Contested boundaries: The moralization and politicization of prostitution in German cities

Abstract

The local regulation of prostitution in Germany is a contested area of urban politics. In this issue area, morality claims intersect with the material interests of home- and landowners and the security demands of ‘ordinary’ citizens. The Prostitution Law of 2001 has liberalized the legal framework: the legislation ‘normalized’ sex work, triggering the re-definition of urban strategies to regulate prostitution. This article analyses the conflict dynamics and the framing of conflicts over regulations in four German cities. It identifies the main actors, coalition-building processes and the framing of conflicts, and links these elements to the resulting policies. With regard to theory, it explores the relevance of classical explanatory approaches to local governance such as party politics, urban growth coalitions, political culture and bureaucratic politics to the value-laden issue of prostitution. It thereby contributes to the growing academic interest in the nature of morality policies and the question of the specific conditions under which prostitution is framed as a moral issue or as a ‘normal’ subject within urban politics.

Keywords

Frame analysis morality policy prostitution regulation urban policy

Introduction

Urban studies have recently re-discovered the manifold ways in which cities and urban regions address similar social problems and respond to the same policy initiatives. In rejection of over-rationalized conceptions of urban policy making that focused on the impact of single external factors (like globalization or neo-liberalism) on urban politics, this research focuses on the contested and political nature of local problem discourses and the adaption of policies. For example, both the research on the ‘distinctiveness of cities’ (Barbehön and Münch, 2015) and the literature on ‘policy-mobility’ (McCann and Ward, 2012, 2013) highlight not only the variation of urban policies, but also the discursive dimensions of problem definition and policy adaption. The framing and narratives of urban policy have become independent analytical categories (see also Atkinson, 1999; Jacobs, 2006).

In this article, this perspective is applied to a topic that might seem negligible and remote at first glance: the local regulation of prostitution. Nevertheless, the issue of prostitution has gained considerable attention from urban policy makers in Germany as well as in other countries, which is reflected in a growing literature in urban studies (Aalbers and Sabat, 2012; Hubbard, 1999, 2004; Kerkin, 2003; Kingston, 2013; Künkel, 2017; Laing and Cook, 2014; Papayanis, 2000). Prostitution can be conceived as a distinctly urban phenomenon with often longstanding traditions (Hubbard, 1999).¹ Its relevance for a broader audience stems from the fact that the issue of prostitution sheds light on several other urban phenomena that go far beyond the single issue itself: these are, amongst others, the dynamics of exclusion in urban restructuring (Künkel, 2017), its proximity with other urban ‘problem’ issues such as drug use, gambling and street criminality (Johnsen and Fitzpatrick, 2010), which challenge conceptions of public space and a ‘decent’ city (Hubbard, 2004), as well as the dynamics of housing markets (Giambona and Ribas, 2017).

Besides urban studies, this article also aims to contribute to an academic debate that has so far been neglected in urban studies: the recent debate on ‘morality politics’ in policy studies (e.g. Engeli et al., 2012; Knill, 2013; Mooney, 1999). Morality policies are understood as policies that make claims to fundamental values – as opposed to simple instrumental interests. Fundamental values can be manifest (i.e. explicit) or latent (i.e. a policy with moralizable aspects can be defended by instrumental arguments). Under which conditions and actor constellations a latent moral issue like prostitution turns into a manifest moral policy, is still under-researched (Knill, 2013: 311).

The regulation of prostitution at the local level differs from the issues considered at other politico-administrative levels, as cities constitute the arena in which prostitution is most visible and its side-effects (e.g. crime, drugs and procuration) are most obvious. This ‘propinquity’ of local politics adds to the specifics of local governance, which require most theories of public policy to be recalibrated (John, 2009). The local problems arising due to centrally imposed legislation deviate considerably from the political arguments discussed at the centre (Euchner and Knill, 2015). According to Knill (2013: 313), the federal policy process exhibited the character of a manifest morality policy: the costs and benefits involved were rather low, and the deliberations could concentrate on moral issues (Pates, 2012). At the local level, prostitution is entangled with a wider set of manifest interests, with the costs and benefits of regulative approaches unevenly distributed and more visible – implying higher levels of conflict (Wilson, 1989). Problems of public order, decreasing land prices, deterred customers and declining neighbourhoods are all unequally distributed. In addition, the regulation of prostitution lacks a closed policy network and an institutional core. One characteristic of such cross-cutting issues is the casual linking-in of actors in the case of direct affectedness. This has led to considerable variance between the regulatory approaches of German municipalities (Dölemeyer et al., 2010).

Due to changes in urban population (‘gentrification’), new actors and value shifts, longstanding regulations have been contested in recent years (Künkel, 2017; Pates, 2012), where different models of local regulation are discussed, tested and implemented. The so-called Utrecht model is a good example of ‘policy-mobility’ (McCann and Ward, 2013), whereby an international policy model is transformed by adaption in other urban contexts. This process has been intensified by two developments: the liberalization of prostitution by the German Prostitution Law of 2001 (Pates, 2012), and the eastern enlargement of the European Union. The later aspect expanded the supply side of the sex trade, resulting in what is often perceived as ‘misery prostitution’, and has obvious links to trafficking (El-Cherkeh et al., 2004).

This article analyses the conflict dynamics and the framing of conflicts over regulations in four German cities: Bonn, Essen, Dortmund and Cologne. It identifies the main actors, coalition-building processes and the framing of conflicts, and links these elements to the resulting policies. The next section provides some necessary information on the regulation of prostitution and the specific role of local governments in Germany. The theoretical framework is subsequently outlined in two steps: I first elucidate the shift from moralization to rational-interest articulation (and back) in the field of prostitution regulation; I then relate this argument to two distinct models of prostitution governance. Starting from these models, typical frames are derived that will guide the empirical analysis. After a short description of the article’s methodological approach, a comparative study of recent conflicts over the territorial regulation of prostitution in four German cities is presented and analysed. In the conclusion, I argue that the discourse on the regulation of prostitution shifts towards a manifest moral policy when political alliances are unclear or when external events foster new frames. When political coalitions remain stable, a moralization strategy remains marginal.

