Fragility of State in Central African Republic: An Econometric Approach to Efficiency Understanding

Abstract

A fragile state contributes to the underdevelopment of the nation and its consequences can be very devastating on the state’s cohesion, characterized by a high level of corruption which led the country to an incessant political instability and the continuous presence of foreign troops.¹ This article used the vector autoregresssion (VAR) model covering the period of 2005–2015 to examine the impact of control of corruption on the fragility of the state in the Central African Republic (CAR). The results show that control of corruption is significant and has a negative impact on the fragility of the state in the short run. The impulse response shows a negative impact of control of corruption in the short run but a positive impact in the long run on the fragility of the state. The policy implications of this fragility are that the CAR must pursue better governance as well as in the investment choices. Unless the CAR leaders and citizens recognize their own fragility, things can only get worse.

Keywords

State fragility control of corruption VAR policies the Central African Republic

Introduction

The idea of state fragility which was formerly initiated by political scientists has recently been debated only on economic development. This thought has been related to several combinations of dysfunctions. The notion of a fragile state emerged in the early 1990s. It designates a state’s inability to ensure its core objective of development, security guaranteeing and peacekeeping within its borders. Such fragility has become a new international concern as its aggravating factors can likely affect international security. A fragile government can be overthrown by power-hungry politicians whose motivations are to seize power, thus establishing a totalitarian or autocratic regime which seeks to isolate the country from the international community.

The fragility is not limited to the situations of conflict but the consequences after the conflicts. Based on a report made by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2014, 51 fragile states were recognized with a population of nearly 1.4 billion. Many of them are extremely fragile; their governments cannot fully assume their tasks and have lost their legitimacy. The loss of their legitimacy brings forth a lot of adverse impacts such as: outbreaks of violence, lower treaties and guarantees, slow growth, low gross domestic product, political instability, low yield in agriculture hence resulting into hunger, undernourishment and malnutrition, high illiteracy rate, an inability to provide basic services and meet vital needs, unstable and weak governance, a persistent condition of extreme poverty, lack of territorial control and high propensity to conflict and civil war. That reflects how far the Central African Republic (CAR) is underdeveloped.

The new OECD report (2015) takes this direction to formulate a general understanding of fragility that goes beyond fragile and conflict-affected states with the 16 sustainable development goals (SDGs) precisely aiming to lessen violence of all forms. All countries, not only those usually considered fragile, will be anticipated to meet targets for this goal. The report grants a new, multidimensional observing framework which uses five magnitudes of fragility based on a post-2015 framework: violence, justice, institutions, economic foundations and resilience. The definition is quite different from Canada’s Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) project which states that:

[F]ragile states ranges beyond service entitlements to include the states that lack the functional authority to deliver basic security inside their borders, the institutional capacity to offer basic social needs for their populations, and/or the political legitimacy to effectively signify their citizens at home or abroad. (Canada’s Country Indicators for Foreign Policy [CIFP], 2006)

As a landlocked country, the CAR covers an area of 623,000 square kilometres with a population of 4.5 million. Bordered in the south by the Republic of Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo, to the west by Cameroon, to the east by Sudan and finally to the north by Chad, the country is in the middle of Africa. The CAR is known for being conspicuous by the fragility of the state. This country is ranked as the third most fragile state in the world, after Sudan and Somalia [the Fund for Peace (FFP)].² The CAR is very fragile due to decades of corruption resulting in poor governance. A seemingly endless series of coups d’états and civil wars have negatively affected the economic development of African countries in terms of the social and economic growth perspective.

Generally, the failure of the state is due to armed violence which makes the government susceptible of being overthrown. After the CAR gained independence in 1960, it became a theatre of changing powers, thus breeding political instability. Corrupt governors and the repression of the Central African people have resulted in the nation’s decreasing patriotism. Except for the democratic election between Kolingba and Ange-Félix Patassé, in 1993–1994, and the election of Faustin Archange Touadéra in 2016,³ coups and mutinies have undermined political life and compromised the economic development of the country.

This article investigates the main cause of the CAR being a fragile state and shows which policies can be integrated in the government to fight against the fragility, as well as poverty and underdevelopment. Fragility CAR not only reinforces the negative development but also the demise of the rule of law. Identified as the main cause of state fragility, corruption will be an object of our investigation by using control of corruption as a policy to fight against state fragility covering the period 2005–2015.

