What should adult children do for their parents?

Abstract

Adult children’s particular obligations to their parents are filial obligations. The gratitude of filial obligations that treats one’s filial obligations as duties of gratitude to one’s parents is a mainstream view. However, in terms of the requirements of such obligations, the gratitude account fails to provide practical guidance. The general requirement seems that children should benefit their parents as the beneficiary should benefit the benefactor. The question is what kinds of benefits adult children should provide to their parents? In some cases, adult children feel obligated to provide particular benefits to their parents like paying their medical bills or spending time with them. While in some other cases, it seems that they can use their own discretion to decide how to satisfy the filial obligations so long as what they do benefits their parents. In this article, I am trying to argue that although the general requirement of the filial obligations is to benefit the parents, there are two kinds of benefits that adult children are strongly obligated to provide. These are special goods that parents can only get from their children and things that meet their parents’ basic needs. In addition, although adult children have filial obligations to benefit their parents, there should be some limitations on the requirements of filial obligation. Namely, adult children do not have a filial obligation to meet their parents’ desires that could only be satisfied at the cost of adult children’s liberty related to significant aspects of their lives, or to meet their parents’ desires that could only be satisfied at the cost of infringing their capacity to fulfil other important duties.

Keywords

Basic needs filial obligations gratitude special goods

Introduction

Adult children’s particular obligations to their parents are usually defined as filial obligations.¹ Here, one thing is worth noticing. Blustein discusses young children’s duties toward their parents in his book,² which seems to broaden the scope of filial obligations to include young children’s particular duties. However, in most cases, when we mention filial obligations, we probably mean adult children’s particular duties towards their parents. Hence, in this article, filial obligations are understood as adult children’s particular obligations to their parents. In the article, I will argue that based on the gratitude account of filial obligations, although the general requirement of the filial obligations is to benefit the parents, there are two kinds of benefits that adult children are strongly obligated to provide. These are special goods that parents can only get from their children and things that meet their parents’ basic needs. The article will be divided into three sections. In the first section, the gratitude account of filial obligations will be briefly introduced. Then, in the second section, I try to argue that the special goods and ensuring parents’ basic needs to be met are two things that adult children are strongly obligated to do. In the last section, I will show the restrictions on filial obligations. Namely, there are some kinds of benefits that adult children do not have the obligation to provide even though providing them can definitely make parents better off.

Background

In the last few decades, much attention has been paid to questions related to such obligations.^3,4 One reason behind this might be that the world’s population is ageing,⁵ which means that questions about the proper treatment of the elderly people who, owing to illness or disability, are unable to live independently and who need assistance to meet their needs, assume ever greater importance. In addition, an ageing population also poses a challenge on the health and social care systems. Thus, issues like whether adult children have filial obligations and what adult children are obligated to do become relevant. In this article, I attempt to address the latter issue based on the gratitude account of filial obligations.

Actually, according to the existing literature, there are five theories of filial obligations. These are the Kantian beneficence account of filial obligations,⁶ the debt account of filial obligations, the friendship account of filial obligations, the special goods account of filial obligations and the gratitude account of filial obligations.¹ Basically, the Kantian beneficence account claims that filial obligations are duties of beneficence based on Kantianism when the beneficiaries are parents and the benefactors are their children. Based on this understanding, adult children are required to meet their parents’ true needs (Miller defines true needs as “human agents must have fulfilled in order to continue functioning as rational”) when requested to do so. The debt account treats adult children’s filial obligations as duties to repay what parents provided for their children. One version of the debt account, the narrow debt account, holds that what parents bestowed upon children is like a loan provided by a creditor to a debtor, which undoubtedly calls for a repayment. Supporters of the friendship account view the parent-child relationship as one kind of friendship and argue that adult children’s filial obligations to their parents are just like duties to their friends. With regarding the special goods account, the supporters tend to believe that the parent-child relationship could not be reasonably analogized to any other relations. According to this view, the parent-child relationship is a special relationship within which some goods can only be provided by one’s parents and children. These goods are special goods. Adult children have filial obligations to provide their parents with special goods because they obtained special goods from their parents. The gratitude account views one’s filial obligations as the duties of gratitude that arise from the fact that parents benefitted their children when they were young. In terms of what adult children should do for their parents to meet the filial obligations, the gratitude account advocates that adult children should benefit their parents.

