Reconceptualizing Representation: Interconnections of Experience and Space in the Production of Knowledge

Introduction

Representation, conceived of as a mental activity, individual or social, is central to the communication of knowledge in society. In philosophy and the social sciences, the concept of representation has occupied a pivotal position in the exploration of the possible sources of human understanding, of the association between body and mind, the correlation between rationality and sentiments, the connection between thought and action and the relation between the individual and the collective. It has contributed towards the deciphering of different modes of thought and action, of conflict and ideas concerning stability, of hegemony and resistance, of action and meanings, of the relation between social structure and processes, of the categories of space and time, and of visibility and indifference, among others. In their attempt to deal with the epistemological inquiries of human understanding, these disciplines have engaged with the notion of representation to throw light on the ontological concerns of knowledge itself; on the relation between reason and intuition; on objective knowledge, truth and subjective interpretations; on how categories of understanding are constructed in the human world, how they relate to social action and how their distinct yet interconnected domains of inquiry further contribute towards arriving at a generalized comprehension of social reality itself. In the process, these explorations also accentuate on the connection between representation and the symbolization of authority and domination, social control and collective identity. By attempting to uncover, examine or interpret trajectories of knowledge and action in the human world through the development of conceptual categories, these disciplines also become involved in the classification of the intellectual traditions of social and philosophical knowledge itself. Not overlooking its interpretation within temporal and spatial structures of power, representation and its elucidation as a cognitive construct, as a process involving the communication of thoughts or ideologies, or as an object symbolizing discourses, can then be considered as being connected, in terms of its intrinsic relation to the construction of knowledge. Continually reconstructed by social relations, structures of authority and practices of resistance, its understanding remains fundamental to the comprehension of culture and the construction of social reality.

Exploring the notion of representation, in terms of its interpretation in philosophical discourses as an epistemological category, to its recognition in Durkheimian sociology as constructs symbolizing social relations and enabling collective identity, this article emphasizes on the need to contextualize representation in terms of its existence within historical and social structures. Recognizing its intricate connection with the act of experience in the social world, this work attempts to reposition the concept of representation in social space, thereby making it possible to be aware of the hegemonic discourses and the counter-hegemonic practices involved in its construction of knowledge. Exploring the social and collective nature of such representations and their relation to structures of authority as well as practices of resistance, the article argues for the need to reconstruct the concept in terms of its embeddedness in social space, asserting that representations in the social world are not ahistorical, but are continually restructured and contested in terms of their meaning.

Representation and the Constitution of a Priori Knowledge

Representations contribute towards the institutionalization of belief, facilitating in the interpretation of experience and thus constitute for what can be understood as knowledge in society. In general, the term could refer to a process of mental abstraction or conceptualization, or a symbolic manifestation in the social world. In philosophical discourses, the notion of representation began to occupy a central position from the seventeenth century onwards, when engagement with epistemological concerns highlighted on the centrality of mind as the space within the body where sensations, ideas, accounts of factual events as well as psychological symptoms could be found (Rabinow, 1986). With the contributions of Immanuel Kant, representation emerged as a central component in scientific thought and in the knowledge concerning human understanding. According to him, representations, as such, were objective and independent of things or empirical connections, and instead developed in the human mind (Stedman Jones, 2003). Although he did not refute the significance of experience completely, the development of knowledge according to Kant was contingent on reason, on the use of rational logic that did not itself spring forth from experience, but representations (Kerne & Smyth, 2006). Knowledge was thus based on representation of the object, which itself was considered to be valid on grounds of its agreement with the object concerned (Kerne & Smyth, 2006). In order to develop objective conditions of thinking, pure concepts prior to and independent of experience had to be structured in a manner that enabled the development of causal connections between the elements or objects (Maddy, 2012). Emphasizing on the causal and logical structure of the human world, Kant’s work thus asserted on how one could arrive at an understanding of the empirical reality through the use of a priori knowledge, which was possible by arriving at a transcendental relation of the object and its representation, thereby eluding the trap of experience and subjective thought (Maddy, 2012). Representations and experience themselves could in this manner be comprehended as being modified by human intuition, and through the development of categories of pure concepts, their properties and their causal relations, one could arrive at an understanding of objective logical truth (Maddy, 2012). This would not intervene with the subjective sensibilities at an empirical level but would contribute to the development of logical and pure forms of a priori knowledge in the understanding of the world (Maddy, 2012).