Regulating prostitution in German cities: judicial framework and local leeway

The relevance of the regulation of prostitution on the urban agenda in Germany increased through the liberalization of federal prostitution law (ProstG) in 2001. Whereas other states like Sweden implemented rigid restrictions on prostitution in the same period, Germany belonged to a cluster of countries that are grouped as permissive ‘regulationist models’ in the comparative literature (Crowhurst et al., 2012; Di Nicola et al., 2005).² Since then, Germany’s legal framework is perceived as one of the most liberal in Europe (Euchner and Knill, 2015; Kavemann, 2009). Previously, German regulation was characterized as ‘permission without recognition’. That meant that prostitution was allowed, but socially sanctioned as immoral (sittenwidrig) (Euchner and Knill, 2015: 148). Since the 1990s, there had been strong demands for ‘normalization’ of the status of sex workers, which resulted in new legislation by the progressive coalition of Social Democrats and the Green Party with the support of the left party and numerous civil society organizations, among them self-help organizations of sex workers like Hydra. The new law de facto legalizes prostitution and seeks the emancipation of sex workers in legal and economic terms, including social insurance and tax obligations (Galen, 2004: 13). The main aims of the 2001 legislation were to enable the emancipation of sex workers, to eliminate the origins of (organized) crime and to establish exit programmes encouraging sex workers to abandon prostitution (Kavemann, 2009; Renzikowski, 2007).³

For local governments, this development impeded the implementation of the rigid regulation of local rules. The regulatory framework is, however, fragmented and subject to the three-level architecture of German administrative federalism: although the legislation falls under the responsibility of the federal level, the states (Länder) specify these laws, and local statutes adjust this body of law to local circumstances. This architecture gives states and local government leeway to enact a variety of policies concerning prostitution.

The most important regulatory instruments at the local level are zoning decrees (Sperrgebietsverordnungen). The legal framework for zoning decrees is explicated in Art. 297 of the Introductory Act to the Criminal Code (Einführungsgesetz zum Strafgesetzbuch – EGStGB; Laskowski, 1997: 113–114). In order to protect ‘youth and public decency’, state governments are authorized to ban prostitution for the entire jurisdictions of municipalities with up to 50,000 inhabitants. In reverse, this paragraph in principle allows prostitution for municipalities exceeding this size, although it is still possible to restrict prostitution by ordinance for certain public streets, roads, parking facilities and other locations (Art. 297 EGStGB). These restrictions refer in particular to places where children and adolescents gather, such as schools and playgrounds (§184e StGB).

These regulations apply to three main types of prostitution: street prostitution, brothels and prostitution in flats. The approaches regarding these different types of prostitution differ; the potential for public conflict is highest in the case of street prostitution, moderate in the case of brothels and lowest in the case of prostitution in apartments (Löw and Ruhne, 2011; Pates and Schmidt, 2009). This corresponds to a process of ‘domestification’ (Löw and Ruhne, 2011), a practice by which prostitution is banned beyond public visibility. The latter does not mean that the circumstances are less exploitable in brothels and flats than in the case of street prostitution; quite the contrary might be the case. In the following sections, I concentrate on the regulation of street prostitution – that is the type with the highest potential for moralization due to its visibility and the challenges it presents with regard to governmental control.

Theoretical framework: regulating prostitution and the activation of moral arguments

Latent and manifest morality policy: the case of prostitution

In recent years, morality policy as a distinct type of policy has attracted increased attention in policy studies (Engeli et al., 2012; Knill, 2013; Mooney, 1999). Morality policies in are related to fundamental value conflicts; common definitions describe such policies as ‘conflicts over first principle’ (Knill, 2013: 309) or the ‘validation of a particular set of basic values’ (Mooney, 1999: 675). Morality policies are represented as highly conflictual value struggles that are difficult to resolve through argument or negotiation (Knill, 2013: 310).

This definition, however, raises the question of which concrete policies can be categorized as moral policies. Much of the literature identifies a standard series of problems, such as issues of life and death (euthanasia, abortion, stem cells, etc.), sexuality (prostitution, pornography, homosexuality, etc.) and addiction (gambling, drugs, alcohol) (Knill, 2013: 312; Wagenaar and Altink, 2012). This thematic classification can be criticized for two reasons: first, it excludes a number of policies that involve strong value conflicts (e.g. social policies). Secondly, many of the abovementioned policies are often not treated as value-based issues, but instead in a more instrumentally rational way (Engeli et al., 2012; Studlar, 2008; Wagenaar and Altink, 2012). From an urban studies perspective it becomes obvious that several of these moral issues in the narrow sense are self-evident urban problems, as they become primarily visible in the urban sphere (Wagenaar and Altink, 2012).

Consequently, one crucial problem in the recent discussion of morality policy concerns the conditions under which a policy becomes moralized, and whether there are other logics of moralization on the urban level (juxtaposing law-making by central government). Potentially moralizable policies that are discussed in an instrumentally rational fashion without moralization will be referred to hereafter as latent morality policies. De facto moralized policy issues will be called manifest morality policies. The key question is thus: when do latent morality policies turn into manifest morality policies (Knill, 2013)? Moreover, is moral argumentation used strategically, or does it reflect a deeply held belief of the actors (Ferraiolo, 2013; Mucciaroni, 2011)? When morality policy is defined as the ‘validation of a particular set of basic values’ (Mooney, 1999: 675), how do these basic values relate to standard interests such as the quest for the maximization of power or profit (i.e. instrumentally rational policies) (Lowi, 2011)?

As Mucciaroni (2011) argues, policies are not moral per se; rather, moral arguments are introduced strategically in order to frame the public discourse - the question of whether normative or strategic concerns are basic for coalitions that become important in urban politics. One can assume that advocacy coalitions that coalesce along certain belief systems are more stable than mere strategic coalitions. The strategy of moralizing issues can be understood from this perspective as strengthening of one’s position by making it ‘non-negotiable’. A retreat from instrumentally rational politics towards moralizing can thus be understood as the calcification of positions and the refusal to engage in discourse (Knill, 2013: 310).

Governance models and policy frames: management versus prohibition

The regulation of prostitution invites moralization strategies, as it is a typical case of moral policy (as defined by its content) (Knill, 2013: 312; Wagenaar and Altink, 2012). Issues concerning sexual behaviour can be found in every ‘listing’ of morality policies; the relationship between prostitution and general societal norms of sexual behaviour and the morals of bodily autonomy is obvious (Hubbard, 1999; Löw and Ruhne, 2011; Sanders et al., 2009). The regulation of prostitution may, however, be framed by various problem perceptions, categorizations of tolerable and intolerable forms of prostitution and regulatory approaches (Hubbard, 1999).