The gratitude account of filial obligations is not a novel idea (being present in both ancient and modern society).^7

–10 However, in terms of the requirements of such obligations, the gratitude account fails to provide practical guidance. Three views are usually mentioned. The first one is that the whole story of the filial obligations is to require adult children to meet their parents’ needs. Ethicists like McConnell⁸ and Feinberg¹¹ hold such a view. This view seems to ground what adult children should do on the parents’ needs. However, the question arises here. If parents’ needs have been met by themselves or anyone else, will children still be obligated to do something? The second approach is to list a range of benefits that children should provide to their parents. In this view, many of these items do not depend on the parents’ needs. As Blustein claims:

Such duties (filial duties) are commonly thought to include supporting aged parents financially; taking care of sick parents; helping parents avoid the isolation and depression of retirement; preferring advice and criticism, ……, spending time with parents; sharing one’s disappointments and achievements with them; giving parents the opportunity to be with and enjoy their grandchildren.²

However, it seems that in some cases, not all these things are required considering that parents may not need such provisions or children may not be able to provide these benefits. The third view claims that adult children can use their own discretion to decide how to satisfy the filial obligations so long as what they do benefits their parents. However, the question is whether there are some kinds of benefits that adult children are primarily obligated to provide to their parents? These issues will be discussed in the following sections.

The gratitude account of filial obligations

As mentioned above, the gratitude account of filial obligations views one’s filial obligations as duties of gratitude to one’s parents. The typical gratitude model is: that B did something to benefit A generates A’s duty of gratitude. In order to show A’s gratitude, A should do something to benefit B.¹² Thus, according to the gratitude account, in the parent–child relationship, parents are benefactors and children are beneficiaries. It is worth clarifying the gratitude theory briefly. As mentioned above, gratitude is normally grounded in a benefit received. However, this benefit only grounds a duty of gratitude when several further conditions are satisfied. Two conditions, in particular, are important. First, there must be benevolent motivation. Second, the benefit must lie beyond the call of duty. The term ‘benevolence’ comprises altruistic motivation.¹³ The condition of benevolence maintains that the actor’s concern for the people he benefits should be reflected in what he does. It fits our intuition that motivation plays a significant role in generating the duty of gratitude. For instance, if the actor is motivated to harm the person who is benefitted, then no gratitude is owed. In the parent–child relationship, gratitude is owed only when parents were motivated altruistically to benefit their children. Although the benefits provided by parents should be for their children’s sake rather than for their own interests, this does not mean that parents should be totally motivated for their children’s sake. It just requires parents to be at least partly motivated for their children’s sake, which leaves a space for actions that are driven by mixed motives. Allowing parents to have mixed motives also fits our intuition about the parent–child relationship. There is a proverb in China that ‘parents bring up children for the purpose of being looked after in old age’, which seems to imply that many parents’ motivation to have children is for their own interests to be taken care when they are old. Denying that these parents are owed gratitude due to their self-interested motivation will exclude so many parents, which seems against our intuition.

A second condition of incurring a duty of gratitude is that the grounding benefits should be supererogatory; they should be beyond the agent’s moral duty. A supererogatory act is morally good to do but not morally wrong not to do, implying that the actor should be praised if he or she does it but should not be blamed if he or she fails to do so.¹⁴ Gratitude seems not to be owed if the benefits are provided by an actor who has a duty to provide them. For example, suppose Henry is a patient waiting for the kidney transplantation. His physician, Lily, is responsible for the treatment. Receiving treatment from Lily seems not enough to ground Henry’s duty of gratitude considering what the physician does is required by her professional duty. To be sure, it may be that Lily’s acts deserve an oral expression of thanks. But they do not require gratitude in the form of a substantial benefit. After all, as patients, we usually expect to receive treatment from our physicians. As mentioned above, the typical gratitude model is: that B did something to benefit A generates A’s duty of gratitude. In order to show A’s gratitude, A should do something to benefit B. In terms of responding to the benefits A received from B, sometimes it is believed that an oral expression of ‘thanks’ is enough to show one’s gratefulness. For example, if a person holds the door for me, then I respond by saying ‘thank you’. It seems enough to show my gratefulness to the person’s help. However, in some situations, a mere ‘thank you’ or a warm hug seems insufficient. In the parent–child relationship, a mere ‘thank you’ seems not enough to show one’s gratefulness to the parents. As Berger⁷ says,

Sometimes we can demonstrate those attitudes by expressing them verbally; sometimes more is required for the demonstration to be adequate to the situation. Thus, an adequate demonstration of our appreciation and concern for our parents could never be a mere handshake. A kiss on the cheek might suffice for a particular birthday present, but it is not an adequate demonstration of appreciation for years of care, inconvenience, and, perhaps, sacrifice.