Steeped in rationality and the philosophy of logic, the nature of knowledge thus developed was deemed to be objective. Evidently, the basic characteristic of such knowledge was its detachment from sensorial experience. The notion of an a priori in this sense was used as early as the fourteenth century ad by Albertus de Saxonia to refer to knowledge that was based on an understanding of causes and its effects (Benecke, 1895). For Kant, who has been associated with the modern meaning of the term, it denotes knowledge that is completely devoid of and separated from any influence of experience (Benecke, 1895). Going beyond the spatial and temporal situatedness of sensory perception and experience, Kant’s understanding of a priori knowledge involved the utilization and development of concepts in a relational capacity (Schurman, 1899). Not refuting the possibility of attaining knowledge through an engagement with the senses, Kant believed that such knowledge would, however, be subjective, owing to its association with impressions, and therefore, could not be extended to the development of a generalized understanding (Schurman, 1899). Further, elaborating on the knowledge concerning the pure science of nature, he stated that nature, as such, in itself, cannot be interpreted through empirical or logical reasoning in a universal manner (Schurman, 1899). It is then only in the context of its possibility of being experienced by human senses that an a priori understanding based on objective laws can be advanced (Schurman, 1899). And this is where the intricate relation of representation to knowledge can be realized, as according to Kant, since both inner and outer experiences of the human self are mediated through representations, it accounts for the expression of social reality (Stedman Jones, 2000).

Representations form an integral part of knowledge, and, as they deal with human cognition, they are also significant in terms of their influence on social action. The implication of representation in the social world is often interpreted not simply in terms of its ability to be present as a reproduction or an image of an original object, thing or person in the real world but also for its capacity to evoke a conceptual image of an idea or thought. In this sense, representation can therefore be understood as being fundamental to the communication of social discourses and beliefs that shapes an individual’s understanding of the social world. In its endeavour to produce common categories of understanding that allow for the development of a shared world view, necessary for enabling interaction and social action, it also makes way for the perception and internalization of norms and contributes to the development of a common moral knowledge.

Stemming from its central position in epistemological inquiry, representation as a concept has therefore significantly contributed to the interpretation of the social world, structures, processes and largely human action in social theory. In order to make sense of the role of representation in the constitution and interpretation of the social reality, French sociologist Emile Durkheim (1938, 1984, 1995) in the course of his work on social facts, forms of solidarity and on religious life, extended the concept beyond its philosophical interpretation in the theories of empiricism and rationalism. Emphasizing on the superiority of scientific knowledge, he believed that it was through representations that perception of the social world could be made possible beyond what was presented by the senses. As reflected in his works, representations were indispensable for social existence and thus their conceptualization was equally important for social philosophy. French philosopher Charles Renouvier’s contributions also had a great influence on Durkheim’s understanding of the categories of representation and its relation to social reality. For Renouvier, following Kant’s insistence on the use of rational logic, the negation of empiricism as a mode of epistemological inquiry emerged because of its tendency to reduce all representations and cognitive thinking to experience (Stedman Jones, 2000). According to him, experience itself, and for that matter its interpretation as well, were contingent on representations (Stedman Jones, 2000). Renouvier believed that although representations were based on sensory perception, or possibly emerged from the functioning of sensibilities, they were not constitutive of or dependant on experience (Stedman Jones, 1995). Espousing the development of a critical method and extending Kant’s idea of the limitations of empiricism, Renouvier distanced philosophical inquiry from the doctrine of positivism and incorporated the concept of phenomena to comprehend representations as not only involving objects but also ideas and thoughts (Stedman Jones, 1995). Such representations, he stated, could be made sense of through observation (Stedman Jones, 1995). In fact, for enabling such an observation to take place, phenomena themselves had to be supported by representations (Stedman Jones, 2000). Logical knowledge being constitutive of representations, he was of the view that such representations required the existence of shared relations or a sense of collectivity in order to be effective. Representations as such also entailed taking cognizance of historical and social activity. Renouvier’s influence was therefore of considerable importance, in persuading Durkheim to adopt a method of inquiry that lay in between objectivism and subjectivism, and thus move beyond empiricism as well as apriorism (Stedman Jones, 1995).

