The Emotion in Early Buddhist Psychology of Human Values

Introduction

The life of Vasubandhu can be divided into two parts, the first as an early Buddhist philosopher and the second as a Mahayana Buddhist. In this article, we will be examining the early phase of Vasubandhu’s life, during which he wrote a most celebrated book entitled Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam (hereafter, AKB). In this book, Vasubandhu espoused the notion of personality in detail. The idea of emotionality in Vasubandhu philosophy is significant because, for early Buddhism, the external world is not objective and emotion plays a significant role in human life. However, Vasubandhu does not mention the word ‘emotion’ although there are words in the Buddhist text for specific emotions, such as hatred, love, compassion and lust. It is challenging to maintain theories of emotion in Buddhist philosophy (McRae, 2012, p. 347). De Silva has argued that in Buddhist philosophy, emotion is a joint product of many other processes, for instance, perception, feeling, desire and belief (De Silva, 2011, p. 256). Anacker has examined motivational disposition, which is significant for any action. This motivational disposition is called ‘emotion’ (Anacker, 2005, p. 57). AKB has elucidated that the mind and mental states, as well as immediately antecedent conditions, can only arise and dissolve together (Pruden, 1988, AKB II, 62a–b). All such antecedent conditions are called samanantara, which means equal and nearly antecedent (Pruden, 1988, AKB II, 62a–b). These conditions are important for understanding the role of emotion in action. The main aim of this article is to investigate whether Vasubandhu’s notion of emotion is a natural one or not. Vasubandhu’s philosophy of emotion in one’s life will be explored, as well as the cause and conditionality of our emotional experiences. An important question that needs to be addressed is whether or not we are able to control our emotions. Let me put it another way—is there any possibility of intentional intervention in an emotional state, or are we simply slaves to our emotions, which control our physical and mental activities? In this article, I have argued that in AKB, emotion is a natural state and plays an important role in moral judgement and desire. The article is organized as follows: First, the Buddhist concept of emotion is explored; next, I argue that emotion is a contributory cause of subjective consciousness; and, finally, I examine the role of emotion in action.

Underlining the Early Buddhist Idea of Emotion

The notion of emotion is complex and philosophers have explained it in various ways. For instance, emotion has been described as a consciousness state, a cognitive process or a mental state. Vasubandhu has described emotions as mental states or mental concomitants that arise and dissolve with the mind (citta) (Pruden, 1988, AKB II, 23a). They depend on citta for their arising and exert a good, bad or in different influence as they arise. There are different kinds of citta that arise when coming into contact with different objects. To understand the relationship between the mind and a mental state, let me illustrate this in terms of A and B. Here, A is the mind and B is a mental state. If the relationship between A and B is such that B always arises simultaneously with A, then A is the relating dharma and the causal condition for the arising of B (which is known as the related dharma). Here, it is significant to note that this relationship does not necessarily mean that A cannot arise independently of B. It only means that under no circumstances can B arise independently of A. According to early Buddhism, the mind and its mental factors are not supposed to arise and dissolve independently of each other because they are said to have the same base (sensory organ) and the same object. So when an emotion arises in mind that has been generated by the sense fields, creating visible, audible or olfactory sensations as objects, the mental factors also depend upon these same sense fields. Buddhism does not differentiate between emotional states and mental processes (Ekman et al., 2005, p. 60).

According to AKB, vednā skandha is the threefold mode of feeling or experiencing a sensation that is painful, pleasant or neutral (Pruden, 1988, 14c, 72). By further distinguishing these three types of vedanā on the basis of them being experienced by the mind, we arrive at a sixfold division. However, in the Visuddhimagga, Buddhaghosa writes that the division is fivefold: (bodily) pleasure, (bodily) pain, (mental) joy, (mental) grief and equanimity (Ñaµamoli, 2010, XIV, 127). AKB also maintains that vedanādharma appears when our consciousness comes into contact with an object through a particular sense field. Vedanā includes all kinds of feelings and their variant conditions. Its function is to experience the flavour of the object. Vasubandhu, in the third chapter of AKB, argues, ‘Vedyate tad vedayituṁvāśakyam’ (Pruden, 1988, 3:31d). The type of contact where pleasure should be felt (sukhamvedya) is called sukhavedya (Pruden, 1988, 3:31d). The text discusses the notion of agreeable sensations, which are called sukhas. There are three different types of agreeable sensations, namely, prahāṇasukha, virāgashukha and nirodhasukha. For Vasubandhu, sukha is sāta, the agreeable, that which does good (sātavād hi sukhamucyate); in addition, satisfaction pre-supposes joy (prīti) (Pruden, 1988, 327). However, vedanā is not an emotion, but it can turn into one when other additional factors are included (De Silva, 2011, p. 256). Such additional factors include not only beliefs and desires but also cultural and social filters. Therefore, cognition plays an important role in the emotions in early Buddhism.

