State of the Regional Integration Within South Asian Association for Regional Organisation (SAARC): Assessment of India’s Leadership

Abstract

South Asia is one of the least integrated regions in terms of trade and people-to-people contact. With the goal of promoting regionalism, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was founded in 1985 and now has eight South Asian countries as a member (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka). India alone controls more than 80% of all variables, including economy, size, and population. Thus, the entire regional integration of South Asia has been and will continue to be dependent on India’s intentions regarding SAARC. As a result of several bilateral disagreements between the organisation’s member states, the SAARC has been dubbed a dysfunctional, talk-shop, and dead organisation. Having said that, this article aims to investigate the role of India as a regional leader as well as its intention and approach towards South Asian integration. Similarly, this document also assesses the effect of India’s leadership on the regional integration of South Asia. This article is based on the qualitative method of research and thus uses discourse analysis as the main methodology. As primary sources, discourse analyses in international relations often examine official speeches, declarations, legislative debates, diplomatic documents, interviews, newspapers, and editorials. Other scholarly works, novels, and conceptual histories can be analysed in addition to these.

Keywords

South Asia Regionalism South Asian Integration SAARC Leadership

Introduction

One of the most active and diversified regions on earth is South Asia. The region has a unique identity thanks to a shared regional theme as well as cultural, linguistic, geographical, and economic variety. Their economies have shown remarkable resilience and strength in the face of many global slowdowns, proving their importance for global economic growth. Despite the many potentialities that the region holds, it remains one of the less explored and integrated areas of the world. Thus, regionalism in South Asia has a very mixed perception.

In order to promote regional collaboration, regionalism is as such a manifestation of specific regional arrangements in a variety of economic, social, cultural, and political groupings. These regional organisations are starting to work and are developing a new environment for global economic and political engagement. Regional integration offers methods for resolving disputes in clearly defined geographic areas as well as opportunities for achieving shared foreign policy goals in a regional setting. Additionally, it offers a system for fusion and unification that fosters community development (Mohanan, 1992). However, the economic component of a regional agreement holds the top spot for interdependence among the participating nations. The most prevalent tendency in today’s globe is the idea of regionalism. The importance of regional arrangements has grown for global political and economic engagement. Regional organisations around the world give countries a forum to increase their influence in international affairs. Other regional organisations around the world are inspired by the European Union (EU), which is a success story for European regional agreements and regional economic integration.

The new political map split peoples when most of the South Asian region was decolonised in 1947. The area ended up being among the most economically destabilised places on earth. After numerous attempts to resolve these concerns through bilateral connections, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), a regional organisation, was established in 1985 (Aryal & Nair, 2021). Seven nations formerly made up the SAARC: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Bhutan, and India. In 2005, Afghanistan joined. There are nine observers in the SAARC, including the USA, China, Japan and the EU. The SAARC’s founders sought to increase intra-regional commerce and investment at the time, drawing inspiration from other successful regional organisations like the Association of SouthEast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the EU. The SAARC was thought to be inefficient. The SAARC was established to safeguard regional citizens’ welfare, boost trade, and advance regional cooperation and peace. All of the member states were dealing with issues including poverty, terrorism, extremism, social unrest, etc (Haran, 2018). On the broader dimension, SAARC not only has an issue concerning internal components but also has many inter-state complexities such as border disputes, ethics and religious clashes. Due to the giant size and associated disputes with almost all the small states in South Asia, India’s approach to SAARC remains one of the main factors that anchor regionalism.

India’s ‘willingness’ and ‘capacity’ to assume more international obligations is contested, like that of other emerging nations (Acharya, 2011). However, there have been several instances where India has actively contributed to global governance in areas like international trade talks and climate change (Narlikar, 2017; Saran, 2012). The paradox of India’s ascent is that while its influence in global governance is clearly moving in a favourable direction, regional governance is still firmly rooted in geopolitics. South Asia is a region where SAARC, a pan-South Asian organisation, has existed for more than three decades yet has yet to implement a single all-SAARC initiative (Yhome & Maini, 2021). Following PMModi’s request to have a virtual meeting via video to establish a regional strategy in tackling the fast-spreading coronavirus, India led from the front in organising the first SAARC meeting in years on March 15, 2020. He suggested that the ‘leadership of SAARC nations devise a strong strategy to combat coronavirus (Mishra, 2020)’. This effort signals the need for a fully functional regional organisation specially in times of crisis, but it also remains as a one-time thing. While the SAARC remained dysfunctional and unexplored, India’s willingness to move toward other regional and multilateral organisations somehow questions India’s potential as a leader.