Durkheim and the Significance of Collective Representations

The notion of representation occupies a central place in Durkheim’s works on religion, solidarity and social facts. Highlighting on the social nature of representations, he made a clear distinction between individual and collective representations. Closely tied with his concept of the ‘conscience collective’, is the thought that representations reflect social mind. The manner in which Durkheim defined the conscience collective in his works has also undergone modification as witnessed in his early works including The division of labour, where he identified it as a common conscience that is present in individual minds and is shared by them and in later works such as that of Suicide where he defined it as having a social existence of its own, independent of the individual mind (Nemedi, 1995). An independent existence of the social body and mind also implied that the consciousness emerging from it was marked by an absence of any sort of dependence on or lacked proximity with any particular individual consciousness (Durkheim, 1995). It was through their collective association in social life that individuals then realized the power of the social (Durkheim, 1984). Their course of action as well as their structures of experience were influenced by the social mind, and this was enabled by representation. For Durkheim, logical thinking comprised concepts that had their origin in society, involving the awareness of being associated with social obligations and requirements (Stedman Jones, 2000). These concepts were not limited to individual thought but were objective in the manner that they reflected the way in which the society engaged with representations to make sense of social reality (Stedman Jones, 2000). These concepts are what he identifies as collective representations. Stressing on the significance of representation in The rules of sociological method, Durkheim (1938) thus asserted that society itself comprises representations and so, the social body is produced through collective conditions of mind which include representations. Collective conscience, therefore, was possible only through commonly shared representations.

There are two meanings of representation that then become prominent in its utilization as a concept for making sense of ideas and action in social world—as a medium of knowing and experiencing and as knowledge itself (Nemedi, 1995). Referring to the works of Durkheim, Pickering (2000) thus tries to bring to light the possibility of associating with the content of representations in ways more than one. Alluding to Durkheim and Mauss’ work Primitive classifications (2009), he states that when comprehended from the point of their functional significance, representations for Durkheim were quintessential for the formation of knowledge in society because they enabled the categorization of ideas and thoughts, facilitating in the production of objective knowledge (Pickering, 2000). Again, he states that if representations were only of functional importance, they would not be described by Durkheim as constitutive of knowledge that represents reality. Collective representations, to be more precise in this sense therefore, could be perceived as being significant in terms of their content, as sources of knowledge that influence individual cognition and perception. Durkheim’s contribution on the concept of representation, thus throws light on its relation to the production of objective knowledge outside individual cognition and beyond senses. Representations as such are associated with collective states of thinking and as having a bearing on individual cognition. For Durkheim, individual representations are subjective in nature, while collective representations are outside of individual consciousness, and because of its objective character, it contributes towards the very structuring of individual thought (Bloor, 2000). But he also remained unclear on whether the idea of collective representation was to be interpreted in terms of the collective subject or from the point of view of the object that is being represented (Lukes, 1973). This hence brings us to the question of the actual location of collective representations. If their effectiveness is explained through network of interaction and coordination, then such representations can be viewed as institutions through which the social mind facilitates in the construction of individual consciousness (Bloor, 2000). In Durkheim’s claim that representations occupy a central position in the theory of understanding and knowledge, one is able to observe the influence of the Kantian idea of apriorism and the centrality of logical reasoning. The relation between knowledge and belief is another theme which can be traced in the philosophical works of Kant and Renouvier, as well as in Durkheim’s theoretical formations (Paoletti, 2000). For Durkheim, belief was not imitative in nature; it was characterized by the use of logic and rationality (Paoletti, 2000). Following Kantian philosophy, if knowledge for Durkheim is constituted by what he termed as representations, then it also becomes important to understand the manner in which he depicted the relation between collective representations and belief in society. In this context, although his works reveal a connection between what he meant by collective representations and commonly shared beliefs in terms of their underlying meanings, he uses the term representations in the place of belief because of the ability of the former to engage in the projection of a general meaning (Paoletti, 2000). Furthermore, as the incidence of belief involves the act of cognition, and this is facilitated through representation, it is through their association that Durkheim’s writings are able to deal with the limitations of objectivity as well as subjectivity and move beyond the structures of apriorism and empiricism.