This article is organized as follows: the introduction in the first section, the review of the relevant literatures on the determinant of the fragility of states in the second section, objectives of the study in the third section and rationale behind the study in the fourth section. Causes and effects of state fragility in the CAR are discussed in the fifth section. The sixth section takes an econometric approach of the fragility of the state in the CAR. Methodology, data source and sample frame are contained in the seventh section. The empirical model occupies the eighth section, results and discussions are presented in the ninth section and the conclusion in the tenth section. The eleventh section contains managerial implications, while the twelfth section provides the limitations of the study.

Review of Literature

Nabamita and Sanjukta (2016) examined the relationship between state and transparency by employing a relatively new database of transparency to show that transparency acts as an important determinant of state fragility; a system of generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators found that a higher level of transparency reduces state fragility. Moreover, free flow of information assists in restoring trust in the government, decreasing state fragility and increasing citizen participation in the political arena.

Posso and Regan-Beasley (2015) in their examination of drivers of state fragility conduct an analysis on both binary measures of fragility and the actual Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) scores. They employed an array of estimation techniques. Their study found that democracy, income levels, economic growth, education levels, natural resource rent and the size of the country are important determinants of state fragility. Shields and Paulson (2015) used cross-national data to do a longitudinal analysis of armed conflict, fragility and school enrolment in primary and secondary schooling which employed multilevel modelling techniques. Their study found that growth in enrolment is significantly lower in conflict-affected countries but the effect depends on the countries’ overall enrolment level.

Gisselquist (2015) explored varieties of fragilities and implications for aid. They found that varieties of fragilities are identified in dimensions, degree and duration. Grävingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum (2015) made the case for a multidimensional empire typology of state fragility in their methodological paper. Unlike the existing indices of state fragility, it suggests a route towards operationalization. The main contribution is an emphasis on preserving conceptual multidimensionality in the operationalization of the concepts, hence increasing content validity.

Carment, Joe, Yiagadeesen and Shaw (2015) studied the theory of fragile state transition in Yemen, Bangladesh and Laos. They used CIFP to evaluate fragile states’ transitions. Their findings identify three categories of countries: those in a fragility trap, those which exist in fragility and countries fluctuating between fragility and stability. Arandel, Brinkerhoff and Bell (2015) found that improving state-citizen relations is one of the pathways out of fragility for the case of Guinea. They explore a donor-funded project that was combined with improvements in service delivery. Their findings show that transparency and accountability lead to better services, increased trust and a change of attitudes. Siambabala and Stuart (2015) examined states’ structure which is ‘often seen as willing to sacrifice the well-being of the many for the benefit of a few’. They concluded that a sustainable solution lies in addressing the root causes of unemployment, inequality and poverty, ‘Bridging the concepts of resilience, fragility and stabilization’, disaster prevention and management. Their finding shows that state fragility results from the collapse of the social contract between the state and its citizens. Moreover, they argue that stabilization and resilience are anticipated constructs in decreasing fragility, resulting in a social transformative ability where agency is implanted for societies to exercise some sort of power to raise transformation.

Argitis and Nikolaidi (2014) examined financial fragility and the crisis of the Greek government sector. They argue that the implementation of the fiscal and wage austerity in an economy that lacks structure competitiveness produces recession and unemployment which have adverse effects on financial fragility. Tonwe and Eke (2013) based their research in Nigeria as they study state fragility and violent uprisings. They make their case from the emergence of the Islamic sect, Boko Haram, and its transformation into a terrorist organization. They use historicism to demonstrate that for the case of Nigeria the responsibility for the deepening insecurity resides in the states’ structure which is often seen as willing to sacrifice the well-being of the many for the benefit of a few. State fragility renders being incapable of effective service delivery resulting in massive unemployment and extreme poverty. They conclude that a sustainable solution lies in addressing the root causes of unemployment, inequality and poverty.

Zürcher (2012) examined conflict, state fragility and aid effectiveness in Afghanistan. He finds that, first, in fragile states, the interest of donor-peacebuilders and recipient governments is rarely aligned. Second, the lack of basic security is another impediment. He also finds that aid is more likely to do harm in fragile states than in countries with a stable government. Aid also often fuels patronage and corruption.