According to the Buddhist theory of cognition, bhavaṅga is a mental state where one does not perceive an external object, being a state of profound sleep (Harvey, 2004, p. 160). It is a passive state where the mind does not respond to an external stimulus and there is no mental processing. This state of bhavaṅga is interrupted when one’s consciousness comes into contact with an object. Consciousness then becomes active, initiating the mental processes and the object is recognized. However, mental states add more attributes to the awareness of an object. Dreyfus and Thompson argue that:

Mental states are not just states of awareness; they also actively engage their objects, qualifying them as pleasant or unpleasant, approaching them with a particular attitude, and so on. Mental factors, which are aspects of the mental state that characterize the object of awareness, account for this engagement. In other words, whereas consciousness makes known the mere presence of the object, mental factors make known the particulars of the content of awareness, defining the characteristics and special conditions of its object. They qualify the apprehension of the object as being pleasant or unpleasant, attentive or distracted, peaceful or agitated, and so forth. (Dreyfus & Thompson, 2007, pp. 97–98)

Nevertheless, in our mental process of perception, the saṅkhāra plays a significant role in perceiving an object. Cognitive awareness is always conditioned by the set of emotions created by earlier kammic activities. ‘Every act of perception includes some form of “interest” because it involves consciousness conditioned by disposition. Without such interest, it is not possible for a human being to deal with the sensory input’ (Kalupahana, 1992, p. 33). For Vasubadhu, emotional afflictions constitute the dynamic core of the saṅkhāra. The Buddhist text makes it clear that disposition is so-called because it processes rūpa (matter), which has already been conditioned into its present state. One can recognize an object due to this past experience. However, two important observations can be made at this point. First, cognition is not wholly objective, and second, cognitive awareness is not an exact mirror of the object, which in consciousness reflects things as they are. In other words, all perceptions are always associated with an emotive element. Dreyfus and Thompson state that the ‘Abhidharma list also includes mental factors we would describe as emotions. Consider the ethically determined factors, starting with the eleven virtuous ones: confidence/faith, self-regarding shame, other-regarding shame, joyful effort, pliability, conscientiousness, detachment, non hatred (loving kindness), wisdom, equanimity, and non-harmfulness (compassion)’ (Dreyfus & Thompson, 2007, p. 100). During the process of revealing an external object, mental states play a significant role. Within the thought process, emotion plays an important role. It is due to emotional states that something can be perceived in many different ways by different people. Therefore, early Buddhists constructed their ‘real’ world around their emotions. This ‘Introduction’ section has prepared the ground for my argument that in early Buddhist philosophy, emotion is considered natural and we perform our actions based on our emotional states. In the ‘Vasubandhu and Emotion’ section, we explore ‘emotion and its cause’, one of the core themes of this article.

It is important to understand how emotion arises. This begs the question: Does one come into this world already endowed with emotional states? Because if one is not born with a whole set of emotions already present, then it must be the result of experience gained from the present lifetime. In this case, an infant baby cannot have emotion. It is necessary to introduce Śāntarakœita’s Buddhist philosophy in order to explicitly understand the notion of emotion; however, his work does not fall within the early Buddhist framework. Despite this, he wrote the chapter ‘Lokāyata—Materialism’ from a realistic point of view, or very close to a realistic point of view. In Buddhism, emotion exists due to habit and repetition, which is learned by one’s experiences (Jha, 1986, p. 931). Śāntarakœita claims that the existence of emotion is not the result of our experiences in our present life because, in order to feel love and aversion, an external object is not required (Jha, 1986, p. 932).