Even though Durkheim (1995) identified representations as central elements in the construction of knowledge in society, he added that they were open to errors or flaws. However, irrespective of such shortcomings, he remained of the opinion that they should be seen as the most appropriate category of cognitive constructs for portraying reality (Pickering, 2000). This hence opens the possibility of reconsidering the concept of representation in terms of its meaning and its relation to the construction and interpretation of social reality. Subject to its experience and perception by the human subject, any interpretation of social reality remains limited when observed and examined from a single perspective. Acknowledging its multiple interpretations then requires one to recognize this reality as being socially constructed and maintained through representations and the institutionalization of belief. Its social construction highlights on the significance of cognition, experience and interpretation involved in its construction.

Representations in this sense can thus be seen as related to structures of authority as well as practices of human agency, to processes of knowledge production as well as acts of resistance. Going beyond its objective claims of existing independently of individual consciousness, representation can itself be comprehended as being created by the community to symbolize reality. Shaped by discursive practices and conscious individual agents, reality is therefore continually produced, challenged and reconstructed. Its production is an act of power, and its representation is a manifestation of such authority and also resistance to it.

Experiencing Representation

Emphasizing on the social construction of reality, hence, accentuates on the construction of representations as conceptual categories not confined to individual cognition, but as shared by a group or a community. But again, implicit in its workings is the sense of its reconstruction and possibly transcendence, from social to collective. Collective representations would thus be social in nature, shared by people in a community and again would be more than social in character because of their ability to symbolize or represent the community itself. This does not necessarily entail recognizing their origin or their existence as independent of individual representations which, both Kant and Durkheim claimed, emerged from sensations born out of subjective acts of experience, but involves incorporating the significance of the human consciousness in the constitution of the act of belief, which is facilitated by the act of experience. Belief is both subjectively and collectively experienced in the course of engagement in social action and is also a part of the already available body of knowledge framed by prior experiences of the individual, or that of the other. Intricately linked to the reading of representation is therefore the notion of experience. Clarifying the difference in meaning involved in the interpretation of experience, Gadamer (1975) distinguished between two German terms used to designate the same. Erlebnis, he maintained, is the remnant of situations that involved complete consciousness or awareness which, according to him, implied residue of moments that are lived in their complete immediacy, and then transformed into art (Gadamer, 1975). Erfahrung, also signifying experience, provided the basis in human lives for the particular hermeneutic manner in which individuals are related to other persons and to their own cultural past, through dialogue and specifically through dialogue including questions and answers (Gadamer, 1975). This meaning is separate from the previous term which deals with the residue of isolated moments and instead highlights on an ongoing integrative process that leads to the development of thought and transforms already existing perspectives (Gadamer, 1975). It therefore does not just merely add to the already existing stock of knowledge or information but provides a broader perspective of human life and culture and throws light on the processes involved in the formation of meaning (Gadamer, 1975).