Different kinds of framing of prostitution will be in the focus of this analysis. ‘Framing’ is understood as the establishment of specific perceptions of a policy problem (Schön and Rein, 1994; Ward et al., 2004). Framing is the process of attaching ideas and understandings to social facts and thereby shaping the relevance (and irrelevance) of certain aspects of a policy (Schön and Rein, 1994). This involves perceptions of the nature of a policy problem, its causal explanation and related policy options (‘solutions’). Thus, frames have a cognitive but also a strategic aspect, as they define the actors that are included in and excluded out of the policy process (Schattschneider, 1960).

Two interrelated types of frames will be analysed below: a causal frame (‘what is the nature of the issue?’) and an instrumental or policy frame (‘what has to be done to solve this problem?’) (Schön and Rein, 1994). To improve the connectivity to existing research, potential frames are derived in a first step ex ante from the relevant literature (esp. Ditmore et al., 2010; Pates and Schmidt, 2009; Sanders et al., 2009). In a second step, these frames are complemented by new elements that emerge in the analysis of the empirical material.

The basic distinction regarding the nature of the problem is between moralized and instrumentally rational frames. Moral arguments can be mobilized from several perspectives. Most prominent is a conservative perspective focusing on the immorality of prostitution per se (Anstand (decency) and Sittlichkeit (morals) in the German discourse); in this perspective, both the demand side and the supply side of the sex trade are condemned as immoral. Progressive and feminist moral arguments are found in two opposing variants.⁴ The traditional feminist frame focuses on the exploitation of women as an amoral practice (often in connection with coercion and trafficking). This view holds that blame rests not with sex workers, but rather with the demand side and the facilitators, i.e. pimps, traffickers and other profiteers. In contrast, a more liberal position defends the freedom of individuals to engage in sex work but opposes exploitative settings (Laskowski, 1997; Löw and Ruhne, 2011; Sanders et al., 2009). The first view is linked to a neo-abolitionist position; the second, to a regulationist argument (Di Nicola et al., 2005).

In addition to these moral frames, there exist a number of instrumentally rational frames, as prostitution affects several material interests in urban areas.⁵ These include landowner concerns over real estate prices and negative effects on neighbouring shops, as well as public health issues (e.g. infections from syringes, needles and used condoms in public places); moreover, public order frames may be mobilized due to the perceived side-effects of prostitution, namely drugs, organized crime and violence (Hubbard, 2004; Laskowski, 1997; Löw and Ruhne, 2011; Sanders et al., 2009). I identify seven argumentative frames that will guide further analysis. Of these potential frames, which are depicted in Table 1, three are classified as ‘moral frames’ and four as ‘instrumental-rational frames’.

Table 1.

Frames in local debates on prostitution.

Frames and typical exponents	Core arguments	Typical examples
Moral frames
1. Traditional conservative: conservative parties; churches.	Prostitution is amoral; Prostitution is indecent; Visible prostitution harms children and youth.	P: ‘Prostitution has to be prohibited because it is against morals’; M: ‘Prostitution has to be made invisible for protecting decency’.
2. Feminist: feminist groups; left parties.	Prostitution is exploitation of women; Voluntary prostitution does not exist.	P: ‘Prostitution has to be prohibited because it is exploitation of women’; M: Does not apply.
3. Liberal: (post) feminist groups; sex workers organization; liberal parties.	Prostitution as a ‘normal job’; Strict distinction of voluntary and forced prostitution.	P: Does not apply; M: ‘A regulated market for prostitution offers sex workers the opportunity of emancipations and hinders exploitation’.
Instrumental rational argumentation
4. Economic interests: landowners; shopkeepers	Prostitution leads to declining land prices; Prostitution deters customers.	P: ‘Prostitution has to be prohibited because it deters customers’; M: ‘Prostitution has to be confined to areas where it has no harm for business’.
5. Public order: conservative parties. Organized citizens: police.	Prostitution has harmful side-effects for public order: drugs, violence, trafficking and organized crime.	P: ‘Prostitution has to be prohibited because it attracts crime’; M: ‘Prostitution has to be confined to areas where side-effects can be controlled’.
6. Public health: organized citizens; public health authorities.	Prostitution harms public health directly by sexually transmitted infections (STI) and unhygienic settings or indirectly by side-effects (e.g. condoms, syringes in public spaces).	P: ‘Prostitution has to be prohibited because it harms public health’; M: ‘Prostitution has to be confined to areas where the health of sex workers can be controlled and hygienic standards are safeguarded’.
7. Neighbourhood: organized citizens.	Prostitution damages neighbourhoods and attracts other harmful elements; Prostitution is accompanied by noise and suitors.	P: ‘Prostitution has to be prohibited because it harms neighbourhoods’; ‘Prostitution has to be confined to industrial areas where no direct neighbours exist’.

P: Prohibition approach; M: Management approach.

These various positions tend to prefer one of two ideal-typical models of governance (i.e. instrumental frames) in local settings: a prohibition approach or a management approach (see Table 2).⁶

Table2.

Prohibition versus management approach towards regulation.

	Prohibition approach	Management approach
Basic perception of prostitution	‘Avoidable evil’	‘Unavoidable evil’
Main instruments	• Restrictions in territorial aspects: zoning laws; • Rigid control and sanctions; • Refusal to issue licenses (strict interpretation of business and building laws.	• Territorial assignments; • Cooperative monitoring: licensing and distinction between legal and illegal prostitution; • Social work.
Type of control	‘Police patrol’.	‘Fire alarm’ and taxation.
Moral argumentation	• ‘Decency and morals’; • Negative influence on children and youth; • Exploitation of women, avoidance of trafficking.	• ‘Freedom to choose’: Emancipation of sex workers; • Improvements to working conditions; • Help instead of repression.
Instrumental-rational argumentation	Tolerance zones attract more prostitution and its accompanying side-effects.	Only a management approach can mitigate the side-effects of prostitution.

