Abstract
The supposedly decrepit condition of Spain under the last Habsburg, Carlos II (1665-1700) is among the most entrenched of historical commonplaces: apparently unable to defend itself, Spain only survived because others intervened to save it from Louis XIV until its defensive capability was transformed by the new Bourbon dynasty in the eighteenth century. Evidence for this view is found, inter alia in the performance of Spain's armies. In the sixteenth century Spanish hegemony had rested on its distinctive tercios, but all had come to grief at Rocroi in 1643 in the reign of Carlos II's father, Philip IV. Worse was to follow under Carlos, with defeats in Flanders, in Italy, and in Spain itself, where in 1697 Louis XIV's forces captured Barcelona. In recent decades, however, revisionist historians – including Luis Ribot, Antonio Rodriguez Hernandez and Davide Maffi – have exploited the extensive source materials in the Guerra Antigua series at Simancas to question the received opinion on Spain's military performance in the last third of the seventeenth century. In the book under review Maffi uses this work to provide a synthesis which challenges virtually every aspect of a ‘black legend’ about Spain's armies in this period. Chapter 1 provides a narrative of the performance of Spain's armies from the War of Devolution (1667–1668) to the Nine Years War (1688–1697). This broadly chronological and often detailed survey underpins the more analytical chapters which follow and allows Maffi to advance some preliminary revisionist claims regarding the participation in those conflicts of the Spanish armies – and of the Dutch, English, French and Imperial armies. While Spanish intervention was crucial on occasion, the broader implication is clear: the importance of the Spanish contribution to the overall success of the allies on many fronts in confronting and restraining Louis XIV before 1700. Chapter 2 begins with an invaluable discussion of the character of European warfare in the period – one which all interested in that broad topic will find useful – in part in order to refute those who see Spanish avoidance of battle as indicative of some fundamental lack of martial spirit. Not so, says Maffi, it was driven by a prudent wish to conserve resources which informed the mindset as well of Austrian, Dutch, English and French commanders. Sieges and ‘little war’ were what war was about. Maffi then considers the various units which defended the global Monarchy: the Army of Flanders, the Army of Lombardy (or of Milan), the Army of Catalonia, garrisons in Spain itself, in north Africa and in Spanish Italy, and finally – very briefly – Spanish America where defence rested on various fleets. The total number of effectives was well below earlier peaks, but nothing like as bad as talk of collapse would suggest; the king and his ministers were still able to field respectable sized forces – 60,000 men across Flanders, Lombardy and Catalonia alone in 1695 – which often compared favourably with those of their allies. As for organisation and tactics, the infantry tercios were not what they were, becoming smaller – and more manageable – in accord with developments elsewhere, suggesting again that Spain's armies were by no means conservative diehards, but readily embraced new ways of war: typically, firepower was advancing among the infantry at the expense of pikes. The experience of the cavalry, too, was a positive one. The poor performance of the horse had played a key role at Rocroi, but the same could not be said of it after 1665 when it contributed a higher proportion of the total size of Spain's armies; this was a process under way before 1665, Maffi's awareness of long-term developments ensuring that his book tells us about more than just the reign of Carlos II. Chapter 3 looks at how men were raised, and at the contribution of men by the various territories of this ‘composite’ state. Spaniards (Castilians) were still the most prized and on average 40–45,000 Spaniards were serving in the armies noted above. But Spaniards, raised by a variety of methods from voluntary to forced recruitment, not always by royal agents, could not alone suffice, necessitating resort to Carlos II's non-Spanish subjects. There was too, growing use of foreign auxiliaries and mercenaries. Against those who have argued that it was a mistake to rely on these Germans (and Swiss) – not least because when Spain could not pay them promptly, as was often the case, they might not perform – Maffi defends the practice on the ground that in this, as in so many other areas, Spain was simply acting as did other states. Chapter 4 turns from the men to their commanders, challenging the ‘black legend’ of the abandonment of the military profession by Spain's ruling elite. Here Maffi engages particularly with Fernando Gonzalez de Leon's thesis in Road to Rocroi (2008) that from the end of the sixteenth century merit was trumped by a privileging of the nobility in Spanish army appointments leading to a decline in the quality of the direction of the army, and to catastrophe at Rocroi – and beyond. Maffi questions whether merit was lost sight of, arguing that the Spanish nobility, including many grandees, were far from incapable; on the contrary, the ruling elite, men like the marques de Leganes in Milan in the Nine Years War, were able and intelligent commanders fully meriting their senior positions. In his conclusion, Maffi acknowledges that all was not completely well in Carlos II's Spain, suggesting that any weaknesses in the performance of Spain's armies was due in large part to a combination of overstretch – reminiscent of the experience of Philip II, Philip III and Philip IV in the age of supposed hegemony between 1559 and 1659 – with real problems in Spain itself, notably demographic collapse and lack of funds. In that sense, Maffi's revisionist approach to Spain's military reinforces other elements of that multifaceted commonplace about Spain's seventeenth century crisis and decline. Not all will be convinced by this wide-ranging defence of Spanish arms in this period; Antonio Espino Lopez, for one, continues to suggest that Spain was, militarily, in crisis. And in being shaped in part as a response to a negative historiography, some pertinent issues are perhaps neglected: the central administration, the system of supply, intelligence and medical services for the troops to mention just a few. But Maffi has written an important book which not only pays more attention than is usual to some of Spain's fighting units (including the Army of Flanders after 1659), but also – more important – makes clear that Spain remained a key player in the international struggle, as actor rather than passive victim, operating on more fronts than most other contenders in the wars of the period. There is no excuse now for writing off – ignoring – Spain as a military power in the last decades of the seventeenth century; we may also have to reassess the military achievement of Carlos II's Bourbon successor, Philip V, in the first half of the following century.