This raises the question, ‘why do supererogatory benefits trigger another person’s duty of gratitude?’ One probable reason is that the beneficiary has no right to the benefit he or she receives from the benefactor. According to Peter Jones,¹⁵ rights can be distinguished between liberty rights and claim rights. That A has a claim right against B means B owes a corresponding duty to A. Henry has a right to receive normal treatment from Lily, given that Lily owes this treatment to Henry. There is no duty of gratitude because Henry had a claim right to the benefit. By contrast, the beneficiary owes gratitude to the benefactor when the benefactor benevolently benefits the beneficiary and the beneficiary has no right to claim the benefit. As Joel Feinberg¹¹ writes,

There are in general two quite distinct kinds of moral transaction. On the one hand there are gifts, services and favors motivated by love or pity, or mercy and for which gratitude is the sole fitting response. On the other hand there are dutiful actions and omissions called for by the rights of other people. These can be demanded, claimed, insisted upon, without embarrassment or shame. When not forthcoming, the appropriate reaction is indignation; and when duly done there is no place for gratitude, an expression of which would suggest that it is not simply one’s own or one’s due that one was given.

One objection to this view may claim that the benefactor who is simply acting on the basis of their established moral duty could be still owed gratitude by appealing to the firefighter case. Suppose a firefighter enters a burning building to save someone. Although the firefighter is just doing his orher job, it is believed that the person saved owed gratitude to the person who saved his or her life. In my view, running into a burning building should be regarded as a supererogatory act if it involves a huge self-sacrifice or a risk of huge self-sacrifice. We do not have a moral duty to benefit others at the cost of a huge self-sacrifice or a risk of huge self-sacrifice. As Patricia M. McGoldrick¹⁶ writes,

Neither large, life-endangering, nor even lesser sacrifices for others can be demanded of us as a duty’ because ‘we have duties to ourselves as well as others. Hence, a man who persistently and continually allows others, and indeed believes that he ought to allow others to use him as a means to their own ends, or to demand that he consistently sacrifice his own aspirations, goals, and interests to theirs, fails to recognize this.

Thus, in the firefighter case, whether it is a duty for the firefighter to save someone in a building depends on the risk it involves. If the risk is reasonable, then it is the firefighter’s duty to enter the building. However, if the situation is terrible, let us say, the building is burning, then running into it would become supererogatory.

In the parent–child relationship, it implies that gratitude is owed when the parents provided benefits beyond the call of parental duty. The question is what are the requirements of parental duty? In my view, parental duties are to ensure children have a reasonable expectation of a decent life, which should include some significant rights. Thus, the parental duty should include three aspects: protecting children from abuse and neglect, helping children to become autonomous persons and providing children with adequate moral education. The contents of parental duty are not this article’s interest. Detailed discussions would not be expanded here. The point is that as a moral duty parental duty should not be infinite. By ‘infinite’, I mean that parents are obligated to benefit their children as possible as they can. If the argument makes sense, then what parents did for their children can be divided into two categories: that are required by parental duty and that are beyond the call of parental duty. Gratitude is merely owed when parents did something for their children beyond the call of parental duty.

There might be a view that even no such benefits provided by parents, children still owe their parents gratitude. In other words, even parents fail to fulfil their parental duties, they are still owed gratitude. Because it is parents who provide their children with life. According to this view, adult children’s filial obligations to their parents are generated by the fact that parents bring their children into this world.^17,18 This view seems to treat life as a special benefit (gift) that it can generate adult children’s filial obligations alone. However, in my view, life cannot ground one’s filial obligations because it is not a benefit. The view that life is a benefit maintains that life is valuable to the person who is born, which seems to imply that being given life (or being brought into existence) could make the newborn’s situation better off. This view claims that although some unlucky people’s lives are full of suffering, at least, to people whose life is enjoyable, coming into existence should be regarded as a benefit. As Nils Holtug¹⁹ claims that ‘a person is benefited by coming into existence if, on balance, his life is worth living, and harmed if, on balance, it is not worth living’. He further argues that ‘a life in which the good outweighs the bad can be better than never existing’.¹⁹ According to Holtug, we can make an evaluative comparison of one’s existence and non-existence to judge whether one’s coming into existence is better (or worse) than never existing. Then, he illustrates that if this person never exists, his/her non-existence has no value for him or her because neither positive values nor negative values are created for this person. Thus, Holtug¹⁹ concludes that this person’s existence seems better than non-existence because to ‘have a surplus positive value is better than having no value for a person’.