Having said that, this article aims to make an assessment of the leadership role played by India within SAARC. India’s role from the start of the SAARC has been a mixture of reluctance and scepticism. To make such an assessment this article posed two questions: (a) What is the current state of regional integration in South Asia? (b) What is India’s approach to SAARC?

Methodologically, this article relies on primary and secondary resources. While the primary date refers to SAARC charter, Ministry of External/Foreign Affairs, Newspaper articles and the secondary data refers to the scholarly articles on the subject of studies. Based on those resources the assessment has been made to draw a conclusion.

Understanding of Regionalism and SAARC

Scholars of international relations and actors in the international system define the global system as a cluster. There are several subsystems which are mainly defined based on categorisation under geopolitics. These subsystems are often called ‘regions’ due to their nature of power balance equations and shaping socio-economic and political dynamics in the international arena (Destradi, 2010). Regionalism is an outcome as ‘the expression of a shared identity and purpose’ (Bloor, 2022). Regionalism can define itself as an ideology that combines the development of a unique or particular identity (or multiple), political affiliation, and economic features. These characteristics seek to increase the power, influence, and self-determination of the region or subregion to another via practice. Longley (2021) argued that ‘Regionalism is the development of political and economic systems based on loyalty to distinct geographic regions. Regionalism often results in formal political or economic arrangements between groups of countries intended to achieve common goals’. But Cantori and Spiegel (1969) defined that ‘region shares a social, political, economic or organisational background or activity among a group of states’ which emerges as a central focus in international relations.

Börzel (2016) theorised regionalism through three areas; cooperation, integration, and governance. In the last decades, regionalism ‘experienced the delegation of more political authority and policy competencies. The ideology of regionalism aspires to regional cooperation and integration that has been spread across time and space due to geopolitical constraints. Regionalism is mainly referred to as the building of state-led formal institutions that play the role of a supranational actor in a region. We have an example of European Integration as the EU and Southeast Asian Integration as the ASEAN. These two regional organisations are considered one of the most successful examples of regionalism in terms of economic prosperity and security. Regional integration and cooperation are inspired by several theories mainly dominated by the international political economy (IPE) to foster trade liberalisation, regional development, and settlement of interstate disputes over easy access to markets between states. The main goal drives to establish and effectiveness of preferential and free trade areas (PTA and FTA). The driving factor of regionalism is theory and mainly those are liberal intergovernmentalism, neo-functionalism, and multi-level governance approaches.

Moreover, Barbieri (2019) delimits regionalism beyond promoting market liberalisation or preventing interstate conflicts due to the growing complexity of international relations. Global power is shifting, so regional experiences are also going through ‘variety and complexity of the developmental paths. So, similar Western norms and standards cannot be applied in other parts of the world. Particularly when the rest is facing different kinds of problems than the West, compared to them, they have only the most important task of political and economic weight to maintain integrity’. West made ‘regionalism a more suitable tool to address the broad set of problems that arise in various fields’. South Asia is a similar example of regionalism as Barbieri described after the rise of the South shaped a power shift. India is a growing economy and one of the key players in the world. The size and rise of India influence the geopolitics of South Asia. The establishment of SAARC is also an outcome of its leadership initiative. First, we need to take a snapshot of SAARC and its historical attempt at regional integration of South Asia.

South Asia is a region consisting of eight countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. There is always some sort of controversy over whether Afghanistan should be treated as a part of South Asia region or not, which sometimes brings serious debate. When Afghanistan became a full member (eighth) of SAARC in 2007, the debate was no longer relevant (Sharma, 2011; Zajaczkowski, 2015). But the history of South Asian regionalism can be traced to the 1980s. Initially, the SAARC was established with the signing of its Charter in Dhaka on 8 December 1985 by seven member countries. The SAARC Secretariat was founded in Kathmandu, Nepal, on 17 January 1987 (SAARC, 2020). The regional integration of South Asia is based on five principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, non-interference in the internal affairs of the Member States and mutual benefit. The nine observer states also affirmed to join SAARC Summits such as China, the US, Myanmar, Iran, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Mauritius, and the EU. The objectives of the SAARC included the following in its Charter:

To promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life; to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region and to provide all individuals the opportunity to live in dignity and to realise their full potentials; to promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among the countries of South Asia; to contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another’s problems; to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields; to strengthen cooperation with other developing countries; to strengthen cooperation among themselves in international forums on matters of common interests; and to cooperate with international and regional organisations with similar aims and purposes (SAARC, 2020)

The fundamental promise of regionalism was the recognition of deep-rooted challenges among SAARC member states to solve mutually for regional property, which never became a reality. In 2025, the SAARC will mark its 40 years of establishment, but conflicts among states cannot be resolved. Sharma (2011) argued that it cannot be resolved without the implementation of the regional vision of cooperation in different areas. The multilateralism and regionalism level of diplomacy was desirable, but SAARC states are still dominated by bilateral cooperation to resolve issues. According to Keating (n.d.), regionalism mainly marks three distinct elements like (a) movements demanding territorial autonomy within unitary states, (b) the organisation of the central state on a regional basis for the delivery of its policies including regional development policies, and (c) political decentralisation and regional autonomy. However, South Asian regionalism failed in three areas of the ‘bottom-up’, ‘top-down’ and ‘response to first’ approach to regionalism.

Similarly, South Asian regional trade liberalisation also did not achieve its success due to lingering bilateral matters between India and Pakistan. For better trade and economic cooperation, the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) was established in 2004 and implemented in 2006 (Sharma, 2011). Trade liberalisation is planned for better integration of the region in terms of the potential to yield considerable benefits. Although trust deficit and mistrust only brought suspicion to persist towards interstate relations among member states (Desai, 2010). In this regard, India’s leadership has been always questioned by the other SAARC members. President Rahman continued his proposal for a regional organisation at international conferences.

Role of India in SAARC

Forming a South Asian regionalism initiative, the idea was first brought by the late president of Bangladesh, Ziaur Rahman, in the 1980s. Initially, he opened the discussion on regional cooperation three times at different conferences. He first engaged the Indian prime minister Morarji Desai about the issue of regional cooperation in December 1977. Similarly, King Birendra of Nepal also mentioned close regional cooperation on issues of sharing river waters among South Asian countries (Dash, 1996). Dash argued that India and Pakistan both perceived this proposal as a ‘small state’s gang up’ against them. Indian policymakers feared such a proposal from President Rahman. ‘Security dilemmas’ emerged as core issues among South Asian countries and were concerned about their territorial integrity and sovereignty (Buzan & Rizvi, 1986). The security dilemma in South Asia began with the independence of countries in South Asia from British rule. India’s leadership in the region was transferred by the British after the Indian Independence Act was implemented in 1947 which divided British India into India and Pakistan. Subsequently, the security system in South Asia was never ideal for regional integration. India’s territorial disputes expanded beyond Pakistan such as China, Nepal and later with Bangladesh. Buzan et al. (1998) explained regional security complexity as a theory that causes conflict between two or more states in the region which constitutes a geographically coherent state. Next, Buzan (2011) argued that the South Asian Regional Security Complex (RSC) went through ‘lots of events’ like this and the pictures were not very clear. There is the involvement of great power politics while India got stronger and Pakistan moved weaker, meanwhile, China created the centre of gravity in South Asia.

Likewise, security dilemmas of South Asia, specifically India made its role also a kind of hide and seek. SAARC’s prosperity is also related to India’s security concerns. Buzan et al. (1998) regarded South Asian regionalism as a ‘clear example of a security complex centred on the rivalry between India and Pakistan’. In the past, both countries fought four major wars over Kashmir as in 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999 which emerged as defence competition and ended up as nuclear power countries in the region. Initially, security issues were discussed and dealt with at the SAARC level issues regarding terrorism, drugs, and policy matters (Bharti, 2021). Dash highlighted two aspects of India’s foreign policy based on national interest misunderstood by neighbours from South Asia: (a) India’s concern about its autonomous status means that the South Asian region is free of outside influences and (b) India’s interest in the region is clear, as in the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of all neighbour countries. This means that countries in South Asia need to ‘respect India’s unity and territorial integrity’. However, the neighbours of India’s perception have been Indian hegemonism, and its sincerity has been lacking for SAARC (Dash, 1996). Similar statements were also made by Desai (2010) ‘as the preeminent member state, India needs to take the initiative in building better relations in the region by allaying other members’ security concerns and fears of domination’.