Correspondingly, the early Buddhist texts also argue along the same lines. Let us look at the chain of cognition within an early Buddhist framework. During this period, consciousness was perceived as existing in a state of flux, maintaining continuity between each rebirth without interruption. The concept of mind in early Buddhism creates many difficulties, but when the Buddha talks about the transmigration of consciousness, he is referring to the stream of consciousness that characterizes one’s existence and which is completely conditioned by the kamma of previous lives. The link between two separate lives (caused by rebirth) is a logical problem. If there is no permanent, everlasting Soul then what, exactly, is reborn? In the Visudhimagga, Buddhaghosa explains this ‘transmigration’ of consciousness very clearly.

In this early Buddhist text, consciousness is a stream of becoming (viññāṇasota), maintains continuity between two lives, without interruption and exists in a state of flux (Kalupahana, 1975, p. 120). However, this does not mean that the state of flux or chain of cognition is eternally unchanged. It changes in every moment. It should be mentioned here that if one is using the word ‘change’ within the Buddhist context, then it does not mean that one thing replaces another. According to the tenets of Buddhism, consciousness can be understood through the analogy of a flame. A flame is always sending out a series of flickers, but these cannot be seen by the naked eye, and we perceive it as a single flame. However, in reality, this is a series of flickers that are rapidly changing (Prakash, 2016, p. 314). In Western philosophy, the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus used the metaphor of a river to describe difference within unity. The stream of water remains the same, but there is a continuous change in the currents of the water. Therefore, he claimed that no one could step even once into the same river (Collins, 1999, p. 253).

My main reason for discussing the stream of consciousness is to illustrate that this continuity is always produced by certain causes and conditions and cannot be separated from its constituent elements. No event occurs in isolation without a cause, and nothing is produced by a single cause. In fact, the bringing into being of something requires a number of causal conditions. Hence, all that exists is the result of dependence, conditional relationships and continuity. In early Buddhism, cause and effect were both equally important. The main reason for examining the ‘chain of cognition’ is to show that emotions are not simply the product of present experience. We are born with a set of emotions. In other words, early Buddhism does not discuss the starting point of emotion. In the next section, I will explore early Buddhist theory on the nature of reality. The role of the emotive element in action in Vasubandhu’s philosophy will also be discussed.

Vasubandhu and Emotion

Vasubandhu devoted the fourth chapter of AKB to Karma or action. According to the philosopher, bodily action is mainly directed by volition, which is mental action (Pruden, 1988, 4:1c–d). In AKB, he argues that there are two different kinds of volition. First, there is the initial or preparatory stage called pure volition, from which an action is the result. For instance, I think I must do something—this is pure volition, also called cetanā karman. Here, volition is solely a mental entity. Cetanā is a key term meaning a mental factor associated with all mental states. De Silva argues that ‘it cannot in all contexts be adequately rendered by the English words “will” or “volition”’ (De Silva, 1991, p. 79). For example, depending on whether good or bad thoughts are present, cetanā becomes moral or immoral kammic volition and may even affect the next life. In the Visuddhimagga, Buddhaghosa writes, ‘whatever has the characteristic of forming should be understood, all taken together, as the formation aggregates’ (Ñaµamoli, 2010, XIV, 131). In the Abhidharmakośa, the six classes of volition (cetanās) are called the saṅkhāra. Saṅkhārakhandha conditions the conditioned dhammā (saṁskṛtas), that is to say, it creates and determines the five khandhā of future existence.

Second, there is the manifestation of pure volition, which is called cetayitvā karman (Pruden, 1988, 4:3c). In cetayitvā karman, we move our body or say something. This is the manifestation of one’s mental will. There is an argument in AKB that an action can be categorized as good or bad, dependent on its original intention (Pruden, 1988, 4:9b). To illustrate this, Vasubandhu uses the analogy of milk from a cow, which has drunk water mixed with salutary medicine. The action is only beneficial if the intention is good. A commonly asked question that often arises is: How should one name an action with a resultant agreeable effect? Should it be based on the nature of the action or its result? AKB lists the five ways of experiencing vedanīya or sensation (Pruden, 1988, 4:49).