Davies (2011) in his paper on learning for state-building capacity development, education and fragility examines capacity development in fragile contexts. They identified that capacity development in education can be achieved if the state takes this focus on the analysis of state fragility, coherent, survival intention power in terms of those who have themselves both the capacity and will to affect change and indicators for a successful government. Baranyi and Salahub (2011) investigated on police reform and democratic development in lower-profile states. They find that prospects for SSR and peace building are much better in low-profile societies that are in the margin of war on terror compared to societies which are at the centre of the conflict. Kedir (2011) examined this in the paper titled ‘Donor coordination in a fragile state of Africa: capacity building for peace and poverty reduction’. He argues that donors should match their respective African policy reports and give significance to infrastructure instead of concentrating entirely on social agendas. Moreover, donors should not provide diversified signals to recipients and need to be elastic in their operational techniques as well as to help fragile states to avoid inflation and curb fungible focus on re-integration and discourage ex-combatants.

Kirk (2007) in his study entitled ‘Education and Fragile States’ argues that education should be in the centre of fragile state discussion. He says that gender equality and state fragility are inherently connected. Minimum standards for education in emergencies; chronic crisis; and early reconstructions are important factors in enhancing the quantity and quality of education. Ikpe (2007) reviewed the discourse on state fragility and examined the basis for definition. He used a model which considers both middle-income and low-income countries. He finds that the nature and extent of state fragility is a function of the relationship between state capacity and resilience. Osaghae (2007) examined competing analyses on post-colonial African states and found that the popular characteristics of weak institutions, poverty, social inequalities, civil strife, corruption, armed conflicts and civil wars have a historical background and are not original conditions. They argued that it is not the responsibility of benevolent donors or the international community to determine when the state is no longer to be fragile, rather than the concerned citizens of the country.

Objectives

This article empirically examines the impact of control of corruption on the fragility of the state and shows which policies can be integrated in the government to fight against fragility in the CAR.

Rationale of the Study

This article is first in kind which tries to examine empirically the impact of control of corruption on state fragility in the CAR. This article is very important for policymakers in the CAR as well the rest of the African fragile states which struggle for economic development.

Establishing Causes and Effects of State Fragility in the CAR

The CAR fragility of state comes from a high level of corruption resulting in political instability which can be identified as the main cause of state fragility in the country. Its consequences are very dramatic for economic and human development. On the one hand, the lack of effective government control and the inability to exercise basic state functions provide a fertile ground for disorder, crime and ultimately armed conflict. On the other hand, internal violence and armed conflict are causes of instability and potential spurs of state failure. Once this downward spiral is set in motion, the likelihood of a protracted crisis increases immensely. Besides the high level of corruption, there is poor governance which was caused by incessant political instability triggered by coups and dictatorships. Poor governance and predation have ruined the economy and impoverished the country.

Referring to the Global security website (Global Security, 2015), governance in the CAR was tremendously weak due to several political disorders dating back to the 1980s till now due to corruption and poor financial management, which make the CAR extremely underfunded and depend heavily on donor support.

After the attainment of independence in 13 August 1960, David Dacko was elected the President of the Republic. Because of a coup which occurred on the night of 31 December 1965, he was expelled by Lieutenant Colonel Jean Bédel Bokassa.⁴ After the constitution was amended, the country became an empire. Protected by French parachutists, David Dacko overthrew the imperial regime and announced the return of the Republic. The collapse of Bokassa’s dictatorship and the election in 15 March 1981 brought David Dacko back into power.⁵ Coups d’état are permanent, and France also bears its share of responsibility. This electoral process generated a political crisis and resulted in a bloodbath (Voyemakoa, 1983). General André Kolingba, Chief of the army, conducted another coup on 1 September 1981. On 22 August 1993, the country saw Ange Félix Patasse come into power. His former Chief of Staff, General François Bozizé, overthrew him in 15 March 2003 through a rebellion. With the repeal of the defence treaties, 1960 France could not intervene via its military to save its regime.⁶ These numerous successful and unsuccessful attempts to overthrow the government have crippled the nation.

The fragility of the state at that time led to the establishment of a cartel of rebel movements in the north which led to the creation of the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR),⁷ a catalyst in the formation of the alliance called Seleka⁸ in the national language (Sango). The exactions of the former members of Seleka generated a dramatic inter-confessional confrontation in Bangui and in the west. Instability endures because of the presence of multiple insurgent groups, bands of highway robbers throughout the north, a deeply weak and frequently ineffective military and restricted state presence outside of Bangui. The atrocities of Seleka led to the creation of anti-Balaka.⁹ The assimilation of anti-Balaka to the Christian militia was grossly murderous and strongly contributed to interreligious clashes that developed rapidly after the beginning of the operation of Sangaris (name given to a military operation of the French army in the CAR on 5 December 2013).