Zajaczkowski (2015) presented Indian perception of South Asian regionalism that the region considered India’s ‘sphere of influence’ and treated them ‘as distinct geopolitical and geoeconomics regions. India is an emerging and leading actor that is a member of several regional, sub-regional and trans-regional groupings. Its own interest is overwhelmed with regional and global interest, as well as vision (Yhome & Maini, 2017). There are two meanings of this: (a) the rise of India is a clear positive trend as a role in regional and global governances which remain locked in geopolitics, (b) India’s strategic interests are widening in South Asia and other parts of the world, so it looks to compete with China while ignoring regional issues. India shares close ties like history, culture and geography with South Asia but its role in SAARC is always a priority for India’s internal stability and development. India’s regional approach to South Asia has been more towards building ‘security regionalism’ rather than uniform economic prosperity (Yhome & Maini, 2017).

So far, India has hosted three SAARC Summits out of eighteen in viz. to viz. second in Bengaluru, November 1986; eighth in New Delhi, May 1995 and fourteenth in New Delhi, April 2007. India’s major contribution to SAARC can be considered its cooperation in establishing the South Asian University (SAU). It was established with the effort at the 14^th SAARC Summit in April 2008 and the SAU currently runs 100 acres of land in Maidan Garhi in Delhi. If we look at the recent India official documents, they frequently mentioned that ‘India continues to support various initiatives in the SAARC framework to achieve closer cooperation in diverse areas’ (MEA India, 2020). Even MEA’s India-SAARC document cited that India enjoys excellent bilateral relations with SAARC members, except for Pakistan. However, the document next mentioned India is an active development partner in several projects as per ‘Neighbourhood First’. Lately, India launched a South Asian Satellite (SAS) in May 2017 that was supposed to strengthen GPS technology in the South Asian region. This initiative was also credited for the regional commitment which also ignored Pakistan (MEA India, 2020). India keeps the report on SAARC and the latest report released by the Press Information Bureau (PIB) of India on December 08, 2022, first quoted PM Narendra Modi ‘As a founding member of SAARC, India is committed to strengthening regional cooperation through various initiatives of development and progress of all countries in the region’ (PIB India, 2022).

Bhasin (2008) perceived India’s policies and regional perception as ‘India’s role in South Asia neither confirms the indices of traditional leadership nor genuine hegemony’. Similarly, Cohen and Park (1978) regarded India’s role in South Asia as ‘powerful enough to be feared but not powerful enough to be respected’. India’s active role was acknowledged when the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) won the General Assembly in 2004. Then, foreign secretary Shyam Saran and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh played an active role in addressing the issues related to the Gujral doctrine and increased attention to economic integration within South Asia (Raghav & Rai, 2021). The SAU was an outcome of leadership by these leaders. Due to the lack of India’s keen interest in SAARC, it has been more than eight years since the 19^th SAARC summit has not taken place yet. It was supposed to be held in Islamabad. India refuses to continue any bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the region due to Pakistan’s involvement in the Uri attack. The SAARC Ministerial Level dialogue was also cancelled due to the recent power change in Afghanistan which is under the control of the Taliban (Aryal & Nair, 2021). Shishir and Sakib (2022) stressed that ‘India is thus more interested in fulfilling its geopolitical agenda under the BIMSTEC banner rather than the SAARC banner. Moreover, SAARC does not fit India’s “Neighbourhood First” vision as it constantly faces obstructionist approaches from Pakistan politically, economically and, in some cases, geographically’. Kugiel (2012) argued that India recently realised ‘the importance of its international attractiveness’ and also increased its soft power profile and its projection abroad. Now, India must ‘play a more proactive role in enhancing regional cooperation and integration through the SAARC process’.

Assessment of India’s Leadership in SAARC

The Indian elephant cannot transform itself into a mouse. If South Asia is to get itself out of the crippling binds of conflicts and cleavages, the six will have to accept the bigness of the seventh. And the seventh, that is India, will have to prove to the six that big can indeed be beautiful.

Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Big Brother Syndrome’, India Today, 30 April 1984

While attempting to access India’s leadership in SAARC gave a mixed outcome. Based on the general progress of SAARC, we have divided overall India’s perception toward SAARC and how it is reflected in India’s leadership in the region.

A Confusion on ‘Hegemon or Leader’

Due to a few reasons India automatically considers South Asia its ‘sphere of influence’. Despite the increasing democratisation of international relations, the concept of ‘spheres of influence’ has persisted. Although the British Raj left independent India with a sizable sphere of influence, Partition, estrangement from the West, and an inward economic focus made it difficult to maintain that legacy (Raja Mohan, 2022). But India’s policy making circle, due to India’s increasing socio-economic-security profile, perceived India as a regional hegemon. This remains true if we are talking about India in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Authors have extensively pointed out India’s inconsistency in terms of shaping ‘Neighbourhood Policy’ (see Aryal, 2022; Aryal & Nair, 2021; Aryal & Bharti,2023). In India, it has always been customary to view its neighbours through the prisms of politics and security. Due to the fact that they have few significant relationships with nations other than India, India has long taken their neighbours for granted. For instance, even in the 2000s, China had a very limited footprint in Nepal, while the United States had been heavily influenced by India. In many respects, this was India’s territory, which made it easy to take it for granted. When you take these satellite nations for granted, you obviously do not invest in them, and the region loses its appeal (The Bridge Project, 2020).

Giving an interview to brooking institute Xavier (2020) tried to identify the major reason for SAARC being dysfunctional. There are three that stick out. First, the geographic, economic, and demographic supremacy of India. As the centre state, India makes it more challenging for other countries to cooperate with it since they are more wary of its objectives than those of any other South Asian country. Second, the ongoing India-Pakistan conflict, which has often prevented SAARC from moving further. Third, the post-colonial approach to international politics in this area, which places a strong emphasis on security while often ignoring matters like commercial interdependence. All three reasons, one way or another, concern India. And India seems less interested in resolving those rather than India, hoping to ignore the issues. For instance, 2020’s India-Nepal border disputes (Karki, 2020); India-Pakistan increasing tension (Ganguly, 2022); Mounting negative civil perception in Bangladesh and Maldives (Paul, 2020) are the issues that India recently has been ignoring. This questions India’s intention regarding the region whether it is practising leadership or hegemony.

Bilateralism over Multilateralism

India also has preferred dealing with its neighbours bilaterally instead of setting up multilateral mechanisms. It started when Jawaharlal Nehru rejected the UN’s offer to extend its support to resolve the Kashmir issue with Pakistan. Within SAARC, India has various complications involved with each member state. India, thus, prefers to keep it in a bilateral manner so that it can segregate based on the priority and the interest. While forming its perspective toward SAARC, India in many ways looks in dilemma. On the one hand, India is now heading to be a global actor which have a seat on international decision making. India’s relationships with her neighbours have not always been good, and there is suspicion regarding the country’s goals. India must first establish itself as a regional power in order to realise its goal of becoming a global force, hence this atmosphere of caution needs to be dispelled (ORF, 2019). On the other hand, India remained sceptic in resolving regional issues with South Asian neighbours.

During COVID 19 pandemic, India shows some willingness to revive the SAARC. During the virtual conference to discuss the pandemic issues with SAARC member states, Prime Minister Modi proposed establishing a COVID-19 emergency fund for SAARC countries on a voluntary basis, with India first providing $10 million, and he also announced the formation of a team of specialists for SAARC governments (Parida, 2020). The fund was promptly activated to cover the needs of particular countries for essential medical supplies and equipment. Following that, Sri Lanka committed five million dollars, Bangladesh one and a half million dollars, Afghanistan and Nepal one million dollars apiece, the Maldives $200,000, and Bhutan $100,000. Pakistan agreed to contribute $3 million to the COVID-19 Emergency Fund on the condition that the fund be controlled by the SAARC secretariat (Time of India, 2020). However, this attempts also got trapped by the bilateral tension between India and Pakistan.