This means that the nature of an action is significant and an agreeable sensation can arise because of its presence. Again, AKB states that action experienced in the present moment is not the result of the present moment but of a previous action (Pruden, 1988, 4:51b), even if this is mental disturbance. For instance, the person who disturbs the mind of another through a curse, or in other ways, will have his own mind troubled, even deprived of memory, due to the effects of the retribution of these actions (Pruden, 1988, 4:58b). The present condition of the mind always depends on past actions and their effects. As discussed in the ‘Introduction’ section of this article, saṅkhāra skhandha is primarily responsible for the future state of the mind, working as a storehouse for the person. Here, the word storehouse is only used to give the impression that action in the present moment is always being accumulated. The storehouse does not represent any permanent entity. My main intention in using this word is to show that our actions and their consequences have a significant impact on our subsequent life through the chain of cognition. Action yields results in the present moment based on our intention (Pruden, 1988, 4:55a–b). For instance, the act of killing arises from desire and ignorance, stealing arises from desire, illicit sexuality arises from desire and lying and other vocal transgressions arise from ignorance and hatred (Pruden, 1988, 4:68d). According to early Buddhism, the mental state plays a crucial role in human suffering. The selection of an object is completely dependent upon individual temperament. Guenther writes,

Karman and the emotion are the reason for the way of the world, and among them, the emotions are the prime condition. By way of the domination influence of the emotions, Karman is able to project a new existence (punarbhavākṣepasamarth); it cannot be otherwise. (Guenther, 1991, p. 9)

Action undertaken regulates the prospects of future life and existence and action is conditioned by emotion. Vasubandhu has mentioned the notion of anuśaya in the chapter five. The anuśaya can be understood as dispositions that condition current experiences in a tacit way (Smith, 157). Vaibhāṣikas argues that anuśaya is the kleśa or defilement itself and its associated with the mind (Pruden, 1988, 5:1d–2a). However, Sautrāntika has different argument for the anuśaya:

Kāmarāgānuśaya means ‘anuśaya of kāmarāga’. But the anuśaya is neither associated with the mind, nor disassociated from it: for it is not a separate thing (dravya). What is called anuśaya is the kleśa itself in a state of sleep, whereas the paryavasthāna is the kleśa in an awakened state. The sleeping kleśa is the non-manifested kleśa, in the state of being a seed; the awakened kleśa is the manifested kleśa, the kleśa in action. And by ‘seed’ one should understand a certain capacity to produce the kleśa, a power belonging to the person engendered by the previous kleśa. In this same way there exists in a certain person the capacity of producing a consciousness of memory, a capacity engendered by a consciousness of preception; in this same way the capacity to produce rice, which belongs to the plant, the shoot, the stalk, etc., is engendered by the rice seed. (Pruden, 1988, 5:1d–2a)

Vasubandhu see the emotion as kleśa. However, Sāṃkhya philosophy argues that the cognition and feeling belong to the prakṛti (Chakravarti, 1975, p. 181). Larson writes that the ahaṃkāra, which is the part of prakṛti, is a kind of pure self-awareness (Larson, 2014, p. 186). Sāṃkhya philosophy treats the emotion and cognition as part of matter, and the guṇas are source or foundation of the pleasure, pain and dullness that cause this manifest world.

Early Buddhism contends that mental states not only cause particular kinds of behaviour but also other mental states.

The main objective is to bring the conception of anuśaya at this juncture is to argue that for Vasubandhu, disposition or tendencies that condition the present responses to the situations. Therefore, action is also significant in deciding the future of the next life. Buddhist ethics impart that good and bad are always dependent on good and bad deeds. The intention behind an action plays an important role in this. Our personality is constructed by what ‘we’ intentionally do, because ‘our’ sense of self is a perception of habitual ways of thinking, feeling and acting. In other words, mental states determine the action, and action determines future life and emotional states.

The Joy of Wise Person

It is now important to address the question of whether or not emotion can be controlled, or are we simply its slave. As discussed earlier, one comes into this world with a set of emotions and understands the world accordingly. Cognition plays a role in present action, and the fruits of such action produce an effect in the future. This means that if we remain in a cycle of ignorance, we are responsible for our future ignorance. Therefore, the Buddha has given significant importance to purification of the mind. Through the teachings of the Four Noble Truths, he warned us not to take the subjective world literally, explaining that an object that appears as pleasurable in reality is not pleasurable. AKB outlines the solution to this problem, arguing that as ignorance is the root cause of existence, only when a person has achieved a state of detachment will they no longer generate any action that may have repercussions in a future existence (Pruden, 1988, 3:52c). Such a person has obtained tranquillity of thought. If a person is absorbed in the contemplation of compassion, then he has arrived at a state in which he can increase the well-being of an infinite number of beings (Pruden, 1988, 3:56). Buddha has made the point that our attitudes play a significant role in our response to the stimuli to the present and anuśaya are also mentioned as key player. AKB mentions that the extinction of anuśaya is the extinction of the arising of suffering (Pruden, 1988 2:358). Vasubandhu argues that the anuśaya are abandoned through meditation.

