, for example, in a memorandum from the 1820s. ⁷⁵ Basing the assessment of the situation on a text drafted almost 25 years prior seems to confirm a very conservative approach to defence by the liberal leadership of the Prussian army, which is not surprising given the advanced age of these officers. They still held the opinion that the area's lakes, swamps and forests and a patriotic population made it possible to think about its effective defence. The consensus of the committee and the concept of conducting operations was the same as it was during the period that saw the introduction of the defence system. The decisive factor in this regard was the nature of the system, which required time for units from throughout the monarchy to be concentrated in one place. The main factor that influenced future modifications of this paradigm was the dynamic development of the Prussian railway network and its ability to transport large numbers of troops, in which Boyen was involved between 1845 and 1846. ⁷⁶

Mobilisation Plans

I fully agree with the opinion of Dorothea Schmidt, according to which the considerable difference between the number of available troops in times of peace and war, as well as the obvious problems with harmonising line units with Landwehr units, meant that the Prussian army required considerably more time than other European armies to achieve combat readiness. ⁷⁷ Aware of the nature of Prussia's military potential, Boyen, during his 1814–1819 tenure as Minister of War, unsuccessfully sought to create a comprehensive mobilisation plan that would allow for a harmonious transition of the army to a war footing. ⁷⁸ The whole process was initiated in July 1818 and coincided with the financial and organisational problems associated with securing the mobilisation of horses, which was related to the ongoing process of the army transitioning to a peacetime footing. ⁷⁹ In December 1818, an inter-ministerial conference attended by General Friedrich von Ribbentrop and Col. Koehler, who represented the Ministry of War, and three advisors from Staatsministerium and the Ministry of Finance took place. During the conference, initial assumptions regarding future mobilisation plans were presented. ⁸⁰ The remainder of its efforts is a collection of materials on mobilisation needs from 1818 to 1819. ⁸¹ Before Boyen left his post, however, the issue of developing a mobilisation plan had not been completed.

The financial crises of the 1820s ⁸² initiated a long discussion in Prussia concerning the size of the army and the peacetime structure of Prussian regiments. ⁸³ There is very little evidence concerning the discussion of the mobilisation plan with the authorities of individual provinces, especially the Rhineland. ⁸⁴ Although Minister Hake was convinced that peacetime was the opportune moment to prepare such a plan, there were still no complete data to complete the project. ⁸⁵ This situation lasted until 1 April 1828, when a commission chaired by Ribbentrop was set up. ⁸⁶ From the preserved materials we know that one of the first steps of this commission was to draw up an exact list of the available horses in the kingdom. ⁸⁷

The mobilisation plan was unfortunately not completed until the outbreak of the crisis in 1830. According to the account of Heinrich von Brandt, due to the illness of Major von Schack (the crown prince's adjutant who was responsible for the work) progress on the plan proceeded very slowly. ⁸⁸ Furthermore, Minister Hake was ill and thus excluded from the work, which necessitated the establishment of a commission on 14 August 1830 chaired by Duke Charles zu Mecklenburg-Strelitz. ⁸⁹ The task of the commission was to prepare a complete draft mobilisation plan as soon as possible, taking into account all the regulations and needs of the Prussian army. The lack of such a document was a visible sign of Minister Hake's negligence; it was also simply dangerous in the face of possible war. The idea forwarded by Boyen years earlier required immediate implementation. Paradoxically, Duke Charles, who was responsible for preparing the plan, was an arch-enemy of the former minister. In Brandt's opinion, the duke was not the most suitable person to lead the work on the mobilisation plan. Although he was a man of many talents and known for his pedantry, his knowledge of the army was basically limited to the Guard Corps he commanded. Meanwhile, it was his sub-commandants in the form of adjutants who were to be responsible for the final editing of the mobilisation plan. ⁹⁰ In view of the anticipated difficulties, the preparations were to be coordinated by Witzleben, who was clearly aware of the limitations of both his own officers and those in Berlin. The situation was disastrous; in August 1830, Clausewitz informed August Neidhardt von Gneisenau of the king's outrage at the lack of an approved mobilisation plan. ⁹¹