However, Holtug’s argument incorrectly equates ‘have no value to a person’ to ‘a person never exists’. Based on Holtug’s view, actually, there are four possible situations for a person, let us call her Linda, which are as follows: Linda never exists, Linda exists and her life has a surplus of positive values, Linda exists and her life has a surplus of negative values, and Linda exists and her life has no value to her (either positive and negative). When we say that a person’s life has or does not have a value (or surplus of values) for her, regardless of whether these values are negative or positive, it is implied that this person exists. It does not make sense to say that a non-existent person’s life has or does not have a value (or surplus of values) for her. Hence, to say that for Linda her life having a surplus of positive values for her is better than having no value for her is just to say that situation 2 (Linda exists and her life has a surplus of positive values) is better than situation 4 (Linda exists and her life has no value for her after neutralising positive and negative values), rather than to express that Linda’s coming into existence is better than her non-existence. Just like Nancy S. Jecker⁹ writes,

Yet it is hard to make sense of the claim that bringing a child into the world benefits that child. To say this is just to say that an individual is better off in a situation where she is brought into existence than she is in a situation where she is not brought into existence. But how could this be so? If no person is brought into existence, then no person exists to endure the relatively worse state of nonexistence. It is a contradiction to suppose otherwise, that is, to suppose that it is possible that (1) an individual exists who suffers from being deprived of a certain benefit and (2) that same individual does not exist.

If the argument above makes sense, then bringing a child into the world does not benefit that child. Thus, life alone cannot ground an adult child’s filial obligations to his parents.

Based on the argument above, in the parent–child relationship, gratitude is owed only when parents were motivated altruistically to benefit their children and provided benefits beyond the call of parental duty. The preconditions set by the gratitude account exempt some people’s filial obligations given that not all parents can meet such conditions. It fits the intuition that at least, the ‘bad parents’ are not owed their children’s gratitude. In terms of what adult children should do to fulfil the filial obligations, the general requirement is to benefit the parents. It also follows the gratitude theory. According to the gratitude theory, the general requirement of the duty of gratitude is to benefit the benefactor. This leaves space for the beneficiary to use his discretion to decide how to show his gratitude. It seems to fit the intuition that there is no set list of things that everyone must do to fulfil their filial obligations (what we should do varies with the circumstances). Following this logic, adult children can use their own discretion to decide how to satisfy their filial obligations in particular cases so long as what they do benefits their parents. However, as mentioned above, this requirement fails to provide practical guidance.

What benefits adult children have stronger reasons to provide

As mentioned above, according to the gratitude account, the general requirement of the filial obligations is to benefit the parents which seems to leave space for people to use their discretion to decide how to fulfil the filial obligations. While the question concerned is whether there are some kinds of benefits adult children are more obligated to provide to their parents? In this section, I try to argue that adult children have stronger reasons to provide their parents with special goods and ensure their parents’ basic needs to be met.

Special goods

Special goods, according to Simon Keller²⁰ and Brynn F. Welch,²¹ are goods that parents and children can only get in the parent–child relationship. As Keller says,

There are important goods that you can only provide to your parents (or at least to very few others), and that your parents can receive from (almost) no one but you.²⁰

By contrast, what he calls as ‘generic goods’ are goods that ‘could in principle be received from anyone’.²⁰ Keller²⁰ expands on what generic goods are when he writes,

A grown child may help out her parents by providing medical care, a ride to the shops, or a place to stay whenever they want to visit; and may make sure that their basic needs are met if they fall into financial trouble…These are all examples of generic goods. They are generic goods because there is no reason in principle why it has to be the parent who provides them to the child, or the child who provides them to the parent. They could just as well be provided by others.