Rebel groups were simply one indication of the illness of the high level of corruption, not the root cause of uncertainty. The international community and the government of the CAR had involved much importance to disarmament, demobilization and re-integration (DDR) as the solution to the CAR’s long consecutive conflict. This process, encouraged by the United Nations (UN), was affected by problems such as the slow roll out of the programme, mishandling of funds by the government and difficulty in raising funds from the international community. Despite an agreement being reached in April 2009 that produced a list of rebels to be disarmed and the acceptance by the CAR to use money approved by the Economic Community of the Central African States for DDR for its expressed determination, observers placed too much confidence in the process as a resolution to the CAR’s ills. Until the CAR government had the means and, more significantly, the will to fill the vacuum left behind by disarmed groups, both on a security and on an economic front, the determination was unlikely to achieve its goals. Beyond that was the predominant problem that the CAR was a failed state—there was simply no economy into which former combatants can be reintegrated.

The CAR is one of the poorest countries in the world; it is ranked 180 out of nearly 190 countries by United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index. Its incessant political instability has a tremendous impact on an already weak economy and low human development index. The country continues to experience conflicts and underdevelopment which lead citizens to live hand to mouth. Political instability has limited the country’s attractiveness resulting in a poor business climate, lack of infrastructure, high mortality rate, high unemployment, violations of human rights, a shortage of skilled labour force as well as brain drain. Violence against women, the torture of civilians and other human rights violations continue. Exiled people cannot defend themselves from harm, their health is in misery, they have no water, food or shelter and their daily reality is in danger and hardship. Health rate of the CAR citizens is currently among the lowest in the sub-Saharan region and the state investment in these sectors is very limited. Because of political instability, a large portion of the population has problems accessing health care infrastructures. The political instability in the CAR also has resulted in violence and abuses of innocent people, as well as massive displacement. Due the conflict between Seleka and Balaka, half of the country’s population needs assistance; among them are 554,800 internally displaced people (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2014). Moreover, tens of thousands of people, mostly Muslims, have absconded in fear of their lives to neighbouring countries due to the conflict between Seleka and Balaka.

Economic growth has declined due to political instability prevailing in the country and the lack of economic activities. According to the African Economic Outlook (2015) the real GDP rate gradually improved in 2014 at 1 per cent compared from the targeted initial rate at 1.5 per cent. However, the CAR is still facing some hardships in the economy due to a fall in public sector activities at 8.5 per cent; this is lower than the case in 2013, where it was recorded at −46.5 per cent. Over the period of 2004–2010, real per capita GDP growth averaged just 0.3 per cent annually, considerably lower than in other fragile countries in sub-Saharan Africa. From 2009 to 2010, the exports in goods increased from 120 to 210 million USD against 28–30 in the exportation of services (World Trade Organization Report, 2010) and the slow growth of foreign direct investment (Pacific, 2017).

Corruption resulting in the lack of enough military funds has been an obstacle to effective border controls which make the country a victim of internal insecurity, political instability and illegal immigration into the CAR by Chadians and Sudanese. The high prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases and especially the spread of AIDS is also a major challenge. In fact, the HIV prevalence rate is estimated at 13.8 per cent among people aged 14–44 living in Bangui, 8 per cent in other cities and 4 per cent in rural areas (United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund, 2012).

Under the influence of unemployment of up to 60 per cent of the active population, a significant proportion sees integration by force in an informal economy of exchanges and commissions. Bringing up a family in these conditions is an arduous task, requiring priority access to food and potable water. Fragile infrastructure and support to production strongly limit yields much lower than those neighbouring countries: 3 tons/ha for cassava against 14 tons/ha in Cameroon, more than 30 per cent of Central African households could not adequately cover their food needs (OCED and FAOSTAT, 2008).

In terms of resource, the mining sector accounted for a total of 7 per cent of GDP in 2007 (United States Agency for International Development, 2010), and industry tax revenues were 9 per cent and 11 per cent of total tax revenues of the state in 2009 and 2010, respectively (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 2012).

This decline is the result of insecurity and its implications for the financing of the sector; the interference of the authorities in the production and marketing of diamonds; and massive fraud (facilitated by the difficulty of controlling the country’s borders). Diamonds are the main products of government revenue (whose production is almost entirely interrupted in 2013) because of an embargo related to Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) established in 2013, to prevent conflict diamonds from entering the mainstream rough diamond market. Between 2005 and 2011, exports of the country decreased slightly, to stand at 103.9 million US dollars. The trade balance was in deficit totalizing an amount of 110.8 million US dollars (Annex 4: République Centrafricaine).