In Sāṃkhya philosophy, one who possesses the right knowledge or the principles that make up the manifest world has realized the real nature of this world, and he dwells in abstract or a kind of translucent emptiness (Larson, 2014, p. 186). This is the condition where wise man’s consciousness is no more conscious of anything and gets the absolute freedom. However, it does not mean that individual’s existence will come to an end. The individual continues to exist, which is maintained by his latent impulses from his previous action. This is the highest order of dispassion known as dharmamegha-samādhi in the Yogasūtras of Patañjali (Rukmani, 2007, p. 131). In ordinary way, the knowledge of discrimination of Puruṣa and Prakṛti gives rise to pure wisdom. Puruṣa becomes aware that Prakṛti is not able to bind him; he beholds her with indifference and Prakṛti becomes disinterested to him. Prakṛti cease to the entire world of ostensibly anymore. ‘Prakṛti is like a bashful maiden; whenever she can understand that she has been seen by the Puruœa what happens is that she ceases to expose herself anymore to his sight. Though their union does not break up’ (Chakravarti, 1975, p. 324). For Sāṃkhya philosophy, wise man is not in control of the emotions.

This means that the saint, or Arhat, can control their emotions and, thus, is freed from future defilements. One of the qualities of the Arhat is that they will not be regarded with lust, hatred, pride, etc. by anyone else (Pruden, 1988, 7:35c). The main aim of enlightenment is to achieve a purified mind and let go of the emotions, which are the cause of sorrow. Therefore, it can be appreciated that Vasubandhu regarded emotion as the driving force of life. AKB gives a detailed account of the solution to this and shows how a person can avoid future defilements. Controlling the emotions is significant in achieving this and can be done by seeing the truth or right view. The happiness of the Arhat is different from the happiness of a person who has not learned how to control their emotions.

Conclusion

To sum up, the emotions are at the root of the way in which the world appears to an individual. Thus, action is the result of mental states. In Buddhism, letting go of power and emotion can lead to liberation. We are in a constant cycle of birth, death and rebirth because we are enslaved to our emotions. This is why the Buddha taught the Four Noble Truths. Concerning the second Noble Truth, which says there is a clear cause to suffering, he outlined the 12 causal links. In this never-ending cycle, we see that ignorance plays a key role. Because of ignorance, we act under the influence of emotion. Therefore, emotion, for the early Buddhist texts, is a natural state and plays an important role in action.

The happiness of an ordinary person is very different from the happiness of a wise person. A wise person can control their emotions. In other words, a wise man does not make a decision or perform an action under the influence of emotion. Here, an important question is whether a wise person can be moved by emotion or not. In other words, can he perform an action rationally? The word ‘rationality’ signifies the act of reasoning or the use of reason. Reason is one of the cognitive faculties that helps us to take decisions, make judgements, justify beliefs, etc. In all these cases, reason is used as a means to reach an end. Rationality can be used to reach desired end or for the rationalization of that end. In both cases, the person is showing rationality on an individual level because, for any decision, we have to think about the particular problem. In any case, one has to control one’s emotions in order to be able to think rationally. Take the example of a person with an angry mental state who is trying to make a decision. If their emotion is not under control, their decision will be driven by that particular emotion and cannot be called a rational decision. Therefore, a wise person can control their emotions and make rational decisions.

In other words, a wise person can control one type of emotion and cultivate another type. Thus, a wise person cannot be devoid of emotions. This is why the Buddha talks about the cultivation of social emotions or Brahmviharas, the Stations of Brahma, namely, Love or Friendliness (Maitri), Compassion (Karuna), Sympathetic Joy (Mudita) and Equanimity or Impartiality (Upeksha or Upekkha).