The Prussian sovereign demanded the immediate presence of Grolman (then Commander of the 9th Division in Glogau), ⁹² who on 12 September 1830, was ordered to take a 6-week holiday and, after completing all the formalities, arrived in Berlin at the end of the month. Grolman was very critical of the Prussian army. In an interview with Prince Augustus, he stated explicitly that the military system of the monarchy was at present completely inadequate for the needs of war. According to preserved testimonies, the former director of the 2nd Department had little influence on the shape of the adopted mobilisation plan. Perhaps the prospect of the arrival of the most radical member of the army's liberal faction accelerated the process, as the committee finalised the draft plan within six weeks. The document was presented for evaluation only to Grolman, who then returned to his division having completed the task. Unfortunately, we do not know his opinion of the committee's proposal. ⁹³ Due to the draft plan requiring significant corrections and additions, it did not take effect immediately. The papers of General Ludwig von Wolzogen contain a copy of the plan, dated 15 October 1830, which contrary to the title given in the archive, includes the king's signature. ⁹⁴ An identical copy also appears in Gneisenau's papers, with information that the plan was sent to the individual KG for evaluation. ⁹⁵ The fact that such consultations were conducted is also confirmed by Hake's letter ⁹⁶ and by comments on the project by Prince William, found in the archives of III Army Corps. ⁹⁷ The prince received a copy of the plan from his Chief of the General Staff, Colonel Karl von Reyher, ⁹⁸ and he had several objections to its content. These concerned aspects such as the organisation of the cavalry, the locations designated for the mobilisation of troops, reserve positions and spare battalions, and the recruitment system adopted by the civil authorities. Moreover, it seems that the draft plan was devoid of lists that illustrated the need for recruits, horses and various material resources. Local civil and military authorities were obliged to provide immediate data on their potential holdings. ⁹⁹ Work on this matter lasted until February of the following year. Nevertheless, in view of the threat caused by the uprising in Warsaw, Gneisenau was informed on 4 December that the king had ordered elements of I, II, V and VI Army Corps to create a cordon on the border with the Kingdom of Poland. A day later, the Prussian monarch issued an AKO ordering the general raising of the readiness of mentioned corps. ¹⁰⁰ The relevant civil authorities were informed that the order was not tantamount to a formal introduction of mobilisation but was only issued in order to place the units on a military footing within a specified timeframe. ¹⁰¹ Regulations from the draft plan adopted in October were already in place during this process.

The potential participation of Boyen throughout the process is also a source of contention. Amongst his papers in Dahlem, there is an undated file containing a document entitled ‘Mobilmachung der Armee’. The document was undoubtedly written in the period following the outbreak of the July Revolution in France, ¹⁰² as it contains references to this event. ¹⁰³ According to Meinecke, the text was written in August 1830. ¹⁰⁴ Unfortunately, the author did not specify the addressee, which cannot be determined from the preserved materials. Theoretically, it could have been Frederick William III, as Boyen's biographer explicitly mentions that the former minister addressed memoranda on political issues to the monarch as early as 1826, to which the king never responded. ¹⁰⁵ It is also possible that Grolman, a close ex-minister, shared his materials and thoughts with a friend. Therefore, I would rather treat August, as suggested by Meinecke, as the first possible date of the text, which was probably written between this month and October. Boyen had no doubt that the current situation of Prussia drove the need for a full mobilisation plan, taking into account a number of political and military factors. In his considerations, he referred in detail to issues concerning the potential organisation of Prussian forces. ¹⁰⁶ It should be noted that Boyen was appointed to neither the committee that was charged with developing the mobilisation plan nor the war preparation council of 1830/1831. ¹⁰⁷ In this situation, it is difficult to assume that the text was anything other than a private opinion that had no impact on the final plan. However, the very implementation of the mobilisation plan of 21 March 1831 ¹⁰⁸ was the crowning achievement of his many years of efforts and proof of the vitality of the ideas he promoted.