The country’s transportation system is very limited, both domestically and internationally. The country has only one international airport, located in Bangui, the capital city, which is in poor condition. The CAR has no railway infrastructure despite being a landlocked country. In the southwest regions, most of the roads have deteriorated. Regarding the southeast and north regions, the quality is either fair or poor. Generally, the road network in the country is quite bad, excluding the strategic-condition roads. Additionally, only 2 per cent of the unpaved network is either in a good or fair condition. The country depends completely on regional roads such as Douala-Bangui and Pointe Noire-Brazzaville-Bangui to assume the conveyance of goods as well as public transportation. Paved roads are below the level observed in other fragile states (Dominguez & Foster, 2011).

Electricity production is a largely used hydropower source. Thermal generators are seldom used because of the high cost of fuel, as well as the fragile performance of the principal energy company of the CAR (ENERCA) which is in charge.¹⁰ Telecommunications infrastructure is inefficient to ensure the coverage of the country. To summarize, the cause of the CAR’s state fragility is corruption, which has a great influence on the political, economic and social stability of the country. Most of the governments were characterized by corruption, selfishness dictatorship, arbitrariness, violations of human rights as well as the lack of clear political vision and will.

DP = demographic pressure; REF = refugees and internationally displaced persons (IDPs); HF = human rights; GG = group grievance; UED = uneven development; ECO = poverty and economic decline; SL = the legitimacy of the state; PSs = public services; HR = human rights; SEC = security apparatus; FE = fractionalized elites; EXT = external interventions. The Fragile States Index, developed by the FFP, is a critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all states experience but also in identifying when those pressures are pushing a state towards the brink of failure. As shown in Table 1, the CAR is ranked third out of eight countries with very high alerts in the world preceded by Somalia and South Sudan. This statistic shows how serious fragility is in the country.

Table 1.

Trend between the CAR Fragile State Index and the Countries Identified with Very High Alert

	Fragile State Index 2016	Total	DP	REF	HF	GG	UED	ECO	SL	PS	HR	SEC	FE	EXT
1	Somalia	114.0	9.7	9.7	9.4	9.5	9.3	9.0	9.5	9.0	9.7	9.7	10.0	9.5
2	South Sudan	113.8	9.9	10.0	9.9	6.6	9.0	9.3	9.7	10.0	9.7	10.0	9.7	10.0
3	CAR	112.1	8.7	10.0	9.3	7.2	9.9	8.6	9.8	10.0	9.9	9.2	10.0	9.5
4	Sudan	111.5	9.0	10.0	9.8	9.1	7.6	8.7	9.8	9.1	9.3	9.2	10.0	9.9
5	Yemen	111.5	9.5	9.6	9.5	7.5	8.4	9.4	9.4	9.3	9.4	10.0	9.5	10.0
6	Syria	110.8	8.4	10.0	10.0	8.6	7.4	7.8	10.0	8.9	9.8	10.0	9.9	10.0
7	Chad	110.1	9.9	9.8	8.5	8.9	9.3	8.0	9.2	9.8	9.3	9.1	9.8	8.5
8	Congo (D.R)	110.0	9.1	9.7	9.7	6.8	8.9	8.1	9.3	9.7	10.0	9.2	9.8	9.7

Source: Author’s construction based on FPP. Retrieved from http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/

Figure 1.

Source: Author’s construction from Microsoft excel based on World Bank and the fragility of state index data.

Figure 2.

Source: Author’s construction from Microsoft excel based on World Bank and the fragility of state index data.

Figure 1 shows the evolution of the state index in the CAR. We can remark that the index of the fragility of the state in the country increases gradually each year. The highest value can be observed in 2015 (111.9) and the lowest value in 2005 (93.7).

Figure 2 shows the trend between the evolution of the fragility of the state index and the control of corruption in the CAR. It can be observed that the control of corruption is almost near zero and the fragility of the state has evolved over time.

Methodology

This article uses secondary time series data covering the period from 2005 to 2015. Control of corruption data are collected from worldwide governance indicators available at: www.govindicators.org. The index of the fragility of the state is collected from the FFP website available at: http://global.fundforpeace.org.