However, being related to sensory perception, individual experience—an act that involves ‘seeing’ or being conscious and knowing, only becomes possible through the medium of expressions or social representations. An awareness of one’s experience is also articulated or conveys a sense of meaning through representations. Expressions and experiences can thus be recognized as being involved in a dialectical relation with each other (Bruner, 1986). The recognition of a sense of participation in the act of an experience highlights on its lived nature, through which different categories of representation are formed or made use of, thereby enabling in an interpretation of the experience itself. The different forms of expression also help in defining and explaining what the idea of experience is about. Such a reading of experience would then include events and moments of intense social action and heightened emotions, and also take into account the most ordinary of circumstances of everyday life (Abrahams, 1986).

Engaging with the senses and its relation to cognitive states of consciousness, representation as mental constructs can be identified and acknowledged as collective only when its source is not confined to any particular individual mind. The interpretation of such collective representations and their underlying meanings then become possible through the act of experience. These representations in the form of mental constructs interact with the individual cognition through the medium of experience, thereby contributing towards the institutionalization of belief. With the channelizing of the individual cognition to a common source of perception, the transmission of shared ideas becomes possible. Such acts of representation make way for individual minds to contain ideas that are commonly shared. And when these acts, through the medium of objects or ideas, do not remain confined to the level of individual consciousness but emerge as symbolizing the community, they can be recognized as collective. Such forms of representation might be experienced in the course of everyday life or may refer to atypical moments, extraordinary situations, situations in which as Durkheim (1951) would say, the collective effervescence comes to being. The concept of representation in social theory, as an analytical construct used to decipher social reality, would hence require an acknowledgement of the act of experience in social life. From a phenomenological perspective, experience is made possible by redirecting the course of consciousness. Experience in the social world is guided by the human senses as well as through preconceived ideas. Experiencing such representations would thus lead to the communication of the knowledge behind the symbol. This knowledge could reside in the nature of conceptual categories in the consciousness, but not necessarily in the form of objective elements whose causal relation would determine understanding in the social world, even in the absence of experience.

Experience as such thus becomes the bridge between objects or events and the meanings and discourses underlying them. The existential and phenomenological reality of the social are then truly grasped through the act of experience which redirects the consciousness and makes way for individual to establish cognitive categories that contribute towards human understanding. As such, human consciousness itself is also facilitated by experience. However, as an act concerning the consciousness, it is only in the light of its connection with representations and the underlying meanings that experience can be conceived of as being social. The nature of reality can be acknowledged as social only in the presence of common categories of understanding or when the underlying meanings are shared. Therefore, any analysis of the concept of representation, while taking into account the significance of experiences in terms of its ability to disseminate meaning, should also keep in mind that experiences are cognitive and sensory acts whose meaning can only be deciphered through the presence of representations. And as the relationship between experience and expression is both ‘dialogic and dialectical’ (Bruner, 1986, p. 6), both of them can be recognized as constructing and maintaining social reality together. In other words, just as expressions or representations become open for interpretation through experience, these forms of representation also contribute towards the structuring of experience. Moreover, representation and experience can be read as social not only because of their contribution to the development of shared meanings but how these meanings also reflect on social relations.

Locating Representation

Acknowledging the dialogical relation between representation and experience contributes to the argument that differences in experience can be interpreted as differences in representation. To put it differently, if representation is construed as an act intricately related to knowledge formation or meaning-making, then one needs to look into the discursive nature of such knowledge. Representations are cognitive constructs that are reflective of ideas or thoughts and should be explored in the context of its spatial distribution. If trajectories of knowledge are influenced by structures of power, then the meaning of social reality also becomes contingent on social contexts and history. Difference in knowledge would mean difference in perspective, social position and history. Representation would therefore contribute to the conceptualization of such difference and experience would lead to its validation. If reality is socially constructed, then its representations and underlying meanings throw light on the substructures of power that go into its formation and the acts of resistance that contest its validity. The interpretation of meaning should therefore emphasize on their social and historical construction, their symbolic representation or their intersubjective understanding, as Berger and Luckmann write, ‘Knowledge about society is thus a realization in the double sense of the world, in the sense of apprehending the objectivated social reality, and in the sense of ongoingly producing this reality’ (1967, p. 66).