For Keller and Welch, (1) special goods, which are goods that parents and children can only get in the parent–child relationship, ground adult children's filial obligations; and (2) what adult children should do is to provide special goods to their parents when their parents need these goods so long as doing so would not undermine the mutual respect on which moral relationships are based. As mentioned above, I reject this account because it seems too narrow to explain adult children’s filial obligations. On the one hand, special goods provided by parents are important but are not the only things that ground adult children’s filial obligations. On the other hand, providing special goods to their parents is not the only way children can fulfil their filial obligations. Even so, special goods are still attractive since there may be a stronger reason for adult children to provide their parents with these goods than to provide them with other goods. This is that adult children are uniquely placed to provide these special goods to their parents. In other words, these goods can only be provided by adult children. Before reaching this conclusion, special goods should be carefully explored.

As stated above, special goods are goods which parents (or children) can only get in the parent–child relationship, which exclude items like housing, education and nursing that can be provided by others. The case Keller and Welch frequently mention is that although the good of having friends around for Christmas makes an old couple happy, the couple will also have the good of having their children around for Christmas. Namely, in this case, the good of being accompanied by their children cannot be replaced by the good of having friends around for Christmas.

Following this logic, one understanding of special goods might be that special goods benefit parents because they contribute to the improvement of the parent–child relationship and being in that type of relationship is a benefit for parents. Parents cannot obtain this kind of benefits from anyone other than their children. As Mills²² says,

…our parents give us only what we can get from parents alone (to the extent at they can provide it): unconditional love, abiding interest in our activities, pride in our accomplishments, worry over our problems, advice based on knowing us longer and better than anyone else, time, companionship – the continuation of the relationship itself.

It seems that some goods can benefit parents regardless of who provides them. These goods must include medical care, shelter, and financial support. The value of such goods to parents lies in that they meet parents’ desires or/and needs directly. By contrast, some other goods benefit parents indirectly by contributing to a flourishing relationship between parents and children. They are valuable for parents not because they can meet their desires or needs directly. Rather, they contribute to the improvement of the parent–child relationship, which is expected by parents. If my understanding is correct, then compared with generic goods as defined above, special goods indirectly benefit parents through contributing to a thriving/ flourishing relationship between parents and children. That would make parents’ life go better. In order to have a flourishing relationship, various things are needed–for example, that each side expresses their love/care for the other. The provision of special goods is a good way of doing that, and it is their expressive role that makes them special. As shown in the case above, what makes it important for parents that their adult children visit them at Christmas is that this is part of a family ritual or a way of expressing their love. Such acts are needed in order to maintain the relationship that is of value here. They may also make parents happy and so on, but that is because they are a way of expressing adult children’s love or concern (and it is that parents are loved or cared for by their adult children that makes them happy). The provision of a generic good may not do this so well, in part because it is generic and anyone else could have thought to do the same (as such it may not express love and concern in the same way).

It seems that although the list of special goods may vary, adult children’s concern is a core special good for their parents. As Welch²¹ claimed, what goods are special goods and what are generic goods depends on society. If in a certain society people’s basic needs can be met by the state or public funding, then special goods would be limited to emotional support since the emotional support from grown children cannot be replaced by other goods for parents. However, in all societies, the list of special goods will contain concern from adult children because this concern is associated with the emotional bonds between parents and their children. That is, in a healthy parent–child relationship, the emotional bond, which is naturally produced by the relationship, requires each be concerned for the other. On the one hand, parents provided and continually provide special concern to their grown children. On the other hand, they naturally expect concern from their adult children, which is special good for them. More importantly, the concern from children cannot be replaced by anything provided by other people as the cases above show. Hence, emotional support from adult children is a kind of special goods and would definitely contribute to their parents having good lives.

Actually, adult children’s concern for their parents, especially face-to-face contact, really improves parents’ well-being. Unfortunately, for many old people, the special goods they look forward to do not seem easy to obtain. According to research,²³ old people strongly expect their children to show concern for them, which deeply affects their quality of life. According to the research, all respondents indicated that having good social resources including keeping a good relationship with family members was part of having a good quality of life.²³ Some people, ‘particularly those who were widowed, appreciated the company and emotional support provided by their children’.²³ Similar research^24,25 in which old people express the desire for their grown children’s emotional support is not rare.