To examine the impact of control of corruption in the CAR on fragility, we run the preliminary times series unit root test by using the Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test of Dickey and Fuller (1981) as well the PP test of Phillips and Perron (1988) to see if our variables are stationary or not. We also employed Johansen co-integration technique to examine whether the variables in our model have a long-run relationship or not based on the unrestricted vector autoregression (VAR) model followed with the selection of lag length of the VAR. The results of both trace and maximum Eigenvalue of Johansen co-integration are presented. Our analysis used VAR. In addition to that the stability through the cumulative sum (CUSUM) diagnostic test is analysed to evaluate our model.

Empirical Model

Referring to the history of the CAR and possible causes highlighted of state fragility in the fifth section, we can notice that there is an existence of many factors such as poor governance, political instability, external interference, macro-economic instability, natural resource mismanagement, weak infrastructure, human rights abuses and refugee’s pressures which affect the state fragility of the country.

For the case of our analysis, an accent has been put on corruption due to inadequacy of required data. The study was limited to those variables and factors for which adequate data could be sought. We are not going to take into account the political instability in our model because we assumed that political instability is the result of poor governance due to corruption as some sub-Saharan African countries are politically more stable but still fragile (Dumitru & Hayat, 2015), and also conflicts persisted in the country due to the mismanagement of funds allocated and deflections of funds allocated to the demobilization of armed troops in the CAR.

Even some previous studies focused on political instability as main root of fragility of state (Geiss, 2009) who investigated on armed violence in fragile states: Low-intensity conflicts, spillover conflicts and sporadic law enforcement operations by third parties found that: The gradual process of the state’s failure is mostly accompanied by armed violence. Apart from occasional outbreaks, armed forces’ violence in fragile states tends to smoulder with a relatively low intensity often over an extended period. We hypothesize that the probability of the fragility of the state decreases with a high level of control of corruption in the CAR. Control of corruption is integrated in our model to see how it affects the fragility of the state. In addition to that, the intention of this article is to investigate if the variable included in our model can impact positively the fragility of the state. Based on the aforementioned statement, we hypothesize the following mathematical specification of the model where ^εt represents variables outside the model.

F R A G t = f (C C t) ε t

(1)

The following model is employed for a better understanding of the impact of control of corruption on state fragility:

F R A G t = α 0 + α 1 C C t + ε t

(2)

where

FRAG = Fragility of state, which is the total of: DP + REF + HF + GG + UED + ECO + SL + PS + HR + SEC + FE + EXT

CC = Control of corruption which is measured by the index of the corruption estimate rating from −2.5 to 2.5

α = Error term

α = coefficient

According to Rothstein, 2007, corruption is a phenomenon of crucial importance that can be compared to an epidemic because it is spreading rapidly in the country’s political–economic system. Corruption has become a major global critical issue that affects most of the countries in executing their economic development. This in turn affects the economic growth of the international community at large. Where corruption exists, society can be affected at large in such a way that it is difficult to curb it. It incapacitates the legal and political systems that should be employed for community good by weakening the rule of law and quieting the voice of the persons. African countries have long been perceived to be very corrupt but also politically unstable. In regard to this problem, many African countries have made control of corruption one of their priorities.

Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as the ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests (World Bank Website, 2016) For the fight against corruption, it is very important to take some strong measures in forms of reforms for sustainable development. Kodila-Tedika and Asongo (2013) empirically confirmed that corruption has a major role in this descent into problems. It is a vicious circle: the more corruption weakens African states, once weak, corruption grows more. It is very important for Central African states to fight against corruption; otherwise, the fragility of the state which has already negatively affected the country will shoot down the country. Generally, control of corruption is perceived to have a positive effect. The objective of this model is to check if the CAR government decides to make control of corruption as a priority in their plan; can it impact positively and significantly the fragility of state? As we know, control of corruption leads to the better management of public budget with results such as good services to the population, the reduction of inequalities, the encouragement of investors and developing partners, DDR goals which are very crucial for sustainable economic growth.

Analysis

Tables 2 and 3 show the results of ADF and PP unit root test. All our variables become stationary at either 1 per cent or 5 per cent significance levels at the first difference and we reject the null hypothesis of the existence of the unit root test. In the case of the ADF test, the index of fragility becomes stationary at the second difference. However, the control of corruption estimate and the fragility of state both become stationary at the second difference.

After the unit root test, the next step is to check the existence of the long-run relationship between the fragility state index and the control of corruption. Table 4 shows the results of the co-integration test, estimated Eigenvalue, trace statistics, the critical value and the probability. The trace statistics indicate an inexistence of co-integration among our variables which implies that our variables are not co-integrated or not moving together. Table 5 shows the results for the unrestricted co-integration rank test (maximum Eigenvalue) with zero co-integration. Both tests, trace statistics and Max-Eigen statistics, do not confirm an existence of the long-run relationship between our variables.