In the prohibition approach, prostitution is repressed and prohibited to the extent allowed by the legal framework. Internationally, such zero-tolerance policies, oriented on the Swedish model of neo-abolitionism, have been implemented in a number of legal frameworks including France (Paris) and the UK (London) (Hubbard, 2004). In the German context, a prohibition approach can comprise elements of extensive zoning, strict control measures and the denial of official help for sex workers.

In the management approach, prostitution is viewed as an ‘inevitable evil’ (Euchner and Knill, 2015). This approach aims at regulating the conduct of sex work according to standards and rules set by local governments; it legalizes prostitution so long as certain conditions are met and promotes the emancipation of sex workers, pursuing the ‘normalization’ of prostitution as a person-related service in the legal sex trade. In this perspective, the legalization of prostitution allows better control and the enforcement of fiscal revenues for the state. The management approach also ensures that sex workers receive assistance from lawyers and social workers.⁷ One very influential model in this regard is the Dutch city of Utrecht, whose regulations call for the establishment of controlled areas for street prostitution (afwerkplekken in Dutch or Verrichtungsplätze in German) that promise security and control at the same time. This ‘mobile’ policy (McCann and Ward, 2013) is a good example of the local adaption of international policies that will be visible in the following case studies.

Neither regulatory approach is strictly related to moral or instrumentally rational argumentation. Two of the moral frames tend to prefer a clear prohibition approach, whereas the instrumental-rational frames are more ambiguous: whether they favour a prohibition or a management approach depends on the circumstances and the specific preferences of the actors involved. The crucial question for this paper is: which of these discourses are actualized by whom, and which actors align under a common frame. Most of the frames have ‘natural suspects’ as proponents (see Table 1). The frames are not exclusive, however, nor are the actors bound to one line of reasoning. The ambiguity of most frames thus allows the actualization of a moral frame that can align several actors and their main frames under one umbrella.

Methodological approach

The aim of this article is to analyse conflicts over the regulation of prostitution in cities that have engaged in the territorial re-organization of sex work in recent years. For the assessment of these conflicts, qualitative comparative case studies in four large cities with 300,000 to 1,000,000 inhabitants were conducted. All of the cities are located in the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia, which ensures that the legal framework and other regional factors remain constant. The case selection follows three criteria: first, two cases showing shifts towards a clear management approach (Bonn and Essen), and two cities exhibiting tendencies towards a (more or less pronounced) prohibition approach (Dortmund and Cologne) were selected. Second, socio-cultural determinants were factored in by the selection of one pair of cities with a primarily Catholic population (Bonn (39.0 percent) Cologne (38.4 percent) and one pair with a primarily Protestant population (Essen (27.3 percent), Dortmund (32.0 percent) (all data for 2013). As Catholicism is still a valid signifier of conservative attitudes in moral issues in Germany (Euchner and Preidel, 2018), this factor might explain more conservative frames in these cities. Third, with regard to the partisan composition of the city governments, the cities represent counterintuitive cases. Bonn is governed by the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU), whereas Cologne’s municipal government features a stalemate between the CDU and the Social Democrats (SPD), in addition to a strong faction of the progressive Green Party. Dortmund is traditionally a stronghold of the SPD, although loyalties were strained by a political scandal during the period of investigation. The city government of Essen is also traditionally Social Democratic, but the city council is more conservative than Dortmund’s because the Green Party is weaker. In light of these constellations, a purely partisan explanation of prostitution policies can be excluded.

The case studies rely primarily on the analysis of local and national newspaper articles as well as on documents provided by major actors. These include a systematic analysis of statements made by the four largest political factions in each city council and official statements by the mayor and the city administration, the major local business associations (especially the ‘chambers’ (Industrie- und Handelskammern), shopkeeper associations and organizations of real-estate owners), citizen organizations (to the extent that such groups were identifiable) and the churches. When other actors were cited in the press, they were included to ensure a comprehensive picture of the local discourse.

The positions of the actors were coded independently by two coders according to Table 1, whereby stronger and weaker positions were identified. The crucial question is how these positions translated into manifest policies: to this end, the protocols of council and committee sessions were analysed. Due to limited space, not all positions can be documented in this article, so I have selected typical statements for analysis in the text.⁸

Drawing boundaries: comparative case studies

All four cities have longstanding experience with prostitution, but they have developed contrasting strategies to cope with the issue. We find in all four cities a convergence towards the managerial Utrecht model,⁹ a development that was withdrawn only in Dortmund. The changes made in their zoning laws were, however, quite divergent. Dortmund implemented a radical change after 2010, whereas Cologne implemented drastic adjustments in zoning decrees, Essen made mid-scale adjustments and Bonn undertook only minor alterations in the boundaries of prostitution. In the following sections, the discourse patterns in the cities are analysed. The very different roles that moral arguments played are remarkable. Due to the particular intensity of its conflict and the volatile political strategies, Dortmund is considered in more detail than the other cities.

Dortmund: from the ‘Dortmund Model’ to rigorous prohibition

Dortmund has unquestionably exhibited the most inconsistent and ambivalent approach to regulation. After a period of an explicit management approach (Dortmunder Modell), which was perceived as one of the most progressive policies in Germany, street prostitution was banned across the entire city in 2011. The Dortmund Modell, which was launched in 1995, sought to reduce the criminal side-effects of prostitution. It combined repressive measures against illegal forms of prostitution and trafficking with explicit offers of social work organized by the Protestant organization Mitternachtsmission.¹⁰ The city’s implementation of ProstG was an affirmative interpretation of the law that went even beyond its requirements. This resulted in a relatively high quota of registered establishments and sex workers. Dortmund established one of the first controlled areas for prostitution with drive-in facilities in Germany, thereby becoming a reference point in the German debate.

Between 2008 and 2010, the local discourse and policies changed radically, leading to a total ban on street prostitution in the city. This shift was based in part on material interests, but it also reflected a period of political uncertainty and intensified party competition. In 2009, the results of the mayoral election were nullified by the city council and new elections were initiated due to protests against the successful candidate, Ullrich Sierau, who was accused of consciously concealing considerable shortfalls in the local budget. The new elections and the debate over Sierau’s behaviour fuelled party competition. The escalation of the prostitution issue was a prime opportunity to make a mark as a resolute local politician.