Boyen's greatest achievement during his second term as Minister of War was undoubtedly the development of a new mobilisation plan between 1842 and 1844, ¹⁰⁹ which replaced the now outdated 1831 plan. ¹¹⁰ That document was hastily put together in 1831 and was updated in 1832, 1835 and 1837. This time the relevant committee worked on it for three years. The initiator of the revision process was Minister Rauch, ¹¹¹ which shows that Boyen's ideas were also adopted by decision-makers within the Prussian army. Major Griesheim from the AKD was included in the commission that was to develop the new plan on behalf of the Ministry of War. Boyen considered the accepted concept of mechanisation and full standardisation as a flaw in the previous plan. Too much importance was also attached to the similarity of peacetime and war organisation and the rich supply of the staffs, columns and reserve troops called up during the war. According to Boyen's biographer, despite the modern assumptions in the spirit of the times, he was sceptical of such a schematic construction. Improvisation based on necessity was seen by Boyen as the ideal way to wage war. The old plan, therefore, had two major flaws: it was based on the belief that it was possible to place a peacetime army onto a war footing without major changes, and it also increased the need for human and material resources to an unrealistic level. Boyen also did not like to leave the organisation of the army corps reserves in the hands of deputy institutions even after the mobile forces had departed, which contradicted the aforementioned vision of the role of ‘provincial generals’.

It is hard to disagree with Meinecke that in this case, Boyen's dogmatism threatened the long-established institution of the command district, which could be successfully improved and reformed. The minister also thought that the divisions were too large and decided to divide them into four smaller units, made up of all kinds of weapons, supported by the cavalry division. In this regard, it seems that Boyen did not fully understand the spirit of the new times. Even Meinecke believed that he was still stuck in the realities of the 1820s, considering the defence of the state as conduct of a ‘small war’ and a manoeuvring war based on the conditions of the terrain. ¹¹² Much more important, however, was the institutionalisation of the need for the Prussian army to have a mobilisation plan. This completed the implementation of the idea of a defence system. Although the Wehrgesetz from 1814 was a step towards the realisation of Boyen's ideal of a national and civic army, which was to become the foundation for the reconstruction of the entire state system in the future, the adjustment of the army's shape to the state's demographic and economic potential required the assumption that it would be placed on a war footing during mobilisation.

Conclusion

Boyen's military career ended almost on the eve of the key turning point in nineteenth-century Prussian history, which was the outbreak of the March Revolution in 1848. He left his post in November 1847, receiving the rank of Field Marshal, and died on 15 February 1848 at the age of 76. His death brought a symbolic end to the era of domination in the upper ranks of the Prussian army of prominent participants of the Napoleonic campaigns. The slightly forgotten Boyen played a far greater role in the framing of the Prussian military system than the beloved Clausewitz and Gneisenau. Of course, it is difficult to view the Field Marshal as an outstanding military commander; he was primarily an organiser who devoted a large part of his life to promoting the idea of a ‘defence system’ adapted to the difficult territorial shape of the Kingdom of Prussia after 1815. However, this shape was the price that Prussia paid in order to regain its role as a major European power, which it did not actually have the potential to play during the period in question.

Boyen was aware of this predicament and strove persistently to build a system that would allow Prussia to survive a potential war with one of its stronger neighbours. This required action with regards to the most efficient use of Prussia's population potential, the mobilisation of resources and the integration of the kingdom's territory. All these elements provided the basis for the ‘defence system’ concept presented in this work. Boyen was simply convinced that the overlapping defects of Prussian territories required time to mobilise and concentrate his forces, which in turn meant that provinces left to fight alone for some time against overwhelming enemy forces could not be quickly demoralised. The scheme outlined in the structure of the Prussian army created in 1813–1815 clearly remained unchanged until the 1840s. Despite the existence of bold concepts by Clausewitz, the institutional aspect of war reflection was in fact permeated by Boyen's ideal of defending the country with the use of all its subjects. The lack of offensive conceptions similar to Moltke's art of warfare should also not be used to argue that there was no operational planning in Prussia after the Napoleonic wars. War planning in the Kingdom of Prussia was of a permanent character between 1815 and 1848 but was limited to the defensive sphere and shaped at both the central and provincial level. This system turned out to be Boyen's greatest intellectual contribution to the Prussian army in the nineteenth century.