If the argument above makes sense, then, in my view, although adult children can do anything that will benefit their parents to fulfil their filial obligations, they have a stronger reason to provide special goods to their parents than to provide other goods. The reason, as I suggested above, is that these goods can only be provided by adult children. Furthermore, since concern from adult children is always a special good (no matter which society they are living in), it seems reasonable to ask adult children to pay special attention to the emotional support for their parents when they decide to do something to benefit their parents.

Ensuring parents’ basic needs are met

In addition to providing special goods, adult children also have a stronger reason to do those things that ensure their parents’ basic needs are met. Some philosophers believe that the requirement of the filial obligations is to meet parents’ needs. However, as mentioned above, this view seems to limit the things adult children do to show their gratitude too far. By contrast, in this part, I attempt to argue that although people use their discretion to decide how to fulfil the filial obligations, meeting parents’ basic needs should have priority because ensuring those needs are met is necessary if parents are to pursue their goals. By the way, here, my claim is that adult children have a stronger reason to ensure their parents’ basic needs are met, not that they should meet their parents’ basic needs. This means that if parents’ basic needs have been met by others or by themselves, then adult children do not need to meet those needs.

The concept ‘need’ has two forms: the verb ‘need’ and the noun ‘need’. The two forms have a logical connection that a need (noun) is what one needs (verb). That is, if we say that A needs (verb) X, then X would be a need (noun) for A. Here, I attempt to start my argument with the discussion of characteristics of the term ‘need’. First, needs differ from desires. Desires are usually tied to a subject’s beliefs about the object, which is not a characteristic of needs. The claim that I want to have some alcohol to reduce the pain in my back depends on my belief that alcohol would relieve pain no matter whether it works. However, the claim that I need a painkiller to relieve my pain implies that the painkiller really works. This distinction implies that a person who wants a thing might not need that thing. Hence, the claim that children have a stronger reason to do what would meet their parents’ basic needs does not mean they have a stronger reason to do what would fulfil their parents’ desires.

Second, needs can be divided into instrumental needs and basic needs based on their functions. Accordingly,^26

–29 to say that an object is an instrumental need is to say that the object is a necessary condition for getting something else, or for achieving a given goal. As Garrett Thomson²⁶ says, ‘an instrumental need is always relative to some purpose or goal. To say that a person A has an instrumental need for X is to assert that X is necessary for the completion of some goal or aim of A’s’. Thus, in the sentence ‘A needs X for Y’, X is an instrumental need for A because the function of X is to achieve Y. Hence, the value of X depends on Y. So, instrumental needs, like X in this sentence, do not have any independent moral weight considering their value and importance totally depend on the aims and goals that they contribute to. Compared with instrumental needs, some needs’ value depends on their own characteristics rather than their connection to other goals or aims. These are usually called ‘basic needs’²⁷ or ‘fundamental needs’.²⁶ Basic needs have two features. First, basic needs are universally valuable. Namely, these needs are valuable for all human beings no matter what their tastes, preferences, and interests are.²⁶ Hence, things like water, food, and shelter should be included on any list of basic needs since all of these items are needed by everyone. The reason that basic needs are universally valuable seems to be that without them human beings cannot survive. We would probably die or be seriously disabled if our basic needs cannot be met.

Another feature of basic needs is that basic needs are preconditions for achieving any particular goals. Helping people to achieve their goals can be regarded as benefitting them. For example, suppose I want to become an academic in philosophy. In order to achieve my goal, a PhD degree in philosophy is needed. Thus, I can be benefitted by being sponsored by an intuition who desires to provide me with a scholarship. Here, the scholarship will benefit me because it contributes to achieving my goal of becoming a philosopher. However, if I do not have that goal, then the scholarship is meaningless to me. By contrast, basic needs benefit me in terms of achieving my goals because they are preconditions for me to achieve any goals. Thus, without the scholarship, I cannot become an academic since I won’t get a PhD degree. But I can still achieve other goals. In contrast, without the satisfaction of my basic needs, I won’t achieve any particular goals. Based on this understanding, basic needs are important to us because without them, we would be fundamentally unable to pursue our vision of the good. This feature gives adult children a stronger reason to ensure their parents’ basic needs to be met given that without them, no particular goals can be achieved.