For Manheim, the maturity of human thought was contingent on discourses and ideologies characterized by its social context (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). The knowledge that enables the interpretation of experience and perception is thus, to a large extent, historically and culturally situated and shared through familiar forms of expression. Deciphering this knowledge therefore requires the realization that ideas are but socially constructed. As Berger and Luckmann (1967) point out, this does not repudiate the presence of objective facts or the incidence of objects and events outside the arena of subjective understanding. Instead, the point that is being emphasized here is how these objects, human entities and events are interpreted by the experience and understanding of individuals through their socialization, their prior experiences or through the permeation of ideologies and discourses on their thought and action. If knowledge is socially produced and situated, then the meaning of objects and events are shared by the members of a community, making possible in a shared understanding of the world where communication and mutual participation become possible. The recognition of the element of historicality in the creation of human action or material products then helps in understanding these material or non-material aspects of culture as products socially and historically situated within certain structures of temporality. It is their ‘situatedness’ within a historical context that places them within a sphere of meaning. The significance of such an understanding lies in the fact that it considers that knowledge to be constitutive of experience and thus contributes towards the building of a perspective that requires attention to be placed on the direction of consciousness and experience rather than the viewing the social world in terms of knowledge solely derived from the exercise of reason.

Social Space and the Reconstruction of Representation

Taking cognisance of historical and social contexts in the production of knowledge through representations brings to light not only the working of structured hierarchies but also instances of resistance challenging such discourses, thereby asserting on the significance of human agency in the production of social reality. It is by acknowledging the spatial distribution of meaning that representation and their discursive contexts can be explored, as locations of power as well as resistance. An understanding of space therefore remains essential to the analysis of social structures and processes involved in the continuous production of reality, as Foucault (1991, p. 252) remarks, ‘Space is fundamental in any form of communal life; space is fundamental in any exercise of power.’ The conceptualization of representation as situated within space facilitates in identifying the interconnections of knowledge and experience, of thoughts and action and of social structures and processes. Experience, in this context, would mean repositioning representation within the structured categories of space and time within which consciousness takes place. The notion of space as a concept can thus be defined to contain things, ideas as well as relations (Lefebvre, 1991). Space is where the activities of production take place, be it the production of things, ideas and discourses or of human social relations (Lefebvre, 1991). It is neither perceived to be imaginary nor categorized as a material entity (Lefebvre, 1991).

However, space is not just about social relations. It also has an instrumental role in the ‘existing mode of production’, as ‘knowledge and action’ (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 11). The interests of those in power are reproduced in the social space through action as well as knowledge, which then facilitates in the formation of a system—one that perpetuates itself through a logic of continuity (Lefebvre, 1991). By allusion to different kinds of space, Lefebvre thus states that in the understanding of the concept, the physical, mental and the social space are interconnected (Lefebvre, 1991). The terms and concepts we use, the space of perception and symbolic representation and the space of action and experience are analytically distinguished, but they do have a thread of continuity underneath their functioning. Reflecting on the intricacies of everyday life in terms of its relation to capitalism, Lefebvre stated that it is through the organization of social space that control is exercised and again struggle is visualized (Elden, 2007). Rather than engaging in phenomenological reduction to arrive at an objective analysis, he asserted that any social analysis had to take into consideration the connection between the individual and the social structure (Elden, 2007). Thus, social relations can only be materialized and conceptualized through the category of space (Knott, 2005). And, since it is the location for such social relations as well as resistance, it is essentially political in character (Elden, 2007). Perceiving space as material and concrete in character then confirms the significance of representation (Elden, 2007). It is within the spatial categories that the social emerges through representation, and again through the reconstruction of the social the spatial is realized and experienced. Social relations are continually formed, building on a space in which structural arrangements and definite relations have emerged over the course of time, or history is contained. Space can therefore be comprehended as being constructed by the interworking of ‘synchronic relations and diachronic extensions’ (Knott, 2005, p. 161). Representations within the context of such social space function as symbols of underlying discourses. Objects of representation involved in the communication of certain ideas to the individual mind, which influence their cognitive categories of interpreting social reality function within distinct spaces of human interaction and experience, embodying underlying hegemonic discourses as well as expressing counter-processes voicing resistance. Social and cultural distinctions are largely represented through breaks and fissures in space and such ruptures bring to light social relations of conflict and the play of power (Gupta & Ferguson, 1992).