Before running the VAR model, it is crucial to conduct the Granger causality test statistics to check the direction of causality between dependent variables and independent variables in our model by knowing that if the P-value < 5 per cent, we can reject the null hypothesis.

According to the statistics contained in Table 6 there is a unidirectional causality running from control of corruption to fragility of the state. In another term, the control of corruption Granger causes the fragility of the state at level of 10 per cent. This means that there is an existence from short-run causality running from control of corruption to fragility of the state in the CAR. However, fragility of state does not Granger control of corruption. To strengthen the direction of the relation between these variables in the model, the impulse response test is performed. In addition to that, short run estimated the relationship between our variables and FRAG by using the OLS method.

Table 2.

Unit Root Test by Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF)

Variables	At level		First difference		Included
Variables	t. stat	Prob	t. stat	Prob.*	Included
FRAG [2]	−1.594481	0.4490	−3.444248	0.0476**	Trend and Intercept
CC	−1.005243	0.7009	−2.805000	0.0953*	Trend and intercept

Source: Prepared by the author, based on Eview 8.

Notes: ***, ** and * indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis of the unit root test at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance.

Table 3.

Unit Root Test by Phillips Perron (PP)

Variables	At level		First difference		Included
Variables	t. stat	Prob	t. stat	Prob.*	Included
FRAG [2]	2.606036	0.9932	−1.797485	0.0708*	At none
CC [2]	−1.826474	0.3486	−2.823424	0.0112**	At none

Source: Prepared by the author, based on Eview 8.

Notes: ***, ** and * indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root test at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance.

Table 4.

Johansen Test for Unrestricted Co-integration Rank Test (Trace)

No. of CE(s)	Eigenvalues	Trace Statistics	0.05 Critical Value	Prob. **
None	0.786720	14.36443	15.49471	0.0735*
At most 1	0.049625	0.458087	3.841466	0.4985

Source: Prepared by the authors, based on Eview 8.

Notes: Trace test indicates no co-integration at the 0.05 level and * denotes the rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level.

Table 5.

Johansen Maximum Eigenvalues for Co-integration

No. of CE(s)	Eigenvalue	Trace Statistic	0.05 Critical Value	Prob**
None *	0.786720	13.90634	14.26460	0.0569**
At most 1 *	0.049625	0.458087	3.841466	0.4985

Source: Prepared by the author, based on Eview 8.

Note: Maximum Eigenvalue test indicates no co-integrating equation(s) at the 0.05 level.

Table 6.

Granger Causality

	F-Statistics	P-value.
CC does not Granger Cause FRAG	4.16395	0.0806*
FRAG does not Granger Cause CC	2.00821	0.1994

Source: Prepared by the author, based on Eview 8.

Notes: ** and *** denote the rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 and 0.10 levels.

Table 7.

Estimated Results for the Short Run

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
CC	−102.6409	4.351034	−23.59001	0.0000***

Source: Prepared by the author, based on Eview 8.

Notes: ** and *** denote the rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 and 0.10 levels.

Table 8.

Diagnostic Test

Diagnostic	Statistic	Conclusion
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey	F-statistic = 0.228 P-value = 0.644	There is no heteroscedasticity
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test	F-statistic = 3.335383 P-value = 0.1011	No serial correlation
Normality Test	Jarque–Bera Test = 0.888 P-value = 0.641	Residual are normally distributed

Source: Prepared by the author, based on Eview 8.

Table 7 showed that control of corruption is statistically significant at the level of 1 per cent and has a negative relationship with the fragility of the state; this means that control of corruption is still not effective to impact positively the fragility of the state in the CAR. Figure 3 presents the results obtained from impulse responses from control of corruption to fragility of the state as well from fragility of the state to control of corruption. In our analysis, [0–10] is considered as a short-run period and [10–20] as a long-run period. For the impulse response of control of corruption to the fragility of the state, Figure 3 shows that in the short-run period the impulse response is constantly negative before starting to improve positively at the 14th year. The fragility of the state’s impulse is constantly positive in the short run before it started to decrease slowly in the long run. Compared to Granger causality test statistics, the result is consistent, which stresses that control of corruption has a positive impact on the fragility of the state.

Figure 3.

Source: Prepared by the author, based on Eview 8.

Figure 4.