In my view, these two features together give adult children stronger reasons to ensure their parents’ basic needs are met since if this is not done, their parents cannot survive and pursue their life goals. As mentioned above, the general requirement of filial obligations is to benefit their parents. If the argument above makes sense, then ensuring parents’ basic needs are met would be the best way to benefit parents.

The following question is how ought adult children to ensure parents’ basic needs to be met? For instance, do children have a filial obligation to provide their parents with housing or to welcome them into their own home (if feasible)? Should adult children provide three meals a day to their parents, or meet their healthcare costs? If parents’ basic need of healthcare is met elsewhere (e.g. by the state), should children focus their attention on other basic needs? As argued above, my claim is that adult children have a stronger reason to ensure their parents’ basic needs are met, not that they must meet those needs. Namely, if parents’ basic needs have been met by others or by themselves, then adult children do not need to provide these items. Thus, if parents’ basic need of healthcare has been met, then children should pay attention to other basic needs such as food and shelter. In terms of how adult children should do to meet such needs, in my view, they still have their own discretion. If parents are homeless and no one else can provide shelter for them, then adult children are obligated to meet this basic need. However, in terms of whether to buy a house, or to rent a house or to welcome parents to live with them, adult children can make their own decisions. Similarly, children can provide three meals a day to their parents if necessary and they would like to. But they can also provide financial support to their parents to cover the living costs rather than directly provide meals every day. Actually, the requirement of ensuring parents’ basic needs to be met leaves space for adult children to make their own decisions on how to meet such needs. The duties we undertake usually have costs. Ensuring parents’ basic needs to be met, in some cases, would require adult children to substantially benefit their parents. As shown above, no matter providing parents with three meals a day or covering their living costs, it incurs a heavy burden. In my view, if we have those duties, we should accept the burden caused by them. Take an extreme example. Suppose David has a filial obligation to meet his parent’s essential needs. His father has Alzheimer’s disease who needs full assistance with daily living. If no one else can provide care services and it is unaffordable for David to send his father to the nursing home, then it is David’s duty to take care of his father at home.

Restrictions on filial obligations

According to the gratitude account of filial obligations, the general requirement of filial obligations is to benefit parents. Thus, basically, everything that adult children can do to benefit their parents is included in their consideration. The list may include providing special goods and ensuring parents’ basic needs are met, as well as other items like meeting parents’ special desires. This does not mean that adult children should provide all the items on this list. Rather, it means that these items might be considered by adult children. In this section, I will try to argue that there are some kinds of benefit that should not be on the list, even though providing them can definitely make parents better off. This is what I mean by ‘restrictions on filial obligations’. In my view, these restrictions come in two types: benefits that aim to meet parents’ particular desires and could only be provided at the cost of adult children’s liberty related to significant aspects of their lives, and benefits that aim to satisfy parents’ particular desires and could only be provided at the cost of infringing adult children’s capacity to fulfil other important duties.

First, adult children do not have a filial obligation to meet their parents’ desires that could only be satisfied at the cost of adult children’s liberty related to significant aspects of their lives. Generally, it is believed that people have the liberty to determine their own life plan and how to achieve their goals. This should not be interfered with by others. This liberty is usually defined as ‘individual autonomy’. As Christman³⁰ says,

Individual autonomy is an idea that is generally understood to refer to the capacity to be one’s own person, to live one’s life according to reasons and motives that are taken as one’s own and not the product of manipulative or distorting external forces.

As argued above, the duties we undertake usually have costs. If we have those duties, we should accept the burden caused by them. Thus, because of their filial obligations, it might not be the case that adult children’s autonomy is interfered with if they are obligated to provide certain benefits to their parents in cases where they do not want to do so. In David’s case, no matter whether he wants or not, he should take care of his father at home.