The conflict over street prostitution in Dortmund was marked by two dominant frames that served as the anchors of the debate: public order and public morals. The public order frame (typically endorsed by police officials and the city government) followed a predictable narrative: prostitution must be managed or prohibited because the specific milieu of prostitution undermines safety in the affected areas. In this perspective, prostitution is accompanied by grime, crime, drugs and violence. The already precarious situation in the north of Dortmund, a district plagued by vacancy, poverty migration and also open use of drugs, was exacerbated by the presence of prostitution. As a consequence, a CDU councillor associated street prostitution with ‘sleazy houses and a northern district that is unable to see anything beyond piles of garbage’ and a ‘new wave of offenses and crime’ (Christine Krause, CDU council faction, Klartext, April 2013). This public order frame was closely linked to a new discourse on Eastern European poverty migration that was evident in the comments made by the two major parties, the SPD and CDU. For example, Marita Hetmeier (SPD) asserted that ‘Pimps and criminals from Bulgaria need a clear signal that no more money can be gained from the forced prostitution of women and children’ (WAZ, 15 March 2011).

The traditional feminist frame can be identified as a second dominant moralist frame in addition to that of public order. This frame was used especially by the ruling SPD as a complement to the public order framework: ‘Prostitution is inhumane and a modern form of slavery. Dortmund needs no street prostitution’ (Florian Meyer, SPD council faction, WAZ, 22 March 2013). A comparable position was taken by the city administration: ‘It is not our task to promote prostitution, in particular when it is based on force, trafficking or the exploitation of material suffering’ (Michael Meinders, press spokesman for the city of Dortmund, Welt, 31 August 2014). This line of discourse was again closely linked to the issue of poverty migration; as Mayor Sierau stated, ‘We do not want flat-rate street prostitution that is effectively misery prostitution’ (WAZ, 24 April 2013).

Compared to the other cities analysed, this discourse constellation is unique. A ‘grand coalition’ supported the prohibition approach, with the CDU and SPD unanimously calling for a ban on street prostitution using almost exactly the same argument: ‘A city cannot be forced against its will to introduce areas for street prostitution’ (SPD sub-district chairman Franz-Josef Drabig, taz, 12 April 2013); ‘No one can force us as a city to set up street prostitution’ (Stefan Kanitz, CDU district chairman, press release, 1 March 2011). The Green Party and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) mobilized a liberal moral counter-frame in this debate. The Greens, who saw themselves on the side of the law, called for an explicit management approach:

Prostitution cannot be prohibited or ignored. Whether one likes it or not, it is part of our social reality, and therefore it is the job of politicians to enable the practice within reasonable limits. (Ulrike Märkel, Greens council faction, press release, 24 March 2013)

The liberal FDP went even further to complement the moral frame with an instrumental argument that perceived the successful management of prostitution as an economic asset:

The combination of a red-light district, nightclubs and trendy bars could ensure that an entertainment district is created in which prostitution no longer dominates. (Lars Rettstadt, Chairman of the FDP faction, press release March 2013)

The liberal-moral frame was also supported by initiatives for social work programmes provided by churches and other non-profit organizations. Citizens’ initiatives, in contrast, preferred the prohibition model. This was especially visible in the north of Dortmund, where citizens’ initiatives rallied with the local SPD grouping. The strong local contingents of the SPD and CDU formed a dominant coalition and were able to establish and defend a prohibition approach, even against the will of the regional government (Bezirksregierung Arnsberg).

Bonn: incremental shifts towards a consistent management approach

Among the cities observed, Bonn can be described as the opposite pole to Dortmund with regard to the dominant frames and the implemented regulation model. Bonn established a drive-in area for street prostitution in 2011 with the objective of concentrating street prostitution and establishing acceptable working conditions for sex workers. This was the most far-reaching effort to establish a management model among the four cases, with only marginal and incremental adaptations of the territorial regulations, mostly in response to complaints from residents and local shopkeepers. This made it easy for city administrators to continue the general policy by adjusting the time-frame for legal prostitution and making small-scale spatial adjustments. The management approach was combined with the introduction of a ‘sex tax’ of €6 per day, payable by the sex workers at a ticket machine in the drive-in area. The city government hoped to earn around €300,000 from this tax, which would then cover the costs of establishing and maintaining the drive-in area as well as providing security personnel (General-Anzeiger, 10 June 2011). In the first year, income from the sex tax amounted to €220,000 (SZ, 24 August 2014).

Unlike Dortmund, the discourse was free of moral frames. Instead of moral arguments, an instrumental-rational logic dominated. Neighbourhood- and business-related frames were especially prevalent. The CDU in Bonn declared that the ‘relocation of street prostitution to residential areas is not acceptable: it is unreasonable for residents and their children playing nearby’ (CDU council faction, press release, 23 July 2009). Similar statements were made by other party-political actors. The Greens stated succinctly, ‘Residents have complained for years’ (Green council faction, press release, 23 July 2009), and the liberal FDP viewed the first proposed location as ‘an undue burden on the adjacent residential development’ (FDP council faction, press release, 24 July 2009). In addition to these neighbourhood-related concerns, individual (unorganized) tradespeople called for the displacement of street prostitution from the immediate vicinity of their shops: ‘The prostitutes should not offer [their services] in front of the local shops… ;employees and female customers [are] bothered by potential clients, as they are being mistaken for prostitutes’ (General-Anzeiger, 4 January 2011). Similarly, citizens’ groups and students in adjacent university buildings lodged protests. Local students organized a demonstration to complain about used syringes and excrement in green areas, expressing their fear of pimps and their clients and the possibility that students would be approached on the street (Zeit, 17 December 2009).

These complaints led to a slight adjustment of the zoning ordinance, but the basic political consensus for a management approach was not deterred. The CDU declared that they had ‘fought for almost 20 years [for the management approach]’ (Ingeborg Cziudaj, chairman of the CDU faction, General-Anzeiger, 1 March 2012), and the Greens announced, ‘We will do everything possible to create better conditions for the residents, but also for the prostitutes. This includes the establishment of a specific location for street prostitution and improved health and sanitary conditions for prostitutes’ (Green council faction, press release, 23 July 2009). The only groups that pursued a prohibition approach were the civic organizations and students. Surprisingly, they were unable to find coalition partners in local parties or the city government. Also remarkable is the adherence to instrumental-rational frames even by these opposing groupings.