Source: Prepared by the author, based on Eview 8.

Figure 5.

Source: Prepared by the author, based on Eview 8.

To ascertain the goodness of the model, the diagnostic test and stability test were conducted. Diagnostic test (Table 8) shows that our model has passed all three tests such as serial correlation, heteroscedasticity associated with the model and normality of errors (Figure 4). For the stability test, CUSUM is presented in Figure 5. The results of the stability test show that our model is stable since no root lies outside the range of the conditions. The recursive residual test satisfies the stability test at a 5 per cent significance level.

Conclusion

The VAR is employed to examine the relationship between the fragility of state index and the control of corruption covering the period 2005–2015. The results show that the control of corruption is significant at 1 per cent and has a negative relationship with the fragility index in the short run. The impulse response of control of corruption to the fragility state shows that in the short run the impulse response is constantly negative before starting to improve positively at the 14th year. The fragility of the state impulse is constantly positive in the short run before it starts to decrease slowly in the long run.

Much effort should be done to fight against corruption to impact positively the fragility of the state. If corruption is not controlled, greater will be its impact on political instability. The control of corruption will affect the management of public administration as the government budget. It will help the country reduce its excessive dependence on the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Borrowing from the IMF and other financial international organizations will be effective because it will be directed to real economic sectors and will be sufficient to ensure the security and stability of the financial market. Overall, the study finds that control of corruption has a significant impact on the fragility of the state. Moreover, emphasizing an understanding of the fragility of the state is a hopeful sign. After all, before the CAR becomes more and more fragile, something should be done to avoid the worst situation in the upcoming years.

Managerial Implications

Any country, region or social organization cannot develop if it is badly managed and has an unsafe business climate. It is crucial for the country to fight against corruption for the sustainable development of human capital as well the economic development.

The fragility of the state in the CAR is becoming worse. It is important for the country to implement new policies to fight against corruption because it is this threat that apparently has led to the fragility of the state. To fight against fragility through control of corruption will lead the CAR to have a stable political environment which will improve the national security of citizens, and the CAR will also be able to provide auspicious conditions both internal and external for security, thus protecting true national interests. By fighting against corruption, the country will be fighting the main cause of the fragility of the state and military which can lead its to sustainable development to sustainable development. The control of corruption will help the CAR create more infrastructures, improve business climate as well increase the attractiveness of the country. The creation of schools will affect the thinking way of the population and permit to educate and sensitize the young generation on the importance of the preservation of national identity to avoid inter-confessional and civil wars in another political instability.

The CAR witnessed a big jump back. Though ranked 184 out of 187 in terms of the human development index, a large size of the population lives below the poverty line. The control of corruption will permit the government to have enough funds to implement policies which will lead the CAR to sustainable development as well economic security. A country with a good and strong economy leads to sovereignty, human security, peaceful living, ensures the basic needs of citizens and a sustainable and efficient economy with a sufficient source of government revenue. The new insight on the causes of the fragility of the state is based on institutional quality (Bertocchi & Guerzoni, 2010), but if the CAR does not have enough funds to invest in institutions, it will be difficult for it to run out of fragility. Control of corruption will permit the improvement of the quality of institutions in the CAR because the government exists only through its administration and institutions. However, this is not the case of the CAR where institutions and administrations are virtual. The fight against corruption will help the CAR fight against the fragility of the state which makes the CAR politically stable and leads to positive economic growth (Ramadhan, Jian, Henry, & Pacific, 2016).

Strengthening of the government’s anti-corruption agency will impact the political environment, the quality of institutions and guarantee sustainable national sovereignty and peace keeping. If the CAR continues to face the fragility of the state in the coming years, the country might turn to a terrorist’s base, a place for drug trafficking, human trafficking as well a threat for most neighbouring countries with a substantial increase of refugees. This country can avoid this turning point, only when the CAR political leaders and the population are aware of the fragility of the state, the real danger that may result in the long run, and try to resolve their differences to live in peace so as to maintain solidarity which can lead the country to sustainable development.

Limitations of the Study

Besides the model which tries to identify control of corruption as a possible solution to state fragility, there are a lot of variables out of our control, especially colonial history. We recommend further studies to be done to explore the impact of French colonial history on the CAR’s state fragility as well as the relationship between control of corruption and political instability in the CAR.

Footnotes

Acknowledgement

The authors are grateful to the anonymous referees for their extremely useful suggestions to improve the quality of the article. Usual disclaimers apply.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Notes

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