However, in some cases, the parents’ basic needs have been met. Adult children may want to fulfil their filial obligations by satisfying parents’ given desires. It is such cases in which the cost of fulfilling that duty should not be so large that it interferes with adult children’s liberty when it comes to significant decisions in their life. Significant decisions include, but are not limited to, decisions about whether to get married, who to marry and which faith to follow. Compared with the choice between replacing a computer and saving money to buy a football season ticket, these decisions are extremely important because to some degree what makes a life ours is that it is shaped by our choices on these issues. Thus, in some cases, although I have filial obligations to benefit my parents by satisfying their particular desires, my liberty to make my own decision on such issues should not be interfered with by an external force under the name of filial obligations. For example, suppose Joseph and Kate have a daughter Sophie and the couple did very well in bringing Sophie up. Sophie has a duty to benefit her parents to fulfil her filial obligations. Sophie falls in love with Yao, an Asian PhD student. They plan to get married by the end of the year. However, Sophie’s parents are unhappy when they hear the news. They hope their future son-in-law comes from the local community. It is an old tradition in their extended family that family members are from the same community. The couple does not want to be judged by relatives and strongly suggest Sophie rethink her decision. Sophie feels the pressure from the family. She knows that if she accepts her parents’ suggestion, they would be happy. However, although meeting parents’ such a desire would make them happy, it should not be under the name of filial obligations. Namely, Sophie would not be showing ingratitude by refusing to do what her parents require. Because the requirement has interfered with Sophie’s liberty on the significant decision in her life. It differs from David’s case mentioned above. In David’s case, I argue that he is obligated to take care of his father at home. It may also interfere with David’s liberty on some important decisions. For instance, although he loves his current job, in order to spend more time on home care, David may have to change his job or even stop working. Even so, in my view, David should take care of his father because it is his filial obligation to meet his father’s basic needs. It differs from Sophie’s case because taking care of the father who is with Alzheimer disease is to meet his basic needs. Actually, David has options to provide home care himself or to send his father to the nursing home. In the case, I suppose David cannot afford the cost of nursing home care. Then it is his duty to do all the things himself. By contrast, in Sophie’s case, her parents’ requirement directly interferes with her liberty on the marriage decision. In addition, meeting such a requirement is not a basic need for her parents. Thus, it should not be under the name of filial obligations as argued above.

Second, adult children do not have a filial obligation to meet their parents’ desires that could only be satisfied at the cost of infringing their capacity to fulfil other important duties. A person may have different duties to different people. If adult children are able to provide a given benefit to their parents to satisfy their particular desire and it is so costly that their capacity to fulfil other duties will be seriously infringed, then that benefit should not be the one they consider. For example, suppose David and Molly have a daughter Isabella. The couple did really well in bringing Isabella up. There is no doubt that Isabella has a filial obligation to her parents. As a mother, Isabella has two children. Suppose Isabella has enough money to afford a beautiful house that is strongly desired by her parents. However, if Isabella spends this money to meet her parents’ desire, then her children will lose their primary school tuition fees. It is believed that parents have a parental duty to provide their children with adequate education.³¹ If primary education is not free, then parents might be obligated to pay their children’s tuition fees. Thus, in this case, buying the house for her parents will mean Isabella lacks the money to fulfil her parental duty. In this case, Isabella should not benefit her parents by giving them the house. The reason here is not because parental duty is more important or valuable than the filial obligation, but that Isabella has other options to fulfil her filial obligations such as regularly visiting her parents and ensuring her parents’ basic needs are met. In contrast, in this case, Isabella does not have other ways to fulfil her parental duty to provide her children with an adequate education. That is, on the one hand, Isabella would be morally wrong if she fails to pay her children’s tuition fees. On the other, it is morally permissible for her not to buy the house for her parents.

Conclusion

According to the gratitude account of filial obligations, adult children should benefit their parents to show their gratitude. This is just the general requirement. If the argument above makes sense, then in terms of what kinds of benefit adult children have stronger reasons to provide, special goods and ensuring parents’ basic needs to be met should be considered. The reason for providing special goods would be that adult children are uniquely placed to provide these goods to their parents. In other words, these goods can only be provided by adult children. In addition, as argued above, since concern from adult children is always a special good (no matter which society they are living in), it seems reasonable to ask adult children to pay special attention to the emotional support for their parents when they decide to do something to benefit their parents. Ensuring parents’ basic needs are met has priority because doing so is necessary both to sustain their lives and to help them achieve other goals. However, although adult children have filial obligations to benefit their parents, there are a couple of restrictions on what they are required to do. As stated above, adult children do not have a filial obligation to meet their parents’ desires that could only be satisfied at the cost of adult children’s liberty related to significant aspects of their lives, or to meet their parents’ desires that could only be satisfied at the cost of infringing their capacity to fulfil other important duties.

Footnotes

Conflict of interest

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Hanhui Xu

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