Cologne: new boundaries with a liberal core

Dortmund and Bonn mark the two extreme poles of the examined regulatory debates. The other cities, Cologne and Essen, are located on a continuum in between these extremes. The city of Cologne took significant steps to restrict tolerated street prostitution to certain areas. Unlike Dortmund, however, Cologne pursued an explicit management approach through its Geestemünder Straße project.¹¹ This project was well respected in the professional debate over street prostitution, especially in social work circles (Gesundheitsamt Stadt Köln, 2011; Rossenbach et al., 2009). The establishment of this specific policy mix was accompanied by a public discourse that predominantly framed street prostitution in a public-order frame. In a city-specific quirk, this frame referred strongly to traffic issues: street prostitution was perceived as a danger to passing vehicles. The city government stated, ‘Street prostitution in roundabouts is improper, as it is infringement violation of established traffic rules’ (Cologne City Council, draft resolution 0270/2012).

As in Bonn, moral frames only played a role as a liberal justification of the management approach in efforts to prevent any further bans. These frames can be found across the entire political spectrum, from the CDU to the Greens: ‘The women need to be protected and should be able to work in peace’ (CDU Parliamentary Deputy Verpoorten, Meine Südstadt, 26 April 2012). Accordingly, the management model, which received a positive evaluation from the Department of Health of the City of Cologne (Gesundheitsamt Stadt Köln, 2011), remained largely unquestioned: ‘A successful model that we are proud to show off,’ the city government stated (head of public order office Robert Kilp, Westfälische Rundschau, 11 April 2011). Nevertheless, two variants of this argument were employed in the debate: a concentration model encouraged further concentration in the Geestemünder Straße (supported by the CDU), and another model called for the transfer of the approach to additional neighbourhoods (SPD and Greens). The CDU was able to enforce its position in close coordination with the city government overruling the traffic-based arguments. Again, the strongest resistance came from organized citizens. Again, however, they lacked coalition partners in the debate.

Essen: concentration and a re-launch

In the period under consideration, Essen was shifting from a remarkably unregulated status towards a more regulated model. The former was marked by a laissez-faire approach that was punctuated by unsystematic ad hoc prohibitions. After 2005, the main actors in Essen were prepared to implement the best practices available, in particular the ‘Dortmund [resp. Utrecht] model’, and in 2008 they set out to establish a drive-in area on an old fairground, accompanied by social work programmes. This policy was supported by a majority of the CDU and Green representatives on the city council. Conflict arose between the CDU and the SPD on the location: the former party preferred a fairground in the north of Essen, the latter a space in the western downtown area. The basic focus on a management model was, however, undisputed. Again, moral arguments were used only as part of a liberal frame. Prostitution was characterized as an ‘inevitable evil’, and assisting affected women was seen as the most pressing problem. The SPD argued, ‘Prostitution is unfortunately the less glamorous side of metropolitan life’ (WAZ, 24 May 2008). The CDU focused on the affected providers and neighbourhood concerns:

It has always been important for the CDU that local residents are not unduly affected, and that the women involved can take advantage of support services and are protected from attacks. (CDU council faction, press release, 11 February 2010)

The neighbourhood frame was the second dominant frame, with special attention devoted to the vulnerability of children and adolescents. The CDU presented its position accordingly:

With this relocation, the threat to young people visiting the adjacent youth facility is eliminated. We take the fears of the residents very seriously…. We guarantee that the new neighbourhood will not suffer ill effects from street prostitution. (CDU council faction, press release, 11 February 2010)

The relocation and concentration of the previously dispersed street prostitution to the former fairground was seen as a significant improvement by all political camps, even though the displacement of street prostitution in nearby Dortmund had led to an increase of sex workers in Essen. Although questions were raised, in contrast to the other cities, there were no organized citizens’ initiatives; individuals articulated their concerns in letters to local newspapers, however, and reported harassment in the area. Overall, the group of actors involved in the policy process was kept small, and thus the intensity of the conflict was minimized.

Summary and comparative assessment

The case studies reveal the different perceptions of street prostitution and the (less pronounced) variants of solutions implemented by nearby cities. The municipal idiosyncrasies were based in part on the specific local situation, in particular the demographic and geographical context, but especially divergent municipal perceptions prevailed. The dominant problematization of undue exposure to Eastern European immigration pressure in Dortmund and the related criminal milieu is certainly supported by immigration statistics; it can also, however, be interpreted as an expression of a city-specific ‘burden discourse’ that characterizes the city’s political debates in other policy areas as well (Barbehön and Münch, 2015).¹²

The case studies also clearly demonstrate that the ‘usual suspects’ among explanatory factors for local policy variance (see Davies and Imbroscio, 2009) are only of limited help in clarifying the differences observed. Party ideology played only a minor role with regard to the regulation of prostitution, since clear partisan position lines did not emerge; the two major parties took no fixed party positions, and the opposition consistently employed a progressive liberal frame. With the important exception of Dortmund, political conflicts arose less between the parties than between politicians on the one hand and citizens and the administration on the other. Citizens’ initiatives were only successful, however, when they were able to find coalition partners in political parties.

Contrary to what might be expected from urban regime theory, organized interests and businesses were of negligible importance. There was no obvious participation in the debates by business organizations, with the exception of individual tradespeople. The role of the churches was also interesting and counterintuitive. Church organizations, both the Protestant Mitternachtsmission in Dortmund and the Catholic women’s social workers in Cologne, refrained from utilizing any moral frame, instead adopting a pragmatic approach of concrete assistance in accordance with the principle of charity. Here, as in other areas of social work and health care, we can observe a decoupling of basic ecclesiastical organizations from an orthodox interpreted faith base (Grohs, 2014).

The importance of municipal administrations for problem definition and the development of possible solutions were significant. The dominant coalitions in the urban discourse always included the relevant actors from the administrations, especially officials from the departments responsible for public order. They never argued morally, but instead generally made technical points with reference to public order or public health. Their recognition and legitimacy was based on their perceived ability to maintain order. Latent moral arguments encountered a specific instrumentally rational component of local politics, namely the fundamental interest of local politicians to ‘restore order’ (Hubbard, 2004). Heads of local governments (in the German context, the directly elected mayors in particular, but also individual heads of department and professional office managers) can use the debate over prostitution to demonstrate their ability to ‘clean up’ the city.