India’s Pessimism on SAARC

Due to multiple reasons which have been discussed on various occasions above, India, especially under PM Modi, seems very pessimistic about SAARC. As a result, India has attempted to find an alternative to SAARC. SAARC is still waiting for its 19th summit which was scheduled to happen in Islamabad in November 2016. But the Uri of September same year changed the scenario of regional integration of South Asia. On September 18, a group of four heavily armed terrorists from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) breached the Line of Control (LoC) and attacked an Indian Army base in Uri, Kashmir. At around 5:30 am, the terrorists attacked the camp. There were many losses because the target was a makeshift camp where most of the soldiers were living in tents. In the attack, 18 troops perished and nearly 20 were injured (Times of India, 2023). After this incident India has turned its face from SAARC. The alternative attempt to find a regional grouping includes BIMSTEC and BBIN, which both strategically excludes Pakistan.

The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) encompasses the nations in the Bay of Bengal region, including two ASEAN nations and five South Asian nations. Between South Asia and SouthEast Asia, the organisation serves as a bridge. With the exception of the Maldives, Afghanistan and Pakistan, it comprises all of South Asia’s main nations. Due to its makeup, BIMSTEC has established itself as a suitable venue for evaluating regional cooperation in the South Asian region. BIST-EC, or Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, and Thailand Economic Cooperation, was the original name of BIMSTEC. The organisation was renamed Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand Economic Cooperation once Myanmar joined (BIMST-EC). The organisation was renamed BIMSTEC, or Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, and Thailand Economic Cooperation, after the addition of Nepal and Bhutan (Bhattacharjee, 2018).

In the backdrop the sub-regionalism was discussed in various occasion in South Asia. South Asia’s growth triangle was originally discussed and decided upon in May 1996 in New Delhi at the SAARC Council of Ministers meeting. As a follow-up, during the SAARC Foreign Ministers’ Conference in December 1996, Nepal formally proposed to create the South Asian Growth Quadrangle (SAGQ), which would include Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, and India (North East area). All the relevant nations quickly agreed to the suggestion. The main goals of the SAGQ where to deepen sub-regional economic integration, increase commerce, and enhance cross-border connectivity (Shukla, 2019). Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and the Maldives did not like the initiative. Prior to finally approving it, Sri Lanka and the Maldives both expressed major objections. Pakistan perceived it as an effort to isolate her. The SAARC Foreign Secretaries further endorsed the growth quadrangle’s goals, guiding principles, and action plan in April 1997. It particularly named six sectors, including multimodal transportation and communications, energy, trade and investment facilitation, tourism, and the use of the endowment of natural resources (Michael, 2013).

Although the sub-regional set up within South Asia has been in discussion for a long time India after 2016 implemented BBIN. The goal of the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN) is to increase connectivity and economic cooperation among these four South Asian nations. The joint statement made after the decision to establish a grouping, emphasised that the transport corridors could possibly boost intra-regional trade within South Asia by approximately 60% and with the rest of the world by 30% if they were converted into economic corridors. This effort has received technical, financial, and advising support from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) as part of the South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) program. In January 2016, Dhaka hosted the third meeting of the BBIN Joint Working Group (JWG) on Water Resource Management, Power/Hydropower, and Connectivity and Transit (MEA, 2018).

Conclusion

We can reach a judgement based on the extensive analysis presented above. India, which favours bilateral over multilateral connections, has not taken the lead in creating a regional order architecture. As a result, South Asia has the lowest level of intra-regional commerce among recognised regions and the least connected region. India has a history of using excessive force to dominate its neighbourhood, and many neighbouring nations view India as the regional bully rather than the visionary leader of a shared future. Also unstable is South Asia. With almost every nation now or recently suffering an armed rebellion, it is home to innumerable armed organisations. The most unstable nuclear conflict in the world between India and Pakistan is also located in South Asia.

On the flip side of that, achieving regional leadership requires getting over historical and geographic inconsistencies. The ‘successes and failures’ of the regional policy of any administration cannot be judged in simple terms because this is a process full of detours and turns. But when looking at the bigger picture, it is undeniable that India’s relative standing in the subcontinent has been improving over time. India’s economic expansion and increased focus on regional issues have undoubtedly improved its South Asian strategic options. The ascent of Chinese strength and its expanding regional influence are the biggest issues in the region today, though.

Footnotes

Acknowledgement

Author would like to thank Professor Jakub Zajaczkowski and reviewers of this article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iDs

Saroj Kumar Aryal

Simant Shankar Bharti

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