Considering space as the context which makes possible the connection between social practices and structures of power (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983), representations can be comprehended as the manifestation of power as well as a tool of human agency or counter-hegemony. In terms of its relation to the senses and cognition, representation can be explained as an act of visuality, used by those in authoritative positions to control the very process of ‘seeing’ reality. It can also be imagined as an act of resistance to uncover the work of discursive practices and challenge their legitimacy. The notion of space therefore remains important for comprehending the process of representation as it is within this context that power becomes manifested, discourses are dismantled and alternative ideas are asserted. An acknowledgment of space in the interpretation of representation, hence, highlights on the flow of power beneath all disconnected places and beyond geographical territories, on how these places are connected in a structure of hierarchy, in which it is through the works of the dominant ideology that difference and distance are constructed and represented, where visibility itself becomes an act of asserting domination, difference and hegemony. If locality refers to physical space where culture unfolds through the framework of normatively and socially defined codes of action and interaction, then social space through representation and acts of embodiment makes possible the distinction of locality and collective identity.

Reconceptualizing Representation

While representation as a process is intricately connected with the production of knowledge, it needs to be kept in mind that this repertoire of discourses involves shaping human thought and experience and is oriented towards channelizing action and human relations in the social world. A critical understanding of knowledge by exploring the act of representation itself thus reflects on its ideological origins and its discursive structure. Recognition of the interplay of authoritative structures, discourses and alternative practices highlight on the continuous formation and reconstruction of knowledge. Relocation of the interpretation of the concept of representation within the context of social space, where the discourses concerning human understanding are continually reconstructed, thus emphasizes on the social construction of reality and the contextual nature of representations that symbolize knowledge. Arguing beyond the claims of objective knowledge and their emphasis on the use of rational logic, and going beyond the subjective concerns confining representation as contingent on experience, this work therefore stresses on the need to reconceptualize representation within social space, as being contingent on the interrelations and interactions of discursive practices and structures of authority on the one hand, and counter-processes attempting to dismantle such discursive knowledge on the other. If space is territorially distinguished and demarcated through practices of embodiment and social action, then representation can be comprehended as formed within contextual categories and constructed through knowledge as well as experience.

Challenging the possibility of a universal idea of human nature, an analysis of representation therefore considers interpretation and experience to be located within geographies and histories of power, within structures that contain powerful discourses which frame the course of what is identified as knowledge in society and also the power of agency. What becomes meaningful in society is dependent on the social context wherein it takes shape. This relation of knowledge to social context obviously takes into account the significance of human action and experience. To put it differently, the social context is then the context of the social, the milieu in which human action and interaction takes place. It is in this space where, through the constant process of interaction of human beings with each other and with existing social processes and structures of domination, meaning emerges. And it is this meaning which constitutes for the large part, the body of knowledge. The scope of reconceptualizing representation therefore lies in its interpretation as neither being completely objective in character nor based in social psychology, or in an ideal philosophy, but as meaning that emerges in connection to the context of consciousness and experience, dealing with the social world, and it is in this sense that the concept can be defined in terms of its affinity with power as well as its possibilities of resistance and praxis.