Which of the actors formed coalitions was highly contingent on local situational factors, and coalition building varied considerably across the cities. Nevertheless, some contextual factors help to explain the empirically identified coalitions and the triggering of conflicts. Prostitution has a long history in German cities. Often, there are longstanding arrangements between local authorities (including city governments, the police and tax authorities), citizens and the ‘milieu’ of providers (Löw and Ruhne, 2011; Künkel, 2017). These developed path dependencies frequently operate without any ‘moralization’ of the issue. Building on historical institutionalism (Thelen, 2003), three main factors can be used to explain the dissolution of such traditional coalitions.

First, a change in the political majority may lead to uncertainty about future regulations, and the players must therefore reposition themselves. This repositioning opens up the possibility of re-moralization (uncertainty hypothesis). In Dortmund, the regulatory change was initiated in a period of political uncertainty and stalemate. In the course of the mayoral election, a kind of regulatory competition between the two major parties developed, clearly following the logic of ‘cleaning up’ outlined above. Secondly, changes in the demographics of residents and the local economy can lead to a reassessment of existing approaches (urban development hypothesis). This mechanism played a definite role in the more incremental approaches reassessing the restricted area boundaries in Bonn, Cologne and Essen. Thirdly, changes on the supply side of the sex trade can lead to a reframing of the discourse, as can be shown for new (primarily Eastern European) groups of providers (sex-market hypothesis). It is noteworthy that this issue was communicated intensively only in Dortmund, in part underpinned by obvious racist stereotypes. Although the other cities were affected by similar developments – especially following the ban on street prostitution in Dortmund – arguments of the Dortmund type played only a subordinate role.

Conclusions: morality policy goes local

This article tried to bring together debates on urban politics and morality policy. The raising awareness in urban studies for the idiosyncrasies of urban problem discourses and the distinctiveness and selectivity of the reception of national and global policy frames invites studies such as this. First, it showed that national and local problem discourses differ substantially in the relationship between instrumental and moral arguments: recent policy research has devoted increased attention to the specifics of morality policies. We presented evidence that, in an urban context, moral argumentation is less pronounced. The direct affectedness of problem constellations renders room for instrumental disputes. Compared to the issues frequently raised in policy studies on morality policies, the absence of moral arguments in local regulatory debates over prostitution is striking, considering the obvious presence of moral issues at stake. The local debates in Dortmund, Bonn, Cologne and Essen were dominated by instrumentally rational frames. From the repertoire of moral frames, only the liberal frame can be identified in all cases. Other moral frames were found only in Dortmund where – in the classical feminist tradition – the exploitation of the providers was addressed. Given the prevalence of this frame in the national media (Euchner and Knill, 2015), the absence of this mode of perception in the urban discourse of Bonn, Essen and Cologne is notable and could be interpreted as an expression of pragmatism at the local political level. In the specific arena of local politics, moral policies are typically discussed in a more instrumentally rational fashion than on higher political levels; in local spaces, moral policies are relatively latent. A comparison to other moral policies is promising area for future investigation. Anecdotal evidence on typical issues of ‘morality policy’ at the local level, such as drug use, drug substitution, drinking bans and the regulation of amusement arcades or sex shops can be expected to show similar patterns, which once more reveals the distinctiveness of the local level and urban politics.

Secondly, it shows that moral arguments are not completely absent, but are mediated by an notion of popular or ‘everyday’ morality, which does not refer to highbrow ethical debates, but more to an ‘ethic of visibility’: behaviour that is rated immoral by considerable parts of the local population is uncontested so long as it is hidden by the built environment and remoteness.

Thirdly, the case studies show that a moralization of the prostitution issue happens in times of a general political contestation, when political actors shift from a phase of ‘normal’ policy making to the election campaign mode (from ‘policy seeking’ to ‘vote seeking’ (Strom, 1990), moral arguments).

Footnotes

Notes

ORCID iD

Stephan Grohs

References

Aalbers

Sabat

(2012) Remaking a landscape of prostitution: The Amsterdam red light district. City 16(1–2): 112–128.

Atkinson

(1999) Discourses of partnership and empowerment in contemporary British urban regeneration. Urban Studies 36(1): 59–72.

Barbehön

Münch

(2015) The ‘distinctiveness of cities’ and distinctions in cities: Boundaries of belonging in comparative perspective. Urban Research & Practice 9(1): 37–55.

Bundesgesetzblatt (2016) Gesetz zur Regulierung des Prostitutionsgewerbes sowie zum Schutz in der Prostitution tätiger Personen [Law on the regulation of prostitution-businesses and the protection of persons engaged in prostitution]. Bundesgesetzblatt 50: 2372-2383

Crowhurst

Outshoorn

Skilbrei

M-L

(2012) Introduction: Prostitution policies in Europe. Sexuality Research and Social Policy 9(3): 187–191.

Davies

Imbroscio

(2009) Theories of Urban Politics. Los Angeles, CA: SAGE.

Di Nicola

Orfano

Cauduro

Conci

(2005) Study on National Legislation on Prostitution and the Trafficking in Women and Children. Trento: Università degli Studi di Trento.

Ditmore

Levy

Willman

(2010) Sex Work Matters: Exploring Money, Power, and Intimacy in the Sex Industry. London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Dölemeyer

Pates

Schmidt

(2010) Deviant girls, small-scale entrepreneurs, and the regulation of German sex workers. In: Ditmore

Levy

Willman (eds) Sex Work Matters: Exploring Money, Power, and Intimacy in the Sex Industry. London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 184–202.

10.

El-Cherkeh

Stirbu

Lazaroiu

Dragos

(2004) EU-enlargement, migration and trafficking in women: The case of South Eastern Europe. HWWA-Report No. 247. Hamburg: Hamburg Institute of International Economics.

11.

Engeli

Green-Pedersen

Thorup Larsen

(2012) Morality Politics in Western Europe: Parties, Agendas and Policy Choices. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

12.

Euchner

E-M

Knill

(2015) Prostitution: Sin, unavoidable evil or recognized profession? In: Knill

Adam

Hurka

(eds) On the Road to Permissiveness? Change and Convergence of Moral Regulation in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 129-157.

13.

Euchner

E-M

Preidel

(2018) Dropping the curtain: The religious-secular party cleavage in German morality politics. Religion and Politics 11(2): 221–248.

14.

Ferraiolo

(2013) Is state gambling policy “morality policy”?: Framing debates over state lotteries. Policy Studies Journal 41(2): 217–242.

15.

Galen

(2004) Rechtsfragen der Prostitution: Das Prostitutionsgesetz und seine Auswirkungen [Legal questions on prostitution: The prostitution law and its impacts]. München: Beck.

16.

Gesundheitsamt Stadt Köln (2011) Zehn Jahre Straßenstrich “Geestemünder Straße” in Köln [Ten years street curb ‘Geestemünder’ Street in Cologne] . Köln: Stadt Köln.

17.

Giambona

Ribas

(2017) Unveiling the price of obscenity: Evidence from closing prostitution windows in the Netherlands. SSRN working paper 2994037 (June 2017) Rochester: SSRN.

18.

Grohs

(2014) Hybrid organizations in social service delivery in quasimarkets: The case of Germany. American Behavioral Scientist 58(11): 1425–1445.

19.

Hubbard

(1999) Sex and the City: Geographies of Prostitution in the Urban West. Aldershot: Ashgate.

20.

Hubbard

(2004) Cleansing the metropolis: Sex work and the politics of zero tolerance. Urban Studies 41(9): 1687–1702.

21.

Jacobs

(2006) Discourse analysis and its utility for urban policy research. Urban Policy and Research 24(1): 39–52.

22.

John

(2009) Why study urban politics? In: Davies

Imbroscio

(eds) Theories of Urban Politics. Los Angeles, CA: SAGE, pp. 17–24.

23.

Johnsen

Fitzpatrick

(2010) Revanchist sanitisation or coercive care? The use of enforcement to combat begging, street drinking and rough sleeping in England. Urban Studies 47(8): 1703–1723.

24.

Kavemann

(2009) Das deutsche Prostitutionsgesetz im europäischen Vergleich [The German prostitution law in a European comparison]. In: Kavemann

(eds) Das Prostitutionsgesetz [The prostitution law]. Opladen: Budrich, pp. 13–34.

25.

Kerkin

(2003) Re-placing difference. Planning and street sex work in a gentryfiing area. Urban Policy and Research 21(2): 137-149.

26.

Kingston

(2013) Prostitution in the Community: Attitudes, Action and Resistance. New York: Routledge.

27.

Knill

(2013) The study of morality policy: Analytical implications from a public policy perspective. Journal of European Public Policy 20(3): 309–317.

28.

Künkel

(2017) Gentrification and the flexibilisation of spatial control: Policing sex work in Germany. Urban Studies 54(3): 730–746.

29.

Laing

Cook

(2014) Governing sex work in the city. Geography Compass 8(8): 505–515.

30.

Laskowski

(1997) Die Ausübung der Prostitution: Ein verfassungsrechtlich geschützter Beruf [The practice of prostitution: A constitutionally protected profession]. Frankfurt am Main: Lang.

31.

Löw

Ruhne

(2011) Prostitution: Herstellungsweisen einer anderen Welt [Prostitution: Modes of production of another world]. Berlin: Suhrkamp.

32.

Lowi

(2011) Foreword: New dimensions in policy and politics. In: Tatalovich

Daynes

(eds) Moral Controversies in American Politics. Armonk, New York: Sharpe, pp. xii-xvii.

33.

McCann

Ward

(2012) Policy assemblages, mobilities and mutations. Toward a multidisciplinary conversation. Political Studies Review 10(3): S325–S332.

34.

McCann

Ward

(2013) A multi-disciplinary approach to policy transfer research. Geographies, assemblages, mobilities and mutations. Policy Studies 34(1): S2–S18.

35.

Mooney

(1999) The politics of morality policy. Policy Studies Journal 27(4): 675–680.

36.

Mucciaroni

(2011) Are debates about “morality policy” really about morality?: Framing opposition to gay and lesbian rights. Policy Studies Journal 39(2): 187–216.

37.

O’Neill

(2001) Prostitution and Feminism. Cambridge: Polity Press.

38.

Papayanis

(2000) Sex and the revanchist city: Zoning out pornography in New York. Environment and Planning D 18(3): 341–353.

39.

Pates

(2012) Liberal laws juxtaposed with rigid control: An analysis of the logics of governing sex work in Germany. Sexuality Research and Social Policy 9(3): 212–222.

40.

Pates

Schmidt

(2009) Die Verwaltung der Prostitution: Eine vergleichende Studie am Beispiel deutscher, polnischer und tschechischer Kommunen [The administration of prostitution: A comparative study on German, Polish, and Czech communitites]. Bielefeld: Transcript.

41.

Renzikowski

(2007) Reglementierung von Prostitution: Ziele und Probleme - eine kritische Betrachtung des Prostitutionsgesetzes [The reglementation of prostitution: Aims and problems - a critical reflection on the prostitution law]. Berlin: BMFSFJ.

42.

Rossenbach

Kleine

Wiedenau

(2009) Geestemünder Straße – Neue Strategien zur Unterstützung für Straßenprostituierte[Geestemünder Street - New strategies for the support of street sex workers]. In: Kavemann

(ed) Das Prostitutionsgesetz [The prostitution law]. Opladen: Budrich, pp. 265-285.

43.

Sanders

Pitcher

O’Neill

(2009) Prostitution: Sex Work, Policy and Politics. London; Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

44.

Schattschneider

(1960) The Semi-Sovereign People. New York: Hold.

45.

Schön

Rein

(1994) Frame Reflection: Toward the Resolution of Intractable Policy Controversies. New York: Basic Books.

46.

Strom

(1990) A behavioral theory of competitive political parties. American Journal of Political Science 34(2): 565–598.

47.

Studlar

(2008) U.S. tobacco control: Public health, political economy, or morality policy? Review of Policy Research 25(5): 393–410.

48.

Thelen

(2003) How institutions evolve: Insights from comparative-historical analysis. In: Mahoney

Rueschemeyer

(eds) Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 208-240.

49.

Wagenaar

Altink

(2012) Prostitution as morality politics or why it is exceedingly difficult to design and sustain effective prostitution policy. Sexuality Research and Social Policy 9(3): 279–292.

50.

Ward

Donaldson

Lowe

(2004) Policy framing and learning the lessons from the UK’s foot and mouth disease crisis. Environment and Planning C 22(2): 291–306.

51.

Wilson

(1989) Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. New York